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This thesis investigates how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tactically managed 
and defused major crises between 2002 and 2008 which put its credibility and legitimacy 
to the test. Contrary to conventional wisdom that major crises are likely to challenge and 
threaten regime stability in authoritarian systems or even undermine their viability, this 
thesis argues that the CCP has managed to sustain its political hegemony to date through 
the manipulation of these major crises and through the maximum tinkering with the current 
political system it reigns over.  
 
In order to explain why manipulation is the key in the CCP’s successful crisis 
management, this thesis first develops a critical reassessment of the conception of crisis 
and elaborates on crisis’s tripartite political utilities. These are (a) shift the dominating 
paradigm, (b) centralise political power and (c) (re) gain popularity and legitimacy. These 
altogether form an analytical framework for crisis, which is followed by a chapter that sets 
the backdrop against which our case studies unfold and explains why the Chinese context 
is particularly favourable for crisis manipulation.  
 
The thesis then proceeds with three case studies: the 2003 SARS epidemic, the 2008 
Sichuan earthquake and the Sanlu milk scandal occurred in the same year. The thesis 
suggests that although the CCP’s responses were not flawless, and not always timely, it 
managed to manipulate all three crises in its favour via the aforementioned political 
utilities and subsequently defused these crises. At the same time, its Leninist structure was 
able to unleash formidable mobilisation capacity to help the regime rapidly bring situations 
under control. Overall, the CCP’s crisis management efficacy was satisfactory in the short 
term.  
 
Nevertheless, the thesis concludes that despite the short term usefulness of crisis 
manipulation, in the long term the efficacy of the same strategy as well as the political 
utility of crisis are decaying, as illustrated in reference to more recent crises that stretched 
the CCP’s credibility. Therefore, the CCP is in need of embarking on substantive political 
reform in order to develop an alternative crisis displacement mechanism.  
 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the existing literature in the field. It 
complements the public administration and public management literature by bringing 
politics back in. It also updates the empirical knowledge base of past studies as well as 
offering a comparison of crisis responses. This is a timely contribution to the study of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Intellectual Curiosity and Identifying the Topic 
 
This thesis explores the crucial question of China’s statecraft of crisis management. China 
is a country whose image is full of contradictions. From a state centric perspective, China 
looks strong. It has recently become the second largest economy in the world and the 
world’s largest exporter (BBC, 2011). Many have also argued that China is set to become 
the next superpower and some countries are already treating China based on what power 
and influence it will have in the future (Breslin, 2009). After the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008 in which China was among the least affected major economies, admiration and fear 
alike regarding China’s ascendancy are only growing in momentum, alongside increasing 
interests in the Chinese model. 
At the same time, however, China is also becoming a source of great uncertainty 
for the rest of the world, especially in the realm of Non-Traditional Security (NTS). For 
instance, both originated in China, the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndromes (SARS) 
Epidemic and the 2008 Milk Scandal caused significant disruption to international trade 
and travel. Economists also projected various scenarios where a slowdown in Chinese 
growth would affect a number of countries dependent on China for trade in resources and 
commodities, and even threaten world growth overall (AFP, 2013; Dyck et al, 2011; 
Frangos, 2011). In 2005, Robert Zoellick, then US Deputy Secretary of State, expected 
China to play the role of a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system (Zoellick. 
2005). At the time of writing this thesis and in light of China’s rapid rise in influence since 
2005, the reverse is perhaps also true – that many countries with close ties with China (its 
 11 
neighbours in the region in particular), have become important stakeholders in China’s 
own development. For their economic and security stakes, they expect China to be stable, 
predictable and crisis–proof simply because China is ‘too big to fail’.  
China responded to these concerns from its international stakeholders with 
rhetorical reaffirmations of its commitment to a ‘peaceful rise’, ‘peaceful development’ 
and building a ‘harmonious world’. Regardless of China’s true intentions as a responsible 
player in the international arena, these statements failed to assure other countries over 
whether China has the internal strength to prevent domestically originated crises from 
toppling its projected promising development. The international community remains 
equally unconvinced that China has perfected its system of governance wherein the 
inherent contradictions between a market economy and Leninist political management are 
constantly undermining the efficacy of each other. If such a rising but crisis–ridden state is 
said to ‘rule the world’ sometime soon (Jacques, 2012), its growth will only amplify the 
opportunities as well as uncertainties it brings to the rest of the world. Therefore, before we 
speculate on what China is going to become, we should ask ourselves the prior question: 
How stable is China? 
As such, a critical and systematic analysis of China’s past and present crisis 
behaviour is of crucial importance to the understanding of this world’s largest non-
democratic one-party state1. This topic has multifaceted scholarly and policy significance. 
It contributes to ongoing academic debates in regard to the nature of Chinese politics in 
general and the nature of China’s state capacity in particular. It should also be of great 
interests to those in the policy community who are concerned with managing China’s rise. 
To be sure, the main purpose of this thesis is not to predict where China is heading. 
Instead, this thesis investigates the strengths and weaknesses of China’s crisis management 
                                                 
1 Owing to the fact that in most cases the CCP and the Chinese state are integrated, in this thesis the terms of 
Party, state and Party–state are used interchangeably unless otherwise stated.  
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regime through case studies. Based on this, it assesses China’s capacity and preparedness 




In fact, the debate on the sustainability of China’s political system has been going on ever 
since 1989 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) suffered a grave legitimacy crisis 
due to the Tiananmen crackdown. After Tiananmen, perspectives in the western scholarly 
community regarding the destiny of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the CCP 
were overwhelmingly pessimistic. Scholars had repeatedly predicted that the fate of the 
CCP would simply follow that of communist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe (Baum, 1992; 1996; Gilley, 2005; Nathan, 2003). The only uncertainty remained 
regarding this ‘moribund system…is usually about when, not whether, fundamental 
political change will occur and what it will look like’ (Goldstein, 1994:727).  
What lay at the heart of these projections was the assumption that the communist 
regime in China was extremely crisis–prone, and would not be able to withstand another 
major crisis in the years to come. The period of political terror and economic slowdown 
during the Tiananmen interlude added to the impression that the CCP had become a regime 
where sustainability rested more on coercion than performance. For such a vulnerable 
regime, it was not surprising that when interpreting China, many academics, policy 
practitioners and journalists applied the established wisdom of the relationship between 
crisis and regime stability; that is, crises more often than not undermine regime stability 
and even lead to its demise.  
Writings on the vulnerability of China vis-à-vis crisis have proliferated since the 
1990s, and they can be labelled as the ‘China collapse thesis’. The rhetorical but 
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influential, The Coming Collapse of China, offered the boldest and bleakest prospect of 
China. Gordon Chang (2001) predicted that the country’s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) would accelerate the exposure of all structural problems and 
contribute to a holistic economic crisis, after which the CCP would fall from power. Susan 
Shirk also argues that the fragility of China’s political system is vulnerable to domestic 
social crises and unrest growing in scale and frequency, which have produced a paranoia 
mentality among the Chinese leadership who worry that ‘their days in power are 
numbered’ (Shirk, 2007:7). For Minxin Pei (2002; 2006), China is trapped in its gradualist 
transition which results in a decentralised predatory state and gives rise to a multitude of 
governance crises. Others point to a looming legitimacy crisis besetting the current system 
(Gilley, 2008; Heberer and Schubert, 2008). Even in the PRC academic system, the 
indefinite longevity of the CCP is not automatically assumed. 30 percent of the scholarly 
literature on regime legitimacy published between 2003 and 2007 expressed concern on a 
looming legitimacy crisis (Holbig and Gilley, 2010).  
On a slightly different note, a separate but related ‘China threat thesis’ was derived 
from the collapse thesis. Given the post–1989 CCP regime’s weak legitimacy and its 
strategy to replace communism with nationalism as the convincing ideology to keep itself 
in power, when facing major domestic crises, the Chinese leadership might take the risk of 
unleashing the nationalist genie out of the bottle as a uniting force to hold the fragile 
system together (Kristof, 1993). In the worst case, that could also mean fabricating an 
international crisis in order to deflect a domestic crisis (Shirk, 2007). In other words, ‘it is 
China’s internal fragility, not its economic or military strength, that presents the greatest 
danger to [the rest of the world]’ (Shirk, 2007:6). 
Yet most of the above mentioned scenarios did not come true, and those crises that 
did affect China, they were quickly contained and their damaging impact on the regime 
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remained limited. China’s political trajectory since 1992 has turned out to be rather stable 
and increasingly predictable. The CCP has successfully undergone three leadership 
transitions peacefully (from Jiang to Hu to Xi). It has also managed to survive all major 
crises without implementing substantive political reform. To name a few, the 1998 Floods 
in the Yangtze River and Songhua River, the 1999 Falungong crisis, the 2003 SARS 
Epidemic, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the Sanlu Milk Scandal in the same year. 
When the Jasmine Revolution swept through the Arab world and brought down a number 
of authoritarian regimes there, the CCP stood firmly even if an aspiration for democratic 
change was transmitted into China. Despite market transition during the same period, the 
CCP gradually reinforced its control over state and society. Its membership grew from 51 
million in 1992 to more than 80 million in 2011 (Xinhua, 2003; 2011d).  
At the international level, after the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, China’s 
behaviour has become more moderate and considerate. It still occasionally acts assertively 
on traditional security issues where territorial integrity was at stake. For NTS threats 
including those with a transnational dimension, such as the control of diseases, 
humanitarian crises and food safety issues, China has behaved more cooperatively with the 
international community, and has largely acted as a ‘status quo’ power.  
This relative stability on both domestic and international fronts for more than two 
decades not only reflects China’s strong desire to maintain the status quo of managed 
liberalisation under one party rule, but also a commensurate capacity to do so. The contrast 
between negative projections and the reality of the CCP’s unexpected longevity amid 
frequent crises perplexed the China studies community. Such a contrast also suggests that 
this crucial niche regarding China’s statecraft of crisis management has been under-
researched, or that previous studies on the topic are outdated. 
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1.3 The State of the Field 
 
In response to the CCP’s unexpected longevity amid frequent crises, scholars have 
provided different explanations. These can be grouped into two broad categories; 
institutional and structural. The institutional approach looks at such factors as the 
formation and adherence to established norms and rules, rational bureaucracy, technocratic 
governance, limited accountability and ‘input institutions’ (Nathan, 2003; Yang, 2004), 
which arguably have engendered a considerable degree of ‘authoritarian resilience’ for the 
regime (Nathan, 2003). The structural approach, on the other hand, focuses on popular 
support for the regime from each major social stratum. Current findings suggest that 
neither the middle class (Goodman, 2008), nor the working class (Perry, 2007), has enough 
appetite for liberal political change. The CCP has thus retained its political hegemony 
through co-opting new economic and social elites into the system while divide and rule the 
working class. 
These are all insightful explanations to the CCP’s viability. However, they mostly 
focused on the conduct of normal politics. More precisely, they put the emphasis on how 
have institutionalisation and structural impediments in the time of normal politics have 
worked in favour of the regime to prevent crises from occurring. Unfortunately, with a few 
exceptions (where the crises studied were primarily localised ones), the question of how 
did the CCP actually respond to crises when they did arise, largely remained unanswered2. 
                                                 
2 For an excellent account on localised crises or contentious politics staged by particular social groups, see 
Hays Gries and Rosen (2004). Nonetheless, the types of crisis discussed in this volume still did not qualify 
for crisis politics since the contentions involved were mostly ‘rightful resistance’, a sometimes 
confrontational but largely institutionalised form of popular political participation conducted within the 
parameters of normal politics, which could be potentially legitimacy–enhancing for the regime if handled 
well (more details in Chapter 3). By making the statement that the question of crisis politics remained largely 
unanswered, the author meant that what was lacking in the existing literature were accounts on body-politic 
responses to national scale crises which could have detrimental legitimacy implications if mishandled. This 
thesis is thus trying to fill this gap.  
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This question should not be neglected because normal politics and crisis politics are 
intrinsically linked to the understanding of the nature of a particular regime.  
Normal politics and crisis politics are mutually explicable. On the one hand, the 
former largely conditions the environment in which the latter operates. On the other hand, 
the latter is a condensed and accelerated form of the former. More importantly, crisis 
politics provides us with a distinct and rare angle through which we are able to uncover the 
inherent strengths and weaknesses of that particular regime, which are often unnoticed in 
the day to day business of its normal politics. This is particularly the case for China. It 
should be admitted that the study of Chinese politics has been made easier by the increased 
availability of open information as well as the possibility to gain limited access to various 
aspects of the establishment. However, it remains unclear how the driving forces of policy 
making compete with one another or how decisions are made at the top echelons of the 
CCP leadership. A crisis provides such an opportunity in that the ‘black box’ is partially 
unveiled by the (sometimes unintentional) release of often contradictory information in 
relation to an emergency that is otherwise kept behind closed doors. The Cultural 
Revolution and the Tiananmen incident were both of this nature.  
Furthermore, crisis in Chinese politics has another scholarly significance, and this 
can be understood from the perspective of regime legitimacy. According to established 
wisdom, the CCP’s tripartite sources of legitimacy are performance, nationalism and 
stability (Holbig and Gilley, 2010; Shue, 2004; Weatherley, 2006)3. While these are largely 
findings from China’s normal politics, they are also to a large extent applicable in relation 
to crisis. The situation of crisis provides a site for the confluence of the three sources of 
legitimacy. Performance is embodied by the government’s responsiveness and 
professionalism of crisis management whilst nationalism is often the dominant theme when 
                                                 
3 Certainly, there are many more sources of legitimacy that are being discussed in the scholarly community. I 
only choose the three most frequently cited ones. See these publications for a more comprehensive discussion 
on legitimacy in China. 
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the Party rallies the people behind itself during crises. In particular, scholarly discussion on 
stability as a vital source of CCP legitimacy has a natural fit with the stability discourse 
constructed by the Party itself to justify its continued rule in light of popular anxiety about 
possible chaos triggered by intense socio-economic challenges (Sandby-Thomas, 2011). 
According to this discourse, stability is provided by the CCP at two levels, both of which 
are closely related to crisis. On one level, the CCP has presented itself as a reliable 
stabiliser when the country navigates through tough transformation or even uncharted 
waters. As the CCP itself today still assumes most responsibility for initiating any reforms 
in China (Zheng, 2010), its self–bestowed stabiliser role means that it will only try to 
perfect the system incrementally and in a risk averse fashion rather than implementing 
radical, ‘shock therapy’ style reforms that former communist countries in Eastern Europe 
have implemented. In this sense, the CCP justifies its continued rule on the basis of its 
prudence to avoid economic and social crises as occurred in Eastern Europe in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. On another level, the CCP has presented itself as the ultimate 
guarantor of order in case crises do occur (in the form of external shocks, such as natural 
disasters), safeguarding personal safety and individual wellbeing of the people. In this 
sense, the CCP justifies its continued rule and ubiquitous presence in the society on the 
widely held assumption that only a centralised Party–state with a strong big government is 
able to quickly bring situations under control when the nation is faced with adversities. 
Stability is thus provided in the form of care and assurance that the Party conveys to the 
masses during crises. In these situations the Party becomes a very visible actor, as the 
saviour of the people and the defender of their (human) security. As such, being able to 
provide stability in crises is particularly important for Party legitimacy, given the fact that 
the CCP is still the dominant actor in crisis management (more dominant over other 
societal forces than in normal politics) and that nowadays the Chinese society is so divisive 
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such that almost every major crisis could potentially become a point of contest between 
social classes with incompatible goals4.  
In this respect, crisis creates the situation wherein various legitimation claims as 
found in normal politics can be tested further. It can even be suggested that in such an 
already risk-averse society as China, outstanding crisis management capacity alone may 
have stood out as the fourth, and previously understated pillar of regime legitimacy.  
For a generation of China scholars, the abovementioned significance of crisis in 
relation to the defining nature and legitimation claims in Chinese politics was well 
appreciated. They took advantage of the rich availability of information during crises to 
illuminate the broader picture. For a time, studying Chinese politics through the enquiry of 
crisis was a popular approach used by a number of scholars (Zheng and Lye, 2004), with 
the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen incident being the most studied cases. 
However, this tradition has largely discontinued as a result of the pluralisation of China 
studies since the 1980s, in which the research focus has shifted away from the CCP 
(Zheng, 2010). This thesis seeks to pick up this tradition by studying recent major crises in 
an attempt to update our understanding of Chinese politics.   
Recent crises after 2003 such as those chosen for case studies (the SARS epidemic, 
the Sichuan earthquake and the Sanlu milk scandal) are worth investigating because they 
are qualitatively different from older crises studied by a previous generation of China 
scholars. This is because the defining context of Chinese politics has changed beyond 
recognition since 1989, and this new context has had a profound influence on how recent 
crises were bred and unfolded. For instance, the exclusive focus on economic growth is 
now regarded as problematic whereas in the Deng era it was regarded as imperative; the 
                                                 
4 One recent such divisive event was the Anti–Japanese protest in September 2012, in which people from 
underprivileged background took to the street and destroyed Japanese-related properties en route of the 
demonstration. Many of these properties belonged to the middle class, whom were offended by such a 
xenophobic fever.  
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advent of the Internet and other decentralised means of communication has largely made 
the state’s hierarchal control of information counterproductive; the state of rule by law has 
actually deteriorated in recent years contrary to the expectation that once established it 
would improve in a linear fashion; further fragmentation in the authoritarian establishment 
has given rise to the pluralisation of policy making but also led to a difficult trade off 
between consensus and efficiency; the ‘intermestic’ factor has become increasingly 
prominent when managing domestic crises. These five thematic contexts will be 
thoroughly explored in Chapter 3.  
Unfortunately, scholarly publications on recent crises are in short supply in spite of 
their political importance and analytical richness. Most studies speaking directly to the 
topic tend to appear in edited collections. These volumes all have limitations despite all of 
them offering valuable insights into this crucial topic and are helpful to this thesis. The 
SARS Epidemic: Challenges to China's Crisis Management (Wong and Zheng, 2004) 
offers a comprehensive analysis of this first major challenge facing the Hu–Wen 
leadership. Its strength and shortcoming both lie in it being a multidisciplinary study. It is 
rich in terms of perspectives but at the same time each contributor to the volume has a 
narrow focus on his/her own specialism. For example, inadequate healthcare provision, 
ambiguous laws regarding new infectious disease and the incoming leadership as the agent 
of change, could have been integrated into a broader picture of a paradigmatic shift 
brought about by SARS, but these interconnected issues are addressed respectively in three 
individual chapters. Chinese National Security Decisionmaking under Stress (Scobell and 
Wortzel, 2005) is strong on analysing aspects of decision making such as consensus 
building and information processing, and in particular the role of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA). Nonetheless, both the analytical framework and case studies used are about 
political-military crises, types of threats that are affecting China far less frequently than 
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NTS threats. Also, due to its state–centric perspective and stress on traditional security, the 
societal sphere which is rising in importance in shaping crisis management outcomes, is 
largely underplayed in this volume. China’s Crisis Management (Chung, 2011) has the 
most comprehensive coverage of crises, ranging from economic to environmental crisis, 
from traditional security threat crisis to NTS crisis. This volume does well in highlighting 
the adaptability of Chinese crisis management – the tendency of more capacity building 
and professionalism is clearly conveyed throughout the book. Nevertheless, the diversity of 
the types of crisis studied makes it difficult to adopt a generalised model or draw a 




In light of the shortcomings with the existing literature, this thesis will contribute to the 
study of China’s crisis management in three distinctive ways.  
First, most previous studies implemented different analytical and disciplinary 
perspectives for different types of crisis, making it difficult to determine China’s crisis 
behaviour in general. Drawing on western literature on the political utility of crisis and 
adapting it to the Chinese context, the author constructs a generalised model of crisis 
management under the CCP. This model is capable of explaining how the CCP derives 
political utility in its favour through manipulating different types of crisis. The model is 
applicable to crises such as epidemics, natural and man-made disasters, as will be shown in 
the case studies. It can also be useful in analysing economic crisis, social unrest and 
technological disasters, as will be shown in the conclusion. In short, this model reveals the 
previously understudied ‘standard operating procedure’ of the CCP’s crisis management.  
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Second, for most previous studies that approached China’s crisis management from 
the perspectives of public administration and public management, there was a general lack 
of political analysis. Taking a page from ‘mainstream’ theories of crisis and models of 
crisis management, such as the crisis life cycle, the theory of complexity, the normal 
accident theory and even the human/natural causation of crisis dichotomy, these studies 
have enhanced the intellectual capacity building in the subject matter and have done well 
in capturing the professionalisation tendency of China’s crisis management in terms of 
tactical preparedness and response. However, these theories and models are mostly derived 
from western public administration and organisational studies assuming political neutrality 
or even an apolitical nature in the policy implementation process, which when transplanted 
to China, overlooks the fact that China’s political context is too powerful to ignore. This is 
well manifested in the periodic resurgence of the old reflex that offsets or U-turns the 
progress made on transparency and openness. This thesis will therefore bring politics back 
into the analysis. The author will explain the consistency and inconsistency as found in 
China’s crisis management behaviour by situating the topic within the broader political 
context. In so doing, this thesis will uncover whether the authoritarian nature of China’s 
political system is an advantage or an impediment to effective crisis management.  
Last, scholarly publications on recent crises are in short supply. This thesis will 
therefore update the empirical knowledge base on crisis management in China. It offers 
critical and detailed analysis on the three most challenging crises in the Hu Jintao era; 
SARS, the Sichuan earthquake and the Sanlu milk scandal. It will also mention a host of 
other crises in the run up to the 18th Party Congress (PC) convened in 2012. Furthermore, a 
systematic comparison of recent crises will be presented in the conclusion, a crucial 
dimension determining the sustainability of the CCP style crisis management which none 




The CCP has managed to sustain its political hegemony to date through the manipulation 
of crises and through maximum tinkering with the current political system.  
The CCP runs a country that is ‘perpetually in the throes of crises’ (Scobell and 
Wortzel, 2005:1). The country’s diverse geographic and demographic features, complex 
and decentralised governance, economic and social conditions under intense 
transformation and increasing connectedness with the outside world, all breed formidable 
challenges in the form of numerous natural disasters and man–made crises. Yet the CCP 
has been able to navigate through crisis after crisis without significantly reforming the 
political system. The secret lies in its adept ability of defusing crises through political 
manipulation.  
In democratic systems, crisis merely constitutes a crisis in the system, because 
crisis can often be displaced via the change of the ruling party and the government. In 
authoritarian systems, crisis often leads to a crisis of the system, because the possibility of 
changing either the ruling party or the government, does not exist. However, the CCP has 
developed and refined a sophisticated alternative crisis displacement mechanism. This 
mechanism displaces and manipulates crisis in three interlinking phases, these are: 
(a) Construct an official and hegemonic crisis discourse to shift the dominating 
paradigm, which highlights CCP rule is making progress; 
(b) Centralise political power and shake up the Party-state apparatus; demonstrate 
limited accountability while reinforcing Party control over local governments and 
society; 
(c) Reconnect with the people to show Party benevolence; reinforce the popular 
perception that the central government is more legitimate than local governments. 
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In manipulating crises through this tripartite mechanism, the CCP has so far 
displaced and defused all major crises with general albeit uneven success. In the course of 
managing crises, the CCP has also reasserted itself and maintained its standing as the 
overwhelmingly dominant actor in Chinese politics.  
This hypothesis leads to three main research questions reoccurring throughout this 
thesis. These questions will be answered in the conclusion.  
1) How well has the CCP managed crises so far? 
2) What are the most important factors that condition the efficacy of the CCP’s 
crisis management?  
3) Are the same strategies of crisis manipulation sustainable enough for the CCP to 
manage future crises?  
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
 
This thesis mainly employs three qualitative research methods: case studies, documentary 
analysis and interviews.  
 
 I. Case Studies 
 
This thesis uses detailed case studies to test the validity of the analytical framework the 
author establishes in Chapter 2. As this framework is largely drawn from western literature 
on the political utility of crisis which is underpinned also by examples from the west, the 
author needs to take caution when adapting this framework to the Chinese context. As a 
result, the author does not simply transplant the analytical framework, but devotes half of 
Chapter 2 to identifying some distinctive Chinese attitudes and cultural inclinations and 
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integrates them into the mainstream (western) conception. Nonetheless, the explanatory 
power of this adapted framework cannot be taken for granted unless proved by real crises 
in China. In addition, the case study approach will allow the author to integrate different 
types of data generated from documentary analysis and interviews.  
Three case studies are chosen for this thesis: the 2003 SARS epidemic, the 2008 
Sichuan earthquake and the 2008 Sanlu milk scandal. On the surface, these are natural 
disease, natural disaster and man–made contamination respectively. They are three 
seemingly different types of crisis if we only look at their external causation. However, the 
three crises are not only comparable, but are indeed common. They are all governance 
crises with a combination of exogenous and endogenous causation. And crucially, it was 
mostly the endogenous causation that determined the extent and distribution of disaster 
impact in these crises. In SARS, it was the opaque information dissemination and the lack 
of cooperation between civilian and military health authorities that elevated a local 
outbreak into a global pandemic. In the Sichuan earthquake, it was the poor enforcement of 
building codes that led to the collapse of school buildings killing many school children. In 
the milk scandal, it was the symbiotic relationship between the government and large 
businesses that resulted in a regulatory gap in food safety. In short, it was the endogenous 
causation of the poor standard of governance ex-ante crises that provided the common link 
between the three cases.  
Furthermore, the three crises all became political crises in China’s authoritarian 
context. Without the possibility of changing the government, whenever evidence emerged 
that poor ex-ante governance execrated disaster impact ex-post, criticism from the public 
often went beyond government competence but questioned how the system was put 
together and why it should continue in this way after many similar blunders. Therefore, the 
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three crises selected are entirely comparable in terms of their similar implications for 
regime legitimacy. Chapter 2 will discuss this in more details.  
In addition, the three crises occurred between 2002 and 2008. For the earthquake 
and the milk scandal, their political fallout was not completely settled until 2011. We 
therefore have three case studies that span a timeframe covering almost the entire Hu era. 
During this period, the case studies cover the entire trajectory of crisis behaviour under Hu: 
2002-3 (SARS) for the newly inaugurated leadership, 2008 (the earthquake and the milk 
scandal) for the consolidate leadership and from 2010 onwards (the fallout of the 
earthquake and the milk scandal) for the outgoing leadership. This will help us discern 
elements of change over time and determine their relationship with high politics, thus 
making wider generalisations possible.  
 
II. Documentary Analysis 
 
Research for this thesis used extensive documentary analysis of primary and secondary 
data. For primary data, this thesis consulted numerous official statements, briefs for 
important Party meetings, leadership speeches and departmental specific policy documents 
to gain a better understanding of Party discourse, especially discourse on crisis, given the 
importance of slogans and rhetoric in initiating political campaigns in China. As part of an 
ongoing effort to improve transparency after SARS, an increasing amount of government 
open information has been made available on the Internet. The thesis benefited from this 
transparency measure in terms of factual accuracy. The author mainly cites Xinhua and the 
People’s Daily (People’s Net), the two most important Party mouthpieces, for official 
information.  
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For secondary data, in addition to consulting reputable scholarly works in English, 
the author made extensive use of materials in Chinese, thus enhanced the originality of this 
research. The Chinese journal database, CNKI (Chinese National Knowledge 
Infrastructure), was used intensively throughout the research process, providing a rich 
resource base beyond a sole reliance on English language material. Apart from consulting 
paper based secondary information, the author also visited the Universities Service Centre 
for China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong which maintained a large 
archive of multimedia resources on Chinese political events, including western and 
Chinese made documentaries on contemporary crises. These multimedia resources all 




The author used interviews as a complementary research method to documentary analysis. 
At present, decision making in China’s ‘high politics’ remains opaque despite more 
transparency at the bureaucratic politics level. Interviews with well-informed individuals 
on their perceptions about this area thus provided unique and vital resources that at least 
compensated the lack of open information. During the author’s field research in China in 
2010, a total of 57 face to face interviews were conducted. Those chosen as interviewees 
consisted of professors in the PRC academic system with different degrees of access to the 
policy circle, retired government officials previously involved in the making of key 
policies and representatives of international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) in 
China who keep regular contact with the Chinese government. Due to the still sensitive 
nature of the topic, the details of all respondents are kept confidential. A semi-structured 
and open-ended question format was used during the interviews as this was the way 
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respondents preferred when talking about a sensitive issue. And with semi-structured and 
open-ended interviews, the author could get as much information from as many 
perspectives as possible.  
 
1.7 Outline of Research 
 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters. The introduction lays the background for this 
research by surveying the state of the field, and identifies gaps in the existing literature 
which this research is going to fill. It also sets out the hypothesis and research questions 
that are reoccurring throughout the thesis. The rest of this thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2 establishes an analytical framework regarding the political utility of 
crisis, which will be applied throughout the thesis. In this chapter, examples from the west 
as well as from China are used to support the argument that, as crises are not so much 
objective conditions as subjective judgements, they can often be manipulated for someone 
and for some purposes. This chapter thus provides the analytical underpinning for the 
CCP’s crisis manipulation through which it seeks to reinforce its control over state and 
society. Chapter 3 offers a critical analysis on the Chinese political context and its path 
dependency, alongside the explanation of how this broader context will benefit or 
undermine the efficacy of the CCP’s crisis management. The discussion is arranged 
according to themes, namely the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) centred political 
economy, state control of information, state–society relations, policy making and 
international pressure. This chapter thus sketches the situational limits for the analytical 
framework established in Chapter 2.  
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are case studies that serve to validate the applicability of the 
analytical framework and its situational limits as set out in previous chapters. The finding 
is that, the CCP has managed to address all three crises with general albeit uneven success. 
In the course of managing these crises, the CCP has also reasserted itself and maintained 
the political status quo.  
The concluding chapter is devoted to making further generalisations through a 
comparison of crises. As this is an evolving research topic, the sustainability of the CCP’s 
current crisis management regime is discussed with reference to more recent crises. 
Possible directions for future research are also suggested at the end. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptualising Chinese Crisis 
Management 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter constructs an analytical framework for the thesis. As the thesis argues that the 
CCP has reasserted itself through the skilful interpretation and manipulation of crises, and 
managed to sustain the political system with maximum tinkering, we need first of all to 
look at exactly what a crisis is and how it can be utilised politically. In order to strengthen 
the argument, the author seeks to explain that the politicisation of crisis is commonplace in 
all polities, and it is not something narrowly applicable to China or the CCP in particular. 
The author then situates this argument within the Chinese context and tries to identify 
some distinctive attitudes and cultural inclinations that do exist in addition to the 
mainstream (western) understanding of crisis. This structure outlines the analytical 
foundation for the case studies in later chapters. 
The chapter begins with a reassessment of the meaning(s) of crisis in academic 
settings by clarifying what quantitative and qualitative attributes constitute a crisis 
situation. It also explains how to classify crises and the advantages and shortcomings of 
existing crisis typologies. Then the author argues that crisis is not only an objective 
condition but also a subjective judgement. Exactly what a crisis is depends on the 
experience and perception of crisis participants: therefore one’s crisis could well be 
another’s opportunity (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997). Inferred from this, crisis offers 
maximum opportunities for the active display of agency and thus can be conveniently 
utilised for political purposes.  
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To misquote Robert Cox who famously argues that ‘Theory is always for someone 
and for some purpose’ (Cox, 1981:128), the author argues that crisis is always for someone 
and for some purpose. Crisis has three types of political utility: The first type is to facilitate 
a ‘decisive intervention’ so as to shift the dominating paradigm (Hay, 1996a; 1999a; 
1999b). The second type is to enable the centralisation of political power and alter power 
relations within the state apparatus in favour of the central state vis-à-vis its subordinating 
agencies (Thornton, 2009), as well as redefining state-society relations. The last type, 
which is also where the greatest temptation for leaders to stir a crisis lies, is the relative 
autonomy between the promoted crisis and the concealed, real intention. Put another way, 
political leaders can often articulate and label particular social problems or issues as a 
crisis in order to enlist the temporal unity among the public and advance other purposes 
which only have a weak link with the constructed crisis. 
The latter part of this chapter will apply the above theme to the Chinese context 
with an emphasis on the perceptual distinctiveness. After briefly reviewing the role of 
crisis mentality in ancient China, the author suggests that Chinese history since the 
beginning of the ‘century of humiliation’ has been characterised by the simulation, 
stimulation, or even fabrication of crisis as an integral part of the statecraft. Examples from 
both the Republic of China (ROC) and the PRC eras are given. The last section suggests 
that despite the Party’s insistence on harmony, there has been, and there will remain, 
continuity on the strategic invocation of crisis, and periodic crisis-induced mobilisation 
will continue for some time as one of the powerful tools in the CCP’s arsenal of 
governance strategies to tackle formidable challenges.  
 
2.2 What is a Crisis? 
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Crisis is an important concept in political studies but the word is often used without much 
caution to its meaning. Its frequent appearances in the media, alongside the discursive 
usage of the term to depict the perceived accumulation of irresolvable contradictions, have 
made it a generic and eye-catching - rather than a specialist term. According to 
conventional wisdom, any situation of urgency, instability or even uncertainty can be 
labelled a crisis. As a result, crisis is too ambiguous to define rigorously. However, such 
over-usage of the term can make both analytical and practical research on crisis 
problematic. Conceptions of political and institutional change differ significantly according 
to varying levels of fluctuation and the intensity of transformation. Only revolutionary 
changes or events that have the potential to bring about revolutionary changes can be 
conceptualised as periods of crisis in terms of political time (Hay, 2002), whereas many 
‘crises’, as perceived by non-specialists, are only evolutionary in nature. In practice, the 
categorisation of modest incidents as crises may distract the already scarce crisis 
management resource that should be deployed to deal with real emergencies. For the sake 
of the argument on crisis and crisis management, it is important first to clarify what 
quantitative and qualitative characteristics constitute a genuine crisis.  
 
2.2.1 Crisis as an Objective Condition 
 
I. Quantitative Attributes 
 
For an incident to qualify as a crisis, the seriousness of the threat has to cross a certain 
threshold. This can sometimes be measured by quantitative parameters. First, quantitative 
indicators about damage are widely used. For example, the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) has a warning system to alert the world about the severity of a flu pandemic. That 
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is, as the number of infections and the number of countries being affected rise, the alert 
level will be raised accordingly. Once the virus is continually spreading amongst people in 
several continents and regions, the WHO will declare a pandemic and raise the alert level 
to the highest phase 6, in which case a worldwide public health crisis is confirmed 
(DirectgovUK, 2009). Similarly, quantitative parameters can be the number of casualties or 
the value of property loss, and these numerical measurements of cost are particularly 
applicable in assessing the extent of damage caused by natural disasters (Gov.cn, 2006).  
In addition, crises differ from prolonged troubles in that the former are critical 
junctures that demand rapid responses and decisions, after which decisions can only be 
made under less favourable circumstances (Billings et al, 1980), whilst the latter can be 
muddled through under less time pressure. The time pressure with regard to a crisis can 
also be quantified and is measurable. For instance, in the aftermath of an earthquake, it is 
internationally agreed that the first 72 hours are critical, after which most survivors under 
the ruins are less likely to survive without food and water. This is the reason why the sense 
of urgency during the first 72 hours dictates shorter decision time and quicker response 
than other (prolonged) imperatives (e.g. reconstruction), which are generally not regarded 
as crises and are dealt with using more routine solutions.  
A third, plausible, quantitative attribute of a crisis is the probability of its 
impending occurrence. Even when the value of possible loss is high, it is less of a crisis 
unless it is highly likely to happen. Although this attribute involves a lot of (objective) 
scientific calculations, it is worth noting that the process (by which the resultant decisions 
are derived from the probability) cannot be free from intervention from the parties 
involved. The most typical example is the earthquake prediction. On the one hand, the cost 
of evacuation and relocation is extremely high and such cost prediction is relatively easy to 
calculate. On the other hand, we are not able to predict the probability of earthquakes with 
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the same degree of confidence given the current state of geological or seismological 
expertise. Very few successful predictions have been made so far. As a result, earthquake 
predictions are intertwined with the competition of political, economic and social interests 
and priorities. Subjectivity in both the process and the outcome of earthquake predications 
should not be neglected.  
Numerical indicators of damage, the measurable time pressure and the probability 
of adversity are not meant to be an exhaustive list of all the quantitative variables 
associated with a crisis, but they are most commonly seen in national and international 
governmental contingency plans. Once an incident possesses one or more of these 
quantitative traits, it is likely to be recognised as a crisis by the government and necessary 
responses will be triggered automatically. The inextricable role of governments in these 
situations implies that these (objective) quantitative measurements are not free from 
subjective perception, a topic I will turn to below. However, it is fair to argue that even 
objective conditions have to be above a minimum threshold in order to be perceived as a 
crisis.  
 
II. Qualitative Attributes 
 
Although definitions of crisis are multifarious, common qualitative attributes can still be 
identified among different studies. Hermann’s proposed crisis definition features three 
elements: high levels of threat, short deadlines for decision making and elements of 
surprise (Hermann, 1972). These three characteristics, I argue, are broad enough to 
encompass all qualitative attributes that a crisis possesses because subsequent works on 
crisis definition are more or less evolved from Hermann’s. The high threat dimension is 
largely undisputed. Regarding response time, Brecher (1977) refines the temporal 
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dimension of Hermann’s definition by replacing ‘short time’ with ‘finite time’, considering 
the gap between available time and the deadline for a decision. The only problematic 
dimension is surprise, for which Hermann himself found little empirical backing 
(Hermann, 1972). Nevertheless, the uncertainty about a crisis in a broader sense - in other 
words, the unexpectedness unpreparedness or situational instability relating to a crisis, can 
find resonance in the crisis literature from different perspectives. Once again, a caveat 
should be declared here: these qualitative attributes are not entirely independent from 
subjective intervention. 
In sum, crisis can be regarded as an objective condition or ‘property of a system’ 
(Hay, 1999b:323), as manifested in the above quantitative and qualitative attributes. 
Nonetheless, as argued above, purely objective crises hardly exist. These objective 
conditions are only the necessary but insufficient conditions for a crisis in a political sense. 
For Hay, these objective conditions - i.e. the ‘unacknowledged accumulation’ or 
‘condensation of contradictions’ - constitutes a ‘failure’ vis-à-vis crisis (Hay, 1999b). 
Failure is the purified version of crisis, independent of any subjective perception. 
 
2.2.2 Typologies of Crisis 
 
The above is about what crises have in common. But what makes crises different from one 
another? The typologies of crisis should be reviewed in order to answer this query. The 
most convenient and common typology is the natural-human causation dichotomy. With 
such a dichotomy, it is easier to identify the ‘fundamental influence possibilities’ of a crisis 
(Gundel, 2005:107). According to conventional wisdom, natural catastrophes, by literal 
implication, are acts of God and beyond human control. The hazard is therefore almost 
unstoppable. Man-made disasters, on the other hand, are consequences of human action. It 
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is worth noting here a further dichotomy within the subset of human causation crises - i.e. 
man-made vs. social crises, or normal vs. intentional accidents. According to Perrow, the 
operations of any organisations which depend on sophisticated technology are persistently 
at risk because potential breakdown is embedded in any technological system (Perrow, 
1984). Normal accidents are the result of system-overload in these ill-structured 
technological systems. Conversely, intentional accidents are acts of deliberate malevolence 
conducted by human beings - for example, the terror attacks of 9/11.  
The natural-human causation dichotomy has very different implications on my 
below discussion of crisis management, mainly because of the responsibility attribution. 
Being beyond the control of human beings, natural forces give an acceptable excuse for the 
unpreparedness and slow response of those who are held responsible, whereas man-made 
disasters are more likely to expose human and organisational faults (Rosenthal and 
Kouzmin, 1993).  
However, such a dichotomy is not as clear-cut as it might appear at first sight. It is 
argued that ‘there is nothing “natural” about “natural disasters”’ (Wisner et al, 1976), since 
for a natural disaster the hazard and its consequences should be analysed separately 
(Wisner, 2003). It is fair to argue that the hazard is driven by natural forces but its 
consequences are not necessarily so, a point we will return to below with more discussion. 
Nevertheless, government authorities in general and authoritarian governments in 
particular favour the crisis typology based on the natural-human causation dichotomy. 
Natural disasters are extraordinary public events which reveal existing sources of 
governmental failure by putting the disastrous consequences of such failure under the 
spotlight. But, by labelling a disaster as ‘natural’ and ascribing major responsibility to 
factors ‘beyond’ human control, i.e. by confounding the consequences of the hazard with 
the hazard itself, it is apparently much more convenient to explain away governance 
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deficits and developmental failures. In China, this typology is deep-seated even without 
government manipulation, since in the Chinese language natural disasters (tianzai) are 
explicitly distinguished from man-made disasters (renhuo). However, the CCP takes this a 
step further by propagating a sharp contrast between the sympathy of the Party and the 
brutality of the nature, and thus shows its benevolence to the people. In the aftermath of 
disasters, slogans such as ‘disasters have no mercy, but the people do, and the Party does’ 
(tianzai wuqing, ren youqing, dang youqing) are run as part of the disaster relief 
propaganda campaign5. The natural-human causation dichotomy best serves the CCP’s 
goal of convincing the people of its crisis management credentials – the Party is not only 
technically competent but also morally benevolent in times of crisis.  
Similarly, government authorities are also inclined to explain away their 
responsibility associated with above-mentioned normal and intentional accidents – they 
just happen as a result of various unfortunate exogenous factors, be they faults with the 
machinery (industrial accidents) or with the infrastructure. For example, after the Sichuan 
earthquake, it was explained by the authorities that schools were ‘more likely to collapse’ 
than other buildings because ‘classrooms are big spaces where the number of pillars built 
to support their structures has to be fewer’ (China Economic Weekly, 2009). Similar 
accidents can also be ascribed to the crime of the individual with ulterior motives (in the 
Fanglin School explosion, officials said the school was blown up by a ‘madman’) (Lianhe 
Zaobao, 2001)6, but not the fault of the government. Independent investigations in all these 
cases indicated that the government had regulatory nonfeasance to say the very least, but a 
crisis typology that distinguishes only between natural disasters, technological disasters 
                                                 
5 Just search dang youqing in Chinese (the Party has mercy) on Google for numerous illustrations. 
6 The Fanglin School in Jiangxi province exploded on 6 March 2001 when pupils were manufacturing 
fireworks in the classroom. The incident killed more than 40. The local government covered up the real cause 
of the explosion and claimed it was a criminal case where the school was blown up by a madman. Premier 
Zhu Rongji initially cited this misinformation at a press conference but he had to apologise several days later 
when the story and the real cause became internationally known. 
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and deliberate evil actions covers up much of the government failure, and indeed provides 
the government with plenty of room for the manipulation of the real causations of these 
crises. 
In additional to the flaws in the responsibility attribution with the crisis typology 
based on the natural-human causation dichotomy, this typology cannot keep up with the 
pace of historical and technological change. Historical change has brought about an 
expansion of the variety of situations that are considered crises. The above deep-seated 
typology is facing increasing controversy owning to its inability to distinguish between 
multiple causations of modern crises, which come as ongoing processes (Rosenthal and 
Kouzmin, 1993). One disaster can be simultaneously featured by two or even three 
causations. For example, the Chernobyl incident would be conveniently classified as a 
man-made technological accident if the explosion is viewed in isolation. But if viewed as a 
series of incidents, i.e. the disaster plus its aftermath, Chernobyl clearly had natural 
(environmental degradation caused by nuclear radiation), social (information deception) 
and transnational dimensions. For a more complex example of the climate change, human 
beings are both the victims and the offenders of this ‘natural’ crisis. In addition, 
technological progress – for example, the widespread use of satellite technology and early 
warning systems - has facilitated the estimation and prevention of crisis, rendering the 
‘hitherto absolute factors such as the speed of onset into relative and partially controllable 
ones’ (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997:281). In short, the natural-human causation 
dichotomy is losing relevance.  
Crisis scholars therefore have been working on alternative typologies that would 
clearly differentiate all past, present and future crises of different natures into mutually 
exclusive subsets. Gundel classifies crises according to their predictability and possibility 
of influence before and especially during their occurrences. Such a typology spans the 
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chasm between natural and man-made crises and allows for the allocation of future crises 
(Gundel, 2005). But this typology is not without flaws. For instance, it does not sufficiently 
take into account the difference in information availability ex-post and ex-ante a crisis 
(Gephart, 1984). 
Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1993) propose a more specialised division based on the 
apparent properties of crisis, ranging from business crises, (near-) nuclear crises and oil 
spills to terrorism, riots and crowd disasters. This typology is better at grouping crises of 
similar characteristics, but the number of subsets may go beyond a manageable amount if 
future crises of new types are to be included, such as the misuse of gene technology or 
planetary collision. The same authors later introduce a new typology which distinguishes 
between endogenous and exogenous crises, as well as between ‘conflict’ and ‘solidarity’ 
crises (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997). The former distinction concerns the origin of crisis 
whereas the latter is concerned with the level of consensus among all beholders of the 
crisis. For a solidarity crisis, all crisis participants agree on a particular crisis response 
strategy when facing a common external threat such as a factory fire. When divergence 
over a particular crisis response strategy prevails, a conflict crisis takes shape – for 
example, a strike in the same factory. One interesting case that should not be omitted is 
about natural disasters. More often than not, natural disasters are regarded as solidarity 
crises in their initial phase. However, as more people become aware of how the disaster 
response is going to affect their wellbeing individually, there is a greater risk that the initial 
consensus might break, giving rise to a conflictual crisis instead. 
 
2.2.3 Regime Types and the Limitation of Crisis Typologies 
 
The above development in crisis typology certainly helps us to identify common traits of 
different crises: in this way, it facilitates ‘the deduction of consolidated findings about 
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crises and auxiliary countermeasures’ (Gundel, 2005:106). However, when the ruling 
government under consideration is a non-elected, authoritarian government, the 
applicability of a clear-cut crisis typology is limited. The variety of old and new crisis 
typologies previously discussed seem to downplay, to different extents the role of the 
government and governance, as well as focusing disproportionately on ex-post responses as 
opposed to ex-ante planning and mitigation. Certainly, in democratically elected systems 
this is a less salient issue because if a ruling government is deemed incompetent, it can be 
replaced by a new one via an election (or at least the incumbent government faces the 
potential risk of being replaced so that it does not dare to govern too badly). Once the 
government is deemed incompetent and is changed, governance problems attached to it are 
also off the agenda, leaving few burdens for the next government. For authoritarian 
governments which intend to rule indefinitely, however, the mechanism of crisis 
displacement via change of governments featuring democratic systems does not exist. The 
same issue of ex-ante governance is therefore more salient, and its salience often gradually 
aggravates after the immediate aftermath of a crisis when people’s attention shifts from 
sympathy to accountability. For example, in handling the Sichuan earthquake, the 
government’s high degree of responsiveness won domestic and international endorsements. 
However, as soon as the large scale, life-saving relief effort had finished, governance 
issues with the poor enforcement of building standards and official corruption surfaced and 
undermined support for the government. In a survey, respondents’ support for the 
government increased in the immediate aftermath of the quake, but dropped below average 
when more negative coverage concerning (non) governance emerged (Landry and 
Stockmann, 2009).  
In addition, this trajectory of varying public opinion was also evident in the SARS 
crisis and the Sanlu milk scandal. It suggests that from the grass-roots perspective, there is 
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a similarity between the three apparently dissimilar cases. Indeed, from the administrative 
science perspective, the three crises have to be dealt with by ‘fire-fighters’ from disaster 
relief, healthcare and law enforcement agencies respectively, each deploying its 
departmental-specific measures. But the reason for the detrimental consequences in the 
three crises was a common one: that was, the poor standard of governance which resulted 
in the accumulation of so many unresolved problems before the crises. Before the SARS 
crisis, the poor governance of the dissemination of information, and the lack of 
accountability, emboldened officials who were lying ‘not only to the people but also to 
each other’ (Breslin, 2008a:22). Before the Sichuan earthquake, poor governance and 
regulation of the construction industry as well as poor enforcement of building standards, 
emboldened developers who were skimping on materials and who were cutting corners to 
make profits. Before the Sanlu milk scandal, the poor governance of food safety 
emboldened profiteers who were contaminating milk powder with melamine. In the latter 
two cases, poor local governance and the lack of monitoring of local officials by superior 
governments also emboldened local officials who were colluding with profiteers or who 
were complicit in cheating and corruption. In fact, it was the fundamental issue of ex-ante 
governance that provided the common link between the three cases.  
Equally importantly, issues of ex-ante governance in terms of mitigating and 
limiting the consequence of crisis were entrenched in the three crises under investigation. 
As discussed above, modern technologies have enabled mankind to bring even natural 
forces under partial control (e.g. weather control), let alone mitigate the adverse impact of 
disasters through conscious planning and preparation. To mitigate the consequences of an 
earthquake, for instance, buildings should be designed to be as earthquake-proof as 
possible in places that are more earthquake-prone than other locations. To prevent a 
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moderate infectious disease from becoming a pandemic, there need to be designated 
specialist hospitals prepared to admit people with infectious diseases at any time. 
To prevent a local product safety issue from becoming a transnational scandal, an 
effective recall mechanism needs to be established and enforced. What is most important is 
that whether the government has taken all reasonable precautionary measures either to 
avoid the escalation of a crisis, or to limit its consequences. In light of this, it is the day to 
day governance standard that lies at the heart of the problem, rather than just the 
governance of crises and their case-specific, auxiliary countermeasures.  
From a broader perspective, even the choice of development strategies has 
implications on crises. Development and risk reduction go hand in hand because ‘disasters 
are rooted in development failures’ (DFID, 2005). This was exactly the case for our three 
cases under examination. The SARS crisis and the Sichuan earthquake exposed the 
strikingly unequal distribution of quality infrastructure and healthcare resources across 
regions. The milk scandal reminded us never to stimulate materialist wealth at the expense 
of spiritual and moral collapse. All three crises reflected that the growth model, which 
prioritised economic growth but was biased against social and human development, was 
not sustainable. These failures were as damaging as (non-) governance failures, but they 
were the result of the government’s policy preferences rather than its direct nonfeasance. 
And, as these policy preferences have a popular root because a huge number of average 
citizens have benefited from them, the risk associated with these policy preferences is hard 
to mitigate.  
It is very natural that failures, especially failures which are amplified through crises 
and disasters, will lead to contestation of regime legitimacy. As argued above, elected 
democratic systems are in a more enviable position in the blame game than non-elected 
authoritarian systems after a comparable crisis. This advantage can also be explained in 
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terms of the contestation of legitimacy. This is not to suggest that democratic systems are 
blame free in times of crisis. On the contrary, the censure is often fierce; however, 
responsibility attribution in most cases does not go beyond the resignation of senior leaders 
or a significant reshuffle of the ruling government. The legitimacy of the political system is 
not only unharmed, but to some extent enhanced because the stepping down of 
incompetent officials has verified the seriousness of the democratic accountability system. 
In extreme cases, the responsibility attribution involves the change of the ruling party and 
the government, but the legitimacy of the democratic regime is still undisputed. In contrast, 
in authoritarian systems, whenever a future crisis is upcoming – no matter its exact type – 
the exposure of what the government should do to prepare or mitigate but has not done will 
trigger the blame and discontent to resurge, recycle and accumulate within the system. 
Without the safety valve for crisis displacement which characterises democratic systems, 
authoritarian regimes have very few choices at such critical junctures. They can either 
resort to whatever resources they have to resolve the crisis, or quell the discontent by force 
if they are not willing to fall. As such, the legitimacy of authoritarian political systems is 
‘hijacked’ by crises. In other words, crises under democratic systems may give rise to 
crises in the system whereas crises under authoritarian systems often lead to crises of the 
system.  
To sum up, typologies of crisis are more useful in practical settings than in an 
analytical sense. An analytical caution should be made when discussing crisis typologies in 
regard to different types of political systems. For a similar crisis, what presents as a matter 
of administrative competence in democratic systems may well become a much more 
serious issue about regime legitimacy in authoritarian systems. Also, to classify crises and 
attribute responsibility in authoritarian systems, we need to look beyond the apparent 
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differences between these crises and take a more holistic view that includes more 
fundamental issues of governance, development and regime legitimacy.  
 
2.2.4 Crisis as a Subjective Judgement 
 
Analytically, crisis as a conception is twofold: objective and subjective. In the objective 
dimension, crisis is preconditioned upon the existence of a ‘constellation of failures’ (Hay, 
1999b). In the subjective dimension, crisis is in the eyes of different parties involved in the 
crisis situation. A single event can be interpreted in a number of ways and generate 
different versions of crisis discourse, as the above discussion on different perspectives 
between the elite and the public regarding the nature of a crisis has demonstrated (though 
beware that in authoritarian systems the most dominating version of crisis often belongs to 
the elites, or those with access to the most resources and information). Moreover, 
someone’s crisis could well be another’s opportunity (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997). 
Individual perceptions of the extent to which a given situation is critical differ substantially 
in terms of the importance of what is at stake and for whom it is at stake (Swaine, 2006). 
The stakes concerned can be key interests, core values or moral principles. For example, 
the Chinese leadership often exhibits a high degree of sensitivity over ‘stability’, and when 
stability is perceived to be under threat it often deploys the crisis discourse and is very 
unlikely to back down.  
 
2.2.5 The Mobilisation of Crisis Perception 
 
An individual subjective judgement on crisis has no political significance, but, once 
aggregated and collectively mobilised so that the crisis perception is widespread and 
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overwhelming, such perception in its own right can be powerful enough to alter the 
political trajectory. People with political ambitions all covet this under-tapped resource to 
make political change, as research shows that the ideas people believe are as important as 
their self-interest driven motivations in affecting politics and policies (Campbell, 2002). 
Additionally, mass persuasion is much more cost-effective than monetarily buying off the 
masses. Here emerges the role that the media play. The media, in democratic and 
authoritarian regimes alike, often have an overt hand in engineering ideas and cultivating a 
mass perception of crisis: ‘If the media define a situation as a crisis, it is crisis in its 
consequences’ (Quarantelli, 1998). 
Crisis is therefore a process of social, political and linguistic construction and 
narration. In some cases, political protagonists ‘define crises depending on their normative 
and cognitive presuppositions’ (Campbell, 2002:32). Accordingly, different media outlets 
selectively pick particular contradictions out of a pool of societal contradictions as crisis 
symptoms. Indeed, these crisis symptoms are only a snapshot of the panoramic societal 
landscape and are not necessarily an accurate reflection of the principal problems in a 
given society, but they provide political protagonists with the raw material to challenge the 
political status quo. In other cases, this process of crisis construction can emerge largely 
autonomously and in a bottom-up manner – i.e. members of the public pick particular 
problems concerning them and push them on to the state agenda. Either way, a crisis 
diagnosis is alive and the media are crucial in mediating the crisis narrative.  
In practice, the language of crisis construction needs not to be complex. In fact, the 
simpler the crisis narrative, the more persuasive it is, because for Wilson, ‘only a very 
gross substance of concrete conception can make any impression on the minds of the 
masses; they must get their ideas very absolutely put; and are much readier to receive a 
half-truth which they can understand than a whole truth which has too many sides to be 
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seen all at once’ (Wilson, 1952:20). As such, ‘the only way in which the soul of a great 
nation can be stirred, is by appealing to its sympathies with a true principle in its unalloyed 
simplicity’ (Wilson, 1952:31). In addition, the narrative that triumphs has to be, first, 
ambiguous and adapted to a great variety of ‘morbid symptoms’ whilst ‘unambiguous in 
apportioning blame’ (Hay, 1999a:335). Second, it needs to be narrated in a language vague 
enough so that different portions of the society ‘could read different interpretations into it 
to suit their own interests’ (Campbell, 2002:27).    
On the receiving end of the media message, a large proportion of the mass audience 
are unwary of media distortion. They tend to believe what is in the text without sufficient 
ideological sensibility. For a crisis situation to emerge, it needs to be ‘perceived, attended 
to and evaluated against some standard or measure of how things should be in order for a 
problem to be sensed’ (Billings et al, 1980:302). For a mass audience who may know little 
about the specificity of each crisis symptom, the knowledge about the discrepancy between 
normal and abnormal situations could well be derived from their common sense or 
everyday living experience. This again proves that in order to reinforce cognitively the 
crisis narrative, the language of the crisis narrative needs to be simple yet vivid, so as to 
‘find resonance’ with people’s common sense and ‘lived experience’ respectively (Hay, 
1999b).  
Therefore, the mobilisation of crisis perception comprises both the media and 
audience involvement. It is not just about active indoctrination and passive reception, but is 
instead a cognitive interactive process. The public are invited to situate themselves within 
this purposefully framed context of crisis. Once the crisis narrative is convincing enough 
that it becomes ‘part of people’s taken-for-granted cognitive schema' (Campbell, 2002:32), 
the perception of crisis is internalised and mobilised.  
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2.3 The Political Utility of Crisis 
 
Yet the mobilisation of crisis perception is the means, not the end. During unsettling times 
or critical junctures such as crisis, the subtle balance between structure and agency often 
shifts in favour of the latter, which opens up new possibilities for unconventional choices 
(Streeck and Thelen, 2005). By this token, crisis offers maximum opportunities for the 
active display of agency and thus can be conveniently utilised for political purposes. Crisis 
has three types of political utility. 
 
2.3.1 Utility One: Shifting the Dominating Paradigm with Decisive 
Intervention 
 
The perception of crisis is likely to come hand in hand with popular aspirations for change 
and a resolute break with the past – only at this time can the political possibilities for 
paradigm shifts become more favourable (Imershein, 1977). The incompetent ought to be 
dismissed, the fortress must be stormed and a new departure has to be made. When it 
comes to the question of crisis resolution, the imperative of decisive intervention or the 
need to impose a new trajectory upon existing institutions comes very naturally.  
As mentioned above, ‘one’s crisis is often another’s opportunity’ (Rosenthal and 
Kouzmin, 1997:285). This critical conjuncture provides maximum opportunities for actors 
competing for the dominant crisis discourse and response. According to Gramsci, an 
ideological struggle, i.e. a war of position, will take place out of which a state and 
hegemonic project will be forged (Gramsci, 1971, cited in Hay, 1996a). The new project 
that triumphs often belongs to proponents of the most influential crisis discourse, because 
the underlying contradictories are defined in the most favourable terms to them, upon 
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which the ‘new’ cures are prescribed. In the words of t’Hart, ‘the most important 
instrument of crisis management is language. Those who are able to define what the crisis 
is all about also hold the key to defining the appropriate strategies for [its] resolution’ 
(t’Hart, 1993:41).  
There are numerous examples where politicians define a situation as a crisis so that 
they may intervene in order to overthrow the dominant paradigm that ‘results in’ the 
constructed crisis. Most notable is the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978–9 in Britain, in 
which the ‘New Right’ defined waves of industrial conflict and economic dislocation as a 
crisis of corporatism (Hay, 1996a). Their crisis narrative succeeded and paved the way for 
the new, neoliberal paradigm of economic management under Margaret Thatcher. The 
applicability of Hay’s insights may go beyond democratic politics and explain paradigm 
shifts in authoritarian systems as well, such as in China. At about the same time as the 
‘Winter of Discontent’, Deng Xiaoping utilised the failures of the Cultural Revolution and 
ascribed these to the then still-dominant Maoist paradigm. In doing so, he thus removed 
ideological and ideational barriers to the reform and opening paradigm. To a lesser extent, 
Hu Jintao utilised SARS as a symptom of a crisis with Jiang Zemin’s developmental 
paradigm that focused almost exclusively on GDP growth. He then introduced the 
Scientific Development Concept (SDC) as a more sustainable alternative growth model 
and highlighted this as his contribution to the CCP’s ideology. But, just as utilising crises 
to shift dominant paradigms in democratic politics is not to alter the democratic regime, in 
authoritarian systems there is usually a limit to which this strategy can be played out; as 
such, it is about changing the paradigm within the system but not the system itself, so the 
line of anything that undermines one party rule should never be crossed. For example, 
Deng Xiaoping questioned the legitimacy of the Maoist paradigm but he was much more 
hesitant to question the legitimacy of Mao Zedong as the paramount and principal 
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founding leader, because the latter had been internalised as part of the CCP’s regime 
legitimacy. 
Unsurprisingly, as we shall see throughout the thesis, no matter how reformative 
the new project appears to be, in reality, the resulting changes never occur absolutely and 
can only be measured in relative terms. For instance, Thatcherism brought about economic 
paradigm change in the forms of privatisation, restrictions on labour movement and 
financial liberalisation in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s. Similarly, Reaganism injected 
more elements of neoliberalism into the U.S. economy in the 1980s through tax cuts and 
curbing welfare expenditure. Nonetheless, few would suggest that as far as the conduct of 
politics and economic governance are concerned, the reformative state projects of 
Thatcherism and Reaganism represented sea-changes or resolute breaks from the old 
paradigms and altered the ‘basis of polity in the United Kingdom and the United States’ 
(Breslin, 2008b:215). 
The connection between the crisis discourse and the crisis resolution we discussed 
above implies that the so called ‘decisive intervention’ is not only targeted at the crisis in 
essence – i.e. contradictions and failures that are selected to sustain the crisis narrative – 
but also at the crisis as a phenomenon and ‘discursive construction’ (Hay, 1999b). It is thus 
argued that crisis management only aims at defusing crisis rather than solving the basic 
problems that create it (Swaine, 2005). Hence, any seemingly epoch-making shifts made in 
the post-crisis era should be treated carefully if they involve both crisis as a phenomenon 
and crisis in essence. They are perhaps not as different as their proponents assert.  
To borrow a metaphor from everyday life, your computer crashes (phenomenon) 
owing to software errors (contradictions) and you reboot (intervention) the machine to get 
it working again. Yet the reboot in its own right does not necessarily correct the software 
failure – it is merely an interim solution in which the original software is simply reloaded 
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into the system. This temporarily fixes the computer (making a difference) but does not 
necessarily prevent the computer from crashing again from the same cause. In this case, the 
intervention (reboot) addresses the phenomenal crisis (system crash) more than the 
substantive crisis (software errors), and is logically akin to our discussion of the 
relationship between the ‘decisive’ intervention and the crisis. 
 
2.3.2 Utility Two: The Centralisation of Power and Redefinition of State-
society Relations 
 
Given the limitation of any new alternatives imposed upon the state after a crisis, why are 
ambitious leaders still so keen on crises? Despite having power over the text (i.e. media 
influence), they have something much greater to gain by making real differences in terms 
of expanding governmental as well as state power. In the words of Woodrow Wilson, 
crises have the benefit of bringing forth leadership because they are ‘peculiarly periods of 
action, in which talents find the widest and the freest scope’ and that great minds enter the 
arena when offered opportunities for ‘transcendent influence’ (Wilson, 1925:35). As such, 
extraordinary political mobilisation is often initiated in the name of countering crises. The 
argument leads us to the discussion on the second political utility of crisis.  
Politicians utilise crisis to circumvent ‘normal politics’ and get their way 
(Thornton, 2009). To be sure, ambitious leaders themselves go to great lengths to stress 
their unique contribution to a country’s politics in terms of distinctive policies (Breslin, 
2008b). However, their efforts to stress distinctions from their predecessors are often met 
with obstruction which stems from the day to day business of bureaucratic politics, and 
which reduces the credibility of the leader’s commitment to change. In this sense, the 
massive state apparatus can be seen as a clumsy machine comprised of many gears with 
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different sizes performing different functions but lacking lubricant. In its routine operation, 
the gearing may not be running smoothly and efficiently; that is, if big gears do not engage 
well with the small ones because of mechanical friction then the entire machine will work 
at a low level of efficiency. Crisis is to ‘institutional gridlock’ what lubricant is to 
‘grinding gears’ (Schulzke, 2005:262).  
Policies are more likely to be carried through in dynamic and proactive systems 
which possess inherent capacity for managed change and organisational learning. In 
contrast, most modern states can be regarded as inertial and reactive systems because the 
‘state’ (as opposed to its complex web of agencies) lacks an inherent unity and the capacity 
to coordinate centrally (Hay, 1999b). If policies are to be implemented on the ground, the 
state has to behave as a singular actor and acquire institutional unity, which can only be 
achieved through the centralisation of state power, usually under the rubric of crisis.  
Thus, historical evidence of waves of the centralisation of power followed by crises 
is not a coincidence. The mobilisation of the prevalent crisis perception eases the 
centralisation of political power through the injection of the ‘state of emergency’ into the 
bureaucratic structure. The state of emergency status then narrows the ‘central–field’ gap 
between political elites and local bureaucratic agents of the state (Boin and Otten, 1996), 
thus reducing the number of principal-agent relations associated with the policy 
implementation process. The rising centre of gravity for policy making allows central 
authorities to bypass traditional participants in the decision making process, avoiding the 
scrutiny to which their actions are normally subjected, and circumventing established 
procedures and the inter-agency bargaining in the bureaucracy that prevails in normal 
politics (Rosenthal, 1988). On the part of officialdom, the rubric of crisis significantly 
reduces their bargaining power relative to the central authority, in that the disciplining 
effect of crisis justifies any radical pushes for change in policies – the promotion of the 
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Social Darwinism conception of only the adaptable surviving and the need to adjust or die 
(Breslin, 2010). As such, a real or constructed crisis has the potential to redefine the power 
sharing balance in favour of the central vis-a-vis local authorities, channelling towards the 
centre a commanding authority and undisputed leadership.  
Central authorities overtly utilise this favourable power balance that emerges out of 
the crisis to shake up the political system and to discipline local subordinates. For example, 
in the SARS crisis and the Sichuan earthquake, the CCP’s disciplinary and organisational 
departments regarded these crises as moments of major tests of Party cadres. According to 
the performance of cadres during crises, the Party promoted some model Party cadres but 
dismissed many more incompetent cadres. Similarly, the administrative branch cleaned the 
house after the milk scandal. In fact, the CCP’s limited (norm based rather than formal rule 
based) accountability system was largely born of crises. 
The mobilisation of the prevalent perception of crisis not only changes the power 
relations within the state apparatus itself, but also has important consequences on state-
society relations by redefining the contours of politics. Amid the sweeping crisis 
perception, the public aspiring to change would ‘require’ a decisive leadership. The 
generous attitudes granted to the much needed leadership then pave the way for large scale 
concerted actions, which seem to be imperative and inevitable if the intertwined daily 
affairs among individuals and nations are to be transcended and common interests 
preserved (Schulzke, 2005). More often than not, concerted efforts by the state would slide 
into the subtle private sphere. For instance, in the SARS crisis, neighbourhood committees 
in Beijing were mobilised to patrol their own communities and report those with suspicious 
SARS symptoms, who could then be subjected to mandatory quarantine or isolation 
(Zhang, 2006).  
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Nevertheless, the invocation of these mandatory collective actions at the expense of 
private interests is morally justified, because for Hegel: 
 
The internal dynamic of civil society presses each individual and corporate 
interest to concentrate exclusively on itself and to forget its dependence upon 
the whole … But the threat of external enemies … draws particular interests 
together in awareness of their membership in the state, and it teaches that 
sacrifice for the whole is a condition of both membership and individuality. 
(Hegel, cited in Connolly, 1988:124) 
 
Hence, by stirring a crisis, the leadership is granted the best opportunity to restructure the 
body politic. The boundaries between the public and the private, the state and the civil 
society, as well as between the government and the market, could all be subject to 
redefinition through the attendant intervention in the crisis. 
 
2.3.3 Utility Three: Utilising Crisis to Bolster Legitimacy 
 
The greatest temptation for leaders to stir a crisis lies in the relative autonomy between 
crisis and politics, cause and effect, as well as the ‘tenuous relationship between triggering 
events and the policy preferences of national leaders at particular historical junctures’ 
(Thornton, 2009:25). Put another way, political leaders can often articulate and label 
particular social problems or issues as crises to elicit temporal unity among the public, and 
thus advance other purposes which only have a weak link with the constructed crisis. If this 
‘crisis strategy’ is utilised for legitimate purposes, it can be justified as the art of unifying 
politics to foreclose distractions. Crisis hence becomes a part of growth during which a 
common identity is revealed and refined (Schulzke, 2005).  
However, crises, real or fabricated ones alike, were often utilised for controversial 
purposes. This could even happen in a democratic context. One well-known example was 
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the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was waged in the name of eliminating the 
impending threats posed by Iraq’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It 
was a part of the so called ‘war on terror’, which could have been highly contested 
domestically and difficult to justify without the pervasive perception of crisis among the 
American public. Through the manipulation of fear which peaked after 9/11, George W. 
Bush transformed his previously controversial presidency into a strong one supported by 
sweeping patriotism, whereas convincing evidence on WMDs was never found. Similarly, 
the French intervention in the Mali crisis in January 2013 was a good example. The French 
President, François Hollande, who had been widely perceived as a weak and inexperienced 
leader since his assumption of office, utilised the Malian insurgence as a situation 
justifying military intervention in which he temporarily transformed his image into a 
decisive and competent wartime leader. The intervention made him highly popular in Mali, 
which also arguably boosted his popularity at home.   
In an authoritarian context, the inclination to utilise crises to boost regime 
legitimacy is more commonplace. For example, consecutive paramount leaders in North 
Korea have been adept at precipitating international crises for regime consolidation, from 
Kim Il Sung’s invasion of South Korea, to Kim Jong-il and now Kim Jong-un’s periodic 
sabre-rattling to raise both their international and domestic profiles. For China, Shirk 
(2007) argues that the Chinese leadership has created or perhaps in the future will create 
international crises to divert attention away from domestic problems. Previous examples 
include the highs and lows in the Sino-Soviet relations and their links with power struggles 
within the CCP.  
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2.4 The Conception of Crisis in the Chinese Context and its 
Political Utility 
 
Generally speaking, the understanding of the word crisis, and its conception by Chinese 
scholars, is similar to the western understanding at a practical level. Both the quantitative 
threshold and the qualitative typology methods are widely applied in identifying and 
categorising crises. They are seen in various emergency response plans devised by the 
government in recent years.  
 
2.4.1 Crisis Mentality in China 
 
At the linguistic level, definitions of crisis are also similar in English and Chinese 
languages. Here it is necessary to clarify a common misconception among western and 
perhaps a few Chinese scholars who point out that the Chinese people are particularly 
inclined to view crises as opportunities from which they can benefit (Swaine, 2006). This 
view even resonates with very senior officials, such as Wang Yang, a Politburo member, 
who once suggested turning a crisis into an opportunity during his visit to a Guangdong 
city badly hit by the export slump after the 2008 global financial crisis. He urged local 
officials to regard the crisis as an opportunity for industrial upgrade (Nanfang Daily, 
2009). For them, the Chinese word for crisis, weiji, is an inseparable combination of the 
word wei (danger) and ji (opportunity). This misunderstanding probably originated from 
and was popularised by John F. Kennedy’s speech in 1959, in which he said ‘When written 
in Chinese, the word “crisis” is composed of two characters – one represents danger and 
one represents opportunity … Along with danger, crisis is represented by opportunity’ 
(Kennedy, 1959). In fact, the word ji does not mean opportunity here; rather, it refers to a 
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critical juncture according to its contextual meaning in the Chinese language (Mair, 2005). 
So, for most Chinese people, ‘a crisis is first and foremost a dangerous event that has the 
potential to produce a range of outcomes, good and bad’ (Swaine, 2006:3).  
However, at the perceptual level, some distinctive Chinese attitudes and cultural 
inclinations with regard to crisis do exist in addition to the mainstream western 
understanding. For traditional Confucian literati, the crisis mentality was pervasive even in 
times of peace because it was a moral mandate in their spiritual conception of history. ‘The 
paradigm of patriotic worrying provides all Chinese intellectuals with the claim to a moral 
and spiritual significance for their work’ (Davies, 2007:16), because crisis mentality not 
only connotes but also confers a sense of personal responsibility about the nation’s destiny. 
It is ‘an autochthonous ethos’ that is deeply rooted in the everyday intellectual life ‘in the 
widest and most inclusive scope’ (Davies, 2007:16).   
This deep-rooted crisis mentality comes about, according to Link, because Chinese 
intellectuals hold a fierce conviction that China can and should be an exemplary culture 
and society that other societies should and would follow (Link, 1992). But no society is 
without its problems and China is no exception. So, the contrast between the ideal and the 
reality is often sharp. The ‘dark side’ of society is thus regarded as disgraceful by Chinese 
intellectuals who have a perfectionist tendency. This discrepancy in turn reinforces the 
conviction that China must do better. And when China is in trouble, it is not difficult to see 
why Chinese elites are desperately seeking the way out of the darkness. The fact that the 
guiding principle of China’s development shifts from one totalising philosophy to another 
that each creates as many problems as it solves also becomes understandable in the context 
of this perfectionist tendency (Leonard, 2008). 
From a more materialist perspective, this crisis mentality has also been traditionally 
rooted in China’s predominant strategic culture which Johnston classifies as parabellum 
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realism (Johnston, 1995). He argues that the famous Chinese idiom referring to the crisis 
mentality, ‘Ju an si wei, you bei wu huan’, is similar to the realpolitik axiom, ‘Si pacem, 
parabellum’ (Johnston, 1995:107) 7 . Although being criticised for his bias against the 
Confucian strategic culture, Johnston’s argument is clearly relevant to our analysis of the 
crisis mentality that shadowed China during the ‘century of humiliation’.   
2.4.2 Crisis and Modern China 
 
Since China’s defeat in the First Opium War in 1842, this crisis mentality has been 
enhanced by the Social Darwinist ideology that only the fittest will survive (Hess, 2010). 
In the domestic realm, the outmoded political system of Feudalism, inferior productivity 
and impoverishment were perceived to have contributed to the crisis-ridden state. The 
crisis mentality was even more evident when it came to the assessment of China’s external 
environment. Since then, consecutive Chinese leaders have held a typical realpolitik 
conception of international relations. They believed that states were in the world of 
anarchy and the law of the jungle prevailed. Crisis was therefore inherent to such a 
constantly fluid international system, within which the nation-state with the least (relative) 
power was also the most vulnerable. For them (and the Chinese literati in general), China 
was extremely crisis-prone given its backwardness. The catchphrases ‘falling behind will 
be beaten’ and ‘a weak state has no diplomacy’ at that time reflected the extent to which 
Chinese elites were worrying about the impending threats China was facing. The 
perception of crisis stimulated reforms that came one after another in the wish to make 
China strong and competitive: first technological (the Self-strengthening Movement) and 
then institutional (the Hundred Days’ Reform). Nonetheless, these reforms were either 
                                                 
7 Their meanings in English are also not very different: the former means think about danger while in peace, 
with preparations, there won’t be calamity; the latter means that if you want peace, then prepare for war. 
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minor tinkering or short-lived as a result of strong opposition from vested interests. Neither 
reform was able to change China’s critical situation, as more defeats in the following years 
demonstrated. 
At this point, the perception of crisis reached new heights as the discourse of 
China’s disintegration by imperialists was gaining influence, paving the way for 
extraordinary political mobilisation and revolution as the last resort. At the same time, the 
modern nation-state consciousness began to emerge out of the Chinese society which was 
stereotyped as lacking unity. As the Hegelian crisis-driven unity suggested, threats from 
external enemies raised the individual’s consciousness of the totality and brought together 
the destinies of the individual and the totality which were mutually dependent. As such, the 
political consensus gave priority to national survival and the maintenance of sovereignty 
was taking shape. The Qing government’s humiliating failure to defend China’s 
sovereignty against the imperialists contributed to the awakening of nationalist sentiment, 
which rallied many to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. After the Xinhai Revolution, the first 
republic in Chinese history was founded. For some, it was not only a victorious first step in 
China’s state building, but also a victory against the ‘foreign’ Qing government8.  
 
2.4.3 Crisis and Republican China 
 
Since the May Fourth Movement in 1919, nationalism has formally become the latest 
dimension of crisis mentality. For Link, ‘The worrying mentality is, first of all, related to 
patriotism in the sense that China, one way or another, is always the main object of worry. 
The entire mentality is couched in a big question “What can we do about China?” (Link, 
1992:249). Worries facilitated the New Culture Movement that criticised the backwardness 
                                                 
8 The Qing Dynasty was founded by the Manchurian. Because it was a non-Han regime, many in central 
China, especially intellectuals, regarded it as an alien regime which must be removed. 
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of various components of Chinese society. Targets ranged from Confucian doctrine to 
deep-rooted superstition and anything incompatible with modernity and civility. Even 
language was, under the rhetoric of national crisis, standardised and transformed from an 
elite to a mass language with the moral purpose of creating a Chinese modernity (Davies, 
2007). This period enjoyed much freedom of speech and ideological pluralism – a 
proliferation of ‘~ism’s (zhuyi). To name a few: anarchism, liberalism, utilitarianism, 
neoconfucianism, three people’s principles, socialism and communism. It was worth 
noting that ‘~ism’s themselves were constructions that transformed an ideological 
preference into a set of rational solutions. These ideologies ‘picked and mixed’ symptoms 
out of the pool of China’s many failures and provided corresponding remedies, missions 
and visions, as well as competing for influence. The Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese 
Nationalist Party) with three people’s principles, and the CCP with communism were the 
two that stood out and each found resonance with different quarters of society. With the 
two competing fiercely for control of the country, contemporary Chinese history since then 
has featured the simulation, stimulation, or even fabrication of crisis as an integral part of 
the statecraft.  
Despite their bloody battle, the two parties did hold the country together when the 
whole nation of China faced crises of a higher degree. They subsumed their respective 
crisis discourses under the rubric of greater crises when they were confronted with 
common enemies. The first time they had limited cooperation was during the Northern 
Expedition against warlords whose rule split China. The second time was the alliance to 
resist Japanese invasion. But with the defeats of common enemies, the loosely formed 
alliance began to fall apart, as a result of their sharply contrasted interpretations of China’s 
principal contradiction. 
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The KMT’s defeat by the Communists in the subsequent civil war lay first and 
foremost in its problematic military manoeuvre (Oriental Morning Post, 2009), but from 
the perspective of crisis narrative, their losing was also unsurprising. In the latter phase of 
the civil war, the communists mobilised all means of propaganda, intensively 
disseminating the message of a holistic national governance crisis under the KMT. They 
recruited such discursive crisis symptoms as hyperinflation, stoppages and student 
demonstrations, indicating through media outlets supported by the CCP that the KMT 
regime was at the brink of collapse and presented a crisis diagnosis by which different 
sections of society ‘could read different interpretations into it to suit their own interests’ 
(Campbell, 2002:27): everything that happened was owing to the three big mountains of 
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. Note that this tri-faceted crisis diagnosis 
was appealing to three sections of society. It resonated with peasants who were struggling 
with poverty because of the feudalist agrarian relations; it resonated with left-wing students 
who had been long discontented about imperialism; and it resonated with petty-bourgeoisie 
or ‘national bourgeoisie’ who were oppressed by bureaucrat-capitalists. The plain and 
vivid language they used in comparison with that of the KMT helped the CCP’s crisis 
diagnosis take root, too. Moreover, the communists held the key to crisis resolution by 
presenting themselves as a democratic, nationalist and socialist party (the complete 
opposite to the three diagnoses aforementioned). Regardless of the CCP’s record after 
1949, its skilful crisis narrative did enlist popular support for change, in both rural and 
urban regions. In stark contrast, the KMT’s version of crisis was impotent as a result of 
poor rhetoric. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek in 1948 declared a de facto state of emergency 
according to ‘The Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist 
Rebellion’. The Provisions, aimed at war mobilisation on a national scale, overrode the 
Constitution which was passed just four months previously, and granted the President 
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substantial discretionary, extra-constitutional power (Chiu, 1994), as well as allowing the 
President to be exempt from the two terms limit. This was a poorly narrated version of 
crisis because it recruited no substantive content apart from denouncing the Communists as 
‘rebels’, let alone the impression that this was no less than Chiang’s move from 
authoritarianism to totalitarianism. Not surprisingly, the average citizen did not perceive 
the crisis in the same way that the KMT did. When Chiang flew to Chongqing to command 
the defence of his last stronghold on the mainland, his aide found that the life of people 
there ‘looked as normal, not much different from the time of peace’ (Oriental Morning 
Post, 2009).  
2.4.4 Crisis and the Early PRC Era 
 
Since the CCP took control over China, the political utility of the perception of crisis has 
remained important. The relationship between the perception of crisis and the survival of 
the Chinese state is actually well embodied in the lyrics of the national anthem of the PRC:  
 
Arise, ye who refuse to be slaves;    
With our very flesh and blood,    
Let us build our new Great Wall!    
The peoples of China are in the most critical time,    
Everybody must roar his defiance.    
Arise! Arise! Arise!    
Millions of hearts with one mind,    
Brave the enemy’s gunfire,    
March on!    
Brave the enemy’s gunfire,    
March on! March on! March on, on! [my italics]  
 
This song, originally named the March of the Volunteers, was a battle song 
composed in the 1930s when the fate of the nation reached a point where its very existence 
was at stake. It stimulated Chinese soldiers who rose wave upon wave to fight the Japanese 
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invaders (China.org.cn, 2006). On the eve of the PRC’s founding, when being asked for 
opinions about the national anthem for the New China, Mao disagreed with some delegates 
who proposed changing the line ‘The peoples of China are in the most critical time’, since 
all major enemies were defeated, so the emphasis on looming threats was ‘outdated’. Mao 
contended that the original lyrics should remain unchanged so as to awaken the people to a 
mentality of vigilance in times of peace. He further elaborated that the mentality of crisis 
should not be abandoned, since ‘imperialists and counterrevolutionaries are still 
surrounding us, a threat we may well face even in the future; economic backwardness also 
means danger’ (The PLA August First Film Studio, 1992). Here, crisis was perpetuated 
and given new meaning other than wars which was broad enough to encompass discursive 
difficulties.  
Moreover, there has been continuity of the strategic invocation of crises, and crisis-
induced mobilisation has become a mode of governance for tackling challenges. This is 
parallel to the CCP’s efforts in perpetuating its revolutionary tradition and the spirit of 
struggle. When it came to wars in the early PRC era, for example, during the War to Resist 
US Aggression and Aid Korea (the Korean War) of 1950-1953, crisis discourses were 
created to justify austerity and to rally the people behind the Party-state, while domestic 
mass campaigns were initiated concurrently to purge elements disobedient to the new 
regime. For times of peace after the early 1950s, the CCP’s crisis strategy shifted inwards 
to the social engineering of ‘controlled polarisation’; that is, ‘creating coalition with, and 
cleavage among, key social elements as a means of encouraging popular political 
participation’ in order to bolster the CCP’s political hegemony (Perry, 2007). And for such 
a strategy to work effectively, a variety of social contradictions were identified (again, 
through careful selection) and reinterpreted as critical situations in need of the CCP’s 
intervention and direction. Thanks to the CCP’s monopoly on the dissemination of 
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information (i.e. the transmission belt), the task of cultivating a crisis mentality as needed 
was made much easier because it created only the official crisis narrative that dominated 
public perception. In addition, the cultivation of crisis perception is not an entirely top-
down process, for it also involves mass input. For instance, ‘grasping typical cases and 
spreading the experience gained at selected units to the whole country’ (a popular practice 
reflecting the essence of the Maoist mass line: ‘from the masses, to the masses’) and 
‘forming a consensus after studying the instructions’. With these inputs, official doctrines 
are more likely to be internalised and help turn the Party’s intent into the people’s 
voluntary actions (Wang, 2008). 
Successive CCP leaderships have been adept at ‘crisis engineering’ and ‘controlled 
polarisation’. Chairman Mao was the master of such a strategy. The Three-anti and Five-
anti Campaigns, the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution were crises that were deliberately stirred or fabricated by the Great Helmsman 
in order to achieve his utopian ideal. He utilised crises as developmental strategies because 
he viewed chaos as progressive development: ‘It seems as if where things were really 
chaotic, that’s where they’re really better. We’ve been at it for decades, and that’s our 
experience’ (Schoenhals, 1999:597).  
2.4.5 Crisis and Post-Mao China 
Although Deng Xiaoping’s reign was much less turbulent, he inherited the Maoist legacy 
of ‘controlled polarisation’ as soon as he came back to power. The economic crisis as he 
depicted it, and his numerous urges to modernise the economy so as to catch up with other 
industrialised countries, were a moderate version of Mao’s motivation for launching the 
Great Leap Forward. In addition, the launch of the big discussion on the standard of truth 
and the following thoughts liberation were his manoeuvre to provide the masses with a 
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‘storyboard’ which gave the whole nation the sense of an ideological crisis in need of his 
intervention. This manoeuvre soon shifted the ideological debate in favour of his 
pragmatism and isolated the ‘whateverists’ 9  – hardcore Maoist followers under the 
patronage of Hua Guofeng, Mao’s chosen successor (Weatherley, 2006; White, 1983). 
Without Deng’s ideational triumph in casting Maoism in a negative light desperately in 
need of change, the replacement of the Maoist paradigm with a Dengist one would have 
come much later. During the 1980s, Deng also initiated or supported waves of ideological 
and economic relaxation or contraction.  
For the generations of leaders without revolutionary prestige since Jiang Zemin, the 
Party’s revolutionary legacies have still been retained and practised. Jiang was familiar 
with the strategy of divide and rule, most notably demonstrated by his harsh suppression of 
the Falungong, in which he deployed a divisive revolutionary rhetoric by branding this 
‘evil cult’ as ‘counter-revolutionary’ (Perry, 2007) (and he turned this struggle into an 
antagonistic one – this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). For the reform in State 
Owned Enterprises (SOE) starting in 1997 which he oversaw, his government also 
managed to discursively narrate a looming but abstract threat of ‘globalisation and global 
competition’ (and their adverse impact) on SOEs in addition to the SOEs’ own crisis of 
profitability and efficiency. This skilful framing certainly helped to form a consensus on 
the imperative of such reforms and facilitated their implementation amid opposition.  
Hu Jintao constructed his own image as a populist leader, so it was entirely 
understandable that the conduct of politics under him involved Maoist tactics of mass 
participation. He and his colleagues explicitly used the Maoist term of ‘people’s war’ on 
                                                 
9 The term referred to Party leaders who maintained the ‘Two Whatevers’ thesis initially pronounced by Hua 
Guofeng: ‘Whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever directives 
Chairman Mao issued, we shall steadfastly obey’. As Mao’s designated successor but who was a relatively 
young leader among other CCP veterans, Hua utilised this slogan in an attempt to consolidate his position as 
the new leader. However, when it came to economic policies, it was debatable as to whether Hua was still a 
hardcore Maoist, as a number of pragmatic policies were made under him, including the decision to establish 
Special Economic Zones.  
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two occasions: one was the battle waged against SARS, and the other was the mass 
mobilisation to safeguard the Beijing Olympics that involved hundreds of thousands of 
citizens (Xinhua, 2003c; 2008s). He also initiated a number of high profile mobilisations 
for the purposes of studying Party directives, tackling corruption and rescuing victims in 
natural disasters. At the fourth plenum of the 16th Central Committee in 2004, a resolution 
aiming at consolidating the Party’s diminishing governing capacity was passed. The 
resolution used dire warnings such as ‘fighting corruption is a matter of life and death for 
the Party’ in order to exhort cadres to maintain a sense not only of vigilance but also of 
urgency about the looming threats to the Party (Breslin, 2008a:14; Thornton, 2009).  
Careful readers may infer from the experience of more than six decades since the 
founding of the PRC that crises, no matter whether constructed or real (or in most cases, 
mixed), have been in one way or another serving well the goal of sustaining one party rule. 
Especially since the Deng period, when Party control in various spheres started eroding, 
periodic crises mobilisations have reasserted the Party itself and sustained the current 
political system with maximum tinkering. It has become routine that after the resolving of 
every crisis, the Party reinforces the message that the current system is superior and should 
be sustained. Furthermore, there is a close fit between reinforcing such a message and the 
CCP’s increasing confidence in the Chinese model: one party rule, strong state and 
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. For example, Hu Jintao’s speech at an assembly 
to honour the model cadres in the Sichuan earthquake relief reads: 
 
The superiority of our socialist system, the good qualities of the Chinese 
nation, the politically distinctive character of the people’s army and the firm 
leadership of the CCP, are the predominant political advantages of our country 
and nation which we must always treasure and maintain. (Xinhua, 2008ad) 
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2.4.6 Crisis and the Future of Chinese Politics 
 
The current leadership seems to want to go beyond the instrumental utility of the 
perception of crisis, and tries actively to instil a sense of revolutionary continuity among 
cadres and the people alike (Perry, 2007). This is because the Party is increasingly inclined 
to tap its legitimacy from the 1949 victory (as the symbolic reappearance of the ‘Long live 
Mao Zedong Thoughts’ at the PRC’s 60th anniversary parade might have suggested) since 
it is the Party’s only major achievement that has not been widely disputed. Being seen as 
revolutionary and populist not only will increase the Party’s popularity amid serious social 
divisions, but will also retain the strength and the spirit of ‘plain living and hard struggle’ 
that is much needed in meeting the many more challenges that lie ahead.  
Many misinterpreted the Central Committee’s adoption of Hu’s programme for 
building a socialist harmonious society as the Party’s farewell to revolution because the 
term looked more Confucian than Marxist. In fact, a closer look at the text of the resolution 
might suggest otherwise. The resolution has not dispensed with the dire problems and 
revolutionary rhetoric that usually appear in Party documents. Most noticeable is its 
inclusion of ‘cracking down on the infiltration, subversion and sabotage by hostile forces 
and ensuring China’s political, economic, cultural and informational security’ as one 
crucial task for building a harmonious society (Xinhua, 2006). As such, we can be almost 
certain that some of the revolutionary-era practices will be retained. Furthermore, building 
a harmonious society should be understood as ‘constructing a state of harmony through the 
harmonising of contradictions besetting society’ (Hsiung, 2009:40), an enormous task 
which again requires the vigilance of all. And, on a moment’s reflection, all complex social 
and political systems are contradictory no matter how advanced they have become. So, the 
revolutionary legacies of crisis engineering and crisis mobilisation – which are good at 
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resolving contradictions in the short term – will continue for some time as one of the 
powerful tools in the CCP’s arsenal of governance strategies to tackle intractable problems. 
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The preceding chapter looked at the political utility of crisis as found in various parts of the 
world – in authoritarian but also democratic political systems. To a large extent, this 
phenomenon of crisis being tailored as means towards political ends is universal. 
Nonetheless, the eventual political output of such crisis politicisation still differs, 
depending on the nature of the political system. Arguably, the politicisation or 
manipulation of crisis has more chance of success in authoritarian political systems, mainly 
because political elites in these systems are not bounded by checks and balances to the 
same degree as in liberal democracies. For instance, authoritarian regimes typically tightly 
control the flow of information, a condition that greatly facilitates the domination of 
official discourses or rhetoric on crisis. Subsequently, extra-institutional measures and 
mass mobilisation ‘demanded’ by such crisis narratives more often than not reshape state-
society relations in favour of authoritarian regimes. In contrast, liberal democracies 
inherently possess features which constrain the manipulation of crisis. There are often 
competing crisis discourses that have evolved around the same problems, which inevitably 
weaken the legitimacy of the state’s decisive intervention. Moreover, liberal democracies 
are far less monolithic than authoritarian systems. The separation of powers effectively 
prevents the manipulation of a crisis going to great lengths, and under these institutional 
arrangements the slide of governmental power into the private sphere is never easy, even in 
the name of countering a crisis. All in all, the political context under which crisis 
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manipulation occurs matters most to what the state can do during a crisis or whether its 
objectives will be achieved.  
 
 
3.2 Bringing Politics Back in 
 
The above discussion on the ‘authoritarian advantage’ of crisis manipulation certainly 
applies to China (and China has its distinct characteristics in addition to these authoritarian 
advantages in general). That said, the boundary and content of crisis manipulation in China 
mainly hinges on China’s distinct political context. Surprisingly, as mentioned in the 
Introduction, the crucial importance of contextualising crisis management in China has 
been largely ignored by the existing literature on the topic. In other words, a political 
studies perspective on the subject is missing.  
This problem is particularly prominent in the Chinese literature on China’s crisis 
management, largely because of the way Chinese academia approaches the new subject of 
crisis management. One important task which the Chinese academia and policy circle have 
been doing on modernising crisis management is the importation of modern crisis 
management theories and practices from other countries, especially from the West (Lv et 
al, 2012). These efforts have contributed substantially to administrative improvements in 
Chinese crisis management in recent years, especially in terms of intellectual capacity 
building. Nonetheless, policy advice derived from these studies is often at odds with 
China’s political realities, which render these remedies impractical. For instance, echoing 
western scholars who believe in the advantage of decentralised crisis management over 
centralised solutions, Zhong (2009) argues that local governments should do much more 
when it comes to crisis management. But, as we will see in almost all recent crises, the 
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central Party-state has invariably played a pivotal role. Similarly, imported western 
theories highlight an open approach to crisis management in which civil society plays a 
significant role, whereas for Chinese crises in recent years we have seen either a short-
lived civic effervescence, or the absence of civil society. Mismatches between transplanted 
experience and local context are precisely attributed to the fact that China’s authoritarian 
political system does not possess various institutional attributes as found in liberal 
democracies. The study of China’s crisis management would only scratch the surface 
unless these disparities were taken into account.  
At a deeper level, academic inclinations that centres Chinese crisis management on the 
disciplines of public administration, public management or even management science is 
itself questionable. More than a hundred years ago, Woodrow Wilson (1887) argued in his 
famous article ‘The Study of Administration’ that ‘administration lies outside the proper 
sphere of politics’ because the latter often manipulates the former. This tradition is 
followed by Chinese scholars whose subject of enquiry is a Party-state system where 
administration and politics are highly blended and inseparable. Indeed, the public 
administration approach has enhanced the professionalisation of China’s crisis 
management in one way or another. For example, between 2003 and 2009, China 
formulated 106 contingency plans at the national level, established crisis management 
centres in the State Council, in all provinces and in most cities and counties, and enacted 
more than 60 laws and regulations on crisis management (Zhong, 2009).  
However, the improvement of crisis management has not been linear, as reflected in a 
mixed record on crisis response, where we often find that these new rules and mechanisms 
are not strictly adhered to, with old reflexes periodically offsetting improvements on 
transparency and openness. This back-and-forth is most evident in media control and in the 
state’s tolerance of civic participation. In addition, we can think about an interesting 
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question: when a disaster occurs, why do top Party leaders have to immediately rush to the 
disaster scene to monitor local relief efforts? Aren’t the above administrative, institutional 
and legal measures meant to activate automatically a prompt local response without 
needing the top leadership to intervene personally? It may be fair to say that the 
professionalism of crisis management improved the preparedness for responding to crises. 
However, contextualising crisis management is even more important, because it is not so 
much the level of professionalism or specialism of crisis management as the broader 
political context that determines the ultimate outcome of crisis management.  
One prominent context left unexplained by the administrative perspective is the pivotal 
role of the CCP. As we have argued in the preceding chapter (and will demonstrate below 
in case studies), China’s response to crises is far from depoliticised. It demands substantial 
political skill and calculation. The Party (as opposed to the government) dominates every 
stage of crisis response, from defining to resolving and to playing it down in its aftermath. 
Remember, in the Chinese context, those essential and powerful apparatuses in the political 
system closely related to crisis management – such as the Propaganda Department, the 
Organisational Department, the Discipline Inspection Commission and the Politics & Law 
Commission – are all controlled by the Party rather than the government. Moreover, the 
PLA is indubitably subordinated to the CCP and strictly not to the government, according 
to the current political setting10. On the other hand, the government is largely directed and 
overseen by the Party, and only deals with the 'public administration' aspect of crisis 
management. In other words, the government to a large extent steps back to the position of 
a pure, policy implementer.  
                                                 
10 In fact, the government, i.e. the State Council, faced severe difficulty in trying to command the PLA for 
disaster relief purposes before the PRC Law for National Defence Mobilisation was enacted in 2010. Despite 
this, the PLA has consistently reiterated that it firmly rejects the idea of civilian control of the military and 
argues instead that the PLA only listens to the Party. 
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A political context unique to China, like the one outlined above, is too pervasive to 
ignore. It is therefore important to re-evaluate the limitations of the administrative science 
perspective and to reconsider seriously a better analytical framework which incorporates 
the political context that prevents the benefits of administrative reform from fully 
materialising. 
This chapter is going to deconstruct the Chinese political context into five broad 
dimensions. They are: (a) the GDP centred political economy; (b) state control of 
information; (c) state-society relations; (d) policy making; and (e) international pressure. 
The selection of these is by no means exhaustive or complete. Nevertheless, they are the 
most important backdrops against which the CCP manages the three major crises under 
investigation. Just as Albala-Bertrand (1993) finds in a comparative study that pre-crisis 
conditions shape the post-crisis outcome, similarly, in China, the five dimensions are 
chosen because they are inherently rich in contradictions and largely pre-determine how 
crises originate and unfold in particular ways, and how likely it is that crises of the same 
nature will recur. As much of the development in these realms are path dependent, a brief 
account of the historical evolution of these since the founding of the PRC will be included 
when necessary.  
 
 
3.3 The GDP Centred Political Economy 
 
3.3.1 Legitimating Crises and the Emergence of Performance Legitimacy 
 
The government’s preoccupation with promoting GDP growth rates, or GDPism (Breslin, 
2011:150), to a large extent engendered all three crises in question. This single-minded 
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preoccupation was itself the result of two legitimating crises, one in 1978 and the other in 
1989.  
The CCP leadership in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution faced tremendous 
challenges, both political and economic. Popular disillusion with Maoist utopianism and 
social upheaval put the Party’s legitimacy to the test (Baum, 1991; Goodman, 1994). The 
economic situation was even worse, such that Hua Guofeng, Mao’s designated successor, 
described it as ‘on the brink of collapse’ (Hua, 1978). Thanks to the prevalent perception 
of crisis at the time, Deng Xiaoping was able to rise to prominence and to make a paradigm 
shift, the process of which amounted to the Chinese version of TINA11. The CCP then 
shifted its focus onto economic construction, and managed to reconstruct its legitimating 
base on improving the population’s living standards via economic modernisation. This 
shift may be regarded as the nascent form of performance-based legitimacy for the CCP. 
The 1989 Tiananmen crisis perhaps taught a hard lesson to the CCP leadership about 
performance legitimacy – after all, the crisis first originated from mounting discontent with 
high inflation and a flawed price reform (Naughton, 2007). The hard lesson was that once 
good economic performance was deemed to bring about legitimacy, the government had to 
do whatever it took to keep this momentum in order to meet people’s rising expectations. It 
was an intrinsically unstable base for legitimacy, because even the most capable 
government could not constantly deliver concrete promises that were ratcheting up 
(Davies, 1962; White, 1986; Zhao, 2009). But, without a genuine will for substantive 
political and institutional reforms, the CCP was left with very few choices, and looked 
more and more to the economy as the last, life-saving straw (Weatherley, 2006). This 
economic imperative seemed very pressing when communist regimes fell one after another 
                                                 
11 There is no alternative, often abbreviated as TINA, was a slogan used by former British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher who claimed after the Winter of Discontent of 1978-79, that corporatism would not bring 
Britain any hope and thus economic liberalism was the only viable choice for the country. In the Chinese 
context around the same time, the meaning of TINA was of course much more modest in terms of economic 
and political liberalisation.  
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in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe while during the same period China’s economic 
growth fell from double digit figures to only 3-4% after Tiananmen (UNData, 2012). The 
palpable vulnerable mentality among the CCP leadership was heightened such that Deng 
Xiaoping, who then no longer held any formal titles, had to intervene personally and alert 
his comrades that ‘[If we] do not develop the economy or improve people’s living, it will 
be a dead end’ (Xinhua, 2009a).  
Deng’s tour in south China in 1992 reinvigorated China’s reform and opening, and the 
economy recovered almost immediately (Wong and Zheng, 2001). Since then, economic 
performance has become an ever more important pillar of Party legitimacy12. At the same 
time, there were new additions to the Party discourse which served to support this 
performance-based paradigm. Among others: ‘Development is the core principle’ 
explicitly revealed an implicit social contract in which the people would not demand 
political liberalisation so long as the CCP continued to offer them material and social 
benefits (Tong, 2011); ‘Stability above all’ dictated that any challenge to the political 
status quo or disruption to the economy, rightfully or wrongfully, must be quelled in no 
time; 'Prioritise efficiency while considering equality’ indicated a clear preference towards 
the accumulation over (re)distribution of wealth. 
This new rhetoric had profound implications on crisis and crisis management that 
should not be overlooked. Economic developmentalism went to an extreme, such that it 
confounded development as a means and development as an end, and resulted in the 
government’s neglect of social development and the environment, which undermined both 
social cohesion and resilience in times of crisis13. The emphasis on apparent stability and 
the status quo resulted in many cases of information cover up and misreporting during 
                                                 
12  The other widely agreed legitimating pillars are nationalism and stability, see discussion in the 
introduction.  
13 The single-minded pursuit of economic progress based on neither ideological nor moral principles tended 
to favour individualistic pragmatism, or ‘every man for himself’, which hindered societal collective response 
to crises.  
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crises, and the rhetoric of stability was ill-utilised as a catch-all excuse by local authorities 
to suppress challenges against their self-interest. Worst of all, the preoccupation with 
efficiency paved the way for the dismantling of the socialist welfare state, which at the 
time was regarded as a troublesome legacy of the plan era and thus as inefficient. The 
subsequent marketisation of previous state welfare provisions triggered the end of socialist 
egalitarianism and made people extremely vulnerable against hazards, both in terms of 
financial means and social support.  
 
3.3.2 The Consolidation of Performance Legitimacy and Decentralised 
GDPism 
 
While the above rhetoric accelerated the fading of the remaining socialist tinge of 
economic development, it was the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform that reduced the already non-
ideological notion of economic development to GDPism. Under this new institutional 
arrangement, the division of spending assignments among central and local governments 
was restructured, as were the central-local fiscal incentives. Since then, the central 
government has been mainly responsible for spending on national infrastructure investment 
and national defence. Local governments have been mainly responsible for spending on 
social services (Wong, 2009; Zhao and Lim, 2010). With this expenditure pattern in mind, 
in essence, China’s day to day governance and administration has become much more 
decentralised. In other words, the quality of such governance and administration in terms 
of local public goods provision has become largely dependent on the abundance of local 
government coffers.  
Local governments – especially in less developed provinces – soon found it financially 
pressing to meet multifarious spending obligations that directly affect individuals’ living 
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standards. Nevertheless, local governments as skilful policy entrepreneurs which often 
incorporated their own interests into enforcing central policy (Mertha, 2009) managed to 
handle the budget problem through pragmatically utilising the Tax Sharing System.  
Under this system, local governments were allowed to keep in-house most of the tax 
revenue contributed by local firms. This fiscal arrangement gave local governments huge 
incentives to increase the size of the local economy, measured by GDP growth14, but with 
little concern for the quality and sustainability of such growth. As China’s door opened 
wider to international capital since 1992, one of the key measures and shortcuts to boosting 
GDP growth used by local governments was attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)15; 
in a way, it was not particularly different to other less developed countries in terms of the 
race to the bottom on FDI competition. This pro-FDI policy resulted in deteriorating labour 
standards and caused many industrial-related crises. The environmental crisis was also 
severe. In 2011, China’s annual economic loss as a result of environmental degradation 
was estimated to account for as much as 6% of the GDP in the same year, whereas in 2004 
this figure was only 3% (Financial Times, 2012b). It is no exaggeration that the single-
minded GDPism created as many problems as it was supposed to solve. Critics to GDPism 
referred to superficial economic gain under this development model as ‘blood-soaked 
GDP’. 
Decentralised GDPism also reshaped the specific central-local, fiscal relation 
regarding crisis management, and to some extent widened the regional gap in terms of 
crisis management capacity. Before 1994, most of the disaster relief funding was allocated 
by the central government. For example, from 1983 to 1994, 85% of the disaster relief 
funding in Anhui province was provided by the central government, whereas only 15% 
                                                 
14 From the central government’s point of view, the tax sharing reform also stimulated China’s GDP as a 
whole by allowing some degree of local autonomy and encouraging competition among provinces.  
15 And similarly, during the 2008 global financial crisis when FDI was not easily attainable and when western 
demand shrunk, local governments had to shift from export orientation focused to competition on attracting 
investment from the central government and giant SOEs, in order to sustain local GDP growth.  
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was provided by Anhui itself (Sun, 2004:192). Under the Tax Sharing System, local 
governments were required to shoulder an increasing proportion of crisis management 
funding on their own. But with prevalent GDPism, this important area of public interest 
was underfunded owing to low incentives from local governments, since spending on crisis 
management capacity would not directly contribute to growth figures. As a result, crucial 
disaster prevention facilities such as seismological observatories in some remote areas 
could not even maintain normal operations (Chen, 2012). Whilst underfunding on disaster 
mitigation was a national phenomenon, well-off provinces were in a better position to 
handle crises than less well-off provinces, which were even more financially stretched to 
focus on GDP and keep public services running, let alone managing crises effectively. For 
these regions, underfunding on crisis management was worsened by the GDP imperative, 
which in turn exacerbated the vulnerability to crisis.  
The Tax Sharing System was partly designed to address such inter-regional 
imbalances (not just in crisis management) through transfer payments to poorer provinces 
from the central government, which now had more fiscal resources to dispense. 
Nonetheless, this intention was only partially attained in terms of improving crisis 
management in these provinces. Indeed, the Tax Sharing System strengthened the 
extractive capacity of the central state to a great extent, financially enabled it to launch 
national-scale rescue efforts or mobilisations in an all-out manner, as we shall see in our 
three cases16. But this advantage, or the ‘superiority of socialism reflected in its strength in 
achieving great enterprises through centralisation’, as it often appeared in the official Party 
discourse (Xinhua, 2008ad), could only become apparent after a crisis had already 
occurred. This was owing to the preoccupation with GDP whilst overlooking crisis 
mitigation, and for a long time China adopted an approach featuring ‘stress [ex post] crisis 
                                                 
16 In fact, the first major crisis after the tax sharing reform in which the central government started to flex its 
formidable fiscal capacity was the 1998 flood in central and northeast China. The government also explicitly 
attributed this enhanced crisis management capacity to the reform and opening since 1978. 
 77 
management, overlook [ex ante] crisis mitigation’ (Lei et al, 2005:56). In reality, the 
central government only poured large amounts of resources into a poor region when a 
crisis had already resulted in severe consequences.  
For better or worse, the Tax Sharing System and decentralised GDPism shaped the 
cycle of Chinese crisis management. That was, crises emerged as a result of local 
dysfunctioning political economies, and the central government rushed to handle these 
crises with whatever resources it had. Later in the thesis, we shall analyse the reason for 
the central government to intervene in every major crisis in a very top down manner. 
However, it should first be noted that local governments were also financially dependent 
on the central government on ex post crisis management, especially in poor and remote 
regions.  
The above crisis cycle with Chinese characteristics was a potentially vicious cycle. On 
the one hand, it increased the burdens that a non-omnipotent central government had to 
shoulder, whilst on the other hand it did not guarantee that crises of a similar nature would 
not emerge locally again. Such discursive crisis management only sought to lessen 
phenomenally the impact of these crises rather than addressing the root of GDPism. The 
central government seemed to be aware of the problem and sought to replace – or at least 
complement GDPism, with less materialistic oriented development paradigms, such as the 
SDC and ‘Harmonious Society’, which respectively injected sustainability and justice into 
the meaning of development. However, their advent has not fundamentally changed 
GDPism. The explanation to this lied in the design of the CCP’s reform era nomenklatura 
system, or the cadre management system.  
 
3.3.3 GDPism and Cadre Management 
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Since the inception of reform, meritocracy and technocracy have become important norms 
in cadre evaluation. Incumbent performance weighed more than anything else in 
determining the promotion of officials. This norm has been institutionalised with the 
introduction of a target responsibility system in which targets of a set of important tasks 
were defined by the superior government as evaluation criteria for officials’ mobility. 
These targets thus induced officials to work hard in areas to which the superior government 
attached importance (Tsui and Wang, 2004).  
The target responsibility system had two features that contributed much to local 
officials’ obsession with GDP growth. First, influenced by the prevalent technocratic 
culture in the bureaucracy since the 1980s (and perhaps by the legacy of the plan), the set 
targets were heavily biased towards quantitative measures. These targets gave local 
officials incentives to focus on tasks that were quantitatively measurable such as GDP 
growth, so that they could appear to stand out among competitors. However, at the same 
time it led to officials’ lack of interest in important works on which performance could not 
be quantified or objectively evaluated, such as welfare and environmental protection.  
The second feature was that targets for cadre evaluation were divided into hard and 
soft targets. The former included regime imperatives such as GDP growth and stability, 
whereas the latter included less mandatory tasks which happened to overlap with 
abovementioned non-measurable tasks. In practice, hard targets could not be compromised, 
as failing to achieve these would lead to mandatory administrative punishment or yipiao 
foujue
17 . On the other hand, under-performance on soft targets could be effectively 
compensated by over-performance on hard targets (Shih et al, 2012). This only exacerbated 
the bias towards GDPism because cadre evaluations by design favoured those with good 
performance on short-term quantitative results, even if they failed to fulfil soft targets that 
                                                 
17 It meant that the failing to fulfil one hard target would have a very serious consequence on an official’s 
political career.  
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were mostly defined qualitatively and weighed less than hard targets in cadre evaluation, 
but were nonetheless crucial to people’s livelihood.  
It was therefore apparent that the innovation on the Party ideology and the 
development philosophy could not guarantee a paradigm shift towards a more inclusive, 
sustainable and crisis-prepared development. Cadre evaluation specifics, which determined 
the incentive structure of local officials, have largely remained unchanged following the 
introduction of the SDC and ‘Harmonious Society’, as has GDPism (Wu, 2011). Without 
reforming the guiding philosophy of the nomenklatura system, the vicious circles of 
GDPism-led crises would continue.  
 
3.3.4 GDPism and Governance Deficits 
 
All in all, performance-based legitimacy, the Tax Sharing System and the preference of the 
nomenklatura system have kept GDPism locked in. GDPism engendered governance crises 
and dilemmas. Local governments and officials were caught between developing the 
economy on the one hand, and handling the side effects of it on the other. Most local 
governments opted for an exclusive focus on stimulating GDP in the hope that socio-
economic dislocations would eventually be overcome as a result of high levels of GDP per 
capita. A series of governance dysfunctions thus emerged. As we shall see in the case 
studies, GDPism gave rise to crises in the forms of: (a) covering up epidemics for the fear 
of GDP growth slowing down (SARS); (b) poor infrastructure in remote areas and 
overlooking building code enforcements (Sichuan Earthquake); and (c) symbiotic relations 
between local governments and local enterprises under which GDP was generated at the 
expense of public health. While these three crises had something in common such that they 
all became crises of legitimacy in their consequences, it was largely GDPism that 
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contributed to the escalating of local and generic crises into (inter)national and political 




3.4 State Control of Information 
 
3.4.1 Media Control and the Politicisation of Crisis under Mao 
 
For a long time since the founding of the PRC, state control of information was a powerful 
instrument in the CCP’s arsenal of crisis control. In the Mao era, it could be said that there 
were no crises if these crises were not reported at all. The Party mouthpiece alone had the 
ability to conceal a crisis, and the severity of a crisis would mostly depend on the Party 
propaganda. As the CCP enjoyed a high degree of ideological legitimacy in the Mao era, 
Party propaganda worked well (in terms of not reporting) such that some of the most 
devastating disasters in the 20th century were little known until their official 
declassification decades later. For example, a domino effect of dam bursts following heavy 
rain in August 1975 in Henan province which claimed at least 200,000 lives was not fully 
disclosed until 2005 (People’s Net, 2005).  
The CCP was deeply concerned that once disasters like these were made public, this 
might give rise to connotations that it was losing the Mandate of Heaven – a traditional 
Chinese conception of regime legitimacy that Heaven would only bless a legitimate ruler 
whose conduct was good and moral (Zhao, 2009). In ancient China, connections were 
drawn between disasters and the emperor’s loss of the sacred mandate bestowed from the 
Heaven, and such beliefs were held among rulers and the ruled alike (Gries and Rosen, 
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2004; Zhao, 2009). Even in Mao’s China, the legacy of such beliefs still existed, especially 
in the vast countryside where superstition persisted. Thus the CCP feared that disasters 
would be perceived as a signal, suggesting that its rule was no longer legitimate.  
From the CCP’s own international perspective at the time, it had plenty of reasons not 
to disclose its sufferings, as it believed that hostile neighbouring countries, especially 
Taiwan, might be prompted to take advantage of China’s disasters when the PLA was busy 
handling disaster relief. The CCP also regarded such disasters as tarnishing the PRC’s 
external image, because it deemed excessive narrative about the misery of its people as 
contradictory to its self-promoted image of an energetic, proud and self-reliant, ‘new’ 
China. Another consideration was that once the disaster became internationally known, 
China would be under international pressure to accept international aid, which it was never 
prepared to accept because the CCP saw such action as indicative of weak national strength 
(Chen, 2012).  
Even in the event that crises or disasters had to be reported domestically, details of the 
devastation were rarely mentioned. Instead, reporting was geared towards promoting class 
struggle and nationalist sentiment that centred upon the inculcation of Maoist doctrine. 
This form of manipulation was taken to the extreme during the 1970s, to the extent that 
media Professor Wang Zhong at Fudan University concluded that ‘disaster itself is not 
news, disaster relief is’ (Dong et al, 2010).  
For the abovementioned dam bursts, state media journalists who wrote reports about 
the disaster were asked to focus their reports on class struggle and the people’s undaunted 
revolutionary spirit in fighting the flood (Southern Metropolis Daily, 2010). For the 1970 
Tonghai Earthquake in Yunnan province, local media only published a short piece four 
days after the earthquake in which even the exact location of the quake was not mentioned 
(vaguely described as ‘to the south of Kunming’), let alone casualties and damage caused 
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(China Youth Daily, 2000). Later, state media reports alleged that the revolutionary masses 
heroically fought the disaster with the guidance of the Mao Zedong Thought, and they 
refused and returned all aid materials and funds sent from other parts of China, keeping 
only Mao’s writings, portraits and badges which were said to give them emotional support 
(People’s Net, 2008a).  
Although Mao’s teaching has disappeared in disaster reporting since the reform, some 
Mao era news practices survived and continued to influence the present day disaster 
reporting paradigm. One long-lasting tradition was always framing disaster news in a 
positive light. It was exemplary of how the CCP manipulated a crisis through political 
reconstruction and linguistic narration. This practice required journalists to highlight 
government responses such as leadership directives and disaster relief mobilisation, at the 
same time constructing themes of collectivism and patriotism through writing, and 
sometimes even making up heroic stories about the people’s extraordinary bravery. Such 
distortion artificially turned a miserable atmosphere into a nationalist fever such that 
Chinese journalists referred to this type of distortion as ‘reporting sad news as if it is happy 
news’ (Wu and Xia, 2010). While in the early years of the PRC such distortive framing 
was primarily aimed at consolidating the Party’s ideological legitimacy, in that heroic 
disaster relief exemplified that only the CCP could lead the people in claiming victory in 
the war against nature. This practice has a surprising longevity despite the fact that the 
CCP’s radical revolutionary ideology has been abandoned. Nowadays it has been used 
mainly as a tactic for the government to shirk responsibility for disasters and incidents, for 
which it could have done better in ex ante crisis mitigation. The constructed heroic theme 
is often filled with touching elements that distract people from substantive reflections on 
the crisis or potential accountability issues associated with it.  
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3.4.2 Limited Media Liberalisation under Deng 
 
Although the ultimate purpose of information control has always been to preserve one 
party rule, since the inception of the reform its focus has varied considerably in different 
leadership eras in accordance with legitimating priorities in that era18. In the early Deng 
era, the control of information was loosened temporarily to serve the thought liberation 
from Maoist dogma and to help construct the image of a more legal-rational based and 
accountable Party leadership that was different from Mao (Weatherley, 2006). The PRC’s 
first report of a crisis with a good degree of objectivity was therefore released shortly after 
Deng rose to prominence. In July 1980, the People’s Daily disclosed that eight months ago 
the Bohai No.2, an oil-drilling ship, sank owing to negligence, killing 72 workers on board. 
This report then triggered a series of criticisms and reflections, culminating in the removal 
of the Oil Minister and a serious demerit for Kang Shi’en, Vice Premier in charge of the oil 
industry – all of which constituted unprecedented accountability measures in the PRC’s 
history (News Front, 1980).  
In the 1980s, limited political liberalisation was accompanied by the increasing 
availability of alternative sources of information to the Chinese society. People’s emerging 
consciousness of the right to information and right to know contributed to the growing 
popularity of western radios such as the BBC and the VOA, especially when something 
bad happened but state media kept silent. This situation forced the propaganda department 
to abandon its old approach of a complete information blackout and it injected some 
reformative elements commensurate with China’s open gesture at the time (Zhao, 1998). 
For example, the central propaganda department in 1987 issued a directive which required 
                                                 
18 Sources or pillars of legitimacy on which each leadership built to highlight their distinctiveness from 
previous leaderships, examples of legitimating priorities included legal–rational reform, economic 
performance, nationalism and stability.  
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state media to report ahead of foreign media on incidents and emergencies that had the 
potential to attract international attention. Even critical comments were permitted so as to 
increase the reports’ authenticity (People's Net, 2007b). This measure had a more positive 
effect than its initial intention of establishing and consolidating Chinese state media’s 
credibility in the international community and in the face of competition from foreign 
media, because the same messages would eventually reach the domestic audience and 
therefore improve the Chinese people’s access to information. This was in line with the 
CCP’s renewed state-society relations discourse set out at the 13th PC: ‘major issues should 
be made known to the people; major questions should be discussed with the people before 
being resolved’ (Zhao, 1987).  
 
3.4.3 Further Media Liberalisation and the Commercialisation of the 
Media under Jiang 
 
The Tiananmen crackdown brought to a halt this move towards greater transparency. Party 
theorists and propagandists reflected on why the propaganda apparatus failed to persuade 
the people – and especially young people – to continue accepting its rule. The critical task 
was to revitalise the propaganda system so that it remained relevant. There were two 
dimensions of this reinvigoration project: one was the introduction of an intensive patriotic 
education campaign into the syllabus, which was later regarded by many as the main boost 
to the nationalist pillar of regime legitimacy among young people; the other dimension was 
to renew the contents of propaganda, ensuring stale ideologies were replaced by more 
materialistic and nationalistic content, reoriented to social and generational change.  
Reinvigorating propaganda needed more funding which the old state-funded model 
could not provide. The goal of making propaganda more appealing also demanded more 
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decentralisation and press freedom. A programme of propaganda commercialisation and 
marketisation aimed at meeting both needs was thus launched in the early 1990s, and has 
hitherto helped maintain the importance of information control as a pivotal means of social 
control in China (Brady, 2008). Ironically, this market-oriented reform in propaganda and 
thought work has become largely successful in grafting the seemingly contradicting 
systems of a market economy under communist rule.  
Although the marketisation of propaganda was intended to strengthen the Party’s 
influence over society, economic liberalisation in the media inevitably created more space 
for press freedom, which bred the innovation, entrepreneurship and (relative) autonomy of 
media outlets (Zhao, 1998). Running with many fewer or even without state subsidies19, 
media outlets (especially tabloid metropolitan newspapers) paid more attention to 
multifarious problems as a result of the intense socio-economic transformation in order to 
meet readership interest. Furthermore, owing to profit incentives, the red line on reporting 
was occasionally crossed. More commonly, sensitive issues were reported according to the 
strategy of ‘hitting line balls’ (da cabianqiu) (Jirik, 2008:376)20.  
The impetus of media commercialisation, along with newly-found media autonomy, 
soon gave rise to situations in which the media were able to expose the ‘dark side’ and 
cracks within the system. Beijing-based central media outlets in particular seemed to 
stretch their implied political status and checked local governments’ abuse of power. 
Rather than viewing media autonomy as a threat which destabilised the system, the Jiang-
Zhu leadership at the time attempted strategically to utilise this media autonomy in order to 
hold together an increasingly decentralised state. In fact, some degree of instrumental 
media vocality had not always been to the disadvantage of communist systems. From the 
                                                 
19 In fact, tabloid metropolitan newspapers controlled by Party papers have been operating like cash cows. 
Their profits are extracted by Party papers which fall far behind in terms of meeting readers’ interest but can 
do little to change their styles because of their roles as the Party’s mouthpiece and part of the transmission 
belt.  
20A table tennis metaphor which means doing something controversial but still somewhat permissible.   
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1960s, the CCP’s counterparts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had employed 
similar media strategies to help the leadership oversee restive local behaviour as well as 
addressing welfare issues of major public concern (White, 1986). In addition, the way the 
Chinese leadership utilised the media was very similar to the way they treated the law – ‘an 
instrument for carrying out certain designs of the state’ (Schram, 1987:x).  
The CCP leadership in the 1990s was faced with a situation in which the centre was 
weaker, and untamed local governments were tempted by all sorts of economic incentives 
to engage in wrongdoing. It became increasingly difficult for the centre to enforce policies 
in the localities; as the popular saying went, ‘Policies decided at Zhongnanhai did not 
make them out of Zhongnanhai’. However, leaders in Beijing were desperate to know the 
real situation on the ground because information they ultimately received had been 
carefully filtered or even fabricated, level-by-level in the Party-state hierarchy. As 
Lieberthal (1995:175) pointed out, the state itself became a victim of tight information 
control, because  
[It] has led to a policy of suppressing all independent sources of information 
gathering and transmittal, such as a free press. By thus denying themselves the 
one relatively systematic option for checking the accuracy of the information 
they receive, the top Chinese leaders have made themselves virtual captives of 
their own system and of the distortions it inevitably produces. 
 
Jiang and Zhu were thus determined to inject limited checks and balances into the 
system by allowing the media to partially fulfil their role as watchdogs. They used the 
media to expose ‘officially denounced’ wrongdoings in the localities and to air grievances 
for the people affected in order to ‘smooth the rough edges of the ongoing Chinese 
transformation’ (Zhao, 2000:591-2). Pioneered by China Central Television (CCTV)’s 
Focus programme (jiaodian fangtan), critical reports flourished in the mid 1990s. Zhu 
Rongji in particular stressed the importance of the media’s watchdog role on numerous 
occasions and even personally visited CCTV’s Focus programme to show support for 
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critical reporting (Nanfang Daily, 2011). In the late 1990s, investigative journalism became 
popular in Chinese media.  
With the combination of leaders’ political calculation and the media’s profit motive, 
China’s media landscape became more dynamic. This change was no more evident than in 
crisis and disaster reporting, as these became much less of a taboo from the mid-1990s 
onwards (Li, 2009). Disasters such as the 1998 flood and the 1999 Yantai shipwreck were 
covered rapidly. Notable among them was the Fanglin school explosion mentioned in the 
previous chapter, which was not only reported quickly by local metropolitan newspapers, 
but eventually resulted in an apology from Zhu Rongji who would have been otherwise 
cheated by the local government in Jiangxi province. However, disaster reporting during 
this period was characterised by objective reporting on details, combined with attempts to 
play down responsibility attribution, especially to senior officials – a style still prevalent 
today. 
There were remarkable progresses during the Jiang era in the reporting of one-off 
crises after they tragically happened, such as natural disasters and industrial incidents. 
However, when it came to emerging crises, censorship was still prevalent and reporting 
would take much longer to go public. As previously mentioned, since the early Jiang era, 
GDPism has become the dominant development model, especially at the local level. Crises 
or negative news that had the potential to dampen the all-important local economic 
prospect would almost certainly have been censored. In such cases, censorship was often 
implemented at the local level but sometimes also strengthened from the centre as well. 
For instance, when the SARS crisis first emerged in late 2002 in Guangdong province, the 
news was first covered up by the local government but then banned nationally by the 
Central Propaganda Department when the situation was reported internally to Beijing 
(Wen, 2009). Certainly, the motives for a complete news blackout on the SARS outbreak 
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could be attributed to a mixture of economic and political considerations. Although the  
political caution to ensure that the once in a decade leadership transition would not be 
interrupted seemed to be the prime concern, it should be noted that equally important was 
Guangdong province’s concern that news about the mysterious virus might disrupt 
economic activities and slow down GDP and FDI growth (Zheng and Lye, 2004).  
This heavy censorship on emerging crises with potentially adverse economic 
implications seemed at odds with improved transparency on crisis reporting ex post. 
However, they were not contradictory in essence, but further confirmed the mere 
instrumental utility of the media as confined by the Party, as we suggested above. The fact 
that crises of different natures were treated differently, and the Party’s readiness to switch 
the media on and off according to different situations, revealed its desire to manage the 
information flow in a way that only favoured the enhancement of its supremacy (Zeitlin, 
2003). Given such distorted relations between the Party’s supremacy and media openness, 
it was natural that policies in propaganda and thought work had to be adapted to serve the 
Party’s overall priority, which was an overriding emphasis on economic growth at the 
time. From this understanding, these limited transparency measures did not so much 
represent a move to empower the media as disciplinary measures against localities, in the 
hope that they would promote economic development in line with central policies. 
Likewise, news that might jeopardise economic growth ought to be filtered in order to 
maintain market and consumer confidence, a prevalent post-1992 practice which Brady 
(2008:3) called ‘economic propaganda’.  
Jiang’s propaganda policy of commercialising the media, though it bred media 
autonomy to a limited degree, in fact amplified the Party’s voice in society through the 
explosive growth in the number of media outlets 21 . Overall, Jiang’s economically 
                                                 
21 It was fair to state that owing to a surge in the number of media outlets carrying pro–CCP messages 
(especially in the form of economic propaganda, a good example would be promoting consumerism and 
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liberalising approach reflected the logic of establishing a socialist market economy, a 
principle enshrined at the 14th PC in 1992. It revealed the Party leadership’s renewed 
commitments to openness and reform, a gesture that was believed to create a favourable 
international environment and better international perceptions of China, which would in 
turn favour China’s domestic economic development. In addition, Jiang himself was said 
to have played a supporting role in introducing the Internet to China for stimulating 
economic growth (Duowei Blog, 2012). Despite the fact that economically-sensitive issues 
became a new area frequently subject to censorship, media control on many more topics 
which were considered politically sensitive in the 1980s were relaxed, and overall media 
control under Jiang was considerably looser than under Deng.  
 
3.4.4 The Internet and Moulding Public Opinion under Hu 
 
When Hu Jintao was inaugurated as General Secretary of the CCP in 2002 and President of 
the PRC in 2003 respectively, he faced a China with rising social tensions and inequality, 
more complex state-society relations and more interdependent external relations as a result 
of China’s integration into the world economy and multilateral institutions. He once said, 
‘In balancing reform, development and stability, the contradictions and problems we face 
are rarely seen elsewhere in the world, in terms of both their scale and complexity’ 
(Xinhua, 2008). In carefully navigating through these tremendous challenges, reformative 
space and policy options left for him were limited compared with his predecessors because 
of the fragility of a divisive society.  
                                                                                                                                                    
attributing these newly available choices to rising living standards as a result of the Party’s open and reform 
policies. In this respect, the Party’s discursive presence (be it in the forms of promoting consumerism or 
nationalism) in the society did not decline in the 1990s compared to the 1980s and sometimes it even 
increased. To what extent these messages were believed at the receiving end, was another matter.  
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In the realm of propaganda policy, there was no apparent distinctiveness during his ten 
years in power. Observers saw him choosing to go with the tide in terms of ongoing 
developments in state-society relations and fine tuning the level of media openness 
accordingly22. Interestingly, in the propaganda realm there were periodic resurgences of 
practices prevalent in the Mao, Deng and Jiang eras. This combination of past practices in 
his tenure was another indication that policy choices were locked in by the complex and 
changing socio–political landscape, and that path dependency was too strong to depart 
from. 
From the point of view of the Party’s division of power, another contributing factor of 
this lack of distinctiveness was that since Hu took office in 2002, the propaganda apparatus 
had enjoyed more authority in top decision making circles than it had under previous 
leadership eras. From 2002 to 2012, the Party’s propaganda chief (Li Changchun) had a 
seat in the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), whereas in the past, the 
Party leader in charge of propaganda was only a member of the full Politburo and he had to 
make propaganda-related decisions in consultation with the General Secretary. In other 
words, Hu as a ‘first among equals’ General Secretary (Miller, 2011:5) had less of a say in 
propaganda than previous paramount leaders because many propaganda-related decisions 
were believed to be made by Li on his own.  
However, first and foremost, Hu’s inefficacy in putting his own stamp on the evolution 
of the CCP’s propaganda should be attributed to the popularity of the Internet and the rise 
of grassroots or unorthodox discourses as its immediate consequence. This emergence of 
alternative sources of information and discourses represented a significant counterweight 
to the Party’s traditional propaganda to the extent that in the Chinese academia, there has 
                                                 
22 It was evident in our three case studies in that even in regard to each individual crisis the permitted level of 
media transparency varied considerably in different stages of crisis development.  
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been discussion on and acceptance of the notion of two different public spaces in China 
(Fang, 2004).   
 
I. The Two, Fractured Public Spaces 
 
One public space was the official or ‘mainstream’ public space, dominated by state media 
which essentially performed their role as the Party’s mouthpiece preoccupied with 
conveying indoctrination from the top. The other public space was one formed by popular 
expressions on the Internet, dominated by grassroots discussion and even discourse (Fei, 
2012). In this newly emerged and increasingly influential public space, information 
followed horizontally between citizens as opposed to the top-down communication of state 
media (Rawnsley, 2007). Moreover, as the level of online interaction between citizens 
increased, it posed a threat to the Party either in the form of offline organised activities or 
in their potential to challenge the Party’s hegemonic discourse in the form of a bottom-up 
alternative discourse.  
This predicament of two public spaces arose because they did not often engage with 
each other, which exacerbated the alienation between the Party and the people. The two 
public spaces seemed to be preoccupied with their own agendas and there had been little 
resonance between the two. The official public space bombarded the populace with 
messages boasted of China’s domestic harmony and international prestige, which created a 
‘virtual China’ filled with happiness and pride, whereas the grassroots public space 
presented a much more ‘real’ China, dominated by grievance and complaints about 
multifarious problems created by China’s ‘trapped transition’ (Pei, 2006). The contrast 
between the two was so stark that even the chief of the People’s Daily acknowledged a 
popular saying that ‘only by watching the CCTV News’s [positive stories] for seven 
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consecutive days could cure the negative emotion caused by browsing microblogs for just 
half a day’ (Oriental Morning Post, 2012). 
The huge gap between the two public spaces became a credibility gap when it came to 
political trust (Rawnsley, 2007). When something that had a great impact occurred but 
state media pretended that life was going on as normal, the thirst and curiosity for 
information by Internet users induced them to embrace whatever alternative sources of 
information were available, regardless of its authenticity. In this way, state media might 
well have been discredited by false information or even rumours – a propaganda fiasco for 
the Party which sought to mould public opinion in its favour. Also, the rampant spread of 
rumours caused what the regime feared most – social instability as a result of opacity.  
Given the Internet’s new empowerment of the people as well as the lack of 
connectivity between the two public spaces, the Party’s means of information control in the 
pre-digital age (which was effective in the official public space only) became increasingly 
counterproductive in a wired era. This was most evident when it came to crisis 
communication. When SARS and other public health-related crises occurred, people were 
scrambling to flee the supposedly unsafe places and rushed into all sorts of panic buying 
which was based on gossip owing to the absence of official clarity. This chaos imposed 
great pressures on governance. The official public space often did not respond to the 
concerns of the grassroots public space until the situation had already become chaotic.  
 
II. Bridging the Two Public Spaces 
 
In light of the official media’s increasingly marginalised position in public life in terms of 
both their influence and reputation (especially after the lesson of SARS), the Hu-Wen 
leadership took measures to increase transparency in the hope of rebuilding the 
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government’s credibility. In a similar fashion to improving the people’s right to 
information under Deng when new sources of information beyond the Party’s control were 
available, Hu-Wen made considerable efforts to institutionalise and give legal backing to 
news reporting on facts that were impossible to conceal in an Internet era. According to the 
Party’s latest rhetoric pertaining to propaganda, the people’s ‘rights to know, rights to 
participate, rights to express and rights to check’ should be guaranteed (People’s Daily, 
2008a). This move was clearly oriented towards enhancing the regime’s legal-rational 
legitimacy.  
Rather than letting go of the potentially destructive undercurrent of unofficial 
information, the state sought to minimise its impact on social stability by proactively 
setting agendas and providing the official account before the issue became popular in 
public discussion, a media practice Hu Jintao explicitly encouraged (People’s Daily, 
2008a). Since SARS, state media has been prompt in reporting carefully edited facts and 
narratives on major incidents23. In doing so, state media successfully prevented its position 
from being further marginalised because its press releases often came ahead of non-state 
and foreign media competitors, thanks to its more extensive reporter network and its 
privileged access to the scene. This advantage was amplified when a crisis occurred in a 
remote place. For instance, in the Sichuan earthquake and in the Urumqi riot in 2009, most 
international media had to quote Xinhua in their reports. 
 
III. Further Media Professionalisation 
 
For the official public space, being more transparent as a response to the Internet was not 
enough, as the audience of this public space has been in gradual decline. The young and 
                                                 
23 But only one source of release was permitted, often the Xinhua News Agency, even other state media 
outlets had to reproduce exactly the Xinhua version. 
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educated generation regarded the Internet as the primary source of information, mainly 
owing to the state media’s overly official and impersonal style. This dynamic 
demographical group, growing in influence, was thus alienated by the Party mouthpieces 
of CCTV and official newspapers. As of 2012, China had the largest online population in 
the world of 538 million (BBC, 2012). In order for the Party’s voice to become more 
appealing to this ever expanding and increasingly picky audience, Hu furthered Jiang’s 
efforts on professionalising the state media.  
This professionalisation push was tripartite. First, state media outlets were required to 
improve their operations in terms of professional standards and audience consciousness, 
such as ‘making reports according to media conventions’24 and to ‘research thoroughly the 
preferences of each audience group and their psychological characteristics, and cater media 
content accordingly’ (People’s Daily, 2008a). Successful media practices around the world 
– from methods of subtle mass persuasion in western democratic societies to outright but 
effective tactics of indoctrination in Cuba and North Korea – were studied, adapted and 
incorporated into Chinese media to improve their performance (Brady, 2008).  
Second, the marketisation and commercialisation of the media has been furthered 
under Hu. Modelled upon western media conglomerates such as Murdoch, Chinese state 
media in the late Jiang era established a few giant media groups, and this process of merge 
and reconfiguration accelerated in the Hu era. Referred to as ‘carriers’ in the media 
industry, these media groups often brought newspapers, TV, radio and web portals under 
one roof in an attempt to rationalise resource utilisation and thus enhance their influence 
over society. These Party-controlled media groups were adept at taking advantage of a 
variety of means of financing provided by a market economy to strengthen the Party-state. 
Symbolically and ironically, the web portal of the People’s Daily, the People’s Net, has 
                                                 
24 Here media convention was mentioned in contrast to propaganda, and referred to internationally accepted 
and tested (mostly western) communication theories and practices, as opposed to outmoded Party propaganda 
practices.  
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been listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since April 2012 (Financial Times, 2012a). 
These measures were not only aimed at strengthening state media financially, but were 
considered to secure China’s cultural and ideological security by outcompeting those non-
state and less financially able media outlets that promoted alternative discourses. They 
were also in line with the Party’s renewed emphasis on ‘cultural prosperity’ and on 
developing a stronger cultural industry to enhance China’s ideational appeal both at home 
and around the world (Gov.cn, 2011a).  
While strengthening state media through market means has raised their visibility, it 
may come at the cost of (already limited) press freedom, because the integration of these 
media outlets was primarily achieved through the government-directed centralisation of 
resources. These media giants thus gained a monopoly, not based on their credibility, but 
on governmental support. More worryingly, they have been susceptible both to 
governmental influence and commercial profit motives after intense marketisation, 
whereas in the past they were only mainly constrained by the former. In effect, given the 
context of closely tied-up political and capital power, business interests could easily 
manipulate the media to their advantage, as long as they secured access to either power. 
The media, on the other hand, has not been provided with any institutional insurance25 or 
significant (monetary or moral) incentives to be accountable to people’s interests (Zhou, 
2010). Media corruption where businesses paid off the media for false stories and 
advertising has thus been widespread. In the case study of the Sanlu milk scandal, we will 
see how this collusion did not just threaten public health, but the popular perception of the 
credibility of the government. It will also reveal that this ungoverned but profiteering 
trilateral intimacy between government, business and media has even led to non-state 
media’s involvement in media corruption. Given that the Sanlu case was not the first such 
                                                 
25 The Chinese legislature and academia discussed to enact a Press Law in the 1980s in order to not only 
protect press freedom but also make the media accountable to public interests, but the proposal was removed 
from the agenda because of the Tiananmen protest.  
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instance, it raised serious questions as to whether media commercialisation under a market 
authoritarian political system would lead to greater civil liberty.  
Last, Hu sought to bridge the gap between the two public spaces by ‘mainstreaming’ 
the official public space. In this respect, some Maoist methods and practices were revived, 
especially the emphasis on the mass line (as opposed to the Party line which made official 
media look more like ‘media run for the officials’ rather than run for the people). More 
precisely, official media were still required to convey propaganda, but they were also 
expected to provide more and more informative messages to the people, using its exclusive 
access to government information and agencies. In Hu’s words, the official media should 
follow the norm of ‘three closeness’: ‘close to reality, close to real life and close to the 
masses’ (People’s Daily, 2008a). In so doing, official media permeated people’s everyday 
life as something essential, if not as appealing as those tabloid metropolitan media in the 
popular public space. This emphasised relevance to the populace was manifested most 
when the Party-state publicly recognised a crisis situation and took steps to combat it. We 
shall see in all case studies that the full mobilisation of official media was an integral part 
of crisis management. For the official media, it has become a political mission of 
reconnecting with the people to convey crucial information regarding their wellbeing. For 
instance, crucial information that was extensively publicised by the official media included 
daily updates on the pandemic situation during SARS and tips for how to avoid its 
transmission, and product recalls and safe lists during the milk scandal. In the first week 
following the Sichuan earthquake, the official media outperformed their foreign 
counterparts on promptness and details.  
The other strand of ‘mainstreaming’ was to modernise the official media’s means of 
dissemination so as to reach previously lost audiences. The state invested heavily in state-
of-the-art technology to help the official media outcompete non-state rivals, in order at 
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least partly to compensate for their disadvantaged reputation. In the Hu era, the project of 
expanding the influence of the official public space into the popular public space went 
much beyond simply hosting websites (which most media outlets had done a decade ago). 
Utilising the latest technology for propaganda could also happen offline. For example, 
many people have long found that CCTV’s 7 o’clock news (xinwen lianbo) to be boring 
and rarely watched it at home. However, nowadays people have to live with it because it is 
now broadcast to commuters on every mobile TV, on the underground and on buses. 
Indeed, not all approaches used were that aggressive. Softer and more interactive methods 
were also used. For instance, many official media outlets in recent years had a presence in 
mainstream non-state social media to influence young audiences there with politically light 
messages. Like western political parties that saw online campaigns as part of their political 
marketing, top CCP leaders were sometimes invited to online chat rooms before important 
conferences to solicit opinions and hear complaints from netizens. At a Xinhua-hosted 
online interactive session in 2010, Wen Jiabao spoke specifically on the milk scandal and 
explained the remedial measures that had been put in place (Xinhua, 2010c). Because of its 
less formal communication style, online interaction with the people has become another 
crisis management or public relations approach that the Chinese leadership has been using 
(Chinese leaders had few chances to speak to the ordinary people and vice versa).  
On the other hand, in terms of mainstreaming, non-state and online media have been 
‘mainstreamed’ into the Party-state’s formal institution for media censorship through 
cooption. Unlike in the Jiang era, when the Party propaganda apparatus acted reactively 
and only rushed to delete inappropriate content once it was already in the public domain, in 
the Hu era, content like this was everywhere and the same strategy would stretch the 
censorship mechanism too greatly. The Party therefore took pre-emptive measures to 
macro-manage media content by revising laws and provisions in relation to the media, 
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especially online content, which western Internet providers had to obey when operating in 
China26 . Less binding but more practical rules were made by associations of Internet 
providers (which again co-opted western and non-state Chinese companies) for Internet 
businesses to follow. In terms of the day to day micro management, extra-judicial 
directives regarding content were dispatched from various agencies more frequently during 
crises (Brady, 2012). Most directives were issue-based, requested that chief editors at 
major websites be prepared to filter content before discussion regarding an event of major 
disruption gained momentum27. These orders comprised more sophisticated tactics than 
simply deleting – for example, what to play down (or up), what to recommend to netizens 
on pop-up windows, and which keywords to filter in search engines. All this was to ensure 
that any disrupting news was only known to a tiny community of intellectuals and 
dissidents.  
In addition, as the rules for website hosting have been tightened in recent years to 
encourage the culture of self-censorship, many site owners have made explicit rules for 
their users and prohibited the discussion of politics. In effect, this delegated the task of 
censorship level-by-level, gave agents outside the Party-state apparatus considerable power 
over information control. Predictably, this power has been abused, as we will see in the 
milk scandal case.  
 
IV. Moulding Public Opinion 
 
Constructed their image as populist leaders, the Hu-Wen leadership posited itself on the 
centre-left stage of China’s political spectrum. This was a deliberate effort, despite the fact 
                                                 
26  Content providers such as Yahoo and Internet infrastructure providers like Cisco have cited these 
regulations as an excuse for their cooperation with the Chinese government.   
27 For illustration, see orders from various censors regarding the awarding of Nobel Peace Prize to Liu 
Xiaobo at http://zhenlibu.wordpress.com/2010/10/08/liuxiaobo/ 
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that both leaders embarked on political careers in poor, inland provinces. When they took 
power in 2002-3, the growth of China’s economic and social inequality was accelerating as 
a result of a decade-long, pro-market liberalisation under Jiang-Zhu that disproportionately 
benefited those who were politically well connected. At the same time, the political 
spectrum became even more stretched, represented by the growing popularity of the New 
Left and the Old Left, as well as liberals at both ends, at the cost of the officially promoted, 
state-led capitalist developmentalism. The leading sociologist, Sun Liping, argued as early 
as 2005 that the reform consensus had largely broken down (Economic Observer, 2005).  
With the New Left and the liberals radically advocating their prescribed alternatives, 
and with the Old Left’s ability to mobilise mass discontent with the current development 
model, the Hu-Wen leadership as a weak central leadership had to take with caution any 
reforms that might seem to favour either camp, especially in the realm of ideology. What 
they wanted (or the only option left) was to build up as much economic capacity as 
possible in the so called period of strategic opportunities, and continued to tinker with the 
current system. In other words, without a reform consensus, they were (at least being 
perceived as) replacing (socio-political) reform with (economic) development. In Hu’s 
own words, ‘No waver, no slack and no U-turn [with the current development path]’ 
(Xinhua, 2008; 2012), which resembled Deng’s ‘No debate’ thesis proclaimed in 1992.   
Despite the distaste of the ‘no U-turn’ thesis among intellectuals, it was more 
acceptable to the ordinary people who have been largely absent from the ideological 
debate. They were primarily concerned with economic insecurity and therefore craved 
stability (Brady, 2012; Shue, 2004), which the political system seemed to provide. The Hu-
Wen leadership therefore turned to the ordinary people for support (or at least their 
acceptance) of the status quo, instead of appealing to the elites.  
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The average Chinese citizen seemed to have a high degree of responsiveness to media 
content (Landry and Stockmann, 2009). It was thus vital to ‘mould public opinion’ among 
the majority of the populace (who were too busy making a living to be ideologically 
conscious), which had been the major theme of propaganda and thought work for the Hu 
era. The greatest effort in relation to moulding and manipulating favourable public opinion 
was concentrated in the grassroots public space and on the Internet in particular. Moderate 
forms of this moulding practices included an all out ‘go online’ campaign for government 
agencies. For an indication of the scale, as of June 2012 there were 25,866 governmental 
agencies represented in social media and 19,155 officials microblogging using their real 
identities, among whom there were 30 senior officials ranked above vice-ministerial level 
(People’s Net, 2012a). The effectiveness of guiding online public opinion with a 
ubiquitous government presence remained to be seen. Yet the interactivity that social 
media offered presumably made this approach more popular than traditional Party 
propaganda transmitted through offline means.  
There was also a radical form of public opinion moulding – that was, the Party’s 
application of the Maoist ‘people’s war’ for online propaganda. For many, this was very 
controversial because it involved Internet commentators supported by the Party, or the 
notorious ‘50 Cent Army’28. These people were trained spin doctors that suddenly emerged 
to flood social media and public forums with pro-government messages when a crisis or an 
incident occurred that made the government embarrassed. In recent years, the use of such 
commentators seemed to have expanded without restraint in that most government 
agencies or even some work units established their own teams to manipulate favourable 
opinion (BBC, 2008c). Such distortion took advantage of the Internet’s flattened hierarchy 
and anonymity, and often had the potential to shift debates, made it even more difficult to 
                                                 
28 They were alleged to get paid 0.5 Yuan (wumao) for every pro Party message they posted online. For an 
exemplary list of events that they manipulated, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/50_Cent_Party 
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gauge the ‘real’ public mood because it was hard to tell what portion of the discussion was 
government sponsored. Various government agencies have been complacent about the 
effect of this new approach in crisis management and public relations, because such an 
approach would at least confuse the people, if not completely convince them. Yet in the 
long term, such distortion will hamper the cultivation of a pluralist Chinese public space, 
especially the culture of reason and tolerance, which the current highly polarised and 
crisis-ridden society badly needs.  
In sum, state control of information in the Hu era was marked by contradictions, as 
was reflected in the application of a mix of past practices from the Mao, Deng and Jiang 
eras. And, in many respects, the media have been repoliticised. Faced with challenges 
posed by the Internet, especially in Hu’s second term, the Party-state was still in the 
process of experimenting with new control and guiding measures (technological as well as 
organisational) in response to new demands arose out of an increasingly divisive yet 
digitally and globally connected society. As we shall see in our three crises, these 
contradictions were paralleled with the periodic loosening or tightening of media control. 
Initiatives to improve transparency were tested during crises, but they could not withstand 
the comeback of old reflexes as the Party’s confidence faded, and the control mentality 
triumphed over openness. The failure to institutionalise open measures and the persistence 
of Maoist legacies (albeit moving from offline to the online arena) again pointed to the 
need for genuine political reforms.  
 
3.5 State-society Relations 
 
This section concerns the PRC’s state-society dynamics revolving around crises for which 
its nature evolved from being almost consensual in the early 1950s to becoming largely 
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conflictual in the present day. As social stratification developed throughout the last six 
decades, attitudes towards crises or tensions between state and society, or among different 
strata within society itself, diverged substantially. To distinguish between these contrasting 
attitudes, we borrow Rosenthal and Kouzmin’s (1997) typology. ‘Consensual crisis’ 
denotes emergencies in which all crisis beholders share the same perception regarding a 
(often external) palpable threat and agree upon strategies of crisis response. On the other 
hand, ‘conflictual crisis’ refers to situations in which crisis beholders differ on the essence 
of a crisis owing to their diverging interests, which may eventually mean that they define 
the same situation in antagonistic terms and take confrontational actions accordingly. Most 
crises have both consensual and conflictual aspects at different stages of their 
development, owing to the issue of the objectivity and subjectivity of crisis which we 
discussed in the last chapter.  
 
3.5.1 Mao’s Monolithic Body Politic 
 
The above distinction, as well as the potential exchangeability between consensual and 
conflictual crisis, reminds us of the Mao era when all crises were defined in class struggle 
terms. Mao famously distinguished between antagonistic contradictions and non-
antagonistic contradictions (Mao, 1957). The former denoted contradictions between the 
enemies and the people, which necessitated the suppression of enemies by the people 
through dictatorship. The latter denoted contradictions among the people, which should be 
resolved through democratic centralism.  
Mao’s China was highly monolithic. The uncompromising Leninist political structure, 
with its clear and hierarchical line of command, effectively suppressed societal autonomy, 
while the centralisation of economic resources through the socialist transformation enabled 
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state power to intrude upon social life deeply. By 1956, the Chinese state and society 
became a much more integrated and organic body politic than it was before 1949. A 
prominent feature of strengthened state control in the PRC era was that, for the first time in 
Chinese history, the state’s formal and institutional power took root below the county level 
and into the immense countryside29. Much of this was achieved by the expansion of the 
Party’s Leninist structure into as far as the village level. With a strong, top-down apparatus 
and high level of regime legitimacy at the time, the CCP was able to mobilise the whole of 
Chinese society for its goals, albeit increasingly at huge costs.  
In addition to organisational unity, other important socialist institutions also blurred 
the boundary between the state and the society, and between the public and the private. In 
the urban area, workers were attached to work units (danwei) while rural residents were 
organised into People’s Communes; both institutions formed the backbone of the CCP’s 
mobilisation vehicle. As these institutions dealt with every aspect of a citizen’s social life 
and even part of their family life, the societal realm was very weak and susceptible to state 
intervention. Chinese society (if it existed) was merely the extension and peripheral of the 
Party-state.  
Such a highly unified state-society structure gave rise to formidable mobilisation 
capacity, which was routinely utilised to counter consensual crises framed in antagonistic 
terms. This framing was especially effectual when the target against which the mass 
mobilisation was waged was constructed upon a perceived external threat or challenge. 
Typical examples included mobilisation against or in preparation for perceived aggression 
from the US in the 1950s and from the Soviets in the 1960s. 
                                                 
29 It was undeniable that in the pre-1949 era the ROC had already extended its administrative apparatus into 
the countryside. However, the ROC’s state power was severely impeded by then prevalent warlordism and 
obstinate localism. As a result, the ROC’s central government for most of the time had no effective control 
over the countryside, let alone had taken root.  
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In addition, nationwide campaigns against infectious diseases in the 1950s and against 
natural disasters throughout the early PRC period were exemplary. These mass movements 
often turned radical and were heavily politicised. Nonetheless, the legacies of such a 
heavy-handed approach had proven its utility in quickly containing SARS half a century 
later.  
Mao’s China appeared to be a monolith from the outside. From within, however, 
contradictions, and non-antagonistic contradictions in particular, were prevalent in the state 
and the society. This was where the tactics of mobilising the masses to precipitate and 
resolve conflictual crises came into play, owning to Mao’s loosely defined nature of 
contradictions. For Mao, antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions were 
interchangeable because the dividing line between the people and the enemies was 
dynamic and constantly shifting – whom belonged to which grouping all depended on the 
specific historical moment as well as on the political context associated with it (Mao, 
1957). In other words, there was plenty of fluidity within the body politic, as opposed to 
apparent rigidity such that the political statuses of individuals and social classes alike 
(whether they belonged to the people or not) could be reversed according to the Party’s 
calculation.  
This ‘flexibility’ (if not arbitrary) in turn led to easy convertibility between non-
antagonistic contradictions and antagonistic contradictions. As a result, the Party often 
took advantage of the deliberate ambiguity in political status that it allocated to each social 
class, cultivating a consensus among its preferred classes (the people, or sometimes the 
advanced portion of the people), and then rallying them behind the Party to suppress other 
alienated classes. This tactical social engineering of divide and rule has continued until the 
present day as an effective method of social control to which the Party often resorts during 
crises, despite Party claims since the 1990s that it is no longer a class-based revolutionary 
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party (geming dang) but a governing party (zhizheng dang) that is concerned with all 
people (Schubert, 2008).  
This type of manipulation in the Mao era was most evident when conflictual crises 
needed to be transformed into consensual ones – i.e. when there were diverse perceptions 
regarding a dilemma that resulted in the absence of an overwhelming consensus, and when 
the problem mainly originated endogenously rather than being caused by an external 
threat. The most classic example was the Anti-Rightist Movement. This movement initially 
started as a rectification campaign for the masses and intellectuals in particular to air their 
dissatisfactions with the Party – a typical discursive and conflictual case (conflictual in that 
the people then had no common complaints against the CCP, and the nature of 
contradictions was clearly non-antagonistic, as initially recognised by the Party itself). 
When the criticism turned sharp, with proposals appearing to challenge the CCP’s political 
hegemony, the CCP fought back and depicted those outspoken intellectuals as enemies, 
sacked them from their jobs and named and shamed them politically. The nature of 
contradictions therefore escalated from being non-antagonistic to being antagonistic. At the 
same time, the CCP turned this conflictual crisis into a consensual one by instigating the 
masses to expose those intellectuals with exaggerated allegations, thus cultivated a 
consensus among the people to purge these newly found enemies30.  
State-society dynamics such as the above provided good evidence to demonstrate 
Maoist China’s distinctiveness from conventional authoritarianism. Unlike other classic 
authoritarian regimes where popular participation in the political process was tightly 
controlled, Maoist China not only encouraged such mass involvement but from time to 
                                                 
30 The notions of the consensual crisis and antagonistic contradictions were not in conflict with each other in 
this context. Although the contradictions in question were antagonistic in nature, only the people (as defined 
by the CCP) could participate the process through which the consensus was formed and those deemed the 
people’s enemies were deprived the freedom of expression. In this sense, the crisis was a consensual one 
among the people, despite the fact that they had different opinions on the question of how these enemies of 
the people should be punished. 
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time compelled its people to express their critical opinions against slacking and corrupt 
elements within the Party-state (Perry, 2007). One institutionalised channel of popular 
participation, which was devised in the Mao era but continues into the present day (despite 
its focus changing from political mobilisation and citizen efficacy in the Mao era to 
addressing individual grievances in the post-Mao era),is the letters and petitions system.  
Although functionally similar to its imperial precursor of palace memorials, censorate 
and complaint drums in redressing injustice, letters and petitions were utilised by the CCP 
as an instrument for the more fundamental goal of regime consolidation through consensus 
building (Feng, 2012; Luehrmann, 2003). Furthermore, this state-sanctioned channel of 
complaints served two additional purposes. One was to establish a separate and supposedly 
more accurate channel of information alongside the formal one within the bureaucracy, and 
sought to overcome the problem of information distortion prevalent with the latter. The 
other purpose was to enhance the stability of the system by encouraging people to use this 
channel as an outlet for popular discontent. Taken together the central leadership wanted to 
solicit public opinion (for possible moulding) through the letters and petitions system, 
whilst creating a safety valve within an authoritarian system in which bottom-up pressure  
could be unleashed and absorbed.  
In the Mao era, mass work emphasised participatory consensus building. The ethos of 
‘from the masses, to the masses’ was central to the letters and petitions work. Indeed, the 
CCP heavily manipulated both input and output ends. On the input side, rather than 
responding to multifarious demands from the masses, the state often geared the focus of 
mass complaints towards the ongoing class struggle or periodic major contradictions, and 
attached importance mainly to those complaints that fitted the theme. In other words, 
political mobilisation-oriented letters and petitions work resembled a scenario where the 
Party set the theme and put up an empty storyboard in which the masses filled their 
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individual grievances that validated and enhanced the Party’s insightful claims. Once 
individual complaints of the preferred nature reached a critical mass, a consensus and 
consensual crisis perception were moulded and consolidated because the raw materials of 
which they were formed were from the people themselves. In addition, as letters and 
petitions involved significant popular participation, the masses assumed the manipulated 
consensual crisis perception as their own. Moreover, in popular participation, through 
appealing to the state, the masses, with or without ideological consciousness, were likely to 
have identified with and internalised policies and lines supported by the Party. The Party 
viewed it as a nurturing process through which the masses could educate themselves.  
In drastic cases where individuals made their way to Beijing and appealed before the 
central government, this tendency to buy in to Party-propagated values was more evident 
owing to deep rooted popular faith in the central government. For a brief period, the 
location for central government officials to receive the visiting masses was moved to 
Xinhua Gate, the symbolic main entrance to the CCP headquarters, and the State Council 
even stipulated that petitioners who made their way to Beijing could have their travel and 
living expenses covered (Feng, 2012). Precisely because such contentious politics within 
the institutionalised channel largely helped to strengthen the authority of central 
government and to sustain the regime’s legitimacy more generally (Luehrmann, 2003), the 
letters and petitions system continued despite the fact that law-based channels have been 
available since the 1980s.  
On the output side, i.e. when it came to resolving the consensual crisis, the Party often 
claimed the manipulated consensus to be the genuine ‘general will’, and justified ruthless 
and sometimes violent purges in the name of the people. In many cases of purging, the law 
was largely ignored and the rule of mob-style populism prevailed. In fact, including the 
letters and petitions system, the mass work in the Mao era was marked by such volatile 
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state-society dynamic processes, involving first exposing, then provoking and finally 
resolving contradictions (Feng, 2012), on the basis of which numerous crises were 
fabricated to pit one class or stratum against another for the purpose of finding and 
eliminating new enemies. A famous example was that in 1963, Mao depicted a crisis of 
peaceful revolution by alleging that one third of the CCP’s regime had fallen into the hands 
of the enemy. He subsequently mobilised the masses in the Socialist Education Movement 
to counter the reactionaries (Gao, 2000).  
As one political movement after another swept China, class contradictions were 
intensified and so were the fabricated crises associated with them, despite the fact that 
these moulded crises became increasingly irrelevant to the needs and concerns of ordinary 
people, but were purely created for the sake of power struggle. As shifting coalitions 
within the society and purges became routine, the Party-state operated in a constant mode 
of crisis. This culminated in the disastrous Cultural Revolution, wherein the fever of mass 
mobilisation destroyed the legal system along with the police, the procuratorate and the 
court. China was thrown into a quasi civil war, the consequences of which led to the 
eventual breakdown of Maoism.  
 
3.5.2 The Deng Era and the Rule by Law 
 
As previously mentioned in this chapter, Deng rose to prominence primarily because of his 
skilful framing of the crisis with Maoist economic and political institutions, to which he 
proposed more realistic and rational alternatives. Up until 1989, the Deng era was 
characterised by loosening and decentralising state control, despite a number of 
conservative reactions against this liberalising trend.  
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Economic liberalisation since the late 1970s had implications on social control. The 
dichotomy between urban and rural populations was gradually changing following the 
abolition of the commune system, after which rural residents were allowed to look for jobs 
in (effectively private) township enterprises and in the cities. In the cities, although the 
danwei system still constituted the primary economic institution to which most urbanites 
were attached, state employment had contracted since private and foreign businesses were 
permitted. These changes considerably weakened the CCP’s mobilisation potential which 
rested on party branches in the state sector. At the same time, price reform and rationalised 
incentive structures gave rise to a ‘commodity economy’ (later defined as a market 
economy) with the significantly improved availability of consumer goods. As a result, in 
everyday life, people had more choices in terms of goods and lifestyle, were more mobile 
and thus had more personal freedom than in the Mao era. The imperative to improve 
economic performance (which both liberal and conservative camps agreed upon) required 
increasing decentralisation; flexibility and individual initiative also meant that it would be 
impossible for Maoist near totalitarian regime of social control to return.  
At the societal level, state-society relations were easing in the wake of depoliticisation. 
Here, a comparative perspective could be useful. The theory of post-mobilisation regimes 
suggested that communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR followed a similar 
trajectory in terms of state-society relations. In these regimes, mass political mobilisation 
was utilised in their early years for rapid modernisation. Once they had undergone the 
initial phase of industrialisation, however, they would suffer from a gradual decay in 
revolutionary fever among the people, who became exhausted and disillusioned with the 
communist utopian. In light of the failure of the utopian vision, and to keep the economy 
going, these regimes then had to rehabilitate the societal sphere by creating a less 
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politicised and more liberal society. This was exactly what happened in China under Deng 
(Johnson, 1970; Nathan, 1997).  
Deng’s move to end mass political terror successfully won the hearts and minds of 
people who aspired to a change from the radical politics under Mao. Indeed, Deng 
garnered support from millions of people (mostly former elites) for such a change by 
redressing numerous cases of political persecution while he was emerging as the 
paramount leader. This policy of reinstalling competent professionals back to their rightful 
place considerably compensated for the society’s losing faith in the Party, and was 
especially appreciated by intellectuals and Party veterans who were still loyal to the Party. 
Deng took up the ‘Four Modernisations’ goal set by Zhou Enlai in 1963 during the 
readjustment and recovery period and called on the people to make up the decade wasted 
on the Cultural Revolution. He understood that realising these goals could no longer rely 
on the Great Leap Forward-style emotional motivation, but on expertise. To this end, the 
education system was put back to normal and the University Admissions Examination was 
resumed, which many viewed as a precious asset for promoting equal opportunities (Zhang 
et al, 2012). In general, Chinese people experienced a good degree of emancipation in all 
aspects of life, and Chinese society created more chances for upward mobility in the 
context of (largely harmonious) state-society relations. Among all social strata, 
intellectuals (especially those in the social sciences) and the media benefited the most from 
the loosened political environment. They not only enjoyed more breathing space for their 
professions, but helped to create a more plural public sphere that in turn buttressed (or 
pressed for) further reforms. The fact that several waves of student movements were 
sustained for months and received sympathy from the state media before the government 
clampdown was itself reflective of the relative freedom intellectuals enjoyed in the 1980s.  
 111
Certainly, the proliferation of both authorised and unauthorised intellectuals-led 
organisations contributed directly to student unrest and channelled support to students from 
the wider society. These were deemed evidence that a nascent civil society emerged in the 
1980s (Chamberlain, 1993). In fact, as there were no applicable laws, the registration of 
these organisations had been loosely managed until the Tiananmen uprising awakened the 
authorities. The degree of relaxation in the 1980s has not been seen since 1989.  
Nevertheless, there were major hurdles to full societal equality. Although class-based 
discrimination was abandoned in practice owing to its incompatibility with a meritocratic 
and technocratic society, at the institutional and legal level, discrimination still remained. 
As a compromise to Party conservatives, the largely rewritten and what became the 1982 
PRC constitution (the current version) still implicitly implies that not everyone belongs to 
‘the people’, and that those who do not will not be entitled to civil rights, which can only 
be enjoyed by ‘the people’. There is a designated paragraph on this in the preamble of the 
1982 Constitution: 
The exploiting classes as such have been abolished in our country. However, 
class struggle will continue to exist within certain bounds for a long time to 
come. The Chinese people must fight against those forces and elements, both at 
home and abroad, that are hostile to China’s socialist system and try to 
undermine it. (NPC, 2004) 
 
Clause One of the 1982 Constitution again confirms the nature of this Party-state as a 
‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ (NPC, 2004). This dictatorship clause actually justifies 
extra-judicial measures against ‘enemies’, which presents a normative conflict with a 
subsequent clause that guarantees equality before the law for all PRC citizens. The  
existence of this dictatorship clause also potentially undermines later efforts on ideological 
reform in the attempt to keep the Party-state relevant to the changing social-economic 
realities, such as ‘rule by law’ in the Deng era and the ‘Three Representatives’ under Jiang 
(Chu, 2012).  
 112
In fact, the persistence of the class-struggle mentality has been more evident in 
practice than in ideology. Even before 1989, Party conservatives initiated several quasi 
class struggle campaigns that caused a considerable stir within society, such as the Anti-
Spiritual Pollution in 1983, the Anti-Bourgeois liberalism in 1986, and the ‘Strike Hard’ 
campaign against criminals in 1983, during which petty crimes could lead to the death 
penalty and was justified as a harsh punishment against class enemies. This enemy 
mentality has had a lasting effect well beyond the 1980s and is still found in the 
contemporary era, whenever the government seeks to justify extra-judicial measures in a 
crisis in order to strengthen its control over society. In such cases, blame has often been put 
on enemies at home and abroad, regardless of their actual existence or whether they were 
the major source of the threat. Examples include the suppression of Falungong in 1999 and 
the ethnic unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang in 2008 and 2009 respectively.  
The political sphere under Deng was regarded by most China specialists as having 
undergone the fewest reforms. Nevertheless, limited political reform still had a 
considerable (intended and unintended) effect on empowering society and individuals. 
Themselves being victims of the Cultural Revolution, Deng and other ruling elites were 
concerned with fixing the system to avoid another Cultural Revolution as well as 
eliminating any future possibility of arbitrary and volatile politics under the ‘rule of man’, 
like Mao. They decided to abandon Maoism not for the sake of opening up the political 
system, but for the indefinite longevity of one party rule, which could only become a 
possibility if normal politics was conducted according to formal procedures and 
established rules. In other words, they wanted to strengthen the system through regularity 
and predictability31. The concept of ‘rule of law’ was therefore added to the CCP’s post-
                                                 
31 This was very important for China in the late 1970s because for a country desperately needed to open up 
and rejoin international trade, it had to be perceived by the international community as a stable regime whose 
behaviour was predictable.  
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Mao ideology, a move aimed at enhancing the Weberian legal-rational legitimacy of the 
regime. 
It should be noted that by proclaiming ‘rule of law’, the CCP actually wanted ‘rule by 
law’. The difference is remarkable in terms of the supremacy of the law. Put simply, in the 
former, the law is preeminent, and both state power and individual behaviour are equally 
subject to it. The ‘rule of law’ thus incorporates connotation of checks and balances in the 
liberal democratic tradition (Keith, 1991); in the latter, such liberal connotations are 
minimal, and the status of law is largely reduced to its instrumental purpose of effective 
governance and even to suppression in a legalistic manner (Tamanaha, 2004). Under ‘rule 
by law’, the Party remains the ultimate arbiter and oversees the functioning of the legal 
system, although in theory it should remain restrained when it comes to intervening in day 
to day legal affairs. Such a purpose is clearly reflected in another popular phrase in the 
CCP’s discourse, ‘governing the country in accordance with the law’. This flexibility, 
where the Party is supreme in a rule by law framework, however, justifies the politicisation 
of the legal system when the Party feels it necessary and it has become the source of 
controversy on judicial independence for over 30 years.  
The determination to implement instrumental ‘rule by law’ was demonstrated by the 
high profile and nationally televised trial of the ‘Gang of Four’ in 1980, as well as by the 
harsh punishment to several ‘princelings’ involved in criminal activities in the mid-1980s. 
‘Rule by law’-oriented political reform also strengthened Party-state institutions via the 
introduction of term and age limits on public office holders.  
According to Weberian political sociology, the efficacy of laws lends predictability to 
economic transactions, especially economic contracts (Keith, 1991). As a result, efforts on 
rule by law did spill over from high politics to society in order to give economic 
development institutional assurance. The huge volume of economic transactions and the 
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diversification of ownership led by economic reform rendered the Party’s micro control 
undesirable and unattainable. The Party thus ‘delegated’ a large part of micro-level control 
to legal institutions and only retained macro-level control. This retreat from day to day 
socio-economic affairs laid the foundations of a law-based society and nurtured its 
(previously heavily suppressed) ability to be self-organised and self-governing. Like 
economic reform, self-governing was first tested in the countryside in the late 1980s. The 
Organic Law of Village Committees stipulated direct and regular elections for village 
leaders, set out the procedures for these elections (for example, the introduction of a secret 
ballot), as well as providing for the impeachment of village leaders (Gov.cn, 2010b). This 
bottom-up political reform potentially empowered some 600 million Chinese with the right 
to vote (BBC, 2005).   
Moreover, this top-down empowerment also touched upon the more contentious issue 
of the abuse of state power. As China’s governing structure has become increasingly 
decentralised since the 1980s in order to stimulate economic growth and encourage local-
level experiments, local arbitrary power and official corruption have been on the rise. 
Instead of using Maoist-style mass mobilisation to check local power holders, Deng 
resorted to the law as an institutional buffer against political volatility. The Administrative 
Litigation Law enacted in 1989, for example, provided individuals with the option to sue 
the state, and ordinary people were winning an increasing number of cases against the 
arbitrary abuse of power by local governments and officials (Nathan, 2003). As a 
consequence of this social learning regarding the efficacy of laws, citizen petitions and 
complaints have been increasingly couched in rights discourses and legalistic language. 
Resorting to the law in the hope of resolving grievances, along with the letters and 
petitions system mentioned earlier, constituted the majority of ‘rightful resistance’ – a form 
of rights-based contentious politics that took place within the confinement of established, 
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and officially permitted, channels of appeals. This peculiar form of intra-institutional 
resistance emerged in the Deng era, but prevailed in the Jiang era.  
As seen from the preceding discussion, in spite of state predominance, the balance of 
power in state-society relations shifted in favour of the people before 1989. This was an era 
when society had revitalised and started its detachment from the state, yet had not split 
from within. The reform consensus was relatively strong and was characterised as ‘reform 
without losers’ (Lau et al, 2000), which had held the masses and most elites together and 
produced largely positive-sum interactions between the state and the society, as well as 
within the society itself. However, as political reforms lagged behind economic reforms, 
the resulting gap was perceived by the people to be benefiting the privileged. The 
discontent in this was compounded by high inflation in 1988, leading to the prelude to 
Tiananmen. In this respect, the applicability of the U-Curve extended to China in 1988-
1989. The U-Curve predicted that societal uprisings became much more likely to occur 
when, following a constant improvement in living standards, an intolerable expectation gap 
would emerge if there was a perceived deterioration of prospects that could not keep up 
with people’s expectations based on the previous rate of improvement (Davies, 1962). At 
that time, the exact sentiment was prevalent among urbanites, especially intellectuals. This 
was fuelled by high inflation and a premature price reform which meant that people feared 
their hard-earned savings would be eroded.   
A more open, yet not divisive society, had a huge bottom-up organising potential that 
proved to be challenging to the Party-state as early as the 1986 student movement. 
However, the 1989 movement was different in that it encompassed most urban sector 
employees and led to a state of anarchy; a holistic crisis in dozens of Chinese cities. 
Ironically, the then still largely robust danwei system served as the mobilisation vehicle to 
precipitate the crisis, but this time it was from the bottom-up – demonstrations were largely 
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organised according to state designated sectors and protesters marched through the streets 
of Beijing with banners revealing their officially designated identities (e.g. students, 
workers and journalists) (Perry, 2007) 32 . The 1989 demonstrations were the most 
autonomous social movement in the history of the PRC, if not the largest. However, the 
subsequent tragedy of Tiananmen ruined most of the liberalising change which occurred in 
society and societal faith in the Party’s benevolence evaporated. As Beijing urbanites 
denounced the CCP as ‘fascists’ following the massacre, the CCP was faced with another 
legitimacy crisis.  
 
3.5.3 The Jiang Era and Popular Contention 
 
I. Stability above All 
 
The Tiananmen uprising shocked the CCP leadership, which mainly comprised survivors 
of the Cultural Revolution who all had bitter memories about the destructive power of 
mass mobilisation. They were therefore determined to eliminate any root of organised 
challenge against the Party-state. Under the rubric of ‘stability above all’, state-society 
relations in the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen were overwhelmed by antagonistic 
class struggle, where political terror briefly swept through China in the name of 
dictatorship over saboteurs of socialism. In 1989-1991, the Party shifted its mode of rule 
from consent-based to coercive-clientelistic-based (Gilley, 2008). Numerous protesters 
were arrested and university students were sent to military camps for re-education. 
Political vetting was implemented within the government, higher education establishments 
                                                 
32 Although they joined force in this popular ‘democratic movement’, their visions of democracy were very 
different. Many intellectuals aspired to western liberal democracy but most workers aspired to the Maoist 
notion of proletariat people’s democracy.  
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and other public institutions that affected tens of thousands reform-minded intellectuals. 
Reform programmes devised before 1989 were either halted or reversed, and institutional 
space for societal autonomy was greatly squeezed. For instance, the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) hastily enacted the PRC Assembly, Demonstration and Protest Law, only 
four months after the crackdown. The Law explicitly banned demonstrations against any 
officially upheld ideology and stipulated that to hold any demonstrations with (officially 
deemed) lawful appeals needed permission from the public security bureau, with the 
exception of celebrations and commemorations staged by the state (Xinhua, 2005). This 
new legislation rendered any demonstrations not sponsored by the state infeasible, and 
most of those that did erupt were ‘illegal’ in principle. 
 
II. The Emergence of a Corporatist Civil Society 
 
The state also reasserted itself by tightening its control over civic organisations. Pan-
political organisations such as cultural salons, pro-democracy publishers and journals were 
completely banned by the government (Zhang, 2003). Yet its approach to non-political 
organisations was more realistic. Facing mountains of social problems caused by an 
exclusive focus on economic growth, the government recognised the usefulness of civic 
organisations in addressing dislocations that were too diverse for the government to 
handle. It therefore devised a quasi-corporatist governing structure to monitor these 
organisations at the macro level (Unger and Chan, 1993). This desire for governance 
devolution in order to improve the efficiency of social control was illustrated in the 
promulgation of regulations that laid out a ‘dual management’ system. This system aimed 
to bring these organisations under the auspices of the government, but without constraining 
their instrumental utility in dealing with market and governmental failures. Under this 
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system, there was a high barrier for registration in order to ensure political loyalty – the 
organisation in question had to find a sponsor agency before registering with the civil 
affairs authorities. In addition, an organisation may only be engaged in activities under the 
registered category and operate within a designated geographical area (Yu, 2006).  
In general, this quasi-corporatist approach has contributed to improved governance by 
integrating social initiatives and resources into governmental goals of sustainable 
economic and social development. Particularly with two additional pro-social initiatives 
laws enacted in 1998 33 , the number of civic organisations increased dramatically as 
Chinese people took advantage of the new openings to pursue new social initiatives 
following top-down legal reforms (Cooper, 2006). Starting initially with environmental 
protection, the issues concerning civic organisations have steadily expanded into such 
areas as public health, poverty alleviation, migrate workers, women, legal and policy 
advocacy as well as the provision of social services, including in times of crisis. The 
government tended to view civic organisations with an instrumental utility from a positive-
sum perspective. 
However, despite a high registration requirement, this ‘dual management’ system –
which brought civic organisations and government agencies into close proximity with one 
another – still fell short of avoiding all political risks. Some grassroots organisations 
lacking both financial resources and political connections chose to operate underground, 
even though their activities were largely uncontroversial. Even worse, some ambitious 
organisations pursued goals well beyond what were permitted and over the years quietly 
developed an astonishing nationwide membership base that could be quickly mobilised to 
challenge the Party-state. The best example was the ‘sudden’ eruption of Falungong in 
1998-1999. It was initially registered as a Qigong society and was affiliated with the 
                                                 
33 They were the ‘Regulations on the Registration and Management of Non-Government and Non-
Commercial Enterprises’ and the ‘Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organisations. 
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official Qigong association (Human Rights Watch, 2002). During its rapid growth in the 
1990s, it promoted a set of ethical principles, such as ‘Truth, Goodness, and Forbearance’, 
that were critical to the moral collapse which characterised Chinese society in transition, 
and even challenged the state’s legitimation claims (Shue, 2004). Before being outlawed, 
Falungong even staged a large protest outside Zhongnanhai, the CCP’s headquarters. 
Unsurprisingly, the Party-state launched an antagonistic campaign to eradicate Falungong 
and also strengthened its control over the corporatist regime – all civic organisations were 
required to re-register, and those considered dubious were closed down. The number of 
civic organisations shrunk from 180,000 in 1995 to 160,000 in 2000 (Zhang, 2003).  
Interestingly, after the Falungong case, the government became wary of any 
organisations with a large following. It banned various Qigong and even pyramid selling 
groups. They were banned not because of the way they made money, but owing to their 
huge membership – some of them were alleged to have over ten million members. For 
NGO expert Professor Kang Xiaoguang, ‘The government’s attitude is, no matter which 
organisation or for whatever purpose, it is not allowed as long as it has a lot of people in 
it…the government does not care much about how much money NGOs own, but it does 
care about their sizes in terms of membership; it worries most about NGOs’ potential for 
collective actions’ (Mingpao, 2008). Falungong was ruthlessly suppressed precisely 
because of the government’s fear about its mobilisation capacity for collective action (it 
developed an organisational structure similar to that of the CCP). 
 
III. Rightful Resistance 
 
While the Party-state was adapting to changing social realities by devising and modifying a 
quasi-corporatist civil society structure in the cities, the political landscape in the same 
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period was more contentious in the countryside, as local power holders became more 
predatory to rural residents. This should have become a grave concern for the Party, 
because people affected there were largely supportive of the CCP by virtue of the de-
collectivisation, through which their living standards improved substantially (and as a 
result they played only a marginal role in the 1989 protests) (O’Brien, 2009).  
Notwithstanding this huge governance deficit, the government seemed to be more 
confident politically in handling these rural contestations. Here the nature of resistance 
mattered. The formation of a nascent civil society, despite being controlled through a 
corporatist framework and no matter how peaceful or obedient their activities remained, 
urban self-organisation autonomous of the state carried an anti-establishment connotation. 
Especially after learning what similar organisations were capable of in Eastern Europe 
before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Chinese government ineluctably viewed 
autonomous organisations suspiciously34. On the other hand, resistance in the countryside 
was intra-institutional – petitioners resorted to government-devised channels of inclusion 
to appeal to the central state. As previously argued, this type of resistance would 
potentially enhance regime legitimacy if it was handled well, because by opting to 
participate in the appeal process petitioners should have exhibited a degree of faith in the 
system. In contrast to disobedient civil society activities, rural protests were more of an 
indigenous phenomenon with a long-standing history, owing to China’s peculiar central-
local relations, and reflected a degree of political loyalty rather than alienation.  
This particular form of institutionalised or intra-institutional appeals is characterised as 
‘rightful resistance’ (O'Brien, 1996). In contrast with extra-institutional defiance, where 
dissidents often resort to open violence or some disguised unlawful actions, rightful 
                                                 
34 Although there has been no consensus in China regarding the nature of Chinese civil society or its level of 
independence from the state, the notion of civil society did imply the intrusion and dilution of (authoritarian) 
state power when it was introduced into China in the 1980s by intellectuals who enthusiastically followed the 
writings of Hayek, Havel and Habermas. Therefore, for a long time, this notion was regarded by the Party as 
essentially Western and part of the bourgeois liberalism thought.  
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resistance is permitted and lawful to some extent (such actions range from marginally 
permitted to completely legitimate). Moreover, rightful resistance does subscribe to those 
officially endorsed values, norms and laws, and the government’s commitment towards 
these symbols is often invoked by law-conscious resisters (O'Brien, 1996). Such resistance 
is no more than strategic participation in institutional politics based on a deft interpretation 
of the official discourse. 
Regardless of the genuine intentions of rightful resisters, the willingness to apply 
rightful resistance embeds an implicit recognition of regime legitimacy – that is, the 
contestation is not that the regime is illegitimate, but that some elements within the regime 
ignore the laws and policies endorsed by the regime. In China, where people accord much 
higher legitimacy to the central government than local governments, many cases of 
protests against local authorities conform to this pattern. For example, people often cite 
central government provisions and even the Constitution when they protest against issues 
such as land grabs and official corruption. Indeed, allowing the use of rightful resistance 
should consolidate regime legitimacy, or at least enhance stability by turning people away 
from unlawful or even subversive forms of defiance. Such state-society interactions restore 
popular faith in the system even more if disputes are resolved successfully, because people 
recognise the efficacy of institutionalised channels of appeal. 
As argued previously in relation to letters and petitions, ever since the Mao era the 
Party-state has been adept at utilising rightful resistance to strengthen regime legitimacy, 
as well as reinforcing the popular perception that state autonomy is high once grievances 
are brought to the central government. The same strategy was employed in the Deng era 
with the introduction of rule by law. In this regard, the risk of sanctioning rightful 
resistance was further reduced in the Jiang era, thanks to the simultaneous de-politicisation 
of the letters and petitions (the emphasis of which shifted from facilitating mass 
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mobilisation to addressing individual grievances) (Feng, 2012), and the steady 
enhancement of the legal framework over a decade. A much strengthened and law-based, 
predictable institution could ensure that issue-based contestations did not extend to the 
level of questioning regime legitimacy.  
Moreover, from an effective governance perspective, the Jiang era central-local 
dynamics created an even more favourable environment in which the regime could take 
advantage of rightful resistance because of increased decentralisation and the resultant 
popular perception that local governments were doing worse in terms of complying with 
central government policies. For example, excess fees collected by financially-stretched 
local governments after the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform were the most protested issue in the 
countryside, during which peasants often cited central government documents and decrees 
on alleviating the burden on peasants when they were resisting wrongly-levied fees. 
Certainly, most of these protests were quelled promptly. But instead of relying exclusively 
on the ‘police response’, the Jiang-Zhu government launched high profile crackdowns on 
this malfeasance and gave a ‘policy response’ by introducing the ‘Tax for Fee’ reform 
(Cai, 2006). This paved the way for the total abolition of agriculture tax in 2006. The 
policy shift was much appreciated among peasants who felt that the central government 
policy response resonated with their rightful resistance, which reinforced the belief that the 
central government was highly legitimate and benevolent despite the fact that its 
subordinates were corrupt and predatory.  
The usefulness of rightful resistance in strengthening regime legitimacy also echoed 
the ‘authoritarian resilience’ thesis which was developed based on observations in the 
1990s (Nathan, 2003). The idea was that the application and innovation of input channels 
which facilitated institutionalised resistance would increase regime resilience. These input 
channels functioned as ‘lightning conductors’ (White, 1986:479), that diffused crises by 
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directing pressure into different sub-elements within the system so as to reduce resentment 
against the Party-state as a whole. Our analysis earlier on crisis displacement mechanisms 
also supports this view – converting a crisis of the system into a crisis in the system. 
Overall, state-society relations in the Jiang era were more contentious. The uneasy 
experiment of unilateral openness (rapid economic liberalisation compared with little 
social and political liberalisation) was inherently contradictory. The post-Tiananmen Party-
state made an in time response in 1992 to accommodate the rise of new economic and 
social needs, by co-opting civil society in the cities and stretching rightful resistance in the 
countryside respectively. Notwithstanding these efforts – which acquired additional 
resilience for the regime through decomposing the holistic challenge against the system 
into smaller and sector specific crises – they were interim measures that could at best 
maintain a ‘volcanic stability’ (He, 2003).  
Accompanying mounting social pressure was the gradual tarnishing of the reform 
consensus in Chinese society. The perception that the reform had adverse effects on 
ordinary people’s living standards gained increasing popularity since the late 1990s, when 
the reform of SOEs and the marketisation of public services started. These reforms added 
complexity to the already changing demographics in the 1990s. As early as 1992, when 
economic reform was rejuvenated, the Chinese working population was more mobile, 
rendering the traditional household registration system (hukou) based provision of public 
services ineffective, and thus weakening the link between the state and the individual. 
People worked away from home (the ‘floating population’) often had to pay market prices 
or higher for public services, giving an impression that reforms had made everything more 
expensive. At the same time, the SOE reform, which led to tens of millions of workers 
becoming unemployed, had a profound impact on the CCP’s grassroots organisations. 
Many Party branches stopped functioning as a result of danwei closing down, and the 
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Party’s connections with these former state employees were lost (Brady, 2012). At the turn 
of the 21st century, China’s state sectors had all undergone efficiency-oriented reforms and 
therefore employed significantly less of the working population. The rest of the workforce, 
including those Party members working in the private sector where in most cases no Party 
branches had been established, had little regular contact with the Party. These were all 
signs of the Party’s atrophy (Shambaugh, 2008b).  
The composition of economic reform, political decentralisation and demographic 
change transformed the social identity of the Chinese working population from ‘work unit 
person (danwei ren) to social person (shehui ren)’ (Bray, 2005:157). Society was largely 
formed of atomised individuals instead of collective groupings. The dire consequence of 
this demographic change on the CCP could be best illustrated by the Falungong case. 
Ironically, a significant proportion of urban Falungong practitioners were former or current 
state sector employees, intellectuals and even Party members. Even after the government 
outlawed Falungong, its crackdown efforts were met with organised resistance. It revealed 
that it was more difficult for the CCP to mobilise the populace during a crisis in an era of 
Party atrophy. As such, when the CCP leadership transition occurred in 2002-2003 from 
Jiang to Hu, reasserting the Party to maintain stability became a priority for the new 
leadership.  
 
3.5.4 The Hu Era and Maintaining Stability 
 
When Hu Jintao took power in 2002, a number of indicators of social tension had reached 
very alarming levels, suggesting the state-society relations were qualitatively different 
from the Jiang era – they were so confrontational such that state-society relations under Hu 
could no longer be explained by the frameworks of corporatism and rightful resistance. For 
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example, China’s Gini coefficient, a common measure of income inequality for which 
anything above 0.4 was an indication that the society in question was highly unequal, 
already stood at 0.412 in 2002. Furthermore, since then, the government has stopped 
releasing the official figure, while a widely circulated scholarly prediction suggested that 
the figure had already reached 0.61 in 2010 (China Daily, 2012). The number of ‘mass 
incidents’, China’s official term for describing protests, increased tenfold from 8,700 in 
1993 to 87,000 in 2005, and again the government stopped publishing subsequent figures 
(Fewsmith, 2009). A corresponding figure of government spending on internal security  
also rose sharply during the Hu era, which reached a whopping 701.8 billion Yuan in 2012 
and exceeded China’s defence expenditure for three consecutive years (Reuters, 2012). All 
these rising and alarming figures acted as a warning to the CCP that the social stability 
situation has become grave, and that the system has become overwhelmed by mountainous 
problems. 
 
I. The Co-evolution of the Internet and Civil Society 
 
Meanwhile, the widespread use of the Internet seemed to aggravate these tensions. The 
impact of the Internet on state control of information was previously discussed, and here 
the emphasis is on the confluence of newly available means of communication and 
changing state-society relations. The Internet and civil society are inherently 
complementary – even more so in authoritarian states, where channels of both expression 
and mobilisation are restricted. Therefore, what Yang Guobing (2003) found in China has 
been a progressive co-evolution of the Internet and civil society, in which they favourably 
underpinned the development and diffusion of each other in the larger society, and 
facilitated the transformation of an incipient civil society to a more mature one through 
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democratic uses of the Internet. In addition, unlike citizen appeals in the past where 
autonomous organisations would only sustain temporarily within the lifespan of the initial 
grievance (Luehrmann, 2003), the Internet empowered citizens who benefited from the 
ease of continued communication, and thus kept pushing their demands on to the 
government. For our three case studies, SARS survivors, parents who lost their children in 
the Sichuan earthquake, and parents whose babies became ill because of drinking 
contaminated milk, each had an online community that periodically appealed to the 
government for financial assistance and to the wider society for sympathy. Moreover, the 
Internet had a huge mobilisation potential to alter the policy agenda by quickly increasing 
the number of stakeholders into tens of millions owing to its interactivity and instantaneity. 
In the Hu era, there had been famous cases where public pressure led to changing public 
policy or a reversal of policy decisions. In June 2003, facing continual and powerful public 
pressure, the State Council abolished the Custody and Repatriation System altogether after 
a tragic story circulated on the Internet about Sun Zhigang, who was a university graduate 
from Hubei looking for work in Guangzhou and was beaten to death for failing to show his 
temporary resident permit (Wang, 2008). In the same year, nationalist netizens were 
outraged when they learnt that China might have been planning to import Shinkansen 
technologies from Japan to build the Beijing-Shanghai High Speed Rail, one of the most 
costly projects in the PRC’s history. A petition was widely circulated on the Internet and 
the signatures were reportedly sent to the government, resulting in the Ministry of 
Railways (MOR)’s decision not to import Shinkansen technologies, despite the fact that 
the Japanese bid was the most competitive (South Reviews, 2003).  
Indeed, the government tended to reject the tendency of public pressure-driven policy 
making, not only owing to its preference for expert and scientific decision making (which 
all rational bureaucracies would prefer), but also because it was still at the early stage of 
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experimenting consultative deliberation that was pretty much elites based. It could find 
itself in a very defensive position if it refused to respond to popular demand when pressed. 
As such, it came as no surprise that the government put continuous efforts into Internet 
censorship to prevent a sensitive public event or incident from interrupting the existing 
policy agenda. Or, when the event became too big to cover up, the government would try 
to mould the public opinion in favour of itself so as to support its controversial and 
unpopular responses. Notwithstanding this censorship and manipulation, sensitive 
occurrences that garnered substantial public support nationwide have been happening more 
frequently in recent years, particularly during mass incidents when the public outcry 
against the government’s reaction was brought to boiling point. Examples include the 2005 
Taishi incident in Guangdong, where local government suppressed villagers’ attempts to 
remove corrupted village leaders from office, and the 2008 Weng’an incident in Guizhou, 
where a popular protest escalated into a riot after local police mishandled a case involving 
a girl’s death.  
In both crises the central government exhibited some degree of sympathy towards the 
local people and allowed limited media access. But it was slow to reverse the local, heavy-
handed response, during which period both crises became national events and caught 
international media attention. In such circumstances, the central government was cautious 
and hesitant to intervene directly because the Internet was a double-edged sword. Whilst 
successfully resolving such crises through direct intervention would lend the central 
government extra credibility before a national online audience, netizens would wonder 
why such appropriate responses, which came directly from above, could not constitute a 
precedent for similar crises elsewhere? This was exactly where the government’s fear lay: 
because crises like these were so commonplace, it worried about a ‘ratcheting up’ of such 
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responses forced by popular pressure which required systemic political liberalisation, 
rather than ad hoc and one-off solutions.  
At a deeper level, this caution reflected the Party-state’s calculation on the pace of 
political reform for which it sought to strike a delicate balance between allowing limited 
popular political participation whilst ensuring the Party’s firm grip on power. This 
predicament led to the CCP’s ultimate concern over the nature of stability. As for the pace 
of political reform, for three consecutive PCs (16th, 17th and 18th), the same contradictory 
and vague adjectives of ‘active and prudent’ were used to describe how to proceed with 
political reform (Xinhua, 2002; 2007; 2012) – a somehow appropriate reflection of there 
were no major breakthroughs in political reform in the Hu era. The same contradictory 
mentality lay with the understanding of stability – the debate over static stability versus 
dynamic stability has been going on for years without a decisive conclusion. 
 
II. Static Stability versus Dynamic Stability 
 
Being able to provide stability while the country was navigating through one crisis after 
another caused by turbulent socio-economic transformations, has become an increasingly 
important source of legitimacy for the CCP. However, there was considerable 
disagreement over what would constitute or sustain genuine stability. 
There have been two mainstream competing discourses of stability: static and dynamic 
stability. Static stability has its roots in the Chinese cultural inclination of avoiding chaos, 
placing a heavy emphasis on apparent public order (for example, no open protests). In 
contrast, dynamic stability is marked by its adherence to the legal-rational principle of 
procedural justice, implying that although the process of contestation may seem ‘chaotic’, 
the outcome is nonetheless stable because stability is derived from the inherent objectivity 
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of rightful procedures. In other words, although both discourses stress stability as the 
ultimate outcome, their respective approaches to attaining it are very different. Static 
stability is obsessed with a pre-determined equilibrium, and any deviation from this fixed 
equilibrium is considered instability. Maintaining the status quo regardless of changes in 
context is therefore the top priority. On the other hand, dynamic stability is more adaptable 
in that it does not specify an equilibrium in advance, and often represents a shift from one 
equilibrium to another as a result of a change in demographic and socio-political 
conditions. Furthermore, such shifts of equilibrium are considered legitimate as long as the 
processes and channels through which they occur are government sanctioned. In the words 
of Yu Keping (2006a), static stability is about ‘blocking’, i.e. crude suppression, whereas 
dynamic stability is about ‘channelling’, i.e. negotiation and deliberation. In everyday 
governance, proponents of static stability tend to resort to force and quell any sign of 
disobedience at all costs. Proponents of dynamic stability are ready to keep open existing 
channels of inclusion – such as all forms of rightful resistance – when disputes arise, and 
they are more willing to expand the existing mechanisms of interest articulation, such as 
the introductions of public hearings and opinion surveys (Li, 2009).  
 
III. Contrasting Views on Civil Society 
 
The understanding on the role of civil society is tightly linked to the dichotomy of stability. 
Proponents of dynamic stability regard civil society as one of the prerequisites of its 
existence, whereas proponents of static stability are highly suspicious towards it, owing to 
its self-organising capacity. Since the Hu era, there have been two competing views 
towards civil society, corresponding to the debate on dynamic versus static stability.  
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The first view is the positive-sum view on civil society. Some liberal Party scholars 
argue that a healthy civil society will contribute to dynamic stability. For them, people’s 
involvement in a self-organised civil society results in the training of various ‘civilities’: 
tolerance, sympathy, volunteering, community consciousness and the habit to reason and 
compromise when disputes arise. These qualities are crucial for China’s ‘farewell to 
revolution’ – transforming from a society based on class struggle to a more fraternal 
society (Gao and Yuan, 2008; Perry, 2007). It is believed that a tightly controlled society is 
intrinsically more unstable than a society with the ability to self-organise (Gao and Yuan, 
2008).  
From the social equality perspective, these scholars believe that one effective approach 
to contain any further polarisation within the Chinese society is the nurture of a civil 
society where the social stratum in the middle, i.e. the middle class35, forms its backbone. 
Like their western counterparts, these Chinese academics consider the middle class as the 
stabiliser of transformation: rational, educated and favouring gradualist political views. As 
long as this stratum grows larger by absorbing members from lower strata, China’s 
transformation will not be derailed by polarisation (He, 2004). It is believed that this 
process of upward social mobility will help the Chinese society to transform from a 
‘pyramid shape’ to an ‘olive shape’, where middle income earners count for the majority 
(Wen, 2010).  
In addition, a functioning civil society relatively autonomous to the state-government 
system and the market-enterprise system, will benefit China’s transformation through the 
buffering of various contradictions – it acts as an intermediary between the needs of the 
state, the market and the people. Politically, it will temper the conflict between the lack of 
channels for interest articulation within the existing structure and people’s expression of 
                                                 
35In the Chinese context, a variant term, the ‘middle-income stratum’ has often been used in order to detach 
the politically independent connotation associated with the term ‘middle class’, thus only stressing the 
economic status of this group. 
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their increasingly complex interests. Economically, it will narrow the gap between the 
state’s macro-level management imperative and micro-level reality. In the societal sphere, 
civic organisations will provide public services in areas overlooked by the government, 
and therefore resolve social dislocations caused by the ongoing transformation. Yu Keping 
(2008:20) thus concludes that this emerging social realm is playing an important role in 
‘perfecting the market economy, changing the role of the government, expanding popular 
participation, nurturing grassroots democracy and open government, improving social 
management and stimulating charitable work’. 
These well argued cases for civil society also echo the Hu era discourse on building a 
harmonious society – they overlap in their emphasis on justice and how conflicts should be 
resolved (Wu, 2006). Yu Keping even contends that ‘There won’t be a genuine 
harmonious society without a healthy civil society’ (Beijing Daily, 2011). 
The second view is the zero-sum view on civil society. While the notion of civil 
society seems compatible with Party goals, more hardline Party apparatchiks are concerned 
with its liberalising implication. The normative theory of democratisation predicts that a 
large middle class constitutes one of the most important prerequisites for democratisation. 
This is true at least with the modernisation approach (Potter, 1997), as supported by 
evidence in South Korea and Taiwan. In addition, the Habermas conception of civil 
society, which stresses an autonomous and even oppositional role of the society vis-a-vis 
the state, is very influential in the Chinese academia. The interest in civil society by 
Chinese academics themselves also largely originates in the supposed contribution of civil 
society activities to the collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe (Teets, 
2009). Such dire consequences are what the Party fears most. 
Party hardliners therefore dismiss the notion of civil society as ill-intentioned. The 
Secretary General of the CCP’s Central Politics and Law Commission goes so far as 
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accusing civil society of being ‘a trap western countries designed for China…we should 
prevent ill-minded civic organisations from flourishing’ (Zhou, 2011a). For Party 
apparatchiks, the Party and its extensive array of quasi Party-state organisations should 
enjoy an undisputed monopoly on intermediating and articulating societal interests, but 
civil society develops alternative channels for such functions. It is therefore in direct 
competition with the Party in terms of attaining credentials for resolving conflict. 
Moreover, civil society has a different set of agendas to those of the Party, and its 
association thus encroaches upon the Party’s mobilisation capacity organisationally – the 
Party has been wary of anyone else developing an organisational structure that has the 
potential capacity for collective action, and will never allow such organisations to become 
involved with political appeals. 
Therefore, for Party conservatives, responding to new social demands does not equate 
to the rolling-back of the state frontier and the rolling-forward of society, or the devolution 
of the state. Rather, it means extending the reach of government social control and 
government-run public services, in which consolidating ‘mass work’ is the key (Zhou, 
2011a). In their view, the assumed Habermas dichotomy between state and society is 
simply bogus – the burgeoning societal sphere should not be too autonomous, but ought to 
be affiliated with the traditional Party-state structure, if not be part of it. In other words, the 
mass work-based state corporatism model must expand its traditional frontiers in order to 
fill this new political vacuum where associational life flourishes. ‘Civic organisations 
should be incorporated into the Party-state led system of social management’ (Zhou, 
2011a). 
 
IV. From Harmonious Society to Maintaining Stability 
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In the entire Hu era, the Party-state was searching for an up-to-date strategy of social 
control in order to maintain stability. Nevertheless, there was a noticeable difference as to 
which discourse of stability (and the associated view on civil society) was more influential 
at a specific point. A periodisation might be useful here, with the Beijing Olympics in 2008 
as the watershed that divided the Hu era.  
In the early Hu era of 2003-2008, development in state-society relations largely 
conformed to the notion of dynamic stability as well as to the positive-sum view of civil 
society. New mechanisms encouraging deliberation and consultation were introduced into 
everyday politics, not to mention the large scale popular participation and the 
demonstration of official accountability during the SARS crisis and the Sichuan earthquake 
(during which participation in civil society flourished in particular). The introduction of the 
concept of ‘harmonious society’ into Party ideology in 2006 echoed the notion of dynamic 
stability in the emphasis on (socialist) democracy and rule by law, social justice and rights 
protection (Xinhua, 2006). It was a reflection of the Party’s commitment to maintain 
benign and engaging relations with the people. Interestingly, this concept first appeared in 
the 2004 Party resolution on consolidating the CCP’s governing capacity which, despite 
endorsing the people’s rights to ‘democratic elections, democratic policy making, 
democratic governance and democratic supervision’, also emphasised that all these 
mechanisms contributing to dynamic stability must take place under the auspices of the 
CCP (Xinhua, 2004a). Indeed, the Party considered the perfecting of these dynamic input 
institutions as one of the goals it had to achieve in order to govern well for the people. 
Starting in January 2005, the CCP launched the Campaign to Maintain the Advanced 
Nature of Communist Party Members, an important dimension of which was to inject some 
system dynamics by broadening its ways of keeping in contact with and listening to the 
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people (Xinhua, 2006). In a sense, Party leadership at the time at least considered dynamic 
stability to be instrumentally useful.  
The late Hu era from the Olympics onwards (indeed, since the Tibet unrest in March 
2008) marked a deterioration in state-society relations in that static stability rose to 
prominence. Maintaining (static) stability had been the dominant theme since then. In fact, 
the abbreviation of maintaining stability, wei wen, was a term first used by China’s 
paramilitary forces in reference to emergency situations (New York Times, 2012), and it 
had often been used in the extreme context of anti-terrorism rather than referring to 
resolving everyday social tensions 36 . Despite the term’s obvious repressive and 
antagonistic tinge, its usage had surged in state media since 2008, whereas, during roughly 
the same period, the rate of appearances of the term ‘harmonious society’ had decreased 
sharply (New York Times, 2012). The term was frequently applied in the civilian domain 
to describe non-antagonistic social tensions which, in effect, increased antagonism. 
Moreover, in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring, Hu proposed the notion of ‘new social 
management’ in which he reiterated the vague notion of ‘Party-state led rights protection 
mechanism’, but at the same time specifically stressed the importance of ‘creative’ ways to 
manage the floating population and civic organisations, and reinforcing public order and 
moral education. In particular, for the first time, he called for enhancing the management 
of the ‘virtual society’ – the Internet (Xinhua, 2011c). These palpable changes in Party 
discourse underpinned the shift from dynamic to static stability.  
It was interesting to note why things changed at the time of the Olympics. Many 
believed that the Olympics would promote democracy in China through its further opening 
up to the rest of the world, an effect similar to that in South Korea after its holding of the 
1988 Seoul Olympics. Such expectations were also partly the reason why the international 
                                                 
36  A good illustration can be found in the PLA Daily at http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/yx/2010-
01/10/content_4522826.htm 
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community endorsed Beijing to host the Games (Human Rights Watch, 2012). However, 
the Chinese leadership might have perceived it differently in the run up to the Games. 
Crises such as the Tibet riot and the Sichuan earthquake, where international media gained 
access to the affected regions by taking advantage of the loosened restrictions on 
journalists37, also allowed these media outlets to cover both events extensively and in more 
detail than ever before. A significant proportion of their reports presented China in a 
negative light, which was unintended by the Chinese government, and put it in a defensive 
position before the international community but also before its domestic audience (in the 
case of the school collapse scandal after the quake). What the Chinese leadership found 
was probably that this was the consequence of being unprecedentedly open, the fallout of 
which the current system could not afford. China’s emphasis on stability thus turned to 
static stability. Restrictive measures were in place to keep out domestic and international 
‘trouble makers’. For instance, there were no protests approved during the Olympics, 
despite more than 70 applications and a designated protest zone (BBC, 2008a)38. China’s 
visa policy for foreigners was also suddenly tightened in the run up to the Opening 
Ceremony (New York Times, 2008a). All this happened despite Beijing’s commitment to 
openness, at a moment that could best showcase it. As a result, instead of being a catalyst 
for political liberalisation or contesting the status quo, the Beijing Olympics turned out to 
be an ‘acceleration and concentration of status quo’ (Pelling and Dill, 2009:2). This was 
best illustrated by numerous calls from the Chinese leadership at the time to wage and win 
a ‘People’s War’ on safeguarding the Beijing Olympics39. Despite the deployment of a 
strong security force, the Maoist-style ‘People’s War’ swept through Beijing, other hosting 
                                                 
37 After the Tibet riot, foreign journalists were initially denied access but later allowed into the region on a 
government-arranged media tour; in the case of the Sichuan earthquake, the restriction was minimal from the 
beginning but tightened later.  
38 This policy was a step backward in terms of openness comparing to China’s behaviour in the past. For 
example, during the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women hosted in Beijing, protests were allowed. 
China’s external environment then was also considerably worse than in 2008.  
39 More than one million entries can be found in Google when searching ‘Olympics security + People’s War’ 
in Chinese (aoyun anbao + renmin zhanzheng). 
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cities and places where the Olympics Torch Relay passed. Party members, government 
employees and retired residents wearing red arm bands patrolled the streets – a scene rarely 
seen for decades reoccurred.  
Two simultaneous developments contributed to the Party-state’s increasing 
assertiveness after the Games. One was the international community’s praise of the 
flawless organisation of the Games, which led to a growing complacency within China 
about the Chinese model. The other development was that much of the international media 
scrutiny on China shifted away as the Games closed. The Chinese leadership seemed to 
draw the wrong lesson from holding the Olympics: that maintaining static stability, 
exemplified by monolithic organisation and no unsightly occurrences during the Olympics, 
was an effective way to govern the country40. In this sense, the Olympics marked a turning 
point at which the old reflex of a totalitarian state was reactivated41. Furthermore, with the 
obsession with static stability, increased surveillance on the population during the 
Olympics lasted well beyond the Olympics, and these restrictive measures have been 
implemented elsewhere. For example, security checks on the metro were first introduced in 
Beijing in June 2008, but the same practice was introduced to and made routine in all 
major cities with a metro system. The ‘Eagle Eye’ system – panoramic closed circuit 
cameras used to monitor crime but also to detect instantly anti-government behaviour (such 
as large gatherings) which was first installed in Beijing before the Olympics – has also 
been installed nationwide in recent years. One of the Olympics’ legacies was the rise in 
influence of China’s internal security apparatus, as well as the rapid growth in government 
spending to finance all these new policing measures (Economist, 2011).  
                                                 
40 The requirement of no complaints against local governments filed in Beijing has long been a factor 
according to which local leaders’ performance on maintaining stability is assessed. So no protests and the 
like are important for local leaders’ political careers.  
41 Here totalitarian state in the post-Mao context means (zongtixing guojia) (the fact that the state 
‘encompasses’ every aspect of social and political life) rather than (jiquan guojia) (the standard 
understanding of totalitarian police state in the western sense). The former merely describes the reach of the 
state whereas the latter emphasises the state’s repressive propensity, with the latter having a much stronger 
ideologically pejorative connotation.   
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Accompanying increased surveillance and sophistication in social control practices 
was the Party’s organisational reassertion. As mentioned earlier, in the Jiang era, many 
grassroots Party branches did not function properly owing to economic restructuring, and 
Party members within these became ‘rootless’; therefore, Hu was determined to recover 
this lost grassroots capacity for the CCP. This was not only to strengthen the CCP’s 
leading position in social and economic life, but to pre-empt civil society activities that 
might seek to take advantage of Party atrophy. As a result, the reach of the Party for the 
first time extended beyond the state and public sector (Jing, 2011). The CCP has instructed 
that Party work should be carried out in all ‘new’ economic and social organisations and 
those large organisations should establish their own Party branches42 , a precautionary 
measure aimed at preventing these organisations from getting out of hand.  
In addition, the Party-state sought to absorb typical civil society arrangements into its 
sphere of influence, for example, by directly operating an extensive network of volunteers. 
This strategy was first implemented during the Olympics where all those mobilised in the 
mass campaign were called ‘volunteers’. Such an arrangement was believed to set a good 
example and the same strategy has been repeated in subsequent major national events, not 
limited to sporting events. The conventional western understanding was that volunteering 
activities were decentralised in nature; to the contrary, the CCP managed to incorporate 
volunteers into its mobilisation vehicle, and to command this force in a top-down fashion. 
Ironically, it was not the civil society but the CCP and the Communist Youth League 
(CYL) that ran China’s largest army of volunteers, who were also the best trained.  
 
V. Politicising the Legal System 
 
                                                 
42 New economic organisations comprise all non-state enterprises, including foreign enterprises; new social 
organisations include all professional associations, NGOs, foundations and community based groups. They 
are ‘new’ in that they have not been substantively penetrated by the Party so far.  
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One of Yang Guobin’s (2003) insights into the co-evolution of the Internet and civil 
society is that political control strategies used by the Party-state to tame the media will be 
similar to those applied to restrain civil society, and vice versa. As we discussed earlier, the 
media realm was already repoliticised in the late Hu era, and it was therefore not surprising 
to see a strong propensity in the Party-state to politicise the legal system in the same 
period.  
This wave of politicisation took two forms. One was to strengthen the Party’s control 
over rule by law. Although rule by law was still being upheld as the fundamental principle 
to governance, more conditionality was added. This was clearly evident in the Hu era Party 
discourse on the relationship between the Party and the law. In late 2007, Hu Jintao 
stressed in a judge and procurator joint conference that judicial work must serve ‘three 
utmost priorities’ – namely, giving ‘utmost priority to the Party’s causes, to the people’s 
interests, and to the Constitution and the law’ (Xinhua, 2008l). This new rhetoric was cited 
many times by leaders in the Politics and Law apparatus and had significant influence on 
the handling of crises since 2008, especially social unrests. Later in September 2010, Zhou 
Benshun, Secretary General of the Central Politics and Law Commission, further 
elaborated upon the three utmost priorities by making the following remark: 
We must always maintain the unification of powers (executive, legislature and 
judiciary powers), and not the separation of powers; always maintain enforcing 
law for the sake of the people, and not for the sake of judiciary supremacy; 
always maintain running the country according to the law, and not insist on the 
law’s omnipotence; always maintain fairness and justice, and not make 
western-style superficial equality; always maintain the harmonisation of legal, 
social and political effects, and not just the legal effect; always maintain 
empirical standards, and not make western double standards. (Legal Profession, 
2010) 
 
In fact, this explanatory rhetoric above did not significantly contradict the rule by law 
principle as it was understood in the Chinese context – that was, a harmonisation of the 
Party’s leadership, the people’s rule and running the country according to the law. 
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However, it differed from the rule by law norm in the Deng and Jiang eras in that it 
represented an inclination to politicise (as opposed to professionalise) judiciary work 
(Lam, 2008). According to the new rhetoric: the Party’s dominance was enlarged and its 
goals were given an overriding importance; the people’s interests (which the Party claimed 
to represent) followed; and rule by law was downgraded from an ideal of better mode of 
governance, to a mere tool in the Party’s arsenal of governance strategies. This move 
marked a further departure from an independent judiciary which could have helped to 
increase regime resilience. 
Measures were taken to reflect this latest change in discourse. Political education 
campaigns were launched in courts and procuratorates for the purpose of enhancing the 
CCP’s ‘thoughts, political and organisational’ leadership in the legal system (Zhou, 
2011b). Party building work was also carried out in ‘new social organisations’ of lawyers’ 
associations and law firms. In 2008, lawyers were given a new identity of ‘socialist legal 
workers’, which was awkwardly similar to the 1980s definition of ‘state legal workers’ that 
had been used to describe lawyers before its use was discontinued in 1997. They were also 
told to place their highest loyalty in the Party instead of in their clients (Zang, 2010).  
In terms of day to day legal proceedings, the Party’s influence rose and sometimes its 
discretion became ultimate. Although rule by law in China has always been conditioned 
upon sustaining Party rule, and therefore western judiciary independence is not applicable, 
it was the norm in the Deng and Jiang eras that the Party should be refrained from taking 
‘concrete leadership’ in courts and intervening in court proceedings (Keith, 1991). 
Substantive Party involvement in a number of court proceedings concerning the school 
collapse scandal after the earthquake and the milk scandal represented another backslide in 
the rule by law record.  
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The second form of politicising the legal system was the obstruction, or even 
suppression, of rightful resistance. In the late Hu era, disadvantaged members of the 
society found it increasingly difficult to resolve their grievances through legal means 
because the Politics and Law apparatus frequently restricted their access to intra-institution 
and state sanctioned means of appeal. The preoccupation with static stability made the state 
reluctant to distinguish rightful resistance from those subverting activities in the disguise of 
safeguarding one’s legal rights. In national crises of the earthquake and the milk scandal, 
the Party-state blocked attempts by the disadvantaged to start the judiciary process and 
collective actions were banned. In smaller crises and local social unrest, the use of extra-
judicial or even unlawful measures to quell discontent or ‘disharmonious elements’, was 
not rare. In light of heightened tensions, in September 2010 Hu called upon colleagues in 
the Politburo to improve social harmony by referring back to the classic Maoist rhetoric of 
‘correctly handle contradictions among the people’ (Xinhua, 2010b). However, this urge 
largely failed to change the repressive behaviour of the Politics and Law apparatus at the 
local level, which often viewed any challenges to static stability as antagonistic 
contradictions.  
Overall, state-society relations in the Hu era deteriorated. Stagnation in political 
reform led to little progress in rule by law and human rights. Certainly, as weak paramount 
leaders, Hu-Wen were in an unfavourable position to make any breakthroughs in their 
decade in power, especially after 2008 when most large crises originated internally, which 
lent the internal security establishment growing clout. The uncertain prospect of the highly 
competitive leadership transition in 2012 perhaps also frightened the incumbent leadership 
into inertia, and to be satisfied with (or had to accept) the status quo of an ‘illusion of 
stability that was really reflective of a rotting system’ (Shambaugh, 2008:178). 
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Despite a brief political opening around the 2003-4 SARS crisis, the rest of the Hu era 
saw the Party-state strengthening its control over society. Rather than heading down a path 
of incremental liberalisation that characterised the Deng and Jiang eras, crises such as 
those we are examining in this thesis – as well as the political contraction justified in the 
name of countering these crises – led to the revival of Maoist social control, both in a 
totalitarian mentality and in organisational tactics. In this respect, crisis enabled the 
‘survival and return’ of the old reflex (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). This backslide inevitably 
collided with the rapidly modernising social reality, which led to the CCP’s machinery for 
preserving stability operating in a crisis mode after early 2008. In static stability-oriented 
crisis management, the Party-state pushed the public-private boundary in the form of 
suppressing civil society and limiting civil and legal rights, and these restrictive measures 
had a tendency to become routine. Rightful resistance was more often viewed as an 
antagonistic threat rather than as ‘contradictions among the people’ that needed mediation 
rather than coercion.  
The consequence of the Party-state’s ‘paranoia’ with static stability was grave, as 
overreactions to popular contentions and resorting to force as the default option, have 
already led to larger crises. Since 2011, defiance activities that resorted to open violence 
instead of rightful resistance seem to have been on the rise, and this type of extreme 
incidents – which, in the past, often occurred in the countryside – now happen more often 
in major cities (Zheng, 2012). If this momentum continues, there is a considerable risk that 
‘stability above everything’ will eventually become ‘everything crushes stability’ (Qian, 
2010), meaning that temporarily suppressed contentions join forces and erupt at the same 
time.  
It was not until the 2011-12 Wukan incident in Guangdong that there was a brief 
departure from this momentum. In this incident, villagers staged a protest lasting several 
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months against corrupted officials. The protest was initially suppressed but eventually 
resolved peacefully when the Guangdong provincial government intervened by supporting 
villagers to vote in a fair election. The election was run according to the election law and 
was monitored by representatives from the government, the media and civil society, which 
marked an attempt to shift the dominating social management paradigm from maintaining 
static stability towards creating dynamic stability. On a separate note, following the Bo 
Xilai and Cheng Guangcheng crises, the Politics and Law apparatus has been blamed for 
having had too much power, and the new head of the Central Politics and Law 
Commission no longer had a seat in the PSC when the 18th PC was convened in November 
2012. Whether this temporary reconciliation will sustain under Xi Jinping to become a 
genuine paradigm shift, is still open to question.  
 
 
3.6 Policy Making 
 
This section uses the evolution of policy making under normal politics since 1949 to 
contextualise crisis decision making under the CCP. As stated in the introduction, if the 
essence of normal politics policy making can be well captured, crisis decision making can 
then be more or less predictable. In addition, the foundations of China’s policy making 
superstructures – such as the Party and state institutions as well as policy making norms 
and rules – were laid in the early PRC era and these have largely remained throughout 
different leadership eras. Changes that have already taken place tend to be evolutionary 
and incremental. For this reason, it is important to discern the underlying path dependency. 
Since the existing literature on policy making in the PRC is plentiful, and owing to this 
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study’s focus on crisis, in this section we only review those distinctive characteristics 
developed under each leadership era and discuss their legacies.  
 
3.6.1 The Mao Era and Factionalised Totalitarianism 
 
The popular perception of Mao’s China was that of a monolithic country where the entire 
state apparatus was under the total control of Mao. Indeed, Mao’s leadership was pivotal in 
shaping Chinese politics at the time. It was especially so when it came to decisions 
regarding external relations (Breslin, 2008b), as we have seen in his deciding to enter the 
Korean War and inviting Nixon for the icebreaking visit to China two decades later. 
Nevertheless, when it came to major domestic issues, far from having absolute dominance, 
Mao as the paramount leader was constrained from time to time by other founding fathers 
of the Party in advancing his policies. Including Mao, there were between thirty and forty 
men who made all the major decisions at the top through consensus building (Nathan, 
1973; 1997). There were sometimes fierce debates regarding major policies.  
Fingar (1980a) argued that policy making in the Mao era normally involved the 
formation and realignment of coalitions built around common or compatible stands on a 
number of policy issues. But this finding tended to be more applicable to bureaucratic 
politics at operational, budgetary and functional levels (Fingar, 1980b). Nathan instead 
argued that policy making in the Mao era was characterised by factional politics, especially 
at the top level. But the formation of factions were in flux because the alliances were 
formed on the basis of personal exchange ties in which personal prestige, position and 
contact within the system were of more importance than formal authority (Nathan, 1973). 
And, once the common enemies were defeated, the faction began to fall apart because of 
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the inherent flexibility and fluidity in factional politics in terms of membership (Nathan, 
1973), and the diverse interests of the members (Breslin, 2008b).  
If the centre was far from a monolithic bloc, the central-local relations deviated further 
from the unitary impression of the Chinese state. There was no doubt that in the Mao era 
China had a very strong capacity for national mobilisation, and the extensive array of 
mobilisation vehicles enabled the central state to penetrate its territories and logistically 
disseminate decisions, even to the remotest corners of this massive country. However, this 
did not necessarily mean that policies initiated at the centre would be fully implemented at 
all levels. To the contrary, the multilayered structure of the Chinese state more often than 
not encouraged incompliance or partial compliance at the local level, because the power 
structure of the state apparatus was made up of a ‘five-level hierarchy of dyadic principal-
agent relationships’ (Wedeman, 2001:62), which created conditions that enabled cadres to 
manipulate central directives for local and self interests.  
Within these multilayer principal-agent relationships and over-complex hierarchy, 
local officials had the incentives to prevent negative information from reaching the central 
government, and the culture of exaggerating the good while obscuring the bad prevailed. 
This could lead to wrong decisions being made by the central government because of 
misinformation. In the Great Leap Forward that ended tragically with a great famine, Mao 
was misled into believing that there were super-high grain yields as a result of local 
manipulation, misreporting and false reporting from the lowest administrative unit on the 
ground all the way up to the centre. This problem of misinformation is the legacy of the 
Mao era which has continued into the present day, as we will see in the SARS crisis in the 
next chapter.  
In the Mao era, the system for policy making and information processing was closed, 
and there were very few channels through which policy inputs could be transmitted into 
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this system. A crucial source of advice was from the ‘masterminds’ within the Party. 
Although there were few professionalised research activities in the Mao era, idea 
exchanges between individual policy advisors and policy makers were more frequent. 
These advisors were senior staff who had already served in military, intelligence or 
economic administrative units and were very experienced. They offered their advice 
through a variety of internal channels, usually using interpersonal networks rather than 
following formal organisational procedures so as to get quicker access to senior leaders, in 
the expectation that their advice would be adopted. This ‘inside access’ model played an 
important role in shaping the leadership’s decisions regarding major strategic issues, e.g. 
the deployment of forces in the Korean War and the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with West Germany (Wang, 2008).  
In addition, the state media also played its part in transmitting information into the 
system for policy making. State media was often considered a transmission belt which 
disseminated top directives to every locality on the ground. But it also performed some 
monitoring and supervisory functions resembling those of an Imperial Censorate. Its 
relative organisational independence from local governments enabled it to act as extra eyes 
and ears of the centre. For example, the Xinhua News Agency published its ‘classified 
references’ for a readership that consisted only of leaders above the ministerial level. These 
internal secret dispatches often carried sensitive topics about which the leadership should 
be informed but which were politically too controversial to be made public (Chen, 2005). 
In the Mao era, there were very few channels through which ordinary people could make 
their voice heard throughout the policy process. But the classified references system still 
occasionally made grievances on the ground known to the highest leadership, even though 
the coverage of these issues was limited and the selection criteria was very subjective.  
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In sum, policy making under Mao was highly leader-centric, and few channels existed 
to transmit ideas into the system from outside, because the near totalitarian state 
encompassed everything. As such, most of the interest articulation occurred within the 
state, especially at the central level. There were a number of policy making characteristics 
developed under Mao – namely, factionalism, the local manipulation of central policies 
(which then evolved into fragmented authoritarianism in the Deng era and into de facto 
federalism since Jiang), the inside access model of consultation and the classified reference 
system. These Maoist legacies have continued to shape policy making after Mao, and 
many of the characteristics of policy making in the present day are more or less rooted in 
the Mao era. 
 
3.6.2 The Deng Era and Fragmented Authoritarianism 
 
The most prominent characteristic of policy making in the Deng era was ‘fragmented 
authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal, 1992), which remained the best explanatory framework of 
policy making in the reform era (Mertha, 2009). The formation of fragmented 
authoritarianism could be attributed to declining strongman politics and more dynamic 
central-local relations. 
At the level of elite politics, the paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, had less personal 
authority compared to Mao, as the regime shifted its legitimating base from personalised 
revolutionary utopian to the more secular criterion of performance (Zhao, 2009). Without 
an undisputed vision for the future, an ideological fissure appeared. The debate revolved 
around what constituted legitimate reform. The left, led by prominent statists and economic 
planners in the Mao era, such as Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, were reluctant to implement 
market reforms. They wanted more or less to continue the development strategy that 
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emerged from the First Five Year Plan in the early 1950s, and believed that China’s 
economic difficulties could be fixed by modernising the planned economy and making it 
‘more scientific’ (Breslin, 2008b; Leonard, 2008). The right, led by reformist leaders such 
as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, attributed China’s problems to the incomplete transition 
– halfway between planned and market economy, and between ‘rule of man’ and ‘rule of 
law’. They contended that the solution was to introduce more reforms.  
This divide between the left and the right gave rise to the loose formation of two 
confrontational factions accordingly, which characterised elite politics in the Deng era. The 
struggle at the top was reflected in the not infrequent U-turns on policies, or ‘letting go’ 
followed by ‘tightening up’ cycles. In light of this tension, Deng Xiaoping promoted his 
own ‘no debate’ (bu zhenglun) thesis. He argued that China’s fundamental problem was its 
impoverishment and backwardness. Rather than debating on ideological lines, which 
would make things complicated and waste precious time, China should pursue whatever 
means to promote economic development regardless of the ideological implications. As a 
result of Deng’s pragmatism in striking a balance, all policy outcomes ended up 
somewhere between what the left and the right desired.  
More fragmentation occurred below the elite level and within bureaucratic politics. 
According to Deng’s regional development logic, some people and some regions should be 
allowed to prosper before others. Such logic restructured the matrix of power and increased 
the discretionary authority of provinces, which encouraged them to innovate their own 
ways of development and governance in order to spur rapid growth (Lieberthal, 1995). 
Thus, provinces were motivated to compete with each other for resources and preferential 
treatment, as were central ministries which controlled the allocation of these resources. As 
a result, the bureaucratic empire was even more difficult to coordinate vertically and 
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horizontally, and the entire system was considered by Lieberthal (1992) to be a 
‘fragmented authoritarianism’.  
To make this complex system work more effectively, there were many negotiations 
between the centre and localities, and among localities themselves. The prevalence of these 
informal arrangements inevitably eroded central authority and reduced its ability to impose 
its will on local authorities. Nevertheless, such negotiations, bargaining and consensus-
building processes softened the rigid institutional set-up. Mutual accommodation made the 
system better adapted for the changing economic landscape. At the same time, local 
authorities were more vocal and courageous in defending their own interests in competition 
with the central authority (by taking advantage of factionalism at the centre, if necessary) 
and other local authorities. More skilful and committed local leaders could really make a 
difference. The new central-local dynamics created a more viable channel for local 
interests to be represented and for local talents and initiatives to be transmitted into policy 
making at the centre. For example, local experiments and experience in Wenzhou and 
Shenzhen were transformed into the system for nationwide implementation thereafter. 
These input dynamics illuminated the nature of reform: it was not only reform from above 
but also reform from below (Parris, 1993).  
As China opened up to the outside world and as interests became more diverse from 
within, professional research activities have become increasingly important in policy 
making. In the Deng era, the orientation of policy making gradually shifted from ideology 
and party lines centred towards scientific and technical based. Research institutes were 
established to provide valuable policy inputs to the leadership. For example, researchers at 
the Chinese Rural Development Research Group conducted field investigations and 
gathered first-hand data that helped the central government in formulating a series of 
policy documents on countryside and agricultural development (Wang, 2008). 
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Nevertheless, these research activities had apparent shortcomings. Many researchers 
lacked the knowledge and methodological capacity necessary for systematic research and 
analysis. In addition, political imperatives did from time to time override institutional 
policy consulting. As the radical and controversial price reform of 1988 manifested, once 
policies were initiated by political leaders with firm determination, policy advisors had 
little choice but to design the detailed policy accordingly. Thus, the influence of the 
academic circle in policy making under Deng varied greatly depending on the case and the 
circumstances.  
Deng’s opening up to the outside world not only included being receptive to foreign 
capital and technology, but also learning from foreign experience and institutions. Deng 
was interested in foreign development models and their applicability to China. He seemed 
convinced that authoritarian regimes were more efficient than democratic ones in pursuing 
economic development, and that development could be uninterrupted only if economic 
reforms were implemented before political reforms, as the experiences of Indonesia, 
Singapore, Malaysia and other industrialising countries of Southeast Asia showed (Wrage, 
1998). The establishment of Special Economic Zones and the promotion of rule by law 
(instead of rule of law) in China exemplified this learning from policies from abroad.  
In sum, policy making under Deng became more institutionalised owing to the 
regularisation of normal politics. The locus of policy making was in the process of shifting 
from the centre to the provinces, which resulted not only in fragmentation but in breathing 
space for more diverse interests and policy innovation. In terms of the policy process, more 
actors were involved and policy inputs were increasingly professional. The legacies of the 
Deng era were rich. Fragmented authoritarianism continues to characterise normal politics 
in the present day, and sometimes even during crises. In addition, Deng’s ‘no debate’ 
thesis remains the most debated topic in the intellectual life of China. As unsolved 
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institutional and structural problems have accumulated since Deng, people from a wide 
political spectrum have been questioning the legitimacy of ‘no debate’ and competing with 
each other for alternative agendas.  
 
3.6.3 The Jiang Era and Managed Corporatism 
 
Since Jiang and the CCP’s ‘third generation’ of leaders came to power, Chinese politics 
has entered a new era in which an increasing proportion of decision making has been 
taking place in the context of normal politics instead of in informal, strongman politics. 
The retreat of ideology as the fundamental basis of legitimacy and the remarkable 
diversification of interests in Chinese society facilitated the emergence of normal politics. 
‘Normal’ meant that leaders in their conduct of politics were confined by institutions and 
rules, rather than by ideological dogma (Teiwes, 2002). The lack of revolutionary prestige 
among the third generation also implied that it was not possible for the paramount leader, 
Jiang, to dominate over his Politburo colleagues who possessed comparable bureaucratic 
experience. Although installed as the ‘core’, this status linked him more to the stabilising 
and centrist role he was expected to play in order to unite the Party. In everyday policy 
making, the norm of collective leadership reasserted itself and Jiang was merely the first 
among equals (Tsou, 1998). 
Deng’s reform left the third generation with a complex and unprecedented mix of 
internal and external challenges, a result that Jiang and his colleagues could only build 
upon (Teiwes, 2002). In addition, the costly lessons of the Cultural Revolution and 
Tiananmen had warned the third generation of the disastrous consequences of 
unconstrained internal divisions. As a result, there seemed to be a solid consensus among 
the third generation that leadership solidarity should be maintained. Jiang mentioned 
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Deng’s maxim of ‘stability above all’ on numerous occasions and his stress on stability 
meant that, first of all, stability and regularity among the leadership itself. So, in such a 
context, the notion of Nathan’s patron-client factionalism seemed to be less convincing 
than before. Certainly, nepotism and favouritism on the basis of personal loyalty were still 
very important, especially in the appointments of influential posts (Li, 2000). However, for 
a vulnerable leadership which – for a time – lacked political confidence in the system itself 
(Fewsmith, 1997), aggregating interests, building consensus, pluralising factions and 
sharing power were much more important than asserting differences. Moreover, for a Party 
that seriously lacked but was desperately seeking invulnerable and long-lasting 
legitimating resources, a move to institutionalised, normal politics which provided stability 
would be desirable since it conformed to the populace’s fear of chaos and desire for 
economic security.  
Jiang faced a China which was more difficult to govern than ever before because there 
were a far greater number of interests at work both inside and outside the system. From the 
central-local relations perspective, the over decentralised structure left by Deng was not 
able to accommodate such drastic economic development and the increasingly uneven 
regional pattern associated with it. The central government lacked its own means to collect 
taxes and the drought of the central coffers impeded the ability of transfer payments which 
could help to balance regional development. In 1994 and 1998, the centre implemented 
federal-style taxation and banking system reforms in order to selectively centralise state 
power (Zheng, 2000). Politically, measures were also taken to bring the centre and the 
provinces together. One of the most important approaches was to recruit more provincial 
leaders into important national power institutions, including the Politburo. Under these 
institutional arrangements which were de facto federalism in nature, provincial leaders not 
only preserved the flexibility of implementing differentiated policies to provide economic 
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incentives in their jurisdictions, but were also able to exert influence over central 
government policy making through increased clout in the central nerve of politics (Tien 
and Zhu, 2000).  
The continued expansion and diversification of the Chinese economy had important 
political implications. Reform has produced winners and losers in large numbers. On the 
one hand, a wealthy middle class emerged from the economic opportunities and upward 
mobility brought about by the reform. On the other hand, SOE workers, once the pride of 
Mao’s China, now complained about layoffs and unpaid pensions; peasants, once the 
mainstay of China’s Communist Revolution, now protested against exorbitant levies and 
land grabs by corrupt local officials. They took actions through strikes, demonstrations and 
even violence to press their demands. Since 1989, the leaders have made preparations to 
quell social unrest, the transformation of large number of soldiers into armed police being 
one of the latest such preparations (Bonnin, 2000). And, in some high profile cases, Jiang’s 
regime did respond by resorting to force. But a regime that was increasingly reliant on 
coercive power was unlikely to last long. So, the government must take these petitions into 
account and it did so by expanding the role of ‘intermediate’ associations (Fewsmith, 
2002) – (state) trade unions, neighbourhood committees and other civic organisations that 
would help to buffer direct clashes. Some of these organisations, albeit with limited 
independence, did play more than the role of the ‘transmission belt’ and articulated some 
societal interests, moving along a continuum from ‘state corporatism’ towards ‘societal 
corporatism’ (Unger and Chan, 1996). These input institutions helped the state in seeking a 
new accommodation with society (Fewsmith, 2002).  
Since the 1990s, government-business relations have become an important dimension 
of policy making. Market reforms led to greater firm political activism and gave rise to 
trade associations. Business lobbying was widespread. Kennedy (2005) argues that factors 
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– such as the degree of informality of the policy process, firm size, firm aggressiveness, 
transparency of the industry in question and access to government – are positively related 
to a firm’s influence in policy making. Despite the activism of domestic companies, 
China’s accession to the WTO and the promise of national treatment to foreign firms also 
encouraged foreign lobbying. In cases concerning industries that were so integrated into 
global production networks, foreign firms regularly colluded with their Chinese 
counterparts to ‘work’ policy making to their own advantage. Although firms’ involvement 
in policies made the process seem more inclusive, these inputs would not necessarily 
improve the quality or equality of policies and might make room for money politics in the 
policy process. Furthermore, consumers and other stakeholders who were likely to be 
affected by these policies had far less freedom and capability to organise and make their 
concerns heard, giving firms – especially large ones – a disproportionate weight in terms of 
their say over public policies. The disastrous consequences of the symbiotic government-
business relations manifested itself in the milk scandal. 
Power has become more fiscally and spatially decentralised and diffused. Without the 
personalised legitimacy based on revolutionary prestige, Jiang instead sought procedural 
legitimacy by increasingly turning to institutional instruments for interest articulation 
(Fewsmith, 2002). For example, the role and importance of Leading Small Groups (LSG) 
were strengthened during Jiang’s reign (Shambaugh, 2001). LSGs were formal policy 
deliberation bodies regarding specific inter-agency issues, comprising principal leaders 
from every department or ministry involved. These Groups were usually chaired by a 
member of the PSC who oversaw that broad realm, ensuring that decisions were reached 
by taking into account the widest bureaucratic interests and were compromising and 
consensual. The presence of a heavyweight in LSGs as the ultimate arbiter also ensured the 
obedience to final resolutions by all participants, because these resolutions were adopted 
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on behalf of the PSC. In addition, there has been a greater emphasis on rule by law. The 
People’s Congress and its specialised committees at various levels have been playing an 
important role in policy deliberations (Tanner, 1999). To a lesser extent, they constrained 
government power, or at least put enormous pressure on the government for its 
controversial actions. For example, the resolution to build the Three Gorges Dam was 
passed at the 8th NPC in 1993 with one-third against or abstaining. On the proposal to grant 
special legislative powers to Shenzhen, 40 percent of delegates opted against (Gilley, 
2004). 
Policies made under the third generation were more rational. Many members of this 
generation were engineers by training. As such, this was a technocratic leadership and by 
implication these leaders’ background in technical education might influence their 
approach to policy making in that they focused more on ‘problems’ than the ideological 
implications pertaining to these policy solutions (Fewsmith, 2002). In this respect, the third 
generation resorted to more ‘scientific methods’. Major policies were made usually after 
feasibility and pilot studies had been undertaken and advice was sought from various 
quarters (Shambaugh, 2001). It has become a common practice for Politburo members to 
visit provinces (kaocha), asking for opinions and collecting empirical evidence needed for 
policy making before Party Plenums. Once policies were formulated, implementation was 
more carefully monitored than in the past, there was more regularised feedback from lower 
levels, and policy re-evaluation and alterations were made along the way (Shambaugh, 
2001).  
Think tanks and research institutes flourished in the Jiang era. These institutes not only 
grew in numbers but also expanded their areas of investigation from economic issues to 
social issues. Some even covered sensitive issues such as foreign affairs and cross-straits 
relations (Wang, 2008). At the same time, some think tanks also developed a limited 
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degree of independence. In the 1980s, most research institutes were part of the government 
or were government sponsored. In the 1990s, more research institutes emerged in 
universities. Some were only quasi-governmental because they had diversified sources of 
funding. For example, The China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) at Peking 
University, headed by Lin Yifu, was partly sponsored by the Ford Foundation. There were 
even several truly independent think tanks, such as the Unirule Institute of Economics 
(Outlook Weekly, 2009). Like their western counterparts, they not only contributed to state 
policy research but also provided consulting for businesses and sometimes informed the 
public about social issues of their concern.  
Although Jiang could be credited with the professionalisation of the government and 
being more receptive to ideas and talents, the effectiveness of the channels for transmitting 
information into the system was constrained by Jiang himself, as well as Zhu Rongji. Both 
leaders tended to rely heavily on a designated group of scholars for advice, and these 
preferred scholars enjoyed much greater influence than any other scholars (Wang, 2008). 
Jiang relied heavily on the intellectuals and specialists in the Policy Research Office of the 
Central Committee, many of whom he brought to Beijing from Shanghai, including 
political scientist Wang Huning, who was said to have formulated Jiang’s ‘Three 
Emphases’ and ‘Three Representatives’ discourses behind the scenes, as well as pushed for 
the expansion of village-level elections (Shambaugh, 2001). While Zhu Rongji consulted a 
broader range of scholars regardless of their formal affiliation, his self-confidence and 
impatience sometimes also led to decisions based on his own instincts and preference of 
advice. Therefore, it was fair to say that although the third generation welcomed evidence-
based policy making, they were still capable of imposing personal preferences in final 
decisions. 
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Jiang was criticised for his over-preoccupation with pragmatic difficulties while 
lacking a vision of the future (Fewsmith, 2002). However, beginning in 2000, he made 
tremendous efforts in ideological and institutional spheres that marked his political legacy. 
Both were related to learning from other parts of the world. In the ideological sphere, his 
promotion of ‘Three Representatives’ (the Party should represent the most advanced forces 
of production, advanced culture and the interests of the broad mass of the population) 
brought down the ideological barrier of the Party’s class-based recruitment. It was 
ideologically justified to absorb elites from all walks of life into the Party regardless of 
their class identifications. Jiang’s ideological contributions could make the Party more 
inclusive and flexible in incorporating societal forces. In fact, his invention could be 
attributed to lessons the Party learnt from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Party scholars 
identified that one important reason for the Soviet collapse was that it disenfranchised its 
economic, social and intellectual elites. These elites then became the adversaries of the 
Soviet regime before and during its collapse. Thus, in order to remain in power, the CCP 
needed to adapt and welcome new and existing elites rather than oppose them (Lee, 2008). 
In the institutional sphere, Jiang and Zhu’s push for the WTO membership was intended to 
socialise China into the global political economy. They used the WTO accession as an 
external catalyst to accelerate domestic reform, subjecting local government behaviour to 
international agreements that were binding and to the continuous scrutiny of the 
international community. 
China under Jiang Zemin was characterised by the continuance of liberalisation 
initiated by Deng. Normal politics began to take shape in that ‘game to win all’ style 
factional struggle disappeared (Teiwes, 2002). There were no dominating ‘isms’ 
intertwined with the conduct of politics and policy making has become more constituency 
based (Shambaugh, 2001). The generational change of the leadership, diversification of 
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interests and a more plural institutional sphere of policy making, nurtured more rational 
and scientific policies. Consultation was regularised and the transmission channels 
between state and society were broadened. With the exception of an ideological great leap 
forward to incorporate a broader range of constituencies, the third generation proceeded 
very cautiously with regard to political reform. However, as the Fanglin incident and 
SARS showed, transparency, openness and accountability were badly needed in the 
system. The pressure of political reform on Hu Jintao and the fourth generation was 
tremendous.  
 
3.6.4 The Hu Era and Emerging Pluralism 
 
During the political high season between autumn 2002 and spring 2003, the PRC 
underwent its most orderly power transition in history. At the 16th PC, Jiang Zemin stepped 
down with decent legacies: GDP had more than doubled compared with 1989; living 
standards had improved considerably for many; the successful bid for the 2008 Olympics 
boosted the country’s international prestige; and everything else on the achievement list 
attributed to him suggested that China already stood firmly at the doorstep of prosperity 
and modernisation. However, problems that had accumulated during the same period were 
also grave: China degraded from being one of the most egalitarian countries to one of the 
most unequal; there was severe environmental degradation; there was widespread 
corruption as well as social unrest; and, most importantly, there was a political system 
without genuine transparency and accountability that ‘still falls short of the expectations of 
the people’ (Xinhua, 2007a). The regime over which Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao would be 
presiding was sitting atop a volcano on the verge of eruption (He, 2003). 
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Hu and Wen hence took a timely populist policy shift (Li, 2006), appealing to ordinary 
Chinese people who were increasingly concerned about economic equality and social 
justice. This apparently populist turn seemed to be Hu-Wen’s return to the ‘mass line’ 
which reversed Jiang’s ‘elitist line’ in the previous decade. Based on this observation, Li 
Cheng went so far as to argue that there was an emergence of a new ‘bipartisanship’ – the 
formation of two ‘constituency based’ coalitions within the CCP that clustered around 
Jiang and Hu-Wen respectively, competing with each other for power, influence and policy 
initiatives (Li, 2005). 
This conceived division conformed well to the conventional wisdom regarding the 
nature of Chinese elite politics since Deng – factionalism in the form of a ‘two-line 
struggle’, and in the context of the Hu era, a two-line struggle between the Shanghai gang 
which stressed the ‘economic task of generating growth’ and the CYL (or tuanpai) which 
was more concerned with the ‘political task of promoting development’ (Breslin, 
2008b:218). However, no matter how the new leadership claimed that they were different 
from their predecessors, the regularity of Chinese politics effectively ruled out the 
possibility of any sustained dramatic policy turn. The aforementioned orderly power 
transition ensured some degree of continuity, not only in the composition of the top 
leadership itself but also in the general direction of policy making. It should be noted that 
Hu Jintao had been an influential member of the third generation for ten years before he 
became the paramount leader of the fourth generation. Some popular policies attributed to 
him actually took root in the tenure of the third generation. For example, Hu-Wen tirelessly 
promoted the conception of scientific development as their ideological and ideational 
contributions. One important component of scientific development was balanced regional 
development, but the strategic push for narrowing the gap between the coastal area and 
hinterland – the Go West Development – was actually initiated by Jiang and Zhu as early 
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as 1999. Under this strategy, the GDP growth rate of western provinces had already taken 
off before Hu assumed office in 2002 (Holbig, 2004). In addition, Hu’s pledges of rule by 
law and of intra-Party democracy were not entirely new because these concepts could be 
traced back to Jiang and even Deng.  
Even from a patron-client factionalism perspective, the delineation of a two-line 
struggle was over simplistic. If the notion of a conventionally conceived ‘faction’ was still 
relevant, then one may discover that there were many diversified interests at work and 
there were indeed many factions, be they the tuanpai, the Shanghai gang, ‘princelings’ 
(taizi dang), the secretary clique, the petroleum clique, the Qinghua clique, the Beida 
clique, and so on. But political stability would have been undermined if each faction went 
in its own way firmly to pursue incompatible goals. As such, the relatively stable status of 
Chinese politics suggested the limitation of strictly defined factionalism. In fact, these so 
called factions were by no means monolithic. They were fluid and thus not mutually 
exclusive in terms of membership or policy priorities. One leader may possess several 
factional identities but may pursue policies which were sufficiently centrist. Such 
ambiguities could actually make the leader in question neutral and potentially accepted by 
more people. Furthermore, promising leaders had much broader administrative experience 
and expertise (and those whom did were likely to be promoted more quickly, ceteris 
paribus). They may have worked in both coastal and inland provinces. Equally, being a 
Party apparatchik did not necessarily mean lacking awareness of modern economics, and 
being a populist leader did not necessarily mean alienation from other social elites. In 
short, factions have become much more plural and similarities (or at least compatibilities) 
often obscured sharp distinctions. This was not to argue the irrelevance of factional conflict 
in Chinese politics, but the pluralisation of factions did facilitate interest articulation, 
power sharing and consensus building. This trend of pluralisation was more likely to hold 
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the Party together than precipitating a split from within, and perhaps a key step towards 
what Hu Jintao called intra-Party harmony (dangnei hexie), which was also the prerequisite 
for social harmony, as he argued (Xinhua, 2007a).  
What did emerge as the distinctive feature of high politics in the Hu era was the 
enlargement of the PSC’s size from 7 to 9. The Party chief in charge of propaganda and the 
chair of the Central Politics and Law Commission (China’s internal security apparatus) 
both gained an extra seat in the PSC, whereas in the Jiang and Deng eras they only each 
had a seat in the full Politburo. This expansion of the PSC reflected the rising importance 
of persuasion (through propaganda) and coercion (through tightening internal security) in 
the Hu era. Increased fragmentation at the top level meant that policies made in the realms 
of propaganda and internal security became increasingly autonomous of the Party’s overall 
policy. And, as both were of a repressive nature, they hindered the Party’s experiments 
with new initiatives from time to time.  
In central-local relations, like their predecessors, Hu-Wen also faced the problem of 
local disobedience, and at least in their first five-year term, local resistance undermined the 
central authority considerably. Hu-Wen’s scientific paradigm of promoting balanced 
economic, social and environmental development was perceived by some local authorities, 
especially in well-off provinces, as being incompatible with their single-minded GDP 
stimulation model and oligarchic political economy. In the Hu era, local governments were 
involved in all sorts of activities dominated by short-termism, such as selling or leasing 
land to generate revenue and investing heavily in energy-inefficient industries and projects, 
all of which were undertaken at the expense of wider, longer-term developmental goals set 
by the central government (Breslin, 2007). These short-term measures were often carried 
out without consultation with the people affected and more often than not through illegal 
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means such as land grabs and forced relocation. As a result, social protests soared in the 
Hu era, largely owing to local government wrongdoings (Shirk, 2007).  
Although local governments were central to the functioning of an economic system 
that had dysfunctionally emerged to suit local government interests (Breslin, 2007), Hu-
Wen could not simply clean them up overnight, because dealing too hard a blow on them 
would lead to a hard landing and chaos. Nevertheless, Hu-Wen did ‘arouse’ the people 
affected to put some limited checks and balances on local authorities, not through a 
Cultural Revolution-style campaign, but by directing blame to local offices. A new 
regulation adopted by the State Council in 2005 stipulated that petitioners should appeal to 
local governments according to territorial jurisdiction and the responsibility of the 
department in charge, instead of coming all the way to Beijing (Li, 2006). By making local 
governments more accountable, the legitimacy of the central leadership could actually be 
enhanced. The new regulation placed political pressure on local leaders while enabling the 
central leadership to avoid blame, because people’s complaints about injustice and 
inequality to local governments accorded with the central government’s stress on justice 
and equality. In addition, Hu-Wen also resorted to cadre management measures to bring 
the provinces under tighter control. As Mao once argued, ‘cadres are a decisive factor, 
once the political line is determined’ (Mao, 1956). Hu-Wen increased the geographical 
mobility and transfer of provincial level leaders. It was thought that localism could be 
considerably contained by appointing ‘outsiders’ – who were detached from the local web 
of interests – to decisive positions (Zheng, 1999), at least in the short term. 
In his first five-year term, Hu Jintao’s incumbency represented something of a 
breakthrough in legal-rational terms (Weatherley, 2006). Most remarkable was progress in 
relation to transparency. After Hu Jintao took power, Politburo meeting briefs were 
routinely publicised. Party and government departments (including the Ministry of 
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National Defence) each had a spokesperson to inform the media and the mass public 
regularly about decisions made. Government whitepapers were published regarding major 
issues, increasing the transparency even on sensitive issues such as military spending. 
Public hearings were held before major change in public policies. In fact, these initiatives 
could be traced back to Zhao Ziyang, and were a continuation of his pledge at the 13th PC 
two decades ago that ‘major issues should be made known to the people, major questions 
should be discussed with the people before being resolved’ (Zhao, 1987). Whilst Zhao’s 
quest for limited transparency was almost completely ignored during the price reform and 
Tiananmen, Hu’s promise for greater transparency survived several major crises. In the 
SARS crisis and the milk scandal, despite an initial cover-up, the government later 
changed course, publicising the issues and handling them in a much more transparent way. 
In the 2003 Ming-class submarine incident and the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, media 
coverage followed immediately after the crises.  
In terms of institutionalisation, the fourth generation also made their contribution. On 
the part of the Party, Hu Jintao took measures to improve intra-Party democracy, such as 
resuming Zhao Ziyang’s practice of presenting the Politburo’s work report to the Central 
Committee. Furthermore, this was stipulated as a routine in the newly adopted ‘Regulation 
on Intra-Party Supervision’ at the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central 
Committee (People’s Net, 2004). In addition, the Party enacted many regulations 
governing the selection and promotion of cadres and many informal norms emerged 
(Fewsmith, 2008). On the part of the State Council, Wen Jiabao further institutionalised 
decision making by replacing the Premier Work Meetings for State Council Executive 
Meetings and State Council Plenary Meetings as platforms for major decision making, 
because the latter two meetings had legal status whereas the former had not (Zhao, 2006b). 
In relation to improving accountability, although lacking a practicable and formalised 
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mechanism, informal norms were established which meant that officials responsible for 
major mistakes would be demoted or even removed, as the cases of Zhang Wenkang and 
Meng Xuenong (removed twice) demonstrated, not to mention the hundreds that were 
sacked during the combat against SARS and relief work of the Sichuan earthquake owing 
to their incompetence.  
The intellectual landscape also has become more plural. As the economic reform 
deepened, and particularly at the juncture of joining the WTO, concerns over the side 
effects of neoliberalism apparently found a growing audience in Zhongnanhai (Fewsmith, 
2008). In contrast to the Jiang era, when liberals and neoliberals gained disproportionate 
influence, intellectuals representing the left portion of the ideological spectrum – the Old 
Left and the New Left – emerged as a counterbalance to the Right with Hu’s populist turn. 
There have been sharp debates about the future vision of China, but the Party was willing 
to listen to opinions and criticisms from a wide political spectrum.  
At the same time, the transmittal of information between the state and the society was 
broadened. Think tanks were still very important, but they were ‘knit into a web of policy 
debate network which makes think tanks less distinctive nodes of that network’ (Naughton, 
2002:625). Zhao Quansheng argued that the network was becoming increasingly active and 
multi-layered. He identified seven channels: consultations with policy makers; internal 
reports via government channels; conferences and public policy debates; policy NGOs; 
outside-system (tizhi wai) discussions; overseas scholars; and a highly specialised, 
professional community (Zhao, 2006a). And apart from these listed, consultations between 
the CCP and China’s eight intellectuals-based ‘democratic’ parties, a channel 
institutionalised under Hu, should also be counted. More profoundly, the Chinese public 
has been gradually moving away from the periphery and towards the centre stage of policy 
debates, thanks to the widespread use of the Internet. Most netizens might not yet be able 
 164
to sophisticatedly articulate a specific policy, but the strong populist sentiment among 
them often led to the government’s serious consideration regarding what they said. 
Virtually every policy constituency wanted to gain the support of a huge number of 
netizens in pursuing their goals. For example, non-mainstream intellectuals whose ideas 
were previously ignored by the policy circle now ‘reach out’ to netizens in the hope of 
generating a critical mass of public pressure so as to force decision makers into accepting 
their ideas (Wang, 2008).  
Hu-Wen continued to seek foreign ideas to improve the system in China. Their 
interests were very ‘plural’ in that they sought to learn from both mature democracies and 
prolonged authoritarian systems. These analyses were transmitted into the system to inform 
recent CCP reforms (Shambaugh, 2008a; 2008b). In late 2003, the full Politburo attended a 
group study session on the ‘historical development trajectory of the world’s major powers 
since the 15th century’. This study session was said to have inspired the Hu-Wen leadership 
on China’s future vision and was decisive to the enunciation of the ‘peaceful rise’ thesis. In 
2004, a resolution on ‘consolidating the CCP’s governing capacity’ was adopted at the 
Fourth Plenary Session. The contents of this resolution were essentially the conclusions 
drawn by several research teams dispatched to the former Soviet Union and other Eastern 
European states studying the longevity of their ruling parties (Fewsmith, 2008). Hu hoped 
that by avoiding the mistakes of these parties that led to their downfall, the CCP could 
enhance its governing capacity and hence sustain its rule. In addition, Chinese analysts 
were particularly interested in social democratic parties in Western Europe and the way 
they managed a successful shift from traditional and ideological to more modern, popular 
and improved socialism. The CCP even sent young cadres to Japan to learn from their 
strengths in disaster management, despite the ups and downs in diplomatic relations 
between the two countries (Jiang, 2009).  
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Hu Jintao devoted much of his time in office to addressing the problems covered up by 
Jiang’s neo-conservative approach to governance (Fewsmith, 2008). He adopted a more 
populist policy programme to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing and dividing 
society. Chinese politics has become more plural than ever before in terms of the conduct 
of elite politics and the interest matrix. He responded with considerable adeptness in 
central-local relations and state-intellectual relations, and made remarkable achievements 
in improving the transparency, institutionalisation and accountability of the regime. If the 
above were considered his recipe for tinkering with the current system and muddling 
through, his doctrine of a ‘socialist harmonious society’ clearly inspired more hope. A 
harmonious society, as Hu depicted, was an ideal system that offered a people-centred 
government, a socio-economically sustainable and environmentally friendly economy, and 
a rule by law society. However, this ideal could not be achieved as long as an inherent 
contradiction was not resolved – a contradiction between empowering the people on the 
one hand, whilst keeping the grip on power on the other, a contradiction that has been 
obsessing the Party since the founding of the People’s Republic. More often than not, it 
was the regime’s very inclination to ‘grip’ rather than ‘empower’ that blocked the channels 
of reliable information, the talent and the societal input needed for policy making.  
 
 
3.7 International Pressure 
 
 
This section briefly explains the role of international pressure in affecting China’s 
management of domestic crisis. In this thesis, the international factor is very important in 
moderating China’s behaviour, as we shall see in the case studies. Nonetheless, 
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substantively incorporating the international dimension will require the application of such 
frameworks as foreign policy analysis, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Also, 
using foreign policy analysis is more appropriate for the study of inter-state political-
military crises in the realm of traditional security, but not particularly suitable for our case 
studies – NTS crises mainly threaten a specific nation-state but with an uncertain 
transnational dimension if they are not handled properly by the national government 
concerned. Therefore, here we continue our domestic focus and only outline the 
‘intermesticity’ in China’s handling of domestic crises. More detailed discussions of the 
international dimension are to follow in the case studies.  
As argued in the introduction, as far as NTS crises were concerned, China has behaved 
like a status quo power, i.e. a rule taker of international institutions, or an emerging rule 
maker that mostly contributes to stabilising existing international institutions rather than 
promoting its own alternative (Breslin, 2010). China’s orientation to existing international 
institutions and orders can be explained by the fact that it is a country which has benefited 
most from adhering to such orders in the last three decades, and its rapid economic rise can 
be attributed to its playing by the rules within existing institutions. China thus regards 
behaving like a status quo power as a way of building up and maximising its national 
interests.  For instance, China’s more than decade long perseverance in negotiating its 
WTO membership as well as the substantial concessions it has made best exemplify its 
willingness to embrace international institutions (Kim, 2004). In addition, although China 
is adept at realpolitik, it is relatively inexperienced at managing NTS and human security 
crises when compared with industrialised countries. Its lack of institutional and operational 
capacity has propelled the Chinese government to socialise itself into the existing 
framework of international cooperation on managing global risk.  
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 More importantly, since China opened up in the late 1970s (and even more so since 
1992), its diplomacy has been subordinated to, and in the service of, domestic goals. In the 
reform era, there have been triangular and mutually reinforcing relations between 
diplomacy, interdependent economic development and regime stability at home. In other 
words, China needs to be seen as behaving responsibly in the international arena in order to 
create a favourable external environment for China’s ongoing economic growth, on which 
China’s political stability rests (Breslin, 2010; Buzan, 2010; Wang, 1999; Zhang; 1998).  
Given the primarily domestic origin of China’s international behaviour, in this thesis 
we treat China’s responses to international pressure or expectation as a dependent variable, 
i.e. the international dimension of China’s crisis management is a function of China’s 
domestic policies and political context. The abovementioned four contextual themes, to 
different degrees, can all determine China’s largely cooperative international behaviour. 
That is, GDP centred political economy and performance-based legitimacy require China 
to continue behaving as a rule taker of international institutions, in order to secure foreign 
investment and resources needed for domestic growth, and to secure overseas market 
access for Chinese-made goods. In terms of state control of information, the changing 
strategy of censorship from bluntly suppressing to tactically managing information, creates 
limited transparency for international media as well as disciplining China’s behaviour 
under an international spotlight. In terms of state-society relations, the increasingly open 
Chinese society – with its constant flow of people and ideas into and out of China – is 
putting pressure on the Chinese government to behave like a ‘normal’ country. This is 
especially true when informed citizens make a comparison between China and other 
‘normal’ countries on a particular concern, such as environmental protection, food safety 
and public services. For policy making, the transmission of foreign interests into the 
system as a result of emerging pluralism means that China now has to take into account 
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concerns of international stakeholders when making domestic policies. Also, as Chinese 
policy makers learn from foreign experience and are socialised into the global epistemic 
community, their policy making processes and policy outputs are becoming more 
professional (Zhao, 2006a), which also means that China’s domestic policies are 
increasingly compatible with international norms. 
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The SARS epidemic was the first major crisis facing the newly inaugurated Hu-Wen 
leadership. It hit the country unexpectedly and caused significant frustration to the political 
system through a series of thorough exposure of the cleavages and weaknesses within the 
system. Despite the regime's changing course in the later phase of the crisis, its crisis 
management strategies were largely reactive. The effective containment of the epidemic 
seemed a win-win scenario for both the state and the society. The state certainly learnt the 
costly lesson and subsequently took considerable administrative as well as legislative 
measures to improve its crisis management capacity. The society, on the other hand, 
eventually pushed the agenda and prompted the state to address the anxiety of the people. 
After the SARS crisis, as a result, a new social contract seemed to be reached between the 
Party and the people. It represented a shift towards the new equilibria in the demand for 
and the supply of democratisation (Breslin, 2008a) which included such new elements as 
transparent information and political accountability.  
The SARS crisis once again demonstrated that the CCP regime possessed 
remarkable resilience and adaptability despite its authoritarian nature. Speculations about 
SARS as 'China's Chernobyl' which would consequently lead to ‘perestroika and glasnost’ 
(restructuring and openness, as happened in the Soviet Union following the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster) were proved over-optimistic (Fewsmith, 2003a). Moreover, it was largely 
the temporary return to the Maoist mass mobilisation, not progress towards 
democratisation, that enabled the Chinese government to bring the epidemic under 
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effective control within a brief period (Gries and Rosen, 2004). In other words, it was 
mainly the CCP’s formidable mobilisation capacity and non-compromising, heavy-handed 
approach of disease control that reversed the grave situation.  
If we look back to the 1950s, we may well find that the effective elimination of 
schistosomiasis, smallpox, cholera and other epidemics was also achieved through mass 
campaigns. The CCP seems adept at countering infectious diseases historically so there is 
little surprise that the CCP will do a satisfactory job once the Party apparatus is fully 
mobilised in the Maoist manner. It is therefore fair to suggest that this mobilisation and 
extractive capacity has been effective in responding to extraordinary circumstances.  
The SARS crisis was therefore an extraordinary event that revealed not only the 
weaknesses, but also the strength of China's political system. It was a fascinating case for 
the analysis of the nature of contemporary Chinese politics because it was a classic 
example of the CCP managing crisis through manipulation and maximum tinkering with 
the current system. In addition, to a large extent, the importance of crisis management as a 
crucial dimension of public policy had not been fully recognised by Chinese policy makers 
up until SARS. Similarly, the subject of crisis management as a popular discipline was also 
born of SARS. Much of the crisis learning from SARS has been translated into policy and 
legislative amendments that in turn affect future crisis management behaviour. Thus, our 
case study starts with SARS, which serves as a good benchmark for the other two crises. 
 
4.2 The Pre-SARS Milieu 
 
Before looking at how the SARS crisis unfolded, we need to have in mind the shape of 
China's socio-economic milieu prior to the crisis and the many governance problems that 
elevated a local health issue into a transnational political disaster. To apply the terminology 
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in the analytical framework we developed in Chapter 2, these crucial conditions and 
problems formed the pool of 'raw materials' out of which the Party first picked and mixed 
to construct a crisis discourse and then selectively addressed. So the SARS crisis should be 
analysed in the context of the following dimensions.  
 
4.2.1 The Economic Dimension: The Problematic Growth Model 
 
The orthodox economic thought in China at the turn of the 21st century was to achieve a 
‘moderately well off’ level of prosperity through the use of neoliberal economic policies. 
Since Deng's Southern Tour (the Nanxun) in 1992 which reinvigorated the reform, the 
single-minded pursuit of GDP growth has been the dominating task for Chinese officials at 
all levels. As a result, the concept of development was conceived interchangeably with the 
meaning of economic growth. This narrow definition considered neither the quality of 
growth, nor its sustainability. Moreover, the GDP-focused development model 
marginalised social and human development on the national agenda and created as many 
problems as it solved. The most notable consequence of this GDP-focused development 
model was the unraveling of the socialist welfare system. The marketisation of healthcare, 
housing and education meant that access to welfare services increasingly depended on 
one's ability to pay. As mentioned in the last chapter, the tax-sharing reform of 1994 aimed 
at strengthening the state's redistribution capacity through centralising tax revenue further 
exacerbated the problem of inadequate welfare spending at the local level, due to the fact 
that most of this expenditure had to be financed by local governments on their own. As a 
result, the levels of social protection provided by local governments varied substantially 
across regions. In less developed localities, welfare services were often underfunded, 
especially in healthcare and education. 
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This growth model provided the best explanation for the so called ‘Chinese 
Miracle’. However, the model’s sustainability and legitimacy have been hotly debated at 
home and internationally. China's Maoist Old Left criticised these neoliberal policies as the 
restoration of capitalism and a betrayal to the Party's revolutionary promises. While 
China’s social-democratic oriented New Left was less critical on market principles per se, 
but worried more about the negative consequences of the neoliberal project (Breslin, 
2008a). International critics similarly argued that China was 'an ideal capitalist state' which 
embraced capitalist doctrines for the purpose of growth while at the same time suppressing 
those affected by the negative impacts of economic liberalisation (Zhao, 2008). 
Like all other governments, the Chinese government also constructed discourses to 
justify controversial policies. The official reasoning could be summarised by two 
mysterious numbers, 8% and 2000-2020. The mysterious 8% referred to the asserted 
bottom line growth rate that the Chinese government must achieve in order to create 
enough jobs for maintaining stability. Extensive protests by redundant state owned 
enterprise workers in 1997-8 when the growth rate failed to achieve 8% were seemingly 
fresh examples of what might happen once growth slowed down (and bear in mind that the 
activities of the Falungong peaked in the same period). So the growth rate became 
something more than an indicator of economic health, but an indispensable pillar of the 
Party's stable rule. Furthermore, growth and stability were thought to be mutually 
dependent and mutually enhancing, i.e. more growth would deliver a higher level of 
stability, which would in turn constitute the prerequisite for further growth. In hindsight, it 
could be argued that this understanding on the relationship between growth and stability 
was deeply flawed because a high growth rate generated at the expense of social and 
human development clearly engendered the possibility of more instability. However, this 
misunderstanding was widely held by local governments at the time prior to SARS.   
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The focus on GDP growth also heavily influenced the CCP’s nomenklatura system. 
The ability to stimulate GDP growth and to maintain stability in one's jurisdiction was 
regarded as the most important factor in determining the promotion of officials (Chen et al, 
2005). However, this could result in the relationship between growth and stability 
becoming zero-sum. For example, when economic situation deteriorated, local 
governments often deployed more coercive means to maintain superficial stability, or when 
social tensions increased, local governments often attributed them to inadequate growth 
and in response poured investment into large projects in order to stimulate growth. These 
patterns were seen in a number of localities, which could lead to the accumulation of 
unresolved contradictions in the long term.  
The year of 2000-2020 was referred to as the ‘period of strategic opportunities’. 
This was the mainstream belief in the Chinese academia and policy circle that emerged in 
the mid 1990s. The basic prediction was that the first two decades of the 21st century 
would be a brief window of opportunity that China must not miss for its economic 
construction, because China’s surrounding international situation would be relatively less 
hostile so that China could maximise its comparative advantages in the global economic 
integration. The unsaid meaning of this was that it was in China's interest to further 
economic liberalisation for rapid growth, while leaving other non-economic tasks aside for 
the time being. This argument clearly had a materialist tinge that prioritised the 
accumulation of wealth over the (re)distribution of wealth. Similarly, the argument about 
the ‘transitional period’ also emphasised efficiency over equality. Advocates of the 
‘transitional period’ argument contended that the period when socio-economic dislocations 
came hand in hand with high growth, was an unavoidable phase of development that China 
must undergo because the former was the inevitable cost of the latter. The term was 
challenged by Wang Hui who saw the ‘mystification of a “transitional period”’ by 
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neoliberalism supporters a deliberate effort to explain away the adverse effects of market 
reforms (Wang, 2004b:8).  
So, it was obvious to see the incentive (and in many cases, imperative) for Chinese 
officials to be preoccupied with GDP growth, and the disincentive for them to pay equal 
attention to social development. In particular, the ‘transitional period’ argument was so 
powerful in that it was not only accepted by many among the public, but also had a 
considerable purchase within the bureaucracy. Given the deep-rooted ‘GDPism’, it was 
also unsurprising that when there was a public health crisis such as SARS, local officials 
still worried more about GDP growth than the people’s health. To a certain extent, Deng's 
catchphrase ‘(economic) Development is of overriding importance’ was misinterpreted and 
the product of which became the root of many social problems.  
 
4.2.2 The Political Dimension: Fragmented Authoritarianism 
 
The second contextual dimension highly relevant to the trajectory of SARS concerned the 
structures of policy making and implementation. China's massive state apparatus was 
comprised of an extensive bureaucratic network, with agencies organised vertically as the 
‘tiao’ (line) and horizontally as the ‘kuai’ (block) (Lieberthal, 1992). This complex tiao-
kuai structure had two profound implications for the policy process in practice. Firstly, 
policies made at the centre were often subject to the manipulation or selective 
implementation by local governments which then incorporated its own goals into the 
policy implementation itself. This type of manipulation thus reduced the efficacy of central 
government policies (Mertha, 2009). This was especially true when an institutionally 
powerful ‘block’ agency intervened in the policy implementation of an institutionally weak 
‘line’ agency.  
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Secondly, as we mentioned in the last chapter on policy making and fragmented 
authoritarianism, policy formation was often accompanied by the conflict of interests 
between agencies, because for a number of policy areas, there was no clear-cut division of 
jurisdictions. This ambiguity could result in vacuums of governance in some policy areas 
as no agencies were specifically designated to take the lead until the negotiation was 
settled. This could be very dangerous during crises since inter-agency bargaining would 
jeopardise responsiveness.  
During some major crises in particular, an extra layer of complexity: the civilian-
military cooperation, exacerbated the already complex inter-agency coordination problem. 
There had been no legal backing for the civilian government to command the military until 
the promulgation of the National Defence Mobilisation Law (Gov.cn, 2010a). As a result, 
for outside observers, crisis management in China was often characterised by a period of 
initial inaction when government departments were sorting out which was going to do 
what. As an interim measure, a task force, such as a LSG, was often set up to oversee the 
cross-departmental coordination. The important role played by this type of ad hoc 
organisations was an important characteristic of Chinese crisis management. These task 
forces were often powerful enough to break the institutional deadlock because they were 
chaired by political heavyweights. But the potential limitation was that the efficacy of the 
inter-agency coordination depended more on the strength of the political leadership than 
the formal institution.  
Another persistent problem with fragmented authoritarianism was getting the 
accurate information from below and synthesising it for policy making. Even in the 
unlikely case where information was free from manipulation, it was still difficult to gather 
it for macro level evaluation, because in the cumbersome state apparatus agencies charged 
with different responsibilities were not obliged to share information with other agencies 
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outside their ‘line’ or ‘block’ jurisdictions. Within each sub-system of the state apparatus, 
the information flow was less obstructed, but at the same time there existed incentives for 
subordinates to distort information from below, owing to the result-oriented nature of the 
performance contract which they had to sign with their direct boss (Saich, 2003). Hence 
lower level officials were inclined to suppress negative news as no one was willing to risk 
their political career which hinged on the evaluation of their performance by superior 
governments.  
 
4.2.3 The Intermestic Dimension: State-society Relations and 
International Pressure 
 
Prior to SARS, perhaps the CCP’s most symbolic move that generated controversy about 
whom the Party represented was Jiang's 'Three Represents' ideological innovation aimed at 
absorbing the emerging economic and social elites into the Party. They were the strata that 
benefited most from the reform and many of whom within the strata had been regarded as 
‘capitalists’ not long ago. Although this step seemed rational given the Party's strategy to 
expand its support base, this move isolated the CCP from the mass public. For many, Jiang 
and Zhu represented the interests of China's new rich and both leaders favoured well-off 
coastal provinces over other underdeveloped hinterlands. During their rule, China 
accelerated state enterprise reforms amid resentment from laid-off workers, signed the 
WTO deal despite the potential threats to China's uncompetitive agricultural industry 
(Bhattasali et al, 2004). The closing down of two leftist journals by Jiang in the fear that 
they might mobilise resentment from disadvantaged groups also revealed the Party's 
alienation from the working class, its traditional support base (Zhao, 2008). In addition, 
official corruption scandals and widespread crony capitalism severely eroded the Party’s 
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image. The Party was seen by the masses as not serving the interests of the people but 
enriching itself.  
As a result, the credibility of the Party was declining. While the distrust of the Party 
always existed, the problem was not as serious as when the information technology 
empowered citizens. There were inherent contradictions between a state not used to open 
information and a ‘wired’ society whose members could not only obtain alternative 
information but also evaluate information critically. The efficacy of the ‘transmission belt’ 
in a digital age was very limited because people would no longer tolerate to be treated like 
children who needed spoon-fed information (Saich, 2003). So even when the government 
faced pressure and held press conferences to assure people, government messages could 
not convince many. And case after case when there was something wrong but the 
government said everything was as usual, people learnt the conviction that if those officials 
said 'no', the truth must be 'yes' (Zheng and Lye, 2004). People were confused and thus 
resorted to whatever available sources of information. The government’s secrecy approach 
which was supposed to preserve stability actually undermined it.  
Ironically, while the government made every effort to stop the penetration of 
foreign media information, its own tarnishing credibility prompted the people, especially 
the well educated and informed urbanites, to embrace foreign media. There emerged a 
network where foreign media information was utilised by Chinese users to articulate their 
concerns, or internally leaked information was utilised by the foreign media to lobby the 
international community which would subsequently press the Chinese government. This 
complex network of information exchange thus undermined the ‘logic of territory’ (Harvey, 
2005) concerning the exercise of state power. As such, how did the Chinese government 
behave not only hinged on the consent of the Chinese people, but was also subject to the 
scrutiny of the international community. And as China has been well integrated into the 
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global trade and transportation networks, what happened in China would also have an 
impact on the rest of the world. 
  
4.2.4 Contingent Factors 
 
There were of course other contingent factors which shaped the trajectory of SARS. For 
example, the leadership transition took place between autumn 2002 and spring 2003 
clearly prompted officials to take a more risk-averse approach when confronting SARS. 
Also, to a large extent, the virus of SARS itself was an external shock. It was a previously 
unknown natural disease that broke out with no warnings. So it was fair to forgive at least a 
part of the poor containment of SARS by the government. But as these factors were 
contingent, they would be considered in relation to how SARS unfolded rather than being 
listed as broad, fundamental dimensions. The following section will review the 
development of the SARS crisis chronologically given the aforementioned settings. 
 
4.3 The Unfolding of the SARS Crisis 
 
4.3.1 The Origin of the Virus 
 
The SARS disease was thought to originate in Guangdong Province around November 
2002. Southern China, including Guangdong has been one of the world’s infectious disease 
hotbeds and scientists attribute this to the close proximity between human and wildlife 
raised for food (McKenna, 2004). So despite an initial small outbreak of SARS within 
Guangdong, the issue was not paid particular attention to and it was regarded as a purely 
medical problem because local health authorities were used to the mysterious emergence 
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and subsequent disappearance of new diseases in the winter-spring season given the 
documented history of flu strains in Guangdong (Thornton, 2009). However, the exact 
nature and cause of SARS were unknown, which increased the difficulty with detection 
and diagnosis, let alone preventive measures and treatment. As a result, the virus spread 
slowly to other localities in Guangdong almost uncontrollably. Its emergence in 
Guangdong also had an international consequence because Guangdong and Hong Kong 
were adjacent regions where daily cross-border population movement was very high. 
When the outbreak hit Guangdong, Hong Kong was among the first affected regions, from 
where the virus was also rapidly transmitted to other parts of the world.  
 
4.3.2 Administrative Fragmentation 
 
As a regional epidemic was about to break out around January 2003, the problem of 
administrative fragmentation presented a serious impediment to the containment of the 
virus. Owing to little information sharing, hospitals that suffered from small outbreaks did 
not alert other hospitals about the disease. First hand information on the characteristics of 
the virus from hospitals admitted SARS patients was not shared even within Guangdong 
province due to poor communications and the institutional setup (Lai, 2004). In addition, 
the military health authority, which was not responsible to the civilian government, 
possessed considerable assets and expertise in controlling infectious diseases. However, it 
did not share valuable information with civilian hospitals. For example, the Guangzhou Air 
Force Hospital did not have any spread of infections as a result of strictly employing basic 
hygiene procedures. But this hospital did not share the hard-learnt experience with others 
(Puska, 2005). If this information was shared between civil and military hospitals as well 
as within jurisdictions of civil and military health authorities respectively, the infection 
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tragedies in hospital after hospital could have been less likely. Furthermore, military 
hospitals did not report the numbers of infections to the civilian health authority and this 
increased the difficulty for the civilian government to evaluate the overall infectious 
situation.  
Moreover, the above problems revealed the failures of an outdated information 
collection system. The system of information management was intertwined with the 
priority conflicts between agencies was equally problematic. The civilian health authority 
would logically want to release as much disease-related information as possible but its 
capacity of doing so was constrained by its weak institutional status. More powerful 
departments, for example, the Party’s propaganda department that was responsible for 
maintaining the Party’s image, and the public security authority which oversaw social 
stability, both outranked the public health authority. As the Party’s guards, these two 
departments would logically prefer to release as little negative news as possible in the fear 
of chaos once this information went public.  
The CCP had a tracked record of blocking negative news in the face of crises.  
Although as mentioned above that departmental self-interestedness was partly responsible 
for the suppression of negative news, institutional factors mattered most. China’s crisis 
response system was largely derived from the national defence mobilisation system, which 
was the institutional product of the CCP’s revolutionary era (Zhong, 2007). The system 
required strict confidentiality and defined different levels of access to information 
according to one’s political status. This practice was highly effective during an era when 
the international environment was very hostile. Confidentiality helped to preserve stability 
and localise a crisis given the limited scale of the movement of people and underdeveloped 
means of communication at the time. While it was reasonable to restrict information flow 
within a limited circle of personnel in times of war on the ground of protecting sensitive 
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information, the same justification could not easily fit with natural disasters and other 
forms of public emergencies where situations were developing rapidly and many lives 
were at stake. Since the reform in the late 1970s, China has been facing many more crises 
that originated from spheres of the society and the economy than from that of national 
security. However, the confidential requirements were largely unchanged despite the far-
reaching socio-economic transformation, due to a sense of vulnerability commonly felt by 
authoritarian regimes in transition.  
 
4.3.3 Legal Impediments to Timely Reporting 
 
In addition to institutional factors, there were legal barriers to the timely reporting of 
tragedies prior to SARS. With the notion of rule by law gaining momentum since the 
1980s, China’s policy framework for guarding state secrets has also emphasised the use of 
laws as an important deterrence instrument. The State Secrets Law was enacted in 1988, 
followed by detailed implementing regulations with regard to different policy areas 
involving state secrets43. These legislations and provisions jointly formed an extensive 
framework regarding the use and disclosure of sensitive information. However, these 
deterrence measures may not necessarily serve public interests well. In the case of SARS 
for example, only the Ministry of Health (MOH) or agencies authorised by it had the 
statutory authority to disclose this type of infectious disease according to the State Secrets 
Law and its implementing regulations regarding public health (Saich, 2003), which meant 
that any bold statements made prior to the MOH authorisation were unlawful. Therefore, 
given the risk of being prosecuted for leaking state secrets, officials were discouraged to 
say anything more than the Party line.  
                                                 
43 For example, the MOH along with the State Secrets Protection Bureau, enacted in 1996 and 1997 detailed 
provisions regarding secretive issues in public health.  
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4.3.4 The Virus Spread Nationwide and Government Deception 
 
Given the above context and the preoccupation with social stability, the Guangdong 
provincial authority kept silent about SARS from November 2002 up until February 2003, 
with the exception of a few denials about the spread of the virus by its subordinating local 
governments. Zhang Dejiang, the Party secretary of Guangdong, reportedly ordered a news 
blackout on SARS as soon as the Guangdong authority became aware of the spread of the 
virus (Puska, 2005). Nevertheless, as previously noted, the preoccupation with stability 
was often coupled with concerns about economic growth. Guangdong was the powerhouse 
of the Chinese economy and it was China’s largest trading and taxpaying province. Its 
economic growth was highly reliant on foreign investment and tourism (especially from 
Hong Kong and Macau). Given its economic weight and outward orientation, it was 
unsurprising that the leadership of Guangdong were very concerned with any negative 
news such as SARS that could potentially affect inward investment and tourism. Several 
other economic factors also contributed to the decision to censor SARS in this period. In 
January 2003, the main reason for silencing reports on SARS was to maintain consumer 
confidence during the Chinese New Year so that people would continue to spend and travel 
(Washington Post, 2003). In addition, the spring was the high season of trade for 
Guangdong as the China Export Commodities Fair was about to open in Guangzhou in 
April 2003. The Fair was important to China’s trade as well as to the country’s open image 
so the authorities considered that this Fair should not be disrupted. One might also 
speculate about the motives of the Guangdong leadership on this delicate issue. The Party 
secretary, Zhang Dejiang and the provincial governor, Huang Huahua, both recently 
appointed to their respective posts, were relatively young among their same-ranking 
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colleagues. They were certainly cautious about their political careers and feared any 
exposure of bad news in their jurisdictions.  
While governments at varies levels sought to resolve the problem of SARS, they 
took a solely closed approach in the hope that they would eliminate the virus by working 
hard behind the scene (Zheng and Lye, 2004). However, without a concerted effort, the 
combat against the virus was poorly coordinated. Moreover, the problem of administrative 
fragmentation went beyond Guangdong province and worsened the overall situation. The 
Guangdong authority should have known about the seriousness of the virus by early 
January and reported this to the central government in Beijing by early February (Saich, 
2003).  An investigation team was quickly dispatched to Guangdong but civilian and 
military health experts were unable to agree on the nature of the virus until April 19 due to 
a lack of cooperation (Puska, 2005). Even within the civilian health authority, researchers 
affiliated with the central and provincial medical institutes disputed over the right measure 
of treatment, which led to avoidable exposure to the virus in hospitals that followed the 
wrong advice (Puska, 2005). The statistics on the number of infections also faced the same 
problem. It was not until late April that the number of infections announced by the civilian 
health authority began to include those patients admitted by military hospitals, which 
resulted in significant underreporting compared with the updated statistics adjusted after 
April 20. Without accurate information, even the leadership in Beijing had to wait for 
information to be synthesised before making any decisive actions. According to a credible 
source in Beijing, the head of the CCP’s General Office once consulted the Health Minister 
on the overall infectious situation so that he could then decide whether or not to take 
quarantine measures in Zhongnanhai (the CCP headquarters), but the Health Minister was 
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unable to provide accurate information because that was also what he was trying to find 
out44.  
While the virus was spreading, the efficacy of this closed-door approach was 
challenged by both international and domestic stakeholders (even by reform-minded 
officials within the Chinese political system). The first wave of panic erupted in 
Guangdong, shortly after the Guangdong authorities reported the virus to Beijing. Short 
messages suggesting that there was a ‘deadly flu’ in Guangzhou were forwarded by mobile 
phone users millions of times within three days (Life Weekly, 2003a). People rushed to 
buy all sorts of things that were said to be able to resist SARS, such as herbal medicines 
for treating cold, vinegar and mosquito coils (believed to kill germs), antibiotics and face 
masks. Although much of this information was exaggerated or simply untrue, and the panic 
buying was unnecessary, without transparent information, people still opted to believe this 
false information (because this was the only type of information that was widely available). 
The credibility of the government fell dramatically.  
In hindsight, the main source of pressure that forced the Chinese leadership to act 
decisively actually came from the international community. The WHO, which initially 
dealt with the Chinese government very patiently, eventually issued travel advisories for 
Guangdong and Hong Kong. This was followed by a flurry of cancellations and 
postponements of high profile international events, such as the World Economic Forum 
China Business Summit and the Rolling Stones concert (Puska, 2005). Foreigners living in 
Beijing also started to flee. China’s international image was tarnished.  
For much of the period between March and April 2003, the central and Guangdong 
governments released more (carefully filtered) information on SARS at press conferences 
but they reiterated that the virus was not serious. Nonetheless, the steadily rising publicly 
                                                 
44 The author’s interview with an anonymous scholar in the policy circle. 
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released infections figure implied a different conclusion contrary to the official statement 
that everything was under effective control. The civilian health authority certainly 
understood that kept saying everything was fine would be unconvincing, but it had more 
important and delicate factors which must be taken into account. In fact, the civilian health 
authority was aware of the seriousness of the situation but could not do much about it 
before consulting other institutionally more powerful departments. This was even more so, 
given that the time when the SARS crisis emerged coincided with the political high season 
of the PRC – the 10th NPC was underway in March in Beijing. Traditionally, during NPC 
sessions media outlets were told to mainly report positive news and focus on the 
conference itself so as to create a favourable environment for the NPC. The civilian health 
authority certainly did not want to be the troublemaker which disclosed negative news that 
could potentially disrupt the high politics.  
Moreover, the 10th NPC was of something special in the PRC’s history – it marked 
the completion of the civilian leadership power transition from the CCP’s third generation 
of leadership, headed by Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, to the fourth generation, led by Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao45. Power transitions in authoritarian regimes were often uneasy. 
These power transitions often triggered or were accompanied by political turmoil, as seen 
in China in 1976 and 1989. The transition from the third to the fourth generation by then 
was relatively smooth, suggesting a transformation towards a more regularised regime in 
terms of legal-rational legitimacy (Weatherley, 2006). However, a contingent event such as 
SARS could create opportunities for individual leaders, mainly Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, 
to demonstrate their clout. The showing up of their relative strengths and weaknesses could 
potentially change the subtle balance of power between the two leaders and disrupt the 
                                                 
45 Jiang Zemin did not give up his chairmanship of the Central Military Commission until September 2004. 
Nonetheless, the handover of state and government power between the two generations was completed in 
March 2003 at the 10th NPC.  
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power transition. The political risk of leaking negative news at this critical juncture was 
thus extremely high.   
On April 3, the Health Minister Zhang Wenkang held a press conference at which 
this highest ranking health official claimed that there were only 12 SARS cases in Beijing 
in total. He stressed again that SARS was under control and therefore ‘China is a safe place 
to work, tour and live’ (Xinhua, 2003a). However, the actual situation was already grave 
and hundreds more people were infected by the virus on a daily basis. Zhang’s lie was met 
by fury within China and beyond. A few days after the controversial press conference, Dr. 
Jiang Yanyong, a respected military surgeon, provided authentic information to CCTV and 
the Hong Kong based Phoenix TV that there were more than 140 SARS patients in three 
military hospitals alone (Life Weekly, 2003b). This information was then exposed by the 
foreign media such as the Time Magazine and the Wall Street Journal. Subsequently, the 
WHO issued a travel advisory for Beijing. At the same time, Southeast Asian countries 
took measures to restrict incoming travellers from China. International isolation put further 
pressure on the Chinese government to take actions. 
 
4.3.5 Public Panic and Government under Mounting Pressure 
 
Within China, the circulation of western media reports on SARS among the Chinese public 
via websites and text messages fuelled another wave of panic. Thousands of university 
students and migrant workers fled from Beijing unstoppably and this large scale movement 
of people made it even harder to control the spread of the virus. It was worth mentioning 
that this unprecedented escape could be partly attributed to the unequal access to 
healthcare. The ‘floating population’, such as migrant workers without permanent resident 
permits of Beijing, would have to pay the health costs at the unsubsidised rate that was 
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much higher than what Beijing permanent residents would have to pay. Migrant workers 
fled Beijing partly because they feared being contracted SARS as much as they worried 
about the inability to pay for the health costs once contracted the virus.  
People also rebuked the government’s deception and ironically compared the 
Health Minister Zhang Wenkang with Al-Sahhaf (the former Iraqi Information Minister 
who spoke for the Saddam Hussein regime during the 2003 Iraqi War) since they were 
both thorough liars (China Review, 2004). 
By mid April, a national pandemic and a full blown political crisis were both 
underway. Both the healthcare system and the political system could no longer withstand 
the pressure brought about by SARS. The top leadership was apparently unconvinced by 
the conclusion that SARS was under control, as evidenced by Hu and Wen’s urgent tones 
during their hospital inspection visits in Guangdong and Beijing. Their visits to the front 
line of fighting SARS and consultations with non-Party experts also suggested their desire 
to get first hand information which had been distorted by the fragmented political system. 
Furthermore, the propaganda apparatus was starting to cultivate a sense of national crisis 
among the public using extensive coverage on fighting SARS, which foreshadowed a 
decisive action to break the deadlock. 
 
4.4 The Political Utility of SARS 
 
As argued in Chapter 2 that crisis was not necessarily a wholly negative thing because 
danger was also represented by opportunities. The SARS crisis highlighted the problems 
with the routines and therefore generated some new thinking. More importantly, SARS 
provided a site for the confluence of pressure to alter these routines. In the following 
section, the author argues that the CCP has successfully utilised the SARS crisis as a 
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catalyst for reforms: shaking up the Party-state apparatus and improving administrative 
structures, introducing the SDC as a paradigm shift, reconnecting with the people and 
learning from the crisis.  
 
4.4.1 The Centralisation of Power and the Shake-up of the Political 
System 
 
SARS elevated into a political crisis mostly because of the administrative fragmentation 
within the political system. As such, the immediate task for the crisis leadership was to 
bind the system together and synthesise efforts. Crisis could be conveniently utilised to 
centralise power and circumvent established procedures, as well as bypassing the inter-
agency bargaining in the bureaucracy that prevailed in the ‘normal politics’ (Rosenthal, 
1988). Moreover, the multilayered structure of the Chinese state consisted of a five-level 
hierarchy of dyadic principal-agent relationships and this complicated linkage between the 
centre and localities created conditions that enabled cadres to engage in the act of ‘strategic 
disobedience’ (Wedeman, 2001:62). As a result, the Chinese political system had been 
heavily relying on periodic mobilisation and political campaigns for proper functioning 
because routine monitoring and ‘police patrolling’ were insufficient in controlling local 
malfeasance (Wedeman, 2001).  Given these conditions, it was entirely understandable that 
the CCP leadership would utilise a crisis in order to instil a sense of urgency and shake up 
the (disobedient parts of the) system. 
April 17 marked the turning point of the SARS crisis – Hu Jintao convened a PSC 
special session on SARS that called for the entire CCP to fight SARS in an all-out manner 
(Xinhua, 2003b). This meeting reinforced the message conveyed by a State Council special 
session on SARS held a few weeks earlier that the combat against SARS was the 
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overriding priority on the political agenda. The PSC special session also stressed the 
urgency of SARS and thus ordered to ‘centralise leadership and centralise command’ on 
fighting SARS (Xinhua, 2003b). This order immediately had the ‘rally around the flag’ 
effect. Soon after, a national taskforce on fighting SARS was set up, headed by China’s 
‘Iron Lady’, Vice Premier Wu Yi (Xinhua, 2003e). At this time, civilian and military 
healthcare resources, as well as the Party’s mobilisation vehicle, were integrated for 
concerted efforts.  
Once the fight against SARS became a political mission, national resources were 
soon mobilised and centralised. The Party-state relied on its extensive array of mobilisation 
vehicles established in the Mao era - village Party branches, neighbourhood committees 
and former barefoot doctors - ‘to take temperatures, quarantine people, trace infections, 
and round up laggards’ (Huang, 2005:129). Despite the uncompromising manner, these 
extraordinary (and in some cases, coercive) measures enabled the Chinese government to 
marshal whatever it had in a short period of time. The centralised command of fighting 
SARS unleashed formidable mobilisation capacity, which contributed the most to the 
effective containment of SARS within a few months. A remarkable example was that the 
Xiaotangshan Hospital solely designated for the SARS treatment was built in 7 days by 
over 7,000 construction workers (Southern Metropolis Daily, 2003).  
While the campaign against SARS might sound old fashioned for some, the 
implementation of limited accountability was something new to the Chinese political 
system. Symbolic removals of the Health Minister (Zhang Wenkang) and the Beijing 
mayor (Meng Xuenong) manifested that although the CCP lacked a practicable and 
formalised mechanism for accountability at the time, an informal cadre management norm 
had emerged which stipulated that major mistakes by officials would lead to their 
dismissals. The removals of Zhang and Meng despite their high rankings also 
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demonstrated that the newly inaugurated leadership was treating SARS very seriously. 
Through these high profile dismissals, the leadership was obviously trying to rally the 
Party from top to bottom and warn those incompetent or disobedient cadres. In fact (and 
often less noticed), the CCP’s disciplinary and organisational departments reinforced the 
enforcement of Party discipline and accordingly fired many officials at different levels 
because of their negligence or misreporting in fighting SARS (Xinhua, 2003d). 
 
4.4.2 Shifting the Dominating Paradigm – From GDPism to the SDC 
 
As mentioned above, another prominent cause of the SARS crisis was the problematic 
growth model. In fact, as early as during the 5th plenary session of the CCP’s 15th Central 
Committee in 2000, the problem of unbalanced development had been already paid 
attention to, and the need for the ‘new thinking’ on development had been raised (Zhang 
Ning and Zhang Hefu, 2008). Major policies such as the ‘Go West’ development 
programme were implemented, but a comprehensive alternative development strategy was 
still in its formation. Since the new leadership took office at the 16th PC in 2002, early 
signs of a paradigm shift towards a new development strategy had already emerged. 
During public appearances, Hu and Wen spent more time touring China’s vast hinterland, 
encouraging the economically most disadvantaged and shaking hands with AIDS patients. 
These signals could be interpreted as the new leadership’s desires for a paradigm shift – 
they wanted to ensure that the ongoing reforms not only served the vested interest but also 
benefit more people, as well as ensuring that the development model would be more socio-
economically and environmentally sustainable.  
However, prior to SARS, the central government’s anxiety about the need for an 
alternative development strategy was not shared to the same extent by local governments, 
 191
especially not by those economically powerful provinces where the single-minded pursuit 
of GDP had dominated policy agendas for a long time. However, without a major shock, it 
was hard to push for a change (Ngok, 2009). The alternative thinking on development 
could hardly take root when the current model looked fine from a short-term perspective. 
The sudden occurrence of SARS caught many local officials by surprise and forced them 
into thinking about the long term. Nevertheless, after these officials had the direct 
experience of SARS through witnessing the tragedy caused by the crisis of GDP-focused 
development, an alternative development paradigm that comprised more elements of social 
and human development should appeal to them. In other words, the SARS crisis paved the 
way for this alternative development paradigm. 
Likewise, this idea of a new development paradigm that stressed social and human 
development should appeal to ordinary people after they experienced the SARS shock. 
This life–threatening public health crisis highlighted a lack of welfare spending which was 
curbed as a result of economic neoliberalism. The desire for a more responsible 
government thus emerged after SARS. In fact, state media explicitly tapped this popular 
desire by carefully framing the SARS crisis as something beyond a public health crisis, 
which made the people to reflect on the meaning of development. In some state–run TV 
programs in particular, heroic and touching stories about fighting SARS came first, 
followed by effusive praise for medical staff members who lost their lives. Commentaries 
about the broader picture were given afterwards – reflection about the inadequate provision 
of healthcare resources over the years, which induced people to rethink about other 
fundamental aspects of development in addition to GDP. Finally, ‘scientific development’ 
was presented as the cure for rectifying these problems and avoiding similar tragedies46.  
                                                 
46 The author’s observation from a CCTV-run programme in July 2003 in celebration of the victory in the 
fight against SARS. 
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The theoretical construction of the SDC was closely linked to people’s desires for 
more balanced development and that the government should take on more responsibilities 
in enhancing the social safety net. The new concept emphasised, first and foremost, putting 
people first (Fewsmith, 2004b). In the aftermath of SARS, this people-centric orientation 
found resonance with people who had reconsidered the relationship between the 
accumulation of wealth and human development. The SDC was introduced at the right 
time as people’s memories about SARS were still fresh. 
At the 3rd plenary session of the CCP’s 16th Central Committee, five months after 
the SARS crisis, the SDC was formally proposed and it soon became one of the most 
important guiding philosophies of the CCP. Without the SARS crisis, it would be 
unthinkable that the SDC was promoted to such high ideological status within a short 
period of time. Moreover, the SDC was soon highlighted as the Fourth Generation’s major 
contribution to the CCP’s ideology. In sum, the paradigm shift from GDPism to the SDC 
was born out of SARS. 
 
4.4.3 Reconnecting with the People 
 
Politicians often utilise crises to address issues beyond the crises themselves. As such, 
SARS was regarded by the Chinese leadership as something beyond a public health 
disaster. The initial inaction and poor handling of SARS severely damaged the Party’s 
credibility because it illustrated that ‘the CCP’s priorities have become so intertwined with 
the Party’s own survival’ (Puska, 2005:87). Hence a decisive intervention had to be made 
in order to restore the Party’s tarnished credibility. Also, the showing of benevolence by 
rulers in times of crisis was an indispensable element of moral legitimation for any Chinese 
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regime in the past (Shue, 2004). Given the CCP’s long time self-constructed image as the 
people’s saviour, it must make a drastic turn to reconnect with the people.  
Following the watershed Politburo meeting held on April 17 (Xinhua, 2003b), 
government actions against SARS became highly visible. All nine members of the PSC 
had gone out of Zhongnanhai to inspect the Anti-SARS campaign and these leadership 
activities were extensively publicised by the state media (Gov.cn, 2005). Despite these 
symbolic actions, the government also took a step forward in terms of information 
transparency. It began to release daily updates on the number of SARS cases. Numerous 
press conferences were held to inform both Chinese citizens and the international 
community. State media were mobilised to cover extensively about SARS-related 
knowledge and on how to resist its transmissions. In the legal realm, the State Council 
issued the ‘Decree on Responses to Emergency Public Health Situations’ on May 12 with 
immediate effect. This new decree clearly defined the respective responsibilities of 
relevant government departments in the event of public health emergencies and how news 
relating to such situations should be reported (Zheng and Lye, 2004). It also stipulated that 
news on any public health emergencies should be reported within 1-2 hours of occurrences 
and those officials caught for deception would be punished and even subject to prosecution 
(Gov.cn, 2003).  All these efforts were aimed to show the Party’s highly responsible 
attitude towards public health and to restore public confidence. 
More notable in the Party’s efforts to re-engage with the people was the ‘People’s 
War’ waged against SARS (Xinhua, 2003c). This reappearance of revolutionary era 
slogans was deemed a step backward by some analysts – a temporal return to the Maoist 
mass campaign. Nevertheless, if we took the issue of regime legitimacy into account, the 
labelling of a major mobilisation as a ‘People’s War’ was clearly deliberate tactics 
deployed to bolster the popular legitimacy of the CCP. In this respect, Perry (2007) argues 
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that Maoist revolutionary legacies have not faded even though China is considered 
nowadays as an economic superpower. The traditional ruling tactics of the periodic mass 
mobilisation continues into the post-Mao, depoliticised era. Although in general people 
lack political involvement in this depoliticised era, during the mass mobilisation they are 
encouraged to participate in popular politics in a manner not threatening to the Party-state. 
In this way, their desires for political efficacy are satisfied during the mass mobilisation 
when they may feel themselves a part of the driving force for a common cause (and the 
common good). Allowing popular political participation therefore consolidates the CCP’s 
political hegemony by enhancing the Party’s mobilisation legitimacy (Weatherley, 2006).  
 
4.5 Learning from Crisis 
 
SARS and its aftermath might have proved that the Chinese political system was so 
resilient that it absorbed most of the impact of SARS (Fewsmith, 2003a). In addition, the 
government’s crisis management capacity improved significantly as a result of learning 
from SARS, and these hard-learnt lessons were embodied in a number of policy measures 
that were likely to improve the quality of governance in the long term. Just to name a few. 
Firstly, the government’s making of economic policies has become more social 
protection-oriented since SARS. For instance, the balancing of urban and rural 
development was accorded a high priority. The government allocated much more 
healthcare expenditure to the rural area to improve the disease control infrastructure there 
because SARS showed that the weakest link in containing the spread of the disease was in 
the countryside (Xinhua, 2004b). The implementation of the New Rural Cooperative 
Medical Scheme was therefore accelerated. Other complementary policies that aimed at 
relieving the financial burdens of peasants were also introduced, including the altogether 
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abolishment of agricultural tax in 2006. These measures were likely to enhance the 
capacity of peasants to resist adversities such as SARS (Zheng and Lye, 2004).  
Secondly, administrative reforms, especially those related to emergency responses, 
have gained momentum after SARS. To avoid the sort of chaotic response like what 
happened in SARS, emergency response centres were set up in the entire administrative 
apparatus. The State Council had a new emergency management office. Central 
government ministries and local governments set up emergency management centres of 
various capacity and each had its own emergency response plan. In March 2008, the State 
Council initiated another round of administrative restructuring by establishing several 
‘super ministries’ through the merge of ministries that had overlapping responsibilities. 
This initiative was likely to improve coordination of work in times of crisis. At the same 
time, the study of crisis management was paid more attention to. Academic institutes, such 
as the Tsinghua University, launched programmes in crisis management which made crisis 
management a popular discipline in public management. The CCP’s organisational 
department decided in 2008 to send all China’s county party secretaries to the Central 
Party School to study crisis management (Wang, 2008a).   
Lastly, new laws on emergency management were enacted and existing laws 
relating to public emergencies underwent substantial legislative revisions. These legislative 
measures profoundly affected the ways in which crises were handled, and removed a lot of 
legal impediments and political taboos regarding the reporting of crisis. For example, the 
Law for Dealing with Emergencies defined four warning levels according to the extent of 
potential damage and stipulated the preventive measures associated with each warning 
level. This law also permitted crucial information to be reported directly to the central 
government if that became necessary (Gov.cn, 2007b). Also, death tolls in natural disasters 
were no longer regarded as state secrets after amendments to the state secret classification 
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system were made in 2005 (People’s Daily, 2005). In 2007, two important sentences that 
might impede autonomous disaster reporting were deleted when the proposal of the Law 
for Dealing with Emergencies was submitted to the NPC Standing Committee. One deleted 
sentence was ‘media outlets should not release information about emergencies against 
regulations or without authorisation’, the other sentence was ‘government manages the 
media’s news reporting’ (People’s Net, 2007a). This was not to say that disaster reporting 
would be free from interference. Instead, it was a gesture showing that the government had 
learnt the lesson from SARS. The deletion of these deterrence clauses was meant to give 
journalists some sort of legal backing if autonomous disaster reporting led them into 
trouble. In the same year, the Decree on Open Government Information was enacted, 
which stipulated citizens’ access to government information and the obligation of the 
government to release information (Xinhua, 2007b).  
Between 2003 and 2008, these concrete results of crisis learning were tested, 
implemented and modified in the handling of various crises. Such as the 2005 Songhua 
River pollution, the 2008 winter storm and the 2008 Shandong train crash. Government 
performance was broadly, if not evenly, consistent with these new measures. 
 
4.6 Limitations of Learning from Crisis  
 
The aforementioned measures introduced after SARS had produced concrete positive 
outcomes in crisis management, notably manifested in the relief work of the 2008 Sichuan 
Earthquake. The government’s initial response to the Sichuan earthquake exhibited high 
responsiveness, transparent information and a more open media environment comparing to 
that of SARS. However, there were a number of areas where the effects of crisis learning 
was constrained by the current settings of the political system. 
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To elaborate on this question, it was helpful to review the three major 
contradictions which had existed prior to SARS, and to assess how well these problems 
were addressed. The second problem: the fragmentation within the political system, was 
addressed relatively well. However, as mentioned above and as was seen in crises such as 
the 2008 winter storm and the Sichuan Earthquake, the institutional deadlock was often 
broken as a result of the presence of political heavyweights rather than as a result of formal 
institutions. Government departments were integrated, but not enough. An overarching and 
powerful commanding centre that could bring all crisis management matters under one 
roof, i.e. something akin to the former US Federal Emergency Management Administration 
(Saich, 2003), or the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, had yet to be established.  
The government’s record of altering the growth model was mixed. New concepts 
such as the SDC and the Green GDP were introduced, but there lacked a mechanism as 
established as the performance contract, to actually assess officials’ performance on social 
development. In other words, there was not enough incentive within the nomenklatura 
system to promote the new paradigm. The only change so far had been to spend more 
money on a specific social protection issue when something went seriously wrong. 
However, the more important ideational change regarding the balanced development had 
yet to come. In particular, some less developed provinces still had to swing between ‘the 
economic task of generating growth and a political task of promoting development’ 
(Breslin, 2008b:218).  
On state-society relations, improvements were also limited. In various post-SARS 
crises, the government initially exhibited some openness but as soon as the crisis was over, 
there was a strong tendency for a return to the pre-crisis status quo. This could be 
explained by the contradictions between empowering people on the one hand while 
keeping the grip on power on the other, and the gradual fading of openness manifested the 
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Party’s very inclination to ‘grip’ instead of ‘empower’. It was entirely understandable that 
any forms of political participation had to be within the bound set by the state. But if the 
political system became too defensive, channels of reliable information, talents and 
societal inputs which were crucial in the post–crisis recovery, might be blocked.  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
 
At the fourth plenary session of the CCP’s 16th Central Committee convened in 2004, a 
resolution aimed at consolidating the Party’s ruling capacity was passed. As the risk 
society came to China, the sound ability of crisis management during a far-reaching 
transformation was a crucial component of the ruling capacity. Given the current settings 
of the Chinese political system, major impetus to reforms were more likely to materialise 
after major crises. As discussed in the above case study of the SARS epidemic, that a crisis, 
if defined, framed and managed well, could have multifaceted utility that coincided with 
the policy preferences of the political leadership: ‘a constant improvement and 
optimisation of the population as a strategy for economic and political development’ 
(Thornton, 2009:29). This was certainly not to imply that the more crises the better. Instead, 
it suggested that when a crisis inevitably occurred, broader thinking and a long-term vision 
could help to push for the reform and the preferred agenda while defusing the crisis itself. 
As a result, crisis management was likely to continue as one of the powerful tools in the 
CCP’s arsenal of ruling strategies to tackle intractable problems and improve the quality of 
governance in the years to come. In the next two chapters, we would see more examples 
where crises were utilised by the CCP through the maximum tinkering of the current 
system, in order to demonstrate to the people that the CCP rule was good and therefore 
should be maintained.  
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The Sichuan earthquake was not only the largest crisis (in terms of damage and casualties) 
faced by the Hu-Wen leadership, but arguably the best managed crisis during their ten 
years in tenure. This chapter critically reviews its trajectory, from the relief effort through 
to reconstruction, in light of the analytical framework established in Chapter 2 on the 
political utility of crisis. It attempts to address a number of questions concerning the CCP’s 
crisis behaviour. For example, why did the Chinese government (under the same 
leadership) act so quickly such that its responsiveness stood in stark contrast with the 
initial inertia during the SARS crisis we just studied? What domestic or international 
factors were decisive in realising the unprecedented transparency of information, 
international openness and civic effervescence? Was it the contingent factor of the Beijing 
Olympics, or an expected outcome of protracted domestic efforts towards these goals since 
China’s reform and opening in the 1980s? And more fundamentally, what made the CCP 
switch on and off the valve of political liberalisation within a short period of time?  
The Sichuan earthquake was not a new type of crisis. Natural disasters are arguably 
the type of crisis about which the Chinese government is most confident in dealing with 
and for which it is most prepared. The key in managing major natural disasters, namely 
through large scale mobilisation and logistical support, has a natural fit with the CCP’s 
Leninist structure of command and control. Nevertheless, the ‘conventionality’ of the 
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Sichuan earthquake did not reduce its significance for a closer investigation. The timing of 
its occurrence mattered, which lent it considerable comparability in relation to other crises. 
For example, when comparing disaster responses to the Sichuan earthquake and the 
Tangshan earthquake in 1976, the response to the Sichuan earthquake looked very different 
from that of the Tangshan earthquake. Although technological, social and political realities 
that had changed beyond recognition over the three decades were apparent explanations to 
these differences, the Sichuan earthquake still had some distinctiveness deserved for 
further analysis. Note that it was the first major crisis after China had established an 
institutionalised crisis management regime at the national level which included a 
comprehensive contingency plan, designated organisations for crisis management, the 
clarity of agency responsibilities and a law for emergency response (Zhong, 2009). It was 
also the first major crisis confronted by the consolidated Hu-Wen leadership. These factors 
all helped us to ‘test’ the government performance during the Sichuan earthquake and to 
see whether any learning from the SARS crisis materialised, or whether high politics 
remained a decisive variable in determining crisis responsiveness. In addition, the Sichuan 
earthquake serves as a good point of reference when we look at the milk scandal in the 
next chapter. Only by then can we be sure about whether the Sichuan earthquake was a 
routine case or an ‘outlier’ in the CCP’s crisis management.  
 
 
5.2 The Earthquake and the Government Response 
 
The earthquake occurred in Wenchuan County, Sichuan Province and measured 8.0 on the 
Richter scale; it was so strong that the tremors were felt in all regions in China except Jilin, 
Heilongjiang and Xinjiang (China Daily, 2008a; Xinhua, 2008b). The death toll as of 11 
 201
November 2008 was nearly 70,000, with another 18,000 listed as missing. More than 
374,000 people were injured (Xinhua, 2008w). The earthquake severely damaged 
buildings and other infrastructure in Sichuan and nearby provinces, resulting in a direct 
economic loss of ¥845.1 bn (more than $120 bn) (Xinhua, 2008j). According to Premier 
Wen Jiabao, the Sichuan Earthquake was the most devastating earthquake in the history of 




The reporting of the earthquake was rapid by international standards, and unusual by 
Chinese standards given its notorious record of blacking out news reporting on natural 
disasters in the past. Such speed reflected a genuine improvement in media openness that 
we mentioned in Chapter 3, let alone the significant improvements in information 
gathering and processing. At 14:46, eighteen minutes after the tremors at 14:28, the state 
news agency, Xinhua, released the first official reporting on the earthquake (Xinhua, 
2008q). The report was brief, but indicated the intensity (initially measured at 7.8, raised to 
8.0 in the same evening) and epicentre (Wenchuan County) (China Daily, 2008a; Xinhua, 
2008q). Meanwhile, CCTV started its 24 hours, non-stop, live coverage of the disaster. The 
in time media coverage suggested that legislative and regulatory revisions after the SARS 




In the meantime, the Chinese leadership responded rapidly and gave disaster relief 
overriding importance in the political process. General Secretary Hu Jintao issued a 
 202
directive calling for a timely rescue (Xinhua, 2008w). Premier Wen Jiabao arrived at the 
scene fewer than five hours after the quake (Legal Daily, 2008) – in part for public 
relations, as he had been regarded as the most benevolent and caring leader among the 
fourth generation leadership, but mostly in anticipation of a chaotic situation in which 
inter-agency infighting and local incompliance with central government orders would 
prevail that could cause delays in rescue in the absence of a political heavyweight. 
While Wen was overseeing the rescue work on site, Hu Jintao in Beijing took 
overall charge of the relief effort. He centralised power scattered throughout the Party, the 
state and the military through the PSC which ensured rapid responsiveness by the whole 
Party-state apparatus, which was vital when tens of thousands of lives were at stake. He 
convened two PSC meetings within 3 days after the earthquake (Xinhua, 2008f; 2008e)47. 
The first meeting set the relief work as the top priority and called for mitigating the impact 
of the earthquake by whatever means. A national taskforce for earthquake relief was 
established, headed by Premier Wen Jiabao (Xinhua, 2008f). The second meeting, held 
shortly ahead of the first 72 hours48 following the earthquake, stressed that ‘as long as there 
is even a little hope, we must make every effort to save lives’. It also indicated potential 
problems that must be addressed, such as delivering more relief supplies and the 
prevention of epidemics (Xinhua, 2008e).  
 
5.2.3 The Civilian-Military Cooperation 
 
Having learnt the lesson from SARS in which the military’s reluctance to share 
information with departments in the civilian government undermined the concerted efforts 
                                                 
47 The PSC is the supreme decision making body of the PRC, normally PSC meetings are only held once a 
week. 
48 According to worldwide experience, the first 72 hours after an earthquake is a watershed in terms of life 
saving, most people under ruins are less likely to survive without food and water once the first 72 hours have 
elapsed. 
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to fight SARS, and after the PLA was blamed for its slow response in the winter storm in 
January 200849, this time the military acted swiftly and was in much better cooperation 
with the civilian rescue force. This swift cooperation was achieved as a result of the 
abovementioned PSC meetings that brought scattered rescue forces under one roof. It also 
signified Hu Jintao’s considerable consolidation of power as he was able to command the 
gun in a short space of time50. Meanwhile, China’s armed forces – including the PLA, the 
armed police, and the reserve forces – were fully mobilised immediately to take part in the 
rescue. Chen Bingde, the PLA’s Chief of General Staff, recalled that he issued the first 
order of the manoeuvre of troops as early as 15:40 on 12 May, about an hour after the 
quake (Xinhua, 2008w). At 19:20, he added, ‘reserve forces can go to the affected area 
without seeking approval. The PLA troops on active duty can go while they report and all 
troops in the surrounding area can be mobilised’. On 13 May, as many as 11,420 soldiers 
were transported to Sichuan by air (many of them were transported there by civil airliners), 
breaking the record for the number of soldiers sent by air on one single day in the PLA’s 
history (Elite Reference, 2008). Within several days, more than 140,000 soldiers were sent 
to the affected area (Xinhua, 2008z).  
 
5.2.4 Media Transparency 
 
The earthquake happened eleven days after the implementation of the Decree on Open 
Government Information. The media did a good job in reporting the disaster, as well as 
                                                 
49 A massive snow storm hit central China in January–February 2008 and paralysed many parts of the 
transportation network there. The PLA was only manoeuvred after the disaster had caused severe damage. 
The delay in the deployment of the PLA prompted speculations about the coordination problem between the 
civilian government and the military in crisis management.  
50 It should be made clear that the disagreement and confusion over whether the civilian government should 
have control of the military in a natural disaster rescue that had allegedly arisen was between the PLA and 
Wen Jiabao, and not between the PLA and Hu Jintao. The PLA vowed to listen to the Party and Chairman Hu 
at the very beginning, at least the media coverage of the PLA’s activities was not contradictory to this 
statement of loyalty.  
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conveying sympathy and rallying support for the victims; this was especially true for 
media outlets in mainland China. Thanks to China’s unprecedented media openness during 
the first week or so following the earthquake, Chinese media had the opportunity to 
demonstrate to foreign counterparts its professionalism, as opposed to the stereotypical 
perception that Chinese media were merely the government’s mouthpiece. ‘This is the first 
time the Chinese media has lived up to international standards’, said Shi Anbin, Professor 
of Media at Tsinghua University (Los Angeles Times, 2008a). As usual, the Central 
Propaganda Department reportedly issued a directive asking journalists not to go to the 
affected area and use only press releases from Xinhua. Such directives were ignored. 
Hundreds of journalists still went to Sichuan, by air, by bus or even on foot, and they sent 
back first-hand reports about the damage (Zhang Jieping, 2008). But the Chinese 
authorities refrained from recalling these journalists.  
For foreign journalists, this time they found their reporting activities almost 
unrestricted. Local governments issued them with reporting permits and offered other help, 
including even at one point taking them to the affected area on a military helicopter. This 
degree of openness stood in stark contrast to the traditional information culture of secrecy, 
since, in the recent past, western reporters had often been regarded as spies by many 
Chinese officials (Los Angeles Times, 2008b). The access they were given was also 
unprecedented: ‘As long as the road was undamaged, we were allowed to go in’ said one 
western reporter (Zhang Jieping, 2008).  
 
5.2.5 International Openness 
 
This new level of transparency allowed foreign reporters to release timely reports which 
facilitated a huge number of donations from abroad (Hui, 2009). As previously mentioned, 
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China’s rescue was praised by an International Federation of the Red Cross official for its 
rapidness and efficiency, but he also added, ‘we can't expect that the government can do 
everything and handle every aspect of the needs’ owing to the magnitude of the quake and 
the scale of the damage (BBC, 2008d). This may partly explain why China decided to 
accept international aid. The following day after the quake – when the severity of the 
disaster had been raised from Level 2 to Level 1 (the highest level) and the death toll had 
already exceeded 12,000 and was set to rise – China announced that it ‘cordially appreciate 
and welcome assistance from the international community’ (Xinhua, 2008a). As of 4 June 
2008, the international community contributed a total of ¥3.555 bn (more than $500 
million) and material donations worth ¥1.154 bn (more than $165 million) (MOCA, 2008). 
The overseas Chinese community also contributed more than ¥1.3 bn ($187 million) (Bo, 
2010). 
More symbolic was the presence of foreign rescue and medical teams on Chinese 
grounds for the first time. The decision to accept foreign rescue teams was probably made 
at the second PSC meeting on the evening of 14 May (Bo, 2010). The following morning, 
China expressed its willingness to accept foreign rescue teams. The first rescue team that 
arrived in Sichuan was from Japan, a team with plentiful experience in earthquake rescues 
both in its own country and abroad. The very fact that the Japanese – who had once 
invaded China and brought indelible trauma to the country – were allowed into the country 
to rescue the Chinese people was in its own right symbolic in that it represented the 
remarkable ease of diplomatic tensions. Rescue teams from Russia, South Korea and 
Singapore arrived shortly afterwards. Nine other countries also sent medical teams with a 
total number of 223 medical staff to the quake-stricken area (MOCA, 2008).  
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5.2.6 Social Cohesion and Civic Participation 
 
For a long time it was commonly thought that the uncertainty of the socio-economic 
transformation eroded Chinese civic consciousness (Wang, 2004a), but the tremendous 
help that the Chinese public offered to the earthquake victims suggested that sympathy was 
still pervasive at a time of crisis. People made donations at their workplace, in 
neighbourhoods and in shops; school children and even beggars donated; long queues of 
people standing in front of blood donating stations quickly filled blood banks. Until 30 
April 2009, donations worth ¥76.712 bn (more than $11 bn) had been received51. 
If the mounting donations after a disaster were usual in Chinese society, then the 
politically more significant, autonomous civil participation in the aftermath of a disaster 
was clearly unseen before. Millions of volunteers marched to the quake zone at 
considerable personal risk. Organised by clubs, societies, associations and businesses or 
even went there on their own, people participated in delivery distribution, basic medical 
care, psychological help and so on. These activities complemented the state-led relief effort 
and filled many gaps with which the state was too busy to deal. Moreover, through 
‘learning by doing’ during the relief effort, these civil organisations enhanced their 
capacity and publicity, as well as learning how to work better with the local state, the 
broader society and also with each other (Teets, 2009). Every wealthy province and city in 
other parts of China was assigned to help a corresponding region in the quake-stricken area. 
By late 2010, most of the reconstruction work was completed (Sichuan Daily, 2010).  
 
5.3 The Political Utility of the Sichuan Earthquake 
 
                                                 
51 This statistics also included overseas donations, however, there was neither follow up statistics regarding 
total domestic donations nor total overseas donations respectively.  
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The above section outlined the major factual development of the earthquake. To a certain 
extent, the Sichuan earthquake differed from the other two cases studied in this thesis 
because the very hazard of this crisis was largely natural, whereas the other two crises 
originated largely from human errors. The earthquake seemed more apolitical, as suggested 
by the conviction of many scholars that ‘there shouldn’t be a politics of disaster’ (Olson, 
2000:266). However, when we took a closer look at the series of events around the Sichuan 
earthquake through contextual and historical lenses, these extraordinary events were not 
merely pure ‘facts’ or apolitical occurrences. Indeed, they were highly politicised and 
parallel with historical records. This section thus seeks to deconstruct the Sichuan 
earthquake out of the ‘facts’ and explore the political motivation underlying the crisis 
management strategies. Of course, to speculate about the politics at work during a 
humanitarian crisis was unsettling, because this government performed better than ever 
before on disaster relief in professional terms. But our analysis will go beyond the 
government’s manipulation or diversions in the course of managing this disaster, since 
more pragmatic and progressive elements can also be found. It is therefore helpful to 
analyse critically the political utility associated with this crisis along with the crisis itself. 
Such analysis will uncover how the Sichuan earthquake was uniquely placed in China’s 
recent political trajectory and will help to explain the more general pattern of Chinese 
crisis management.  
 
5.3.1 Shifting the Dominating Paradigm(s) 
 
In managing the Sichuan earthquake, there were two paradigm shifts that could be 
observed. The first one concerned the immediate media transparency. The second one was 
about openness, and was closely linked to the first but placed a particular emphasis on 
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China’s open attitude in relation to the international community, a long-awaited, confident 
gesture commensurate with China’s great power status. Both paradigm shifts, however, 
took the form of gradual change along path dependent trajectories, i.e. they were creeping 
instead of drastic shifts. However, it was the extraordinary situation in the Sichuan 
earthquake that catalysed the pinnacle of both shifts.  
 
I. The Media Surge – A Long March to Transparency 
 
The media surge in the aftermath of the earthquake was the culmination of a steady process 
over several decades of rebalance in the demand and supply of information, and of the 
right to know. Nevertheless, as we discussed in Chapter 3 on state control of information, 
the CCP did not always play a passive role by merely meeting new social demands. Rather, 
it has struggled actively to shape and manage this demand. Certainly, all of this has been 
carried out pragmatically and in accordance with the goal of ensuring the CCP’s political 
hegemony.  
As we have already discussed the evolution of censorship in general in Chapter 3, 
here we only compare the Sichuan earthquake with similar disasters in the past so that we 
have a clearer focus on how transparency improved. The 1976 Tangshan Earthquake was a 
devastating disaster, comparable to the Sichuan Earthquake in magnitude. In the news 
reporting after the quake, no details were mentioned – not even the quake’s magnitude or 
what damage it caused. The death toll was not reported until three years after the 
earthquake (China.com, 2005). The main reason not to report was the fear of social 
instability, originating partly from the perception that the earthquake implied the CCP’s 
losing of the mandate of heaven (Gries and Rosen, 2004). Moreover, the earthquake rescue 
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was soon turned into a propaganda vehicle to promote a nationalist sentiment that centred 
upon the inculcation of Maoist doctrine on self-reliance and resilience.  
The 2003 SARS crisis we studied in the previous chapter was another comparable 
crisis. Although it was not a natural disaster, the origin of the crisis was a natural disease. 
In fact, disaster reporting had already become habitual prior to SARS owing to persistent 
efforts on liberalising the media in the Deng and Jiang eras which nurtured a path 
dependency towards more transparency. As a result, the Chinese government suffered from 
a credibility crisis when it attempted a transparency backslide during SARS. Owing to the 
ongoing but somewhat unsettled leadership transition, Party and state bureaucrats were 
excessively concerned with the Party’s own comfort rather than the wellbeing of the 
people. When the people were extraordinarily anxious about the virus, there had been no 
honest clarification for five months. Opaque information created much of the instability 
that it was meant to prevent. Empowered by the Internet and mobile telecommunications, 
the Chinese people expressed their deep concerns to the foreign media as well as among 
themselves. The Chinese government could not resist the resultant mounting pressure and 
was forced to take a drastic turn by releasing the concealed information by late April 2003.  
The SARS crisis had a profound impact on the evolving state-society information 
flow. At one level, the state would find itself in a more embarrassing position vis-à-vis the 
informed Chinese public, if it attempted an information blackout. First, as the evidence of 
temporary social unrest during SARS had shown, the government could not afford to step 
backwards by suspending the evolution towards information transparency. The constantly 
rising expectations of the Chinese public regarding the government’s commitment to the 
‘right to know’ would not allow such a backslide. Second, in an information age, the 
state’s system of information control had more and more loopholes, and as such its 
dominant position as the provider and disseminator of information were both weakened. 
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The state had learnt to ride on the tide of the information revolution rather than stem it. 
However sophisticated its filtering system might be, it had to operate that system according 
to this general tide and could only control the speed of information dissemination.  
On another level, crisis communication was very important to crisis management 
and regime legitimacy. This was especially true in terms of how effectively to inform those 
who would potentially be affected by the crisis. The golden rule of corporate crisis 
communication: ‘tell it all, tell it fast and tell the truth’ – also applied to social and political 
crises. However, the CCP’s performance fell far short in this regard and missed the 
opportunity to enhance legitimacy for much of the period until the underreporting of SARS 
was acknowledged. Moreover, the Chinese public voted with their feet when they found 
the Party to be so self-concerned during the crisis. Although the blunder was rectified later 
to some extent, the damage to the Party’s image as well as to China’s image globally was 
inevitable. Both led to a deficit in Party legitimacy. As a result, the Party had to 
demonstrate its commitment to open information as well as preparing well for the next 
crisis.  
In the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake, we saw a dramatic change in the 
control of information when the earthquake was viewed in relation to SARS. Despite the 
apparent media surge – unprecedented access, speed and depth of reports, for example – 
there were more encouraging elements in the government’s handling of information which 
were worth investigating and which distinguished the earthquake from SARS.  
The first element was how information was disseminated. After the government 
waged a battle against SARS, there was no doubt that it mobilised its propaganda 
apparatus to convey the disease-related information in an all-out manner. Nonetheless, 
information flow was largely one way and top down – i.e. from the authorities to the 
citizens in very much a paternalistic fashion, and citizens were ‘taught’ the dos and don'ts, 
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similar in style to the heavy handed, uncompromising, mass campaign for sanitation swept 
across China simultaneously. In this regard, the media remained to a large degree the 
state’s political education instrument. In the earthquake, the flow of information between 
state and society became much more interactive. There were numerous occasions where 
the state deliberately gathered information from the grassroots in order to improve its relief 
work; an often cited instance was when the rescue helicopter could not find a suitable 
landing pad in the epicentre, a local student put up a post on the Internet and suggested an 
appropriate location and the helicopter eventually landed there (Xinhua, 2008c). We also 
saw that state-run web portals set up bulletin boards to update in real time about various 
supply needs. In short, the state not only exchanged information with those at the 
grassroots level, but used the extensive array of its propaganda machinery to help the 
grassroots to relay information. Without the state’s help, this crucial information would 
have taken much longer to deliver and may only have reached a much smaller audience.  
The second element was how information was clarified. In the fight against SARS, 
the state discourse dominated the public sphere even after it stopped lying. It was close-
ended and hegemonic. In the earthquake, the state’s discourse was much more open-ended. 
The state adopted a listening mode through responding to grassroots agenda-setting and 
through clarifying information. This approach proved to work in easing tensions and 
enhanced government credibility. For instance, in the morning following the quake, there 
were rumours going around attacking the government’s slow response. But when the state 
television showed the image of completely destroyed roads to the epicentre, many stopped 
blaming the government (People’s Net, 2008c). In addition, at press conferences, officials 
responded to contentious issues – such as the perceived failure of earthquake prediction 
and shoddy school construction – with straight answers. For the former, they explained the 
internationally recognised difficulties and complexities of predicting earthquakes. For the 
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latter, they did not rule out the possibility of corruption involved. Although their 
explanations might not have been fully convincing, speaking frankly on these topics was a 
step forward. Moreover, the state even used grassroots-supplied information on the Internet 
to tackle a corruption scandal involving the distribution of tents (Southern Metropolis 
Daily, 2008). In short, although it would be over-optimistic to suggest the flourishing of 
civil society discourses regarding the earthquake, there was plenty of evidence to suggest 
the state’s acceptance of a grassroots voice, and its important role in checking the relief 
work of local governments. 
The final element was the kind of information that was disseminated. The contrast 
between SARS and the earthquake was particularly sharp in this regard. In the battle 
against SARS, the activities of the Chinese leadership and heroic stories received the most 
news coverage, which were typical of a patriotic campaign. In the earthquake relief, media 
outlets and especially the state media showed a very humane face. During the first few 
days following the quake, the central theme had been life saving. The ordinary people – the 
victims and rescue workers alike – became the central focus of the media. Reports 
produced by the state media were characterised by care and sympathy, and leadership 
activities no longer dominated the television and newspapers. These reports looked just 
like disaster reporting in the west. Also, in the past, reports tended to treat disaster victims 
as one whilst individual character and personal suffering were either obscured or neglected. 
However, this time the narrative focus shifted from the ‘indistinguishable collective’ to the 
‘unique individual’, and a more humane perspective was used instead of a political one 
(Dong et al, 2010). This change reflected that the emphasis on ‘taking people first’, the 
pivotal principle embedded in the SDC advocated after SARS, has taken effect.  
All in all, the Sichuan earthquake represented a paradigm shift in media 
transparency. The largely non-intervention attitude of the government, especially towards 
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non-state-run media outlets, facilitated a media surge that conveyed unprecedented 
sympathy and unity in the country. This did not appear to be a new paradigm, but 
considering that the government refrained from the usual oppression – i.e. stayed away 
from the routine – it qualified as a paradigm shift. Moreover, the government demonstrated 
its respect for lives and human dignity alongside with the media transparency. Together, 
these produced a dramatic shift away from SARS. But, if viewed in a broader historical 
context, this shift was not as dramatic. Instead, it was the result of a creeping shift towards 
media transparency. The path dependency of media transparency shaped by prior events 
during the last three decades garnered considerable momentum which was unleashed after 
the Sichuan earthquake.  
 
II. Unprecedented Openness – Behave Like a Responsible Great Power 
 
This section concerns China’s changed gesture to the international community during the 
earthquake relief. Like the gradual progress in transparency, openness did not happen 
overnight. In fact, China accepted or even formally requested international aid as early as 
198052 and 1991 respectively (Chai and Ma, 2010). Even in the SARS crisis when the 
Chinese government seemed extremely uncooperative, it allowed the WHO investigation 
and research teams to visit China before its acknowledgment of underreporting. Given this 
path dependency, unprecedented openness during the earthquake therefore did not seem 
surprising. However, this was not to suggest its inevitability, and several factors that made 
this happen should not be neglected.  
The first such factor was China’s long-term effort in establishing itself as a 
responsible great power. This effort started after the Asian financial crisis when China 
                                                 
52 Before 1980, China only accepted very limited personal donations from abroad when disasters occurred, 
but no inter–governmental aid was accepted. 
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pledged not to depreciate the Renminbi. Gradually a discourse on responsible great power 
has evolved to become China’s new foreign policy doctrine. New concepts such as 
‘peaceful rise’, ‘peaceful development’ and ‘harmonious world’ were developed and 
elaborated on and they have become catchphrases in China’s diplomacy. At the same time, 
from the international community there was also demand on China that it should behave in 
a way commensurate with its global economic and political strength. The most cited 
among them was Robert Zoellick’s 2005 speech in which he urged China to become a 
‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system (Zoellick, 2005). Despite its initial 
blunder in SARS, generally speaking, China’s behaviour in international interactions has 
become more considerate and disciplined as China’s role in facilitating the Six Party Talk 
and in settling disputes in the South China Sea with ASEAN countries has showed. 
Moreover, it was logical to argue that the notion of being responsible in the international 
community was meaningless if such pledged responsibility did not extend to include 
China’s own citizens. In other words, any good conduct of a country in the international 
arena had to be based on treating its own people in a reasonable and acceptable manner. 
Ironically, the more prominent China’s benefactor image abroad was, the sharper contrast 
it presented vis-à-vis China’s thrifty attitude towards its own people. From time to time 
there were Internet discussions talking caustically about China writing off billions in 
African debt on the one hand, but spending inadequately in China’s own countryside on 
the other. The discord made Chinese aid look more purposeful abroad as well as generating 
discontent at home. As a result, the Chinese leadership responded subtly to this discord, 
stressing the importance of social harmony and promising to make people ‘live with more 
happiness and dignity’ (Xinhua, 2010e).  
When it came to the Sichuan Earthquake, there was nothing more important than 
the mobilisation of domestic and international resources to save lives. It was exactly for 
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this reason that experienced international rescue teams were allowed to go to the quake 
zone. There were minimal ideological factors attached as long as foreign teams could help. 
Symbolically, rescue teams from Japan and Taiwan (regarded by many in China as hostile 
neighbours) were allowed in despite the fact that Japan decided at the last minute to use a 
civil airliner instead of a Defence Force C130 cargo aircraft to deliver rescue supplies53. It 
also confirmed the point that a major natural disaster might pacify bilateral tensions and 
facilitate the building-up of trust (Pelling and Dill, 2009). 
This open gesture helped to enhance China’s responsible great power image in that, 
first, its acceptance of foreign aid was a move adhering to international norms. It 
demonstrated that it was more responsible with its own people on top of being a ‘rule taker’ 
in the international community. Second, as a great power, it was becoming more confident. 
The most obvious evidence of this was its confidence in terms of military openness and 
transparency.  
For instance, one of the core forces that participated in the rescue was the Jinan 
Military Region (Xinhua, 2008w), the PLA’s strategic reserve, which comprised several 
Emergency Reaction Group Armies. The use of this strategic reserve for a non-combat 
mission indicated China’s confidence regarding its surrounding environment. China 
believed that there were no immediate threats to its national security upon the decision to 
dispatch the strategic reserve for earthquake relief. In addition, the large scale military 
manoeuvres over a very long distance (over 1500km) within several days could not have 
been carried out very secretively. In fact, some related images were already shown on TV; 
other details that were not shown – for instance, the designation of each military unit, the 
location where the troops boarded/alighted aeroplanes/trains and the routes of projection – 
could easily be traced by outside strategic analysts with the help of satellite technology and 
                                                 
53 According to the Japanese, it was to avoid reminding the Chinese people of the bombing of Chongqing 
between 1938 and 1943. 
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the like. Such information might be indicative as to how China might deploy military 
resources in wartime. However, China still made this manoeuvre, implying it valued its 
people more than military secrets. 
Moreover, foreign military aircrafts were allowed to fly over Chinese airspace and 
land at hinterland airports. ‘You can see all kinds of foreign military cargo aircrafts at the 
Chengdu Shuangliu Airport. This was unthinkable in the past’, according to Major General 
Qian Lihua, director of the Foreign Affairs Office at the Ministry of Defence (Xinhua, 
2008g). Countries sending military aircrafts to China included world powers such as the 
USA and Russia (which sent 9 aircrafts). They flew into the southwest of China from the 
east and north over a long distance. China’s acceptance of these military aircrafts, despite 
the fact that they were from strategic competitors and that technically these aircrafts could 
collect a lot of useful information on the way, was a good counter statement in response to 
the concerns over China’s military opacity. It was an indication that China was prepared to 
risk the exposure of its ‘hard power’ if its people were in needed of supplies.  
This brought us to the second factor, i.e. the notion of soft power, a dimension of 
power into which China has been putting considerable effort in order to assure the world of 
its peaceful rise without changing the ‘rules of the game’. For a long time, there had been 
concerns in the West over China’s ultimate goals as China grew exponentially. Proponents 
of the ‘China threat thesis’ warned that once China accumulated enough strength, it was 
not only going to change the global economic balance of power, but also the structures of 
international governance institutions; it might even try to challenge the currently 
dominating liberal democratic norm by presenting a distinctive ‘Chinese alternative’ 
(Breslin, 2010).   
However, the openness of China during the Sichuan earthquake relief clearly 
demonstrated its commitment to some fundamental and universally applicable norms in 
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that it did whatever it took to save the people, an explicit upholding of the right to life and 
the right to security of the person54. It wanted to show to the world that China was one 
among them, and that it was not an exception trying to destabilise the system. Rather, it 
was a stabiliser and active supporter of certain fundamental values, the understanding of 
which was shared by the whole human race.  
The rapid and open earthquake relief therefore assured both those from outside 
China and those from within. To the Chinese people, such a gesture was a recognition that 
previously the government had not had enough respect for lives, so the government was 
learning and catching up visibly in this regard. For the international community, this highly 
visible change made the ‘responsible great power’ rhetoric more convincing, because such 
rhetoric now found domestic origin and evidence. These changes improved the image of 
the Chinese government both domestically and internationally. They also contributed to a 
different dimension of Chinese soft power, as previously the discussion on soft power 
usually focused on China’s exporting of economic and cultural influence to other parts of 
the world, but here the focus was on China’s adhering to norms from the outside which had 
been rejected on various grounds previously. In this sense, soft power was not only about 
what a country exported, but what it embraced.  
Despite the above two, long-term factors, there were contingent events that 
facilitated China’s unprecedented openness. For example, as mentioned above, the Chinese 
government wanted to show that it was caring about the Chinese people more than 
anything else by presenting itself as a more humane, more benevolent, and above all, a 
different government from the past. What exactly was it different from? The question 
found its answer in a catastrophe comparable to the Sichuan Earthquake in scale, the 1976 
Tangshan Earthquake, in which radical leftists in the government manipulated the 
                                                 
54 The exact wording of the Chinese government was more implicit. These rights oriented phrases were 
replaced by phrases such as ‘respect for lives’. 
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catastrophe for political advantage and handled it without openness. As such, here, 
Tangshan was implicitly regarded as a benchmark by the government to show that it had 
improved significantly in Sichuan three decades later.  
An event of a similar nature that happened more recently was the Cyclone Nargis, 
which swept through Myanmar in May 2008. The ruling junta in Myanmar hampered 
international aid and the international community condemned them strongly. For a long 
time, China was thought to have backed the ruling regime in Myanmar despite 
international pressure calling for political liberalisation. Having learnt from this bad 
example, the Chinese leadership knew that they would be regarded by the international 
community as fellow dictators with Myanmar’s junta generals unless they accepted 
international aid. Leaders in China presumably took this different sort of international 
pressure into account when they decided to behave differently to their ‘friendly’ neighbour.   
The international consequences of the Tibet unrest in March 2008 also affected the 
Chinese leadership’s decision to be more open in a crisis. In the Tibet riot, all foreign 
journalists were forced to leave the area, leaving no independent source available regarding 
the nature and extent of the crisis. The Chinese government and the Dalai Lama accused 
each other of being responsible for the crisis. Both accounts were highly politicised and 
partial, and neither could be confirmed owing to the absence of credible witnesses (Blecher, 
2009). The international community was confused by exactly what happened, but as usual, 
mainstream opinion turned against the Chinese government owing to long-standing 
mistrust. Such mistrust culminated in the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay in which pro-
Tibetan protests followed and sought to obstruct the Relay as the Torch travelled over 
several continents. Following a series of embarrassing events, the Chinese government 
learnt that in an international environment where mainstream public opinion was often 
against itself, the best counterstrategy was to be open and allow the western media access 
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to first-hand information and the scene in order to let them generate an independent, 
relatively less stereotyped discourse from the ‘epicentre’ of a crisis that might be 
supportive to the discourse of the Chinese government. This partly explained the decision 
to permit foreign journalists access to the quake area and even helping them start working 
on site.  
The last such attributing factor was the Olympics itself. With the successful bid for 
the Olympics, Beijing promised adherence to international practices, including the right for 
foreign journalists, during the Olympics and the run up to the Olympics, to interview 
anyone upon consent of the interviewee (Xinhua, 2006b). This new rule certainly 
encouraged foreign journalists to go to Sichuan at the first opportunity. It also reminded 
the Chinese government, in a situation in which western opinion became less supportive – 
especially when western celebrities threatened an Olympic boycott – of the extra political 
cost of violating international practices on media reporting.  
China’s relief effort during the Sichuan earthquake was a paradigm shift towards 
openness and respect for lives. It was a result of the Chinese government’s own initiatives, 
accelerated by contingent events. Its long sought prestige of a responsible great power 
became more convincing following the earthquake. Its soft power in terms of the 
willingness to embrace universal norms, or international practices at least, was 
consolidated. The new found openness was a win-win situation: the victims were rescued 
more quickly as a result of foreign assistance; the government’s move towards more 
openness, on the other hand, had ‘nothing to lose but international legitimacy to gain’ 
(Potter, 1997).  
 
5.3.2 The Centralisation of Power 
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Strong leadership was born out of great crises and the Sichuan earthquake added further 
empirical evidence to support this proposition. Since even in democracies a widely 
perceived crisis would grant the incumbent leadership greater power than under normal 
politics, in the case of China this was even more the case because of the long-standing, 
unitary nature of its political system (Hui, 2009). Despite the varying levels of state retreat 
from different realms of Chinese society that resulted in the dismantling of the totalitarian 
state, the totalitarian mentality has never faded and remained strong (Jing, 2010). The 
Leninist structure of the Chinese Party-state meant that it was essentially a structure set up 
to deal with crises through all-out mobilisation. As a result, whenever there was a crisis, 
the totalitarian mentality would make a strong come-back and the mode of mobilisation 
resembled the Party’s revolutionary-era-style. We should bear this intrinsic characteristic 
or inclination in mind when analysing power relations regarding any crisis in China. 
Moreover, in the case of the Sichuan earthquake, the leadership could not afford 
not to centralise power and react quickly. The location of the earthquake told all: 
Wenchuan county was located in central north Sichuan, a hinterland and mountainous 
place that had been much overlooked by state development strategies for decades. It was 
an Ethnic Autonomous County where more than half of those living there were ethnic 
minorities, including 18.6 percent who were Tibetan (Xinhua, 2008r). It was an 
economically peripheral locality vulnerable to disasters and simply would not be able to 
cope with disasters on its own.  
Remote places like Wenchuan were also politically peripheral in that political 
supervision from the top to these places had been weak and minimal. When a disaster hit 
such places, it thus stirred fear among the central leadership who believed that local 
officials would almost certainly misbehave (because of incompetence or disobedience). 
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This could exacerbate the vulnerability of the victims and even lead to a second wave of 
misery as a result of delayed disaster relief and diseases.    
Therefore, it was Wenchuan’s dual periphery, economic and political, that caused 
much worry among the Beijing leadership. Historically and around the world, peripheral 
regions were often the most vulnerable to disasters owing to economic backwardness and 
insufficient political attention paid to these regions. Disasters therefore often highlighted 
regional and ethnic inequality which could potentially activate nascent discontent along 
these lines. For instance, the Berber communities protested in the aftermath of the 2004 
Moroccan earthquake against existing regional inequality (Pelling and Dill, 2009). For the 
Sichuan earthquake itself, media attention highlighted the problem of poor infrastructure 
that delayed the relief effort; the wiping out of whole towns and villages showed how weak 
local governance was in enforcing building codes. Unknown or unnoticed problems were 
likely to surface and be magnified by media attention. 
What was more worrying to the state was that as these problems got worse because 
of the damage caused by the disaster, resistance to the state may snowball. This resistance 
may become organised and even give rise to a political force in opposition to the central 
state, owing to the availability of a temporary political vacuum. This opposition may 
provide an alternative source of relief effort that could be in direct competition with the 
central state in winning the hearts and minds of the people. For instance, following the 
Marmara earthquake in Turkey, the immediate relief effort was provided by NGOs (many 
of which were pro-Islamic) rather than the state, owing to weak state capacity. NGOs were 
praised for their quick response through which they gained much legitimacy. The state 
stepped in soon after and suppressed NGO activities with a heavy hand for fear that these 
Islamic organisations may have turned the disaster to their political advantage (Washington 
Post, 1999; Pelling and Dill, 2009). That even a regime with significant democratic 
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elements like Turkey promptly repressed such a challenge to the state, an authoritarian 
regime like China would no doubt deem such organised activity to be a serious political 
threat. There was a political imperative to react quickly so as to fill any potential vacuum 
of state power.  
But fear of a political vacuum could only partly explain the Chinese leadership’s 
motivation for a quick response. On the other hand, there was much potential for the state 
to turn the crisis to its advantage as the regime could garner greater legitimacy if a crisis 
and its associated tensions were recognised and handled well (USAID, 2002). The 
potential of a totalitarian mentality and the rigorously organised Party-state structure often 
fitted this purpose well. The benefit of both in the process of centralising power was 
apparent. In addition, with China’s strong state capacity in general (Goodman, 2004), and 
its extractive capacity in times of crisis in particular, the effectiveness of the power 
centralisation was ensured. 
 
I. The Centralisation of Decision Making 
 
The centralisation of power was first manifested in the immediate tightening up of the 
Party-state apparatus. Following the quake, something familiar re-emerged: the Party 
unified awareness while the central government did whatever it took to extract and then 
redistribute resources. For instance, the PSC convened two meetings within just three days 
to rally the Party. On the part of the government, Premier Wen took a dozen government 
ministers with him when he rushed to the epicentre. He virtually ‘moved most of the State 
Council apparatus’ to Sichuan (Lianhe Zaobao, 2008). The level of centralisation was both 
swift and unprecedented in scale.   
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This unprecedented efficiency of centralisation could only be achieved under a 
strong leadership with firm determination55. Therefore, the political background conducive 
to strong leadership should be noted. In the last six months prior to the earthquake, the 17th 
PC and the 11th NPC met respectively. A series of personnel manoeuvres at both meetings 
occurred which favoured the Hu-Wen leadership compared with the 16th PC and the 10th 
NPC convened five years before, when the partly ‘unsettled transition’ of leadership 
looked rather ambiguous (Fewsmith, 2003b). This laid the foundations for a stronger Hu-
Wen leadership, but did not necessitate its extraordinary centralisation of power, which 
could not be justified or legitimised unless there was a major crisis. Coincidentally, the 
earthquake gave momentum to the Hu-Wen leadership’s desire to reassert its authority 
through centralising control. It accelerated and concentrated the political status quo pre-
earthquake. Facilitated by such a favourable setting, Hu and Wen could take the helm 
swiftly and got their way.  
With Hu Jintao confirmed as the CCP’s paramount leader, his crisis leadership was 
resolute. Despite mobilising the Party apparatus – as was the case in SARS – what was 
more remarkable was that Hu as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission gained 
firm command over the military in this wave of power centralisation. This was significant 
because in reality it was largely powerful, individual leaders who could exert control over 
the military rather than (in principle) the Party as the organisation to command the gun 
(Zheng and Lye, 2004).  
While centralising control in the Party and the military was relatively 
straightforward because they operated largely in the top-down mode, Wen Jiabao’s task to 
centralise power on the part of the central government was potentially more problematic 
                                                 
55 Remember what happened at the peak of SARS when only Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Wu Yi 
took visible actions against SARS, even the then Health Minister Zhang Wenkang did not accompany them 
when they were visiting the affected areas, whereas all other members of the PSC remained ambiguously 
silent. It was only after SARS was labelled as a major crisis against which a ‘people’s war’ was waged that 
the CCP leadership took unified and all-out actions.   
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and to this we should pay more attention analytically. Following the 11th NPC, many 
elected ministers in Wen’s cabinet were new faces. In addition, the problem of fragmented 
authoritarianism deepened further as several former ministries dealing with similar policy 
areas were merged to form ‘super ministries’ whose efficacy remained to be seen. By the 
time of the earthquake, some of these super ministries had not completed the restructuring 
in roles and jurisdictions (Sina.com, 2008c) 56 . This could lead to catastrophic 
consequences in the relief effort if things were messed up owing to these ministries’ 
incomplete transition (which was highly likely under ‘normal politics’, or at least it would 
take these ministries a considerable amount of time to familiarise themselves with the new 
roles). Wen was acutely aware of this, and he thus brought the ministers under one roof in 
order to improve coordination and collaboration. These ministers, along with other 
government officials, led or joined eight working groups which centralised the command 
in eight designated areas57.   
 
II. Top-down Accountability 
 
One may note that the ministers who went with Wen to Sichuan almost exactly mimicked 
local government functionalities during disaster relief. Referring to the above discussion on 
crisis and the ‘central-field’ gap between the central state and local governments (Boin and 
Otten, 1996), the centralisation of power in the form of on-site decision making and 
supervision by senior leaders narrowed down the distance between the central and local 
governments in terms of communication and information processing. With the presence of 
many ministerial-level leaders in the quake zone, the layers of principal-agent relations 
                                                 
56 For example, the newly established Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) had not been 
functioning with new responsibilities until late June 2008. 
57  These were the groups for disaster relief, forecast and monitor, medical and sanitation, livelihood 
arrangement, infrastructure, production recovery, public order and propaganda. 
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involved in the policy process were reduced from five to two – in many cases 
bureaucracies at the provincial, prefectural and county levels were bypassed. This 
extraordinary measure mitigated the potential for local bureaucrats to manipulate 
information – senior leaders ‘stand over the shoulder of every local official’ to supervise 
closely and ensure compliance and competence (Breslin, 2008a:26).  
This top-down measure of accountability proved to be even more necessary when 
huge amounts of relief supplies flooded into the affected area and created a huge 
temptation for corruption. This monitoring, along with bottom-up pressure from the people, 
such as exposure on the Internet of possible appropriation of relief materials, made such 
cases surface quickly as they occurred (for example, the appropriation of tents mentioned 
above). The on-site senior leadership’s awareness of what was happening on the ground 
allowed these wrongdoings to be punished promptly58. 
 
III. Organisational Shake-up 
 
Moreover, the Party explicitly utilised this crisis-induced opportunity to shake up the entire 
system. In other words, it used the Sichuan earthquake as a touchstone to test the loyalty, 
competence and diligence of Party members and thus systematically remove those deemed 
unqualified. Only days after the quake, the CCP’s Central Organisational Department 
launched a campaign to tighten Party discipline, asking subordinating Party organisational 
departments to evaluate cadres according to their performance in the earthquake relief 
(Xinhua, 2008v). 28 cadres were punished or removed in the first three weeks for 
                                                 
58 Under ‘normal politics’, the entire accountability procedure was prolonged. It might take months or even 
years from the point of starting investigation to the point where those responsible finally received punishment. 
Also, within the process, local distortion of information was prevalent. With the presence of senior leaders in 
a major crisis, wrongdoings were more likely to be spotted and therefore receive prompt and severe 
punishment. But under this critical circumstance local bureaucrats were at the risk of being punished more 
severely than they deserve because such a circumstance was likely to be characterised by ‘rule by man’ rather 
than ‘rule by law’. The central leadership needed targets for high profile crackdowns in order to show their 
commitment to the people as well as disciplining the rest of the bureaucracy.   
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nonfeasance, and later 186 more were punished for offences in allocating relief supplies or 
funds, in accordance with a newly promulgated Party decree requiring such cases to be 
punished ‘quickly and seriously’. On the other hand, 69 cadres that performed well were 
promoted (including 19 promoted more than one rank). As in the case of SARS, Party 
branches also made a significant number of new recruits at the site of disaster relief (Legal 
Daily, 2008; Sichuan Daily, 2008; Xinhua, 2008t).  
As a result, the earthquake relief exerted a considerable impact on the existing 
power relations within the political system. The centralisation of power opened a window 
of opportunities for the central Party-state to redraw the boundary of central-local relations 
by extending the reach of the centre, and thus penetrate inertial local governments. And, as 
usual, personnel mobility played a key role in serving this purpose. Heavy-handed 
measures ensured compliance while ad hoc promotions enlisted loyalty to the Party and to 
the central leadership who initiated these measures. In other words, the centralisation of 
power for crisis management and the consolidation of the Hu-Wen leadership’s authority 
took place concurrently.  
 
IV. Fiscal Centralisation and Redistribution 
 
It should also be noted that the centralisation of power did not fade as the disaster relief 
finished. During the period of reconstruction, this effect continued and extended well 
beyond Sichuan. In terms of resources, the state council used the redistribution mechanism. 
It designated each wealthy province to aid one county in the quake zone in the form of 
delivering construction projects (Gov.cn, 2008a). In terms of personnel management, the 
Central Organisational Department despatched many cadres to Sichuan to fill the vacancies 
in Party branches at various levels (Xinhua, 2008u).  
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After the central government had done this, people and especially the victims might 
have had the impression that the central government was much more responsive than the 
local government. This perception enhanced the popular conviction that the central state 
was more accountable and benevolent, compared with the local state’s corrupt and self-
enriching image. Even under normal circumstances, such perceived difference was widely 
held among the average citizen in China and was supported by a number of studies which 
suggested that the central state enjoyed much greater perceived legitimacy than the local 
state59 (Gilley, 2008; Li, 2006; Saich, 2005). As such, the effective disaster relief in the 
Sichuan earthquake directed by the central government gave additional credence to its 
legitimacy. This was precisely the effect that the central leadership wanted to achieve 
through managing a crisis, and it led us to the interpretation of the last, but most important, 
political utility of the Sichuan earthquake. 
 
5.3.3 Reconnecting with the People 
 
As previously argued, the CCP, like many other parties in other polities, often did not treat 
a major crisis as a purely negative event per se. Rather, it consistently sought to utilise the 
opportunity that came along with the crisis. And on numerous occasions, the CCP took 
advantage of the miserable situation in the aftermath of a major crisis or natural disaster to 
enhance its perceived role as the people’s saviour, an image that the CCP has been trying 
to maintain since its very foundation in the early 1920s. In other words, the CCP has been 
using crisis situations to reiterate the message that the Party was flying to save the people 
                                                 
59 And the central government sought to reinforce this perception through deliberate attempts to localise local 
problems. One measure was to encourage people appealing directly to local governments while discouraging 
them from travelling a long way to Beijing for appeals. As a supplementary measure, local government 
offices (especially those at the county level) were periodically asked to open their doors and welcome 
petitioners. These measures were ways of mobilising the underprivileged people to exert checks and balances 
(to some extent) on local authorities.  
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whenever they were in trouble. One may argue that the CCP requires crises to stay relevant 
(Miller and Scobell, 2005).  
At the same time, the paternalistic Chinese political culture implied that the social 
contract between those who ruled and those were ruled comprised an essential component; 
that was, the people were expecting to be looked after by the state, especially in the event 
of adversity. Whilst some degree of dependency on the government in adversity was also 
common in liberal democracies, what was unique about the Chinese case was that the 
Chinese people regarded the army as having a legitimate role to play in adverse situations 
and thus aspired to the PLA’s presence in natural disasters in particular. The PLA was 
viewed as the mainstay in government crisis management that gave the people assurance. 
Under such circumstances, the PLA was not just the army of the state but the army of the 
people. After many occasions of extensive PLA involvement in natural disaster rescues 
since the founding of the PRC, the PLA’s self-promoted image as the saviour of the people 
and the popular perception of such an image were mutually reinforcing.  
In this context, crises like the Sichuan earthquake often gave regime legitimacy a 
short-term but robust boost because China’s strong extractive state capacity, and the PLA’s 
abundant manpower, would almost guarantee the government to do well on those 
occasions that required large scale mobilisation. Having had the ideal situation for decisive 
intervention and also the strong capability of doing so, there was nothing as good as a 
natural disaster for the Party to reconnect and win the hearts and minds of the people. 
Some Chinese scholars even argued that any natural disasters were good for regime 
legitimacy60. 
                                                 
60 Interview with a professor in political science, March 2010, Beijing. 
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In previous natural disasters in the PRC’s history, the practice of trying actively to 
reassert the Party’s relevance with the people has been prevalent61. In this respect, the 
handling of the Sichuan earthquake was similar to handling the floods that affect China 
almost every summer. The Sichuan earthquake was not even very different from the 
Tangshan earthquake in terms of the strategy used. What made the Sichuan earthquake 
stand out, however, were the different and sophisticated tactics serving this strategy.  
 
I. From Paternalism to Humanism 
 
The most apparent difference could be observed from the leadership’s gesture. In previous 
disasters, the Chinese leaders’ attempts at showing a connection with the people tended to 
appear impersonal. Although the ‘warmth of the Party and the government’ was always 
stressed, the more personal faces and characters of individual leaders were not conveyed. 
The convention of keeping a low profile was adhered to strictly so as not to emphasise the 
personality of any individual leader in an era when collective leadership was the 
unchallengeable norm62. However, the disadvantage of this was that it distanced leaders 
from the people and engendered alienation. As a result, although the leadership tried to 
show their connections with the people, the result was unsatisfactory owing to poor 
interaction between the leaders and the people on a ‘personal’ level.  
This was a common problem before the Sichuan earthquake. For example, during 
the floods in the summer of 1998, Jiang Zemin personally visited the flood-affected areas 
of Hubei and Jiangxi provinces. But upon comparing video footage of his activities there 
with that of the Hu-Wen leadership during the Sichuan earthquake, a palpable difference 
                                                 
61 In the CCP jargon, such re-engagement is called ‘consistently maintain the “flesh and blood” ties between 
the Party and the people’. 
62  And by implication, individual leaders were unwilling to behave too personally when addressing a 
domestic audience, but it was interesting to note that leaders behaved much more personally and flexibly 
during their visits to foreign countries where highlighting personality was not an issue.  
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appeared. When addressing the crowds, the language Jiang used was filled with outmoded 
political slogans and he was surrounded by circles of officials while he was talking. His 
talk to the masses did not differ much from that to his subordinates, in that the style of his 
talking was very inflammatory but paternalistic, characterised by indoctrination and orders 
as opposed to sympathy and care (but it was consistent with the neoconservative leadership 
style in the Jiang era which stressed authority) (Fewsmith, 2008). From the people’s point 
of view, this approach easily distanced ‘them’ from ‘us’ because, first of all, the leaders did 
not speak the masses’ language, let alone find resonance with the people. It could be a 
good opportunity for improving relations between the Party and the masses, but it was not 
seized well. 
Equally important, for any crisis, it was the people that were most vulnerable to the 
hazard. However, this important point seemed to be neglected by former leaders in that 
they often stressed the political significance of resolving crises. In other words, they 
constantly tended to treat crises as political struggles. Even worse, such inclinations were 
sometimes externalised. For example, Jiang, during the same visit, stressed that the top 
priorities for the battle against floods were: ensuring the safety of dams, ensuring the safety 
of big cities such as Wuhan and the Jianghan Plain, and ensuring the safety of people’s 
lives and property. His order of priority might be unintentional, but he did put the people 
last.  
As soon as the Hu-Wen leadership took power, they attempted to make a departure 
from this and constructed their image differently, as ‘men of the people’. From the very 
beginning of their term, Hu-Wen put forward a new discourse of ‘putting people first’ 
which was embedded in the ‘three people thesis’. Borrowed from Abraham Lincoln’s 
dictum ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’, Hu proposed a 
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‘development for the people, by the people and of the people’ (Ngok, 2009)63. Moreover, 
in crisis situations, Hu-Wen’s different approach to the people distinguished them from 
their predecessors in particular. Hu-Wen often stressed their deep concern with the 
wellbeing of the people when a disaster occurred They wanted to convince the people that 
they were the first leadership that viewed crises from a humanitarian perspective, i.e. 
viewed them as tragedies and had the utmost concern for the wellbeing of the people over 
other priorities.  
Their gestures (including body language) therefore became more in touch with 
ordinary people – as opposed to the previous top-down approach – emphasised more about 
benevolence rather than simply boosting morale. During the peak of SARS, Hu Jintao 
visited Guangdong’s Disease Control Centre without wearing a mask. During the winter 
storm in January 2008, Wen Jiabao visited railway stations filled with tens of thousands of 
stranded passengers and offered his personal apology for the paralysed transport system 
and promised to resolve the problem so everyone could get home before the Chinese New 
Year’s Eve. These gestures were ‘rare moves’ for Chinese politicians at their rank (CNN, 
2008), but they were helpful in shaping people’s realisations that leaders could do little 
more in these difficult situations (Blecher, 2009), and thus resembled, to a limited extent, a 
safety valve that absorbed some pressure affecting the government.  
Certainly, it was over simplistic to argue that the Hu-Wen leadership cared about 
the people much more than their predecessors did. Rather, it was more of a Party-initiated 
public relations drive aimed at garnering leadership popularity, as well as forging a new, 
engaging relationship with the people. Brady (2008:3) argues that, thanks to increasing 
cultural exchange, the Chinese regime has been learning, adapting and exercising a 
‘methodology of political public relations, mass communications, political 
                                                 
63 This is the update to an earlier version: ‘use power for the people, show concern for the people and seek 
benefit for the people’.  
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communications, and other modern methods of mass persuasion commonly utilised in 
western democratic societies’. The existence of such practices was no secret within China. 
For example, it was widely rumoured that each of the nine PSC members had his own 
public relations consulting team comprised of highly experienced media professionals who 
managed all the details of the leader’s publicised appearances, e.g. to whom to speak 
during inspections, what clothes to wear on which occasion or the best angles from which 
to film televised video. Notably, it was commonly felt that Wen Jiabao’s team did a good 
job in constructing him as an open minded and engaging leader, and that distinguished him 
from other top leaders in terms of personal image (RFI, 2011)64. Being aware of the 
importance of the Internet in shaping public opinion and its decentralised features, Hu and 
Wen also attended a number of online Q&A sessions with netizens to show their 
accessibility. They wanted to change the deep-seated stereotype about the overly serious 
and rigid perception of Chinese leaders and they wanted especially to appeal to the youth, 
who later set up an unofficial publicity website to promote Hu-Wen’s image (similar to 
Facebook’s fan pages) which was endorsed by the authorities65.   
All these political marketing efforts peaked and presumably reaped praise, during 
the Sichuan earthquake. Wen Jiabao rushed to the epicentre at the very earliest opportunity. 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, people’s attention tended to focus on the 
casualty and physical damage and they psychologically required a stabilisation force of 
some kind to pacify their sadness. Wen’s timely arrival thus greatly boosted national 
confidence66. People saw on live broadcast the Premier stressing at every moment the 
utmost importance of saving lives. His tireless work and humane gestures greatly repaired 
                                                 
64 While this approach presumably improved his personal image, some people, ironically, nicknamed him 
‘China’s ying di’ (literally, China’s master movie star) for his emotional but seldom materialised promises.  
65  The People’s Net even issued electronically ‘Certificate of Hu-Wen’s Fans’, see 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/132796/ 
66 As an indication of how important psychologically Wen’s prompt response was, it was interesting to note 
that when people were referring to impressive crisis management in this earthquake by the Chinese 
government, the most cited evidence was Wen’s timely arrival, not Hu Jintao’s visit to the quake zone three 
days after.  
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the battered image of the government. People who saw him personally felt ‘moved … He 
is so worried. You can see it in his eyes’ (Newsweek, 2008). During his three days in the 
epicentre, he behaved in a way much like a western politician in democratic societies. 
Despite this difference he made at the symbolic and emotional levels, Wen acted in the 
way that the Chinese people expected from a benevolent leader in the event of a natural 
disaster.  
More precisely, China’s paternalistic political culture required leaders to perform 
the roles of both parents (to children) in times of crisis, in which the father mainly 
provided order and discipline and the mother provided care and sympathy. In addition, the 
timely arrival of a visible, benign and ‘good’ official was regarded as important as the 
existence of an abstract and robust crisis management regime was. Wen certainly 
performed his expected role well. Through hard work and touching gestures, he reminded 
the people of two ‘good leaders’ of the past. One of them was Zhou Enlai, the first Premier 
of the PRC, who had a high reputation for his diligence at work, for his care to the people 
and for being someone who was known as ‘The People’s Premier’. Zhou was praised for 
arriving promptly after the 1966 Xingtai earthquake amid aftershocks. The other ‘good 
leader’ was Zhu Rongji, Wen’s predecessor, who was praised for being tough to 
incompetent local officials. In the 1998 Yangtze River Flood, the supposedly very strong 
dam in Jiujiang collapsed owing to shoddy construction and it provoked Zhu’s fury; he 
then famously created the phrase ‘Tofu project’ which has been widely used to refer to 
constructions which cut corners.  
Wen showed his benevolence in two ways: being benevolent to the people and 
being tough on subordinates as another way of showing concern to the people. For instance, 
in front of the ruin of a collapsed school where the electricity supply was completely down 
and his way ahead could only be lit by torches, he yelled into the crevice where school 
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children were trapped, ‘I'm grandpa Wen. You children will certainly be able to tough this 
out and be rescued’ (Reuters, 2008a). On another occasion, troops deployed for rescue 
moved slowly owing to bridge damage and Wen became furious and ordered them to use 
whatever possible means to advance. Later he told the troops boarding a plane for the 
epicentre: ‘I have only one sentence to say, the people raised you up, and you should 
decide what to do in return!’ (China Daily, 2008b). Parallels were drawn between Wen and 
Zhou and Zhu, but what Wen did and said certainly had a more humane and populist 
lineage.   
Thanks to the media surge, everything that the top leaders did was broadcasted live, 
nationwide. People could feel that the leaders were with them. As a result, they were 
regarded as more approachable leaders, cultivating a feeling that they were among the 
people, in contrast to previous generations of leaders who appeared to be above the people. 
From this perspective, the Sichuan earthquake certainly was a departure from the top-down 
approach prevalent before Hu-Wen. That said, it was more than traditional paternalism. 
The Party, through its top leadership’s gestures, adopted a much more humane approach to 
reconnecting with the people. Throughout the earthquake relief, especially during its 
immediate aftermath, it was strongly felt that the state’s handling of the disaster was 
apolitical or depoliticised (compared to previous, similar crises). The Chinese leadership 
treated the earthquake as purely a natural disaster and nothing else; it showed an unusual 
level of respect (by its own standard) for lives, as well as to the dead; and it conveyed 
unprecedented levels of emotional support to the victims. Although later developments 
showed that the practice of politicising a natural disaster was not completely abandoned, it 
was fair to say that the state at least detached the humanitarian aspect of the crisis from the 
political utility of the crisis thereafter.   
 
 235
II. State Ritual and A New Type of Nationalism? 
 
There was an enlightment mentality emerged from the humanism discussed above. The 
evidence was prevalent, from the state media’s emphasis on respect for an individual’s life, 
to the reverence for nature, and the Premier’s much needed encouragement which 
repeatedly stressed confidence, courage and strength. Also, in Wen’s words, he avoided 
outmoded rhetoric such as self-reliance and rebuilding the home; instead, he talked about 
livelihood, about the future and about being grateful to those offered help. His apolitical 
talk was not only rare, but conformed to liberal ideas about the development of human 
individuals, the community and social solidarity.  
In addition, the relatively open media policy significantly changed the way that the 
Chinese public perceived a catastrophe. The live coverage of the event by all forms of 
modern media conveyed a timely sense of ‘distant suffering’, i.e. a distant but powerful 
impact felt by the spectator who without being there – an impact which shocked the 
emotional state of the spectator (Xu, 2009). 
Some observers were right in claiming that, as with many natural disasters, the 
CCP turned the Sichuan earthquake into a nationalist movement (Pelling and Dill, 2009). 
Nonetheless, nationalist sentiments that emerged at this time were clearly tinted with 
liberal values, such as individual rights (respect for life), equality (common suffering) and 
national solidarity on the basis of strong self-awareness among individual citizens. This 
differed from the xenophobic nationalism as found in the Tangshan earthquake when the 
Party promoted the theme of self-reliance and thus refused all foreign aid. It also differed 
from the officially promoted pragmatic nationalism which required citizens to identify with 
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the Party-state. At the very least, it was a new type of nationalism in that it was not illiberal 
or xenophobic nationalism67.  
This nationalism with liberal values culminated in the state organised 
commemorative ritual for people that died in the catastrophe. On 19 May 2008, seven days 
after the deadly Sichuan Earthquake, the whole nation of China was in its deepest 
mourning for the tens of thousands of victims who lost their lives in the earthquake. 
Chinese people stood in silence for three minutes at 2:28 pm, the moment when the quake 
struck Sichuan exactly one week previously, amid the ringing air sirens of automobiles, 
trains and ships. These were part of the rituals organised by the State Council, which 
earlier declared a three-day national mourning period from 19 to 21 May (Gov.cn, 2008b). 
Public recreational activities were also suspended and all newspapers and websites were 
presented in black and white only. Most symbolically, the national flag of the PRC for the 
first time flew at half-mast for the ordinary people. In the past the national flag was only 
lowered for the loss of national leaders and national heroes68. After the lowering of the 
national flag at Tiananmen Square on the morning of 19 May, the crowd hailed ‘Zhongguo 
jiayou’ (China, be stronger) and ‘Sichuan jiayou’ (Sichuan, be stronger) (CCTV, 2008).  
The above political ritual had significance in its own right in that from the 
nationalism with liberal values perspective, intellectuals (and the public to a lesser extent) 
participated in the making of state policy with regard to organising this ritual. The state 
responded appropriately to the public mood. Shortly after the earthquake, a prominent 
public intellectual, Professor Hu Xingdou, wrote a blog article that resonated with public 
sympathy and was supported by many. He suggested that holding a period of national 
mourning ‘seemingly has no substantive significance, but it essentially reflects who the 
                                                 
67 The author preferred not to use the term liberal nationalism because this term implied that the source of 
legitimacy was from active and routine civic participation, in which regard the Chinese civil society did not 
qualify.  
68 The most recent such occasions were in 1997 when Deng Xiaoping died; and in 1999 when the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade was bombed by the NATO, killing 3 Chinese journalists. 
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genuine masters of the state are, and thus is consistent with the ancient Chinese notion of 
“nation is people based” … lowering the national flag for the ordinary people reflects the 
central role of the people in the state and that will enhance national cohesion and pride’ 
(Hu, 2008). The state accepted the suggestion69. Being responsive to public opinion on 
non-controversial issues made the state look more compassionate. Popular inputs also lent 
state policy greater legitimacy and, as a result, holding a period of national mourning after 
a major disaster has been institutionalised since then.  
Xu (2009) argued that in this commemorative ritual the state ‘unusually 
downplayed itself to honour ordinary victims’. In the past, the state more often dictated and 
educated than interacted with the people, but this time it turned itself into a corporeal 
human which was, to some extent, on an equal footing with the people. The state not only 
showed respect to those who died but, more importantly, made the people alive feel that 
they were living in this country with dignity. It therefore contributed to the unprecedented 
solidarity among the Chinese. 
Nevertheless, unusual progressive practices should not overshadow the more usual 
political calculations. At a deeper level, such a commemorative ritual stabilised the 
authoritarian regime through turning an otherwise divisive event 70  into a vehicle that 
gathered sympathy and emotional energy. Since commemorative rituals could enhance 
emotional energy even across a diverging value spectrum (Xu, 2009), the national 
mourning provided the people with a focal point despite their differences. It effectively 
confined the range of issues that could be potentially in competition with those on the 
                                                 
69 Actually the National Flag Law of the PRC stipulates that ‘the national flag may fly at half-mast in the case 
of a calamity or severe natural disaster which caused extremely heavy casualties.’ Although the Law came 
into effect in 1990, this clause regarding lowering the flag for ordinary citizens had not been implemented 
until the Sichuan earthquake, despite the fact that in the previous two decades there were a number of very 
severe natural disasters.  
70 It was potentially divisive because the catastrophe highlighted the problem of inequality and corruption, 
which triggered a series of smaller crises as the situation developed. 
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official agenda. In other words, concerns over more controversial issues relating to local 
weak governance were ‘submerged’ by the tide of huge sympathy, at least in the short term.  
 
5.4 The Earthquake and State-society Relations 
 
This section has so far dealt with the more symbolic and emotional side of disaster politics 
in the wake of the Sichuan earthquake. However, the institutional side of the event marked 
the most important difference between the Sichuan earthquake and disasters in the past; 
that was, popular participation and the fledgling civil society. Whilst civic effervescence 
was the most substantive change in political terms, it could not be fully understood without 
reference to media openness and the rise of the Internet, especially that of social media.  
 
5.4.1 Civic Effervescence 
 
As discussed above, media transparency cultivated a sense of distant suffering and 
nationalism with liberal values. It was precisely these mentalities that compelled many 
more people in the rest of the nation to contribute to disaster relief. In this respect, the 
media effectively mobilised ordinary people to participate in disaster relief. This again 
differed from previous disasters where media reporting lagged behind the development of 
the situation, and people read such messages in the ‘past tense’ and thus did not have as 
strong an ‘impulsion’ to join with regard to an ongoing event.  
The Internet – especially discussion boards, blogs and other facilities with 
interactive functions – played an essential role in communicating distant suffering. It was 
interesting to note that a lot of the ‘raw materials’ of media reporting, including many used 
by the state media, were from the grassroots participants who produced them on-site. In 
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other words, the content of media reporting was more ‘authentic’ than ‘official’, which lent 
these media reports substantial credibility. In this regard, grassroots contributions to state 
media actually helped to validate state propaganda. With state media unusually echoing the 
voice on the ground, more people were thus encouraged to participate in the relief effort.   
While the magnitude of this civic effervescence was dramatic, it was not surprising 
given nearly two decades of arduous but persistent civic participation, of which the huge 
civic upspring following the Sichuan earthquake was its natural outcome (Yang, 2008). 
The burgeoning ‘civil sphere’ emerged in as early as the 1980s as a result of the rolling 
back of the Chinese state. Even major international NGOs started operations in China after 
the late 1980s. The Tiananmen crackdown dampened this development, but not for long, as 
the tragic outcome of the incident urged Chinese intellectuals to reflect on viable routes 
towards China’s democratic future. Some of them believed that the hope of liberalising 
China lay firmly with a developed civil society, rather than with a heroic uprising. Since 
then, the notion of civil society has been increasingly popular in the Chinese academia, and 
some intellectuals even initiated their own grassroots NGOs71. These NGOs have become 
more capable in terms of resource mobilisation and capacity building during their 
operations since they were established. As a result, Chinese NGOs in the Sichuan 
earthquake were not acting in any new forms in terms of mobilisation and assistance. They 
have been practising these skills for years (Yang, 2008). The only difference was that the 
earthquake repositioned many NGOs from their habitual marginal status to the centre stage 
of socio-political life in China. 
Moreover, these organisations utilised the after-quake social opening to form a 
coherent civil ‘society’, as opposed to operating on their own, and thus made civic 
                                                 
71 By then, the term shimin shehui was widely used by the Chinese academia instead of gongmin shehui. The 
latter was more political rights based than the former despite the fact that they were both translated from the 
English term ‘civil society’. Similarly, NGOs were initially referred to as minjian zuzhi instead of feizhengfu 
zuzhi, with the latter having a connotation of political independence. 
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effervescence after the quake qualitatively different from their previous activities. In the 
past, the so called civil society, if it existed, was at best fragmented, because civic 
organisations working on similar issues had not worked with each other so closely owing 
to the need to compete for resources, such as funding or public awareness (Zhu, 2009a).  
The immense challenge posed by the earthquake and the flood of relief supplies 
and volunteers into the quake zone created an urgent need for organisations to cooperate. 
As many as 19 national and regional NGO associations for disaster relief, including two 
major associations based in the quake zone (The Sichuan NGO Disaster Relief Joint Office 
and The 5.12 Non-governmental Relief Service Centre) were formed to coordinate the 
activities of the NGOs (Zhu, 2009b). In addition, these newly established associations 
collaborated with local government offices and the corporate sector for an all-out concerted 
relief effort. For instance, the Service Centre worked with the government in securing 
access for its NGO members, and also acted as an umbrella command structure that 
supervised the NGO activities and resolved practical difficulties such as creating a 
volunteer database, a training programme and an insurance plan (Teets, 2009). Another 
umbrella association, The Chinese Non-governmental Earthquake Relief Joint Action, 
attracted 122 NGOs and extensively communicated to the public the services that its 
members could offer and what specific relief materials or equipment they needed from the 
corporate sector in order to provide such services (Narada Foundation, 2008). Such 
initiatives greatly increased the efficiency of relief effort. In sum, the NGOs’ cooperative 
participation and activism reflected three decades of incremental change in the relationship 
between the state, market and civil society. Before the earthquake, interactions between the 
three had not always been smooth; in fact, each had accumulated significant tension with 
the other two and this often resulted in zero-sum situations. The earthquake, however, 
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revealed the potential of benign interactions between them which could deliver positive-
sum societal outcomes.  
 
5.4.2 Social Cohesion and Building Trust towards Civil Society 
 
Similarly, the unprecedented recognition of and support for civil society by the masses was 
also a natural outcome of people’s rising public awareness. The depoliticisation of 
everyday life since the reform era was not only accompanied by commercialism and 
consumerism, but an increasing disinterest in public affairs and politics (Liu, 2011). 
However, as the reform deepened with mounting tensions that affected almost every aspect 
of daily life, no one could stay aloof from getting involved in debates about livelihood 
issues. The need for interest articulation has put considerable pressure on the political 
system which lacked the exact channels through which grievances could be expressed.  
The advent of the Internet in the late 1990s, and its widespread usage afterwards, 
has strongly influenced state-society relations against this backdrop of the pluralisation of 
interests. In democratic societies where there already existed established channels for 
interest articulation and points of access to the policy process, the Internet only played a 
complementary role in relaying public opinion. In contrast, the Internet in China has been 
playing a more indispensable role in communicating societal needs and has become the 
most important means of affecting policy outcomes from below. As such, the people’s 
neglected interest in public affairs has been fuelled by the Internet. In particular, the 
Internet greatly facilitated people’s expression of interest in public affairs, and 
demonstrated its potential for mobilisation in times of crisis. Since the 1999 US bombing 
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, popular opinions online (and even collective actions 
conducted offline, for example, the 2005 anti-Japanese protest), whether rational or 
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otherwise, have become an influential factor which Chinese policy makers could not 
ignore. 
In the aftermath of the earthquake, a robust response from the civil society met with 
a population with increasing civic awareness, and, along with the Internet, catalysed more 
trust between ordinary people and the civil society through bridging the gap in mutual 
understanding. Consequently, many donation initiatives were launched online with the 
participation of NGOs and supported by the mass public. For instance, a number of 
China’s most well-known commercial web portals partnered with the One Foundation run 
by Jet Li, and raised a donation of ¥24 million within three days, mostly from individual 
netizens. This case was noticeable because it linked NGOs and websites on the one hand, 
and users of social media on the other (Roney, 2011). It was a new form of mobilisation 
coming out of an existing social setting.  
These new initiatives greatly facilitated ordinary citizens’ understanding of how 
public affairs could be managed alternatively, i.e. by changing the popular, deep-seated 
belief that the government should be responsible for everything and showed instead that 
organised citizens possessed the capacity for self-governing on public affairs which were 
previously shouldered by the state.  
Although Chinese people did not always trust the government, traditionally, when 
choosing between initiatives organised by the government and those organised by civic 
organisations, many people would still go for the former. Societal formations were widely 
perceived as lacking credibility, being undisciplined and being fiscally unreliable. Their 
politically independent status did not give them extra credentials, but sometimes became 
the source of discrimination because the political climate of a strong centralised state (and 
some people’s respect towards it) made the identity of such organisations complicated 
(they claimed to do something that overlapped with government responsibility, but were 
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not part of the government). This ambiguity subjected these organisations to wide public 
suspicion (Cooper, 2006).  
This predicament could be partly explained by the fact that the Chinese state and 
the market have risen respectively in the first and subsequent three decades since the 
founding of the PRC, whereas civil society had remained weak. As a result, the people 
were not convinced that civil society as a societal force in its own right could bring about 
concrete change. Another reason was that the reform created a deeper cleavage within 
society in that different segments of society were preoccupied with protecting their self-
interests that were so different and incompatible. Chinese society as a whole did not share 
a common pursuit or values, which further diminished the credibility of what it stood for or 
what it could do.  
Evidence in the past revealed that huge catastrophes could catalyse social 
cohesiveness, even in divisive societies. And China in the context of the Sichuan 
earthquake was moving exactly in this direction. Chinese people found something in 
common among all social strata: humanism, altruism and an awareness of civil rights and 
obligations (Zhu, 2009a) – all of which were prerequisites for a functioning democracy. 
Moreover, people witnessed or even participated in social initiatives that did achieve 
concrete outcomes, cultivating an unambiguous consciousness that well organised citizens 
had the potential to bring about progress, i.e. the building of trust towards (civil) society. 
Indeed, many of the civic activities were ad hoc and poorly implemented. Nevertheless, 
these activities swept through all quarters of Chinese society, significantly increased the 
potential volunteer and donor base of charitable initiatives (Han and Ji, 2009), and 
improved the sustainability of such initiatives for the future. The Sichuan earthquake was 
thus essentially an enlightment and educational experience for the people. Precisely 
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because of this, Chinese scholars labelled 2008 as China’s ‘civil society epic year’ (China 
Daily, 2009b).  
  It was also interesting to note that this unprecedented civic activism had much to do 
with the specific political context surrounding 2008, when China adapted extensively in 
response to holding the Beijing Olympics. Volunteering, among other things, had become 
popular well before the Olympics and that certainly contributed to civic participation 
following the earthquake (it at least provided thousands of trained volunteers). On the part 
of the government, after its criticised response to the snowstorm that swept through central 
China in early 2008, in which civil society was virtually absent, it should have realised that 
even a strong centralised state needed complementing societal forces for better crisis 
management, at least in increasing the effectiveness and extending the reach of 
government resources (Teets, 2009).   
 
5.4.3 State Responses to Civil Society Participation 
 
Although the civic effervescence crossed the state’s red line of political dominance 
temporarily, it should be remembered that this could not be achieved without the implicit 
consent of the government. Indeed, the government did change its conventional approach 
towards civil society and acted by not acting, refraining from interfering with civic groups 
for several weeks However, the fact that this crisis-induced social and political opening did 
not last long also reflected the Party’s contradictory mentality towards civil society. This 
ambivalence reflected the deep disagreement within the Party regarding the impact of civil 
society on Party rule as we discussed in Chapter 3. 
Furthering this discussion in relation to positive-sum versus zero-sum views on 
civil society, the unsettled debate within the Party led to an ambiguous fault line for civic 
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organisations. This ambiguity on the one hand impeded NGOs’ further development 
because of their complicated identity, but on the other hand, without a clear-cut red line, 
these organisations still had considerable institutional space and plenty of practical space to 
take on new initiatives.  
Yu Keping (2006) argued that the government has been supportive to civil society 
at a macro level but also imposed constraints on the micro level environment in which 
individual organisations found themselves. Kang Xiaoguang suggested that the 
government’s actual approach to civil society was a combination of ‘both use and control’: 
supporting those organisations that ‘help’ the government in managing the complex society 
while monitoring closely those trouble-makers with political agendas (Mingpao, 2008). It 
again reflected the CCP’s long-standing governing strategy of divide and rule. The Sichuan 
earthquake was a good case demonstrating the government’s considerable tactics in 
balancing empowerment and control. We will discuss its empowerment and control 




There was ample evidence to support the government’s willingness to encourage 
participation in the relief of such an unprecedented catastrophe. According to statistics, 
more than 13 million volunteers participated in the relief effort and fundraising nationwide, 
with more than 3 million volunteers labouring in the disaster zone (State Council, 2009). 
This high figure could be attributed to the government’s open policy towards civil society 
activities. It was particularly compelling given that, by then, most Chinese people outside 
universities were still unfamiliar with the role volunteers played in society. Another figure 
in the same publication showed that the year 2008 saw a 31.8 percent jump in the number 
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of volunteers registered with the three largest Government Organised Non-Governmental 
Organisations (GONGO), suggesting that the government played a supportive role in 
encouraging popular participation in disaster relief.  
For practical work and project management in the disaster zone, the government 
also played a facilitating role, allowing civic organisations to play a bigger role despite the 
fact that much of their participation took place without formal institutions (Teets, 2009). 
As mentioned before, civic organisations partnered with local governments in coordinating 
the relief effort, and local governments delegated some responsibility for managing the 
huge inflow of resources and volunteers to these organisations. In addition, high capacity 
civic organisations were invited to get involved in works that could improve transparency. 
For instance, a pilot scheme on mutual supervision between local governments, the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) and group representatives was initiated by the 
government (Teets, 2009).  
The government learnt about these groups’ utility through partnering with them. It 
therefore took steps to revise policies to incorporate and institutionalise their participation. 
On the anniversary of the Sichuan earthquake, China published its first white paper on 
disaster prevention in which a separate section was written on encouraging and promoting 
popular participation. It stated 
Social mobilisation mechanisms are to be improved to give full play to the 
functions of non-governmental organisations and organisations at the 
grassroots level as well as volunteers … in the fields of disaster prevention, 
emergency rescue, relief and donation work, medical, hygiene and quarantine 
work, post-disaster reconstruction, psychological support and other aspects. 
(State Council, 2009) 
 
Despite granting civic organisations a legitimate status in participation, some 
incentive was introduced to encourage routine charitable giving. For example, a 
preferential taxation system was introduced in January 2008 which lifted the tax-free 
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portion of expenses for charitable donations by enterprises from 3 percent of annual 
taxable income to 12 percent of the total annual profit. This proportion was higher than 
similar policies in many developed countries (Gao and Yuan, 2008). Donations made in 
2008 by enterprise or personally were exempt from taxable income altogether (State 
Council, 2009).   
These measures not only reflected the government’s recognition of civic 
organisations’ relative strength in affairs that were ‘societal’, but were consistent with the 
government’s broader goals on social development. They were more than pressure-induced 
interim changes. In the past, the government had tried hard to nurture social cohesion for 
an increasingly divisive and exclusive society by promoting fraternity and volunteerism. In 
Party rhetoric, this was embedded in a discursive ideological construction called the 
‘socialist core value system’, an ongoing state project that was designed to become the 
dominating ‘moral and ideological base of social harmony’ (CCTV, 2006).  
Many argued that Chinese society since the reform has existed without a coherent 
value system after the collapse of the Marxist class struggle-based value system. In the 
face of a mounting social cleavage, the CCP has created dazzling ideological projects in an 
attempt to glue society together and legitimise itself, with the socialist core value system as 
the latest addition. For Xing (2009), this updated elaboration of socialist values was post-
Marxist in essence, in that it abandoned class analysis while embracing Scandinavian 
social democracy in terms of cultural and political attributes (but not political institutions). 
Lin (2006) went so far as to contend that socialist core values should not reject universal 
values such as liberty, equality and fraternity.  
Given the pressing need for social cohesion and harmony, it was natural that the 
Party endorsed fraternity, philanthropy and volunteerism as part of its core values. Indeed, 
Hu put forward a popular version of the core value system in the so called ‘eight honour 
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and eight disgrace’, which included the phrase, ‘honour those who help each other, and 
shame on those who seek gains at the expense of others’ (Xinhua, 2006c). There was no 
reason not to tolerate civil society activities related to these.  
The huge disaster fostered a feeling of common suffering and enhanced common 
identity. It also stimulated a huge upspring of philanthropy. It was an excellent opportunity 
for the Party to demonstrate its commitment to rebuilding the societal moral base, and, to 
build on this, a more efficient and institutionalised social partnership on disaster 
management. Moreover, by allowing different forms of popular participation in the 
immediate aftermath when the nature of the event was still very apolitical, the Party’s 
political hegemony would not be threatened (Roney, 2011). Party officials publicly 
acknowledged popular participation. ‘The orderly participation of volunteer organisations 
in the relief effort did not dilute the Party’s role as the stronghold of battle; rather, the Party 
better fulfilled such roles with their participation’, said Ou Yangsong, vice chief of the 




While the Party supported civil society activities overall, micro-level constraints were also 
palpable72. It was fair to say that at least the Party had a preference over what types of 
participation to support, to ‘leave alone’ and to control. And this tendency was becoming 
more obvious as time elapsed. The above discussion treated civil society as a whole, and 
we now need to break it down and discern different categories of participation.  
The first category was the most organised participation, that was, participation via 
GONGOs, for example, with the CYL, the Red Cross Society or university research 
                                                 
72 At the risk of oversimplification, it could also be said that the central government supported civil society in 
the relief effort overall, whereas local governments with which NGOs must deal, imposed a number of 
practical constraints on civil society.  
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institutes on social work. This category was intra-system (tizhi nei) and was regarded as 
the most trustworthy politically by local governments. The local branch of the CYL  often 
led on behalf of the local government the above-mentioned partnership between the local 
government and civic organisations in coordinating relief. For these GONGOs, most of 
their participating members were formally registered volunteers, i.e. official volunteers. 
They enjoyed largely unrestricted access to the quake zone as well as local authorities there. 
In some cases, their participation was even recommended by the government at a higher 
level. For example, the Jiannan Social Work Group – affiliated with Beijing Normal 
University’s School of Social Development and Public Policy and founded by its vice dean 
who also sat on the expert committee of a national level earthquake response task force – 
was recommended by the government of Deyang city to work in one of its jurisdictions, 
the Town of Jiannan (Tan et al, 2009). Participation in this category had strong government 
ties and was supported by local governments. 
The second category included large enterprises and entrepreneur associations which 
were eager to demonstrate corporate social responsibility. This category was not as closely 
affiliated with the government as the first category, but was trustworthy politically. 
Although they were outside the formal Party-state structure, these people had considerable 
connections with the government and their activities remained strictly apolitical. 
Particularly during the period of reconstruction, these enterprises were in a more or less 
symbiotic relation with local governments. Local governments needed to rejuvenate the 
local economy (again GDPism continued) in which large enterprises could give an 
investment boost while these enterprises gained a responsible reputation locally and 
nationally73. This category was therefore welcomed by local governments. In a town where 
Wanke, China’s largest estate developer, invested heavily in reconstruction, there were 
                                                 
73 A manager at Wanke whom I interviewed said that his company decided to invest lots of money in Sichuan 
because there was mounting social pressure on them for not having donated enough. 
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many posters along the streets saying ‘Thankful to Wanke, caring for the disaster area’, 
‘Happy homeland, we have Wanke’, all of which were put up by the township Party 
committee and government (Tan et al, 2009).  
The third category belonged to well established, high capacity NGOs offering 
professional skills and services that government agencies lacked, such as psychological 
help. They had neither strong government ties nor excess financial resources, but they 
‘demonstrated to local governments that they do not wish to serve as a substitute for 
government, but as a complement’ (Teets, 2009:331). In other words, they were there to 
help the government to achieve its own goals without promoting their identity to a great 
extent. Some of these organisations had previously worked for government sponsored 
projects and they were experienced with detecting and not going beyond the confined 
institutional boundaries. Their presence was therefore acceptable to local governments, 
although the chance of their continued presence was diminishing as the projects in which 
they were involved were completed.. 
The last category was mostly unwelcomed by local governments. It included 
individual volunteers without formal registration; people joined together in an ad hoc 
fashion based on specific issues (e.g. help the victims) rather than around an organisation; 
and grassroots NGO with a low profile. People in this category were no less sympathetic 
than those in the categories mentioned above; in fact, many of them travelled long 
distances on their own just to offer help. But they did not have as much to offer as trained 
volunteers or professional social workers because some of them were volunteering for the 
first time. Similarly, these low capacity NGOs were inexperienced in working in critical 
conditions. Once they arrived, they were overwhelmed by practical problems on logistics, 
accounting procedures and communication with the government (Zeng and Chen, 2010). 
Some people ended up being taken care of by the soldiers who were supposed to rescue the 
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victims (Teets, 2009). Although the state media gave substantial coverage on unofficial 
individual volunteers, the main point was to praise their altruism and thus perpetuate this 
good quality rather than acknowledging what they did. Another worry of local 
governments was that this substantial influx of outsiders could become the source of 
political disorder if they were to pursue goals other than relief. Groups whose main sources 
of funding were from overseas were particularly suspect because the government was 
unsure who they were and what they intended. Concerns over stability contributed to the 
government’s distrusting them. In fact, just one week after the quake, any NGOs or 
individual volunteers wanting to enter the affected area had to seek approval from the 
government or a major GONGO (Chou and Sun, 2009). As early as July 2008, Zundao 
township had stopped accepting any incoming unregistered volunteers. And on 14 April 
2009, the CYL of Mianzhu city ordered that, according to instructions from a political 
meeting on preserving stability, all individuals and groups without ‘legal’ (registered) 
status should leave (Tan et al, 2009).  
From the above discussion, it was clear that government attitudes towards different 
quarters of civil society varied greatly depending on their political trustworthiness and 
‘usefulness’. The government supported all those politically safe organisations as well as 
those that could contribute to the economy; it tended to leave professional groups without 
political objectives alone; it constrained those without either political connections or 
usefulness. In sum, it only encouraged participation that complemented and consolidated 
the legitimacy of the Party-state.  
 
5.5 The Aftermath of the Earthquake 
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5.5.1 Civil Society Involvement in Reconstruction 
 
As the focus of the event gradually shifted from life saving to reconstruction and 
rebuilding communities, blame apportioning became the emerging theme where the 
dialogue between state and society was getting more contentious. It marked the gradual 
closing window of openness, as well as the strong resurgence of the state’s control 
mentality which the initial period of relief effort was thought to have changed. This period 
featured the contestation over two key issues: civil society involvement in reconstruction 
and the school construction scandal.  
Previous discussions have indicated a clear preference of the Party regarding 
different types of civil society participation, and as the event unfolded, it only validated the 
points raised. There was a subtle change in balance between the governmental capacity and 
civil society activities in favour of the government as soon as reconstruction started. The 
governmental capacity was much stronger in the reconstruction than in the initial disaster 
relief because government apparatus and functions affected by the earthquake were quickly 
restored. It was also important to bear in mind the context that in recent years, and 
especially since the financial crisis in 2008, the fiscal capacity of the central government 
has significantly increased and it has been actively using this capacity to strengthen itself 
by taking on responsibilities where civil society may be more appropriate to shoulder.  
Fiscally, the State Council in June 2008 promulgated the ‘Wenchuan Earthquake 
Post-Disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Master Plan’. It pledged to restore or 
surpass the pre-quake basic standard of living and level of socio-economic development in 
three years (Xinhua, 2008k). According to the plan, a total of ¥1 trillion (more than $150 
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bn)74 would be spent on reconstruction (Gov.cn, 2008a). This massive amount inflated the 
confidence of the Chinese state and its officials over what the state could do; this mentality 
inevitably affected Sichuan’s construction as well. It turned a state-led campaign into a 
state-dominated one which profoundly affected the civil society presence.  
As a result, civic organisations, apart from those deemed politically trustworthy by 
the state, faced a severe crowding out effect owing to massive state investment, even if 
they had been working alongside the state in a complementary way. Local governments 
regarded them as potential competitors in serving the affected population in the fear that 
more local people would turn to them for help instead of the government75. There was also 
the concern that the central government and other international organisations may regard 
local government work to be ineffective as indicated by a big ‘share’ of the population 
using services provided by civic organisations. This distrust from local governments along 
with a significant variation in group capacity led to the retreat of many small groups. The 
rejuvenated government apparatus did not need them anymore.  
At a deeper level, this somewhat forced retreat of civil society reflected the Party’s 
political calculation on the attribution of credibility. For the Party, reconstruction was as 
important as the initial relief in consolidating regime legitimacy. While it was just in time 
to demonstrate during the relief that it would fly to save the people whenever they were in 
trouble, during the reconstruction it could also demonstrate that the Party was committed to 
compensate much more than what the ‘nature’ had taken from the people. As the slogan 
went, ‘Disasters have no mercy, but the people do, and the Party does’. It also explained 
why in past disasters, the government often (deliberately) finished the reconstruction ahead 
of schedule. It utilised opportunities like this to demonstrate its commitment and 
effectiveness. Therefore, civil society would find little breathing space in these government 
                                                 
74 This counted for about a quarter of the 4 trillion Yuan stimulus package announced in late 2008 when the 
effect of the global financial crisis on China became apparent.  
75 Interview with the leader of an alumni group which contributed funds and supplies to the affected area.  
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showcases. The Party sought a monopoly on its perceived credentials from the people, and 
it would simply not allow civil society to get involved substantively in reconstruction.  
 
5.5.2 The School Collapse Scandal 
 
Another contested issue relating to the government’s containment of civil society was the 
shoddy school scandal; it was another piece of evidence that the Party was concerned more 
about its own image than justice if confronted with the dilemma of promoting both. 
According to official statistics, as many as 5,335 students lost their lives or were missing in 
the earthquake in Sichuan province alone (Xinhua, 2009e). Such a high death toll of 
students raised the question about corruption – a possibility that the central authorities at 
the beginning did not rule out. In fact, the answer was straightforward – these schools all 
collapsed, whereas most nearby government and commercial buildings stood, suggesting 
that there must have been malpractice in enforcing building standards if not outright 
corruption. In response to the scepticism, the central government ordered an investigation 
as early as May 2008, but their conclusion was questionable – they found no evidence of 
cutting corners but attributed school collapse mainly to poor design and engineering, and 
asserted the collapse was ‘inevitable’ (Xinhua, 2009e). Note that the crackdown on cutting 
corners in school construction could have been a high profile case that demonstrated a 
government commitment to fighting corruption, and that the government did so in the 
Jiang-Zhu era when newly finished dams and bridges suddenly collapsed. But this time the 
scale of the problem in Sichuan was too big – some 7,000 classrooms crumbled. Sichuan’s 
provincial government would have looked very embarrassed if such a campaign was 
launched. Similarly, the central government could not bear the high political costs 
associated with admitting such widespread corruption. In addition, the final report of the 
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investigation was released in May 2009, close to the 20th anniversary of Tiananmen. Even 
if severe problems were found during the investigation, they were likely to be covered up 
in the belief that any indication of corruption in the report would spark political disorder in 
the run up to a sensitive anniversary.  
In addition, the way the government dealt with angry parents – many of whom lost 
their only child because of shoddy school construction – was confronted by fierce criticism. 
It questioned the government’s sincerity regarding its asserted principle of ‘putting people 
first’ and confirmed the above discussion that the state’s control mentality would be 
inflated by any civil society movement that appeared to challenge the state. For example, 
parents who gathered to protest and demand justice were surrounded by police and 
discouraged from making such appeals (BBC, 2008b). Those who did get involved in 
helping grieving parents faced considerable personal risk. Journalists were also removed 
from the scene. Even worse, those who conducted independent investigations into the 
school construction scandal were deemed to be directly challenging the state. Rights 
activist Tan Zuoren and university professor Guo Quan were sentenced to 5 years and 10 
years in prison respectively for subverting the state. The crackdown appeared to be very 
heavy-handed because in most cases the state would not normally jail university academics.  
Grieving parents were eventually offered financial compensation for their lost 
children and the central government took measures to ensure the quality of school 
constructions, using ‘double the usual amount of steel at five times the cost of a normal 
building’ (China Daily, 2009a). Nevertheless, such issues could have been  good examples 
where civil society could play an important intermediation role as well as providing policy 
inputs if the state were to encourage participation, which was exactly the case in Taiwan 
after the 921 earthquake (Roney, 2011). But the fact that the Chinese state bypassed any 
intermediation and chose to deal directly with the parents – and make decisions alone with 
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little contribution from civil society – showed the state’s continued desire for control and 
political hegemony. It disliked any intermediation mechanism (however apolitical or 
unthreatening) that could potentially increase the bargaining power of ordinary people. It 
was also reluctant to institutionalise civic participation found in the initial relief effort, but 





After a critical, detailed analysis on the politics of the Sichuan earthquake, the findings 
have been very mixed. On the one hand, broad progress was made in terms of transparency 
and openness, where previous crisis management paradigms of opaqueness and stressing 
self-reliance dramatically shifted to open communication and to accepting limited aid. 
They were the outcomes from previous crisis experiences, but more importantly, these 
changes ‘reflect the immense political and technological changes of the past 30 years, 
including the end of the Cold War, the institution of economic reforms, and the 
introduction of information technology’ (Roney, 2011:85), as well as the limited 
demonstration of the Party’s discourse on ‘putting people first’. In addition, the 
government also demonstrated its commitment to the people by shaking up the entire 
political system and allowing limited popular participation. All these changes served to 
enhance the Party’s legitimacy.  
However, most of these changes were not institutionalised for the benefit of better 
crisis management in the future, simply because without political reform these changes at 
the administrative level and the reformative momentum associated with these changes 
were unlikely to be sustained. As a result, government confidence faded as openness 
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turned out to expose more problems; there were strong evidence of the tendency towards 
the pre-quake status quo, mostly reflected in the government’s attitude toward civil society 
in reconstruction and the way the government dealt with grieving parents. It raised 
speculation that all the exciting progress found in the initial relief efforts was highly 
contingent on the specific political context of 2008 – the year of the Olympics. The 
Chinese state wanted to showcase before the world what China was and what it stood for, 
and also showcase before its own people where China stood in the world. It meant these 
changes were superficial and one-off; they were gone when the Olympics was over.  
In fact, even when the Olympics was still underway, the milk scandal crisis already 
began to unfold slowly; ironically, it was routinely covered up by the government for the 
sake of preserving China’s image. There was also a strong wave of political contraction 
shortly after the Olympics which lasted through the 20th anniversary of Tiananmen, the 
Xinjiang Riot in summer 2009, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, and the 
awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize Award to Liu Xiaobo. In many ways, the post-
earthquake level of political openness dropped to below its pre-earthquake level. The most 
apparent evidence lay in the 3-year anniversary of the quake, commemorated around May 
2011.    
In the run up to the anniversary, the Party propaganda machinery was operating at 
full strength to propagate achievements in the reconstruction projects. This propaganda 
campaign lasted for a month, with no criticism and no reflection but mostly praise of the 
Party. An anonymous professor I interviewed commented that ‘it was so ridiculous that the 
earthquake was just for a day, but the Party spent a whole month praising itself on what it 
has done in the reconstruction’. According to the theme of praising the Party, CCTV ran a 
commemorative performance called ‘The Chinese Miracle’. So far, the old reflex of 
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politicising crises peaked It was a backwards step towards the crisis management tactics 
‘manipulating a bad thing as if it is a good one’ – the usual practice of the Mao era.  
It was interesting to deconstruct the central theme of this performance as summarised 
by a Xinhua report: 
It warmly extolled the Chinese people under the determined leadership of the 
Central Committee with Comrade Hu Jintao as the general secretary … seized 
a great victory in earthquake relief and reconstruction … reflected the 
happiness of people in the affected area who now have a new life and that they 
praise: the Communist Party is good, socialism is good, reform and opening up 
is good, the great motherland is good, the People’s Army is good and people of 
all ethnics are good. (Xinhua, 2011e) 
 
Note that this rhetoric not only reflected the Party’s attempt to consolidate the status 
quo by reiterating the superiority of the current system in order to resist any significant 
political reform, but the Party went a step further by making a discursive ideational 
construction that linked achievements in the past with the leadership’s political preferences 
for the present and for the future. It echoed what we discussed above that there was often a 
‘tenuous relationship’ between the crisis itself and its proposed solution which rested on 
political elites’ preferences at the time (Thornton, 2009). For the author, ‘reform and 
opening up’ and ‘people of all ethnics’ were only remotely relevant to the quake relief, yet 
they were listed as part of the solution because the Party leadership wanted to garner 
support from reconstruction achievements to push for further market liberalisation, as well 
as continuing the contentious ethnic minority policies. It highlighted that the practice of 
politicising crises did not fundamentally change and suggested a higher level of 
manipulation that served multiple purposes.  
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The tainted milk incident was an international scandal exposing systematic problems with 
governance in China, shortly after the country hosted a highly successful Olympics. It 
highlighted the contradictory nature of China’s state capacity: the same government could 
pull off mega projects like the Olympics and sending men into space, but could not ensure 
even the most basic livelihood issue of food safety (Blecher, 2009). A closely related 
question asks what this tells us about crisis management, a crucial component of overall 
state capacity? Why could China marshal whatever it had in a short period of time 
following the Sichuan earthquake to undertake an internationally praised and timely 
rescue, but could do little either to prevent the milk scandal from unfolding or to avoid 
many more food scares afterwards? The milk scandal is therefore worth investigating in 
terms of its value in revealing the arguably contradictory nature of the CCP-style crisis 
management.  
Moreover, the milk scandal serves as a good reference point in relation to the 
SARS epidemic and the Sichuan earthquake. In many ways the milk scandal is similar to 
SARS. They were both covered up initially by local authorities until international pressure 
prompted drastic and decisive responses from the central government. But they were also 
different in that SARS was largely a one-off crisis, whereas the milk scandal is a part of an 
ongoing product safety crisis with ‘Made in China’ goods which has not yet ended. 
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Likewise, there is much comparability between the milk scandal and the Sichuan 
earthquake. Given the timing that the two crises took place one after another, it was easy to 
tell whether the political space – which briefly opened following the earthquake – has been 
extended into the government’s handling of the milk scandal; or, to be more precise, 
whether the transparency, openness and accountability yielded in the earthquake have been 
institutionalised and found in the government’s managing of the milk scandal. These 
similarities as well as differences will then help us to reflect back on initial findings 
regarding the CCP’s crisis management. The choice of the milk scandal as the final case 
study will thus enhance the explanatory power of our findings regarding the strength, 
weakness and sustainability of the CCP’s crisis management.  
 
6.2 The Tainted Milk 
 
Food safety issues have beset both developing and developed countries from time to time 
as a result of the intensified integration of the global food production chain. What made the 
milk scandal all the more inexcusable was that, rather than being a result of loose quality 
control (as is the case with most food safety issues), the tainted milk was caused by 
deliberate poisoning. Chinese-made milk and powdered infant formula were laced with 
melamine, a chemical commonly used in plastic production and the addition of which into 
food is prohibited worldwide. The adulteration was made in order to increase the apparent 
protein content of inferior milk when tested (WHO, 2008). According to the Chinese 
government, 30 million children have drunk tainted milk, out of which almost 300,000 fell 
ill and 6 died (Guardian, 2008; Xinhua, 2010c).  
Warning signs emerged as early as March 2008 when the Sanlu group, the principal 
culprit in the milk scandal, received complaints about babies who had consumed their milk 
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falling ill; and yet the company neither reported it to the health authorities nor made an 
official recall. As complaints surged – and it was found that melamine was added into 
inferior raw milk by farmers for the purpose of fooling testing devices so that their milk 
would appear to be protein rich, and thus sold at a better price – the company in early 
August 2008 reported the contamination to the Shijiazhuang city government where it was 
based, and only made a trade recall (an internal recall which was only known to the 
retailers but not to the consumers) to avoid bad publicity (Sina.com, 2008d). The 
Shijiazhuang government, however, concealed the scandal for over a month whilst 
ignoring the urge for an official product recall from Fonterra, a New Zealand dairy giant 
which owned a 43% stake in Sanlu’s. Fonterra then referred the case to the New Zealand 
government which eventually bypassed local governments in China and alerted Beijing 
directly regarding the incident on 8 September 2008 (BBC, 2008e).  
The Chinese central government stepped in after the crisis became international. It 
treated the scandal seriously and ordered an overhaul of the country’s dairy industry, but 
the scale of the problem turned out to be grave after the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ) tested 491 sample batches of products 
from all 109 baby milk producers. The result showed that along with Sanlu, 21 other major 
producers also produced melamine-laced baby milk of various levels of contamination. 
Sanlu’s product contained the highest level of contamination: 2,563 mg/kg of melamine 
was found, which was more than 135 times higher than the Tolerable Daily Limit for a 
child weighing 30 kg (Xinhua, 2008p; Zhao and Lim, 2008). Consumer confidence in 
domestic dairy producers crumbled and people turned to foreign brands and other milk 
substitutes. Many mothers who lost faith in the safety of milk turned to breastfeeding their 
babies (Global times, 2011).  
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This finding of rampant adulteration in milk products triggered waves of 
international panic, as more countries seized contaminated food from China or products 
which used ingredients from China. At least 27 countries in Africa, Asia and Europe either 
banned the import of Chinese milk products or recalled such products (Reuters, 2008b). 
The WHO said it was one of the largest food safety incidents with which it had had to deal 
in recent years (VOA, 2008b). The scandal tarnished China’s slightly improved image – 
which had been gathered in the Sichuan earthquake and the Olympics – as the international 
community questioned whether China had really become more open as a result of the 
Games.  
 
6.3 The Root Causes of the Problem 
 
6.3.1 Economic Causes 
 
The milk scandal was first and foremost a systematic crisis rather than an industrial one. 
Nevertheless, the economic motives that led to political wrongdoing afterwards should not 
be downplayed. If we could somehow decompose the milk scandal into two phases – 
adulteration and the subsequent cover up – then clearly the cause of the problem with 
adulteration alone had a lot to do with economic factors at corporate and industrial levels. 
Through a comparative lens, evidence from the rapidly industrialising, 19th century Britain, 
revealed that economic factors were as important as regulatory and scientific factors in 
ensuring food safety (Collins, 1993).  
The milk scandal occurred against a backdrop in which China’s dairy industry 
soared in the past decade. This was the result of: changing consumer preference as Chinese 
people enjoyed higher standards of living; the government’s active promotion in 
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developing the dairy industry; and the availability of more marketing channels (Fuller et al, 
2006). Total dairy production jumped nearly fivefold, from about 14 million tonnes in 
2000 to more than 70 million tonnes in 2007. Annual consumption in per capita terms also 
increased nearly fourfold, from 7kg in 2000 to about 27kg in 2007 (Zhao and Lim, 2010). 
It only took the Chinese dairy industry fewer than ten years to achieve what their western 
counterparts spent decades developing, but what came with this extraordinary growth was 
also great risk (Qian et al, 2011), as was the case with other cheap ‘Made in China’ goods.  
Owing to booming demand on the one hand, and fierce competition among dairy 
firms for raw milk supply on the other, the quality control of raw milk was compromised. 
In the years prior to the scandal, most domestic dairy firms had focused on wrestling for a 
larger market share instead of farm management (Qian et al, 2011). These firms only 
owned a small number of milk farms and sourced most of their supply of raw milk from 
private milk stations, the majority of which had no licence (Qian et al, 2011). These milk 
stations were also in tough competition with each other because there were so many of 
them, a result of the government promoting the local animal husbandry industry (Zhao and 
Lim, 2010). The pressure and incentive to reduce costs, along with the fact that dairy firms 
had no direct control over raw milk quality, created much room for cutting corners. Adding 
melamine into watered down or inferior milk, and feeding cows with cheap feeds bulked 
up with melamine, thus became an open secret between milk dealers and farmers (The 
Telegraph, 2008). In addition, the price cap placed by the government on staple food, 
including milk products in early 2008, exacerbated the problem (Zhao and Lim, 2010).  
The dairy firms were equally guilty. Owing to the focus on market share, they 
accepted whatever raw milk was available, regardless of what was being added, even if the 
milk did not pass their own test (The Telegraph, 2008). The cost pressure on producing 
affordable milk products for less wealthy regions forced dairy firms into using all sorts of 
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corner-cutting measures in production. For example, the milk scandal first emerged in July 
2008 in Gansu province, a hinterland region, where babies were diagnosed to have kidney 
stones after consuming Sanlu’s cheap formula for the rural market which was sold for only 
¥18, half the price of the equivalent on the market.   
The milk scandal revealed the prevailing norm of business conduct, the ‘law of 
jungle’, in China’s rapacious, capitalist economy, and revealed a race to the bottom in 
terms of product safety and business ethics. A WHO official described it as ‘a large scale 
intentional activity to deceive consumers for simple, basic, short-term profits’ (VOA, 
2008b).  
 
6.3.2 Political and Systematic Causes 
 
Wilson (2008) drew similarities between the melamine milk scandal in China in 2008 and 
the ‘swill milk’ scandal in the US in the 1850s in which some 8,000 reportedly died after 
drinking watered down milk adulterated with plaster of Paris, starch, eggs and molasses. 
He indicated that scandals like these were not just about the lust for money, but a failure of 
politics with respective governments which were unable or unwilling to regulate food 
quality (Wilson, 2008).  
In the Chinese case, when taking into account the developmental role of the 
government in the economy, and the absence of substantive checks and balances, the Sanlu 
scandal exposed nothing less than a systemic crisis.  
 
I. GDPism and the Race to the Bottom 
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The systemic failure should first be attributed to the local government’s exclusive focus on 
economic growth in the form of GDPism. As mentioned above, tough competition could 
be traced to government policies. For Hebei province where Sanlu was based, Hebei had a 
comparative advantage in the dairy and husbandry industry because of a suitable climate 
and good availability of farmland (Zhao and Lim, 2010). Since leader performance was 
largely assessed on GDP growth, Hebei had been putting great efforts into developing its 
dairy and husbandry industry by attracting investment. For example, Hebei had been very 
open to local as well as non-local dairy firms, and allowed dairy giants such as Yili and 
Mengniu, both headquartered in Inner Mongolia, to operate locally in Hebei (Zhao and 
Lim, 2010). The local market was gradually saturated as these domestic producers were 
concentrated on the lower end or budget segment of the market (Reuters, 2008c). As a 
survival strategy, they undercut each other on price. Dairy farmers who supplied mainly to 
these firms were disadvantaged as a result of price cuts because they already had the 
lowest profit margin in the entire production chain (Qian et al, 2011).  
While developing the local economy was entirely justified and, in principle, 
creating competition was good for consumers, local governments deserved the blame for 
their laissez-faire policies. Their policies favoured capital investment, whilst neglecting the 
interests of dairy farmers and the ecological consequences of an over-expanded husbandry 
industry. In the process, local governments reaped decent GDP figures and abundant tax 
revenues (Liu and Wang, 2010). However, they failed to establish a sound institution for 
quality inspections and fair competition, without which the market was more likely to 
favour a culture of ‘race to the bottom’ or ‘pitting one against another’. This was especially 
true for the budget segment of the dairy industry in which added value was low owing to a 
lack of innovation.  
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II. Regulatory Capture 
 
Furthermore, GAQSIQ’s policy of inspection exemption effectively relieved local 
governments from supervising famous brands such as Sanlu. According to the regulation,  
Products whose quality have been stable for long, whose market share is high, 
whose producer’s own quality standards meet or surpass national standards and 
have passed GAQSIQ or its provincial branch’s quality test for more than three 
consecutive times may be determined as products exempt from inspection … 
they may use the ‘exempt from inspection’ sign and be exempt from various 
inspections by various agencies for a certain period … whenever they are 
found to have quality problems, their ‘exempt from inspection’ status will be 
deprived and their producers severely punished according to relevant laws. 
(State Council, 1999) 
 
This regulation was initially designed to enable trusted firms to resist local 
government’s rent-seeking in the name of market inspections76. It was the product of the 
Jiang-Zhu era when market deregulation and liberalisation had been prevalent. Proponents 
of this exemption policy contended that these measures improved administrative efficiency 
in that the government could devote its limited inspection resources to products that were 
nevertheless not listed as exemptions. Furthermore, it was stipulated clearly in the 
regulation that trusted products were only exempt from inspection for ‘a certain period’, 
usually a period of three years; this therefore lowered the frequency of inspections, but did 
not abolish them (Shen, 2009). The exemption policy was welcomed by firms whose 
products enjoyed an exemption status. Policy feedback in 2006 showed that these firms 
saw large increases in sales, market share and exports after the exemption policy came into 
effect (Shen, 2009).  
The policy had a palpable pro-capital tinge. Those exempt from inspection products 
were mostly produced by large enterprises, a category of business which the exemption 
                                                 
76 Before the regulation on inspection exemption was enacted, local governments had used product quality 
inspections as opportunities for rent-seeking. For example, they awarded the trusted brand privilege to 
companies which paid them a lot of money. Or, in the case of local protectionism, local governments might 
endorse local brands regardless of the quality inspection results.  
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policy was supposed to support. By 2006, the inspection exemption comprised 105 
categories of products produced by 2,152 major firms, and these products covered almost 
every aspect of daily life (Xinhua, 2006d). It was questionable whether exemptions on 
such a large scale involved ‘regulatory capture’ (Bhatta, 2006), as GAQSIQ established in 
order to protect consumers against unsafe products turned out to serve industrial interests 
through loosening control, and the benefits of such exemptions were concentrated in the 
hands of a few producers, whereas the huge potential risks associated with product 
inspection exemptions were widely dispersed among individual consumers.  
But what was almost certain was that such exemptions created ample room for rent-
seeking on the part of GAQSIQ, as firms were eager to pursue the exempt status for their 
products. Provided that GAQSIQ was the only legitimate agency to determine such a 
status, it had a great incentive to maintain and expand the system. Although in principle 
exempt products would still be subject to random checks, and their exempt status would be 
challenged if consumers lodged complaints, in practice cases of disqualification had been 
rare. First, since random checks conducted by the national GAQSIQ were the only 
legitimate ones, they would miss out a lot of unsafe products because the national agency 
only had limited resources. Second, since the lists of exempt products were enacted by 
GAQSIQ at the provincial level and above, local GAQSIQ offices at the city level and 
below had no incentive to challenge products on the safe lists which were endorsed by 
agencies at a higher level, even if sporadic complaints were received. In addition, given 
that collective actions among Chinese consumers had been rare and discouraged, the 
exemption policy effectively covered up many product quality issues in the course of its 
validity.  
From a somewhat conspiratorial perspective, the exemption emboldened firms to 
produce unsafe products for a maximum of three years – the period of governance vacuum 
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between when the exemption was granted and the renewal of such a status three years later, 
was nothing less than an ‘invitation to swindling’ (Wilson, 2008). In fact, the Sanlu story 
suggested that this inference was entirely logical – the company’s milk powder was 
granted an exemption from inspection status in 2003 and that was renewed in 2006 
(Beijing News, 2008). However, its products were seized in a milk scandal broke out in 
Anhui province in 2004 because of their inferior quality (Nanfang Daily, 2008b), and 
quality issues resurged in 2008 on a much larger scale and in greater seriousness. Both 
scandals took place soon after the exemption was granted. The exemption policy did little 
to improve product safety but allowed quality issues to surface one after another.  
Moreover, GAQSIQ did what a ‘small government’ (a popular idea with the Jiang–
Zhu administration) should not get involved – active market intervention through 
promotion of some products over others. This was not just about economic justice, but the 
politics of government credibility. In China, where both the consumers’ awareness about 
the right to information and the development of consumer interest groups were weak, the 
government-endorsed list of exemptions amounted to outright official recommendations to 
consumers (Shen, 2009). The political risk of doing this was enormous as these 
recommendations were so partial in the context of information asymmetry. Once any of the 
endorsed firms were caught for misconduct, the government that backed them was also 
faced with formidable pressure and would see its credibility tarnished as much as that of 
bad businesses. In the 2008 milk scandal, seven major domestic dairy firms, including the 
national top three – Sanlu, Yili and Mengniu – were all on the safe list but were all caught 
for adding melamine. The millions who consumed these products would surely point their 
fingers at the government in addition to these producers. The central government was 
virtually kidnapped by these bad businesses and GAQSIQ’s hands-off policies. The 
scandal was an utter government failure (Zhao and Lim, 2010).  
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III. Fragmented Authoritarianism 
 
The situation with exempt brands had been grave, but what about those smaller firms 
which were not exempt from inspection, and, in theory, were constantly on the monitoring 
radar? GAQSIQ’s quality test after the scandal broke out revealed that they were equally, 
if not more, problematic. Out of the 22 firms caught for adding melamine, 15 of them did 
not belong to the exempt category. It was certain that the problem was industry wide, 
rather than just being with those with or without exempt status. The state council blamed 
the industry for its ‘chaotic order’ and its regulator whose supervision had been ‘gravely 
absent’ (The Australian, 2008). It was largely the result of a fragmented legal framework 
and institutional design for regulating food safety, regardless of whether the products were 
exempt from inspection or not.  
China had no single, all encompassing act regarding food safety until the Food 
Safety Law of the PRC came into effect in June 2009. As a good demonstration of a 
fragmented regulatory system, before the 2008 milk scandal China’s legal framework for 
food safety comprised nearly 20 laws, 40 administrative provisions, 150 sector rules and 
regulatory documents in effect which were formulated by different government agencies at 
different times (Chen, 2009). The regulatory regime seemed extensive, but it was deeply 
defective since many of the regulations were either outmoded or confusing. Some crucial 
areas were even not regulated at all. For instance, milk collection centres, which only 
began to operate recently as a new link in the production chain, were not regulated before 
the milk scandal (Zhao and Lim, 2010). 
The regime of standardisation also lagged behind rapid development. The testing of 
melamine for milk products was not included in any Chinese national standards until 
October 2008, despite an earlier food safety crisis which occurred in 2007 in which the 
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same chemical was found in Chinese export pet food that killed many American pets 
(Washington Post, 2007).   
The punishment for the violation of food safety regulations was also minimal 
compared to the huge potential for illegal gains, giving no deterrence to malpractice. In 
addition, China operated a double standard system of food quality control. Foods for 
export were governed by a different set of regulations, separated from domestic food 
products, with the export standard significantly more stringent than the domestic one.  
The enforcement of the above legal framework was also fragmented and complex 
since there were more than a dozen government agencies involved in food safety 
supervision and the coordination among them was poor. The Chinese government 
regulated the food industry according to a principle of supervision by segment – i.e. from 
production to consumption, food safety supervision was divided into a series of interlinked 
segments with each government agency responsible for its own segment. For example, the 
Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for supervising the production of primary 
agricultural products; GAQSIQ was assigned the supervision of food processing; the 
Industry and Commerce Administration supervised distribution related matters; the MOH 
supervised the food consumption segment, including the supervision of restaurants and 
canteens; and local governments were charged with the overall responsibility of 
supervising food safety in their jurisdictions (Gov.cn, 2004)77.  
In a modern society where the risk of food safety was scattered in all these 
segments, a single food safety issue may involve multiple agencies that, in China’s case, 
were reluctant to work together, but were used to adhering to their own practices. This 
cumbersome structure resulted in delays in dealing with food scares. For example, in the 
                                                 
77 This apparently clear-cut division of labour, however, was not always strictly followed. In areas with 
plenty of rent seeking potential, for example, the supervision of food processing, there were too many 
agencies trying to exert influence through various inspections (they charged a fee for every inspection 
undertaken) before GAQSIQ was designated to solely take charge of supervising food processing. This 
internal wrangling was an important source of poor food safety governance.  
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Sanlu scandal, consumers registered complaints on the GAQSIQ website’s bulletin board 
as early as June 2008, but GAQSIQ replied, ‘we have a deep concern about this and are 
now actively working on this along with other departments, but you should also inform the 
MOH about this’ (Nanfang Daily, 2008a). A MOH expert said that investigations like this 
involved a lot of coordination, so they did not release the findings of the investigation until 
September (three months after the first complaints), and they had already been ‘relatively 
quick’, from his point of view (Sina.com, 2008b). It was no coincidence that after every 
major food safety crisis the central government had to set up ad hoc LSGs to bring all 
agencies together in order to tackle the issue, and dispatch directives reiterating the 
division of labour among agencies and the importance of concerted efforts78. 
A single agency responsible for food safety, the State Food and Drug 
Administration, did exist from 2003. Although it was supposed to be responsible for 
‘comprehensive supervision and coordination’ on food safety and to ‘investigate and 
handle serious incidents according to the law’ (Gov.cn, 2004), its weak institutional status 
within the political system compared to other agencies had prevented it from fulfilling its 
designated duties, and rendered it marginal in monitoring the food industry. The 
Administration only had a ranking equivalent to sub-ministerial level in the government 
hierarchy; that was, half a level lower than full ministerial level agencies such as the MOH, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and GAQSIQ. In China’s bureaucratic politics where ranking 
mattered most, the State Food and Drug Administration’s junior ranking meant that it 
could not effectively coordinate efforts in which cooperation from other higher ranking 
agencies was needed. This was supported by evidence from the news coverage of the Sanlu 
scandal in which the Administration was rarely mentioned, and in which the MOH and 
GAQSIQ dominated the handling of this crisis.  
                                                 
78 See for example, The State Council Directive on Further Strengthening the Work on Food Safety, available 
at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-08/12/content_22130.htm 
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In China’s political system there have been continuing problems that crucial policy 
areas were governed by agencies with a very limited political capacity to regulate that area 
effectively. Food safety was only one example. Previously, the problem also existed with 
environmental protection. The problem was not partly relieved until the former, sub-
ministerial level State Environmental Protection Administration was promoted to become 
the ministerial level Ministry of Environmental Protection in 2008.   
The regulatory difficulty with food safety legislation and enforcement exposed the 
fact that existing political and administrative structures in the country were outpaced not 
only by the country’s extraordinary economic growth, but by the potential hazards that 
came as the side effect of such growth. The SARS crisis in 2003 had already alerted 
regulators in other policy areas, such as food safety, to keep their regulatory framework at 
pace with the development of risk. However, a major reshuffling had not been undertaken 
until the milk scandal broke out.  
 
IV. Local Protectionism and the Symbiotic Relations between Businesses and the 
Local Government 
 
The last cause of the Sanlu scandal had to do with the ‘local protective umbrella’ provided 
to Sanlu by the local government79. If we first looked at Sanlu's significance to the local 
political economy and its image as the pride of Shijiazhuang, we would understand why 
Shijiazhuang city government chose to shield Sanlu until the crisis was no longer 
concealable.  
                                                 
79 Local protective umbrella, or difang baohusan, refers to local governments giving privileged status to big 
local companies in order to boost the local economy. This often involves some government-business 
collusion in the forms of, e.g. discriminating against non-local competitors, or covering up the wrongdoings 
of local companies when they are investigated by superior government agencies.  
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Sanlu was important to Shijiazhuang both economically and symbolically. It had a 
glorious history from 1956 when it was established, and later became the first domestic 
milk powder producer in China (An Alex and An David, 2008). At the time of the milk 
scandal, Sanlu had around 4,000 employees, along with some 20,000 dairy farmers and 
50,000 peasants who regularly supplied to Sanlu. This was not a small number to 
Shijiazhuang, a city with a modest size economy (and had social stability implications, too, 
if Sanlu were to go bust). In addition, Sanlu ranked 7th among the 10 largest tax revenue 
contributors in Shijiazhuang. The first six of these were sector monopolies in high-energy 
consumption sectors such as steel and petroleum; only Sanlu was a real market player that 
had competitiveness. ‘It was the hope of Shijiazhuang’ (163 Blog, 2008). 
The local government’s reliance on large local businesses to provide employment 
and tax revenue could be attributed to the tax-sharing system introduced in 1994 which we 
discussed in Chapter 3. The system was praised for having strengthened the fiscal 
extractive capacity of the central state which allowed it to rebalance regional 
developmental discrepancies and implement mega projects one after another that were 
unimaginable in the past, such as the Three Gorges Dam and the nationwide high-speed 
railway network. However, it also led to a discrepancy between spending obligations and 
available fiscal resources for many local governments – i.e. the central government, which 
was not directly involved in the provision of most public services, collected too much from 
provinces which were obliged to provide such services. As a result, local governments, 
especially those at or below the city level, were hard pressed to fund a spiralling budget of 
basic education, healthcare, housing, etc., out of limited finances80. This forced them to 
exploit every major fundraising opportunity just to fulfil basic government functions. It 
explained the motivation of local governments in enthusiastically promoting the real estate 
                                                 
80 This problem has been worsened by rapid urbanisation through which millions of rural migrants are 
coming to work in the cities, thus putting extra pressure on the local public expenditure.  
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sector as well as giving disproportionate (and sometimes discriminatory) support to 
businesses such as Sanlu. 
Other than the fiscal motives of local governments, local officials had firm personal 
interests in supporting big businesses. As previously mentioned, the combination of 
GDPism and economic growth as the key indicators when assessing leaders’ performance 
could explain much of the dynamics of the local political economy. Local leaders with a 
strong sense of careerism were keen to get heavily involved with the developmental 
strategies of big businesses, in that as the business grew in influence, so did the leader’s 
publicity. Flourishing businesses, an indication of a healthy local economy, could be 
counted as an important track record of performance, or zhengji, when it came to 
promotion decisions. The local state’s developmental role was thus played to the full and 
even stretched by its officials. It came as no surprise that from the Jiang era, most of the 
local officials had a packed schedule of meeting executives from local, national and 
foreign companies to persuade them to operate locally and invest more. This undue 
mercantilism even resulted in a race to the bottom on labour standards among localities 
(Chan, 2003), whose leaders were eager to beat competitors in the race to higher posts. 
On the other hand, local officials benefited a great deal from the close link with 
businesses by rent-seeking. These businesses purposely came to a specific locality in 
pursuit of cheap land, labour or easy access to the local market and to loans from local 
banks. This created a favourable condition for crony capitalism as local power holders 
often had a dominating say in deciding these factors of production demanded by the 
businesses As a result, local leaders were often invited to become ‘silent partners’ in large 
businesses so as to symbolise a ‘protective umbrella’ they offered to businesses (Lam, 
2008). This protective umbrella would secure access to resources, but more importantly, 
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would prevent lower-level officials from disrupting the day to day operation of the 
business in the form of outright extortion, such as collecting arbitrary fees81.  
The demand for and supply of rent was one of the most important sources of 
widespread official corruption. Superficially, it kept the economy going, as exemplified by 
crony relations between government and business in other Southeast Asian economies and 
South Korea. However, this symbiotic formation between the local government and the 
large business, with local officials acting as the nexus caught up between various interests, 
was detrimental to government credibility and even Party legitimacy, once exposed. 
The Sanlu scandal exemplified the above discussion. On the one hand, Sanlu meant 
a great deal to Shijiazhuang both economically and politically, as mentioned earlier. On the 
other hand, the local government gave it too much support. Sanlu not only secured 
preferential treatment in the form of various product quality awards (An Alex and An 
David, 2008), but enjoyed much political privilege. The company’s chairwomen, Tian 
Wenhua, was honoured as a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, the country’s highest political advisory body, and she was said to be on 
‘comradely terms’ with Shijiazhuang officials (Lam, 2008)82.  
Moreover, Sanlu had been able to mobilise local and provincial political 
connections to cleanse bad publicity or even cover up its wrongdoings. For example, in an 
earlier milk scandal in 2004 that broke out in Fuyang, Anhui province, a number of dairy 
producers were believed to have produced inferior milk that made many babies ill. Sanlu’s 
products were among those seized, but it successfully lobbied the Hebei provincial 
government to appeal to the State Council against the decision to take all Sanlu’s products 
                                                 
81 It is a common and very popular practice for entrepreneurs to hang enlarged photos they took with notable 
leaders in order to symbolise good government–business relations they are enjoying and to deter lower level 
officials from extorting bribes from them. 
82 Sanlu had been a joint venture since 2006, with the New Zealand dairy giant Fonterra owning a 43% 
shares. But Sanlu still secured such government support in the crisis – circumstantial evidence which 
suggested that local governments would normally support any big businesses (not just SOEs) regardless of 
their ownership types as long as they were important to the local economy.  
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off the shelves. In particular, it lobbied the General Office of the Hebei provincial 
government to send an urgent ‘Provincial Governor’s Special Remark’ to the State 
Council, which subsequently resulted in the decision being revoked. Ironically, this case 
was widely cited as an excellent example of utilising political resources to manage public 
relations crises by various MBA training materials83. The popularity of these materials 
suggested worrying, intimate government-business relations because they revealed that 
local governments would rather use urgent and extraordinary measures to uphold business 
interests instead of public interests84.  
Perhaps the success in managing the 2004 crisis emboldened Sanlu further, as when 
more and more kidney-stone cases surfaced, Sanlu asked Shijiazhuang government to 
tighten media control so as to preserve social stability (Southern Weekly, 2009a). It came 
as no surprise that after the exposure of the 2008 scandal, one Shijiazhuang senior official 
admitted that the government had been ‘too considerate for Sanlu’ (Xinhua, 2008h).  
As previously argued, whenever the government played excessive and 
inappropriate roles in business, it had to bear the political consequences of business 
malpractice. As such, the Sanlu scandal was a bitter fruit of this interlocking of business, 
governmental and officials’ personal interests.  
 
6.4 State Control of Information in the Sanlu Scandal 
 
The above section has explained the motives behind the crony interaction between 
government and business, and why local governments could not effectively resist business 
                                                 
83  For example, see ‘Uncover Sanlu’s Crisis Management in Fuyang’, at 
http://www.chinatet.com/html/22_126/2008_3_14_su02712514138002564.htm 
84 In this case, public interests were actually infringed because consumers would get confused by the U-turn 
of the regulator’s decision. In other cases, emergencies that directly affected public interests were often 
reported with some delay. So this difference in terms of promptness implied the low priority of public 
interests in the minds of local officials. 
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influence in exercising governmental power. This section is going to analyse how state 
control of information has been infiltrated by business to serve both Party and business 
interests. In the case of the milk scandal, our analysis will look at how capital played a 
disreputable role in government crisis management and crisis manipulation. Or, to be more 
precise, how capital colluded with the state to deprive people of their right to crucial health 
information. This was different from and more complex than SARS where only the state 
manipulated information. So, as we will see in the milk scandal, there was a new player, 
namely the corporate sector involved in intercepting information that should be made 
available to the public. The influence which businesses could exert on the media was less 
visible than governmental influence, but more subtle than the latter because these 
businesses were not subject to virtually any public scrutiny. In short, an understanding of 
state control of information was inadequate or even misleading without analysing the huge 
corporate interests involved. 
 
6.4.1 The Immediate Discourse 
 
It came as a surprise that a company like Sanlu could be involved in a scandal of this scale 
because of its noble reputation in the dairy industry. Nevertheless, revelations after the 
milk scandal suggested that much of its highly-regarded reputation was ‘bought’ from the 
media through public relations campaigns. Sanlu was a veteran at media public relations, 
and as early as 2004 in an aforementioned milk scandal, Sanlu put a lot of efforts in buying 
off media. According to another report boasting about Sanlu’s effective crisis management, 
‘we used our extensive media connections to launch a public relations campaign …within 
one day, we informed 93 media outlets, and 19 of them removed Sanlu from the list of 
inferior milk. At the same time, the company wrote more than 10 news reports and 
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published them in more than 20 authoritative newspapers … the campaign peaked when 
CCTV clarified things for us’ (Gao, 2005).  
Given its track record in utilising the media for business interests, other examples 
of its collusion with the media seemed entirely natural. More ironically, members of the 
public found that in September 2007 (about three months before the problem appeared), 
CCTV produced a ‘Weekly Quality Report’ dedicated to praising the superior quality of 
Sanlu, in which Sanlu milk was proclaimed to have passed more than 1,100 quality tests 
before being sold, and that Sanlu exemplified that ‘“Made in China” doesn't just mean 
affordable or good value for money, but represents safe, superior quality and reliability’ 
(CCTV, 2007). Equally ironic was that Sanlu’s ‘New Generation Infant Formula’ was even 
awarded the National Science and Technology Progress Award, a prominent award that for 
the first time was honoured to a dairy company. Numerous media reports and interviews 
with Sanlu’s management were published. Moreover, the press release about an award that 
Sanlu won, ‘30 Years: Brands that Have Changed the Lives of Chinese’, appeared on the 
People’s Net and that piece was actually written and supplied by Sanlu itself (Wall Street 
Journal, 2008).  
Readers might have noticed that media outlets with nationwide coverage, such as 
CCTV and the People’s Net, were involved in the collusion. This was an indication of how 
powerful the influence of business interests was in that they even infiltrated the Party’s 
most prominent mouthpiece. These two outlets relied much less on commercial earnings 
compared to local metropolitan papers, and were thought to be less susceptible to business 
influence, but unfortunately facts proved otherwise. More importantly, many Chinese 
people still regarded what the People’s Daily or CCTV published as authoritative. This 
attitude might be especially relevant given that Sanlu was a budget segment leader, and 
that many of its customers lived in the countryside.  
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We have reiterated in previous chapters that popular opinion regarding the 
legitimacy of central and local governments did vary; the former was thought to be far 
more legitimate than the latter. To a lesser extent, this distinction in perception also existed 
regarding the relative credibility of central and local media. Although ordinary people 
might disregard what was said about politics in both central and local media, they 
nonetheless regarded information – such as outcomes of product quality tests – as useful 
guidance, in the belief that information given by central media should be more objective 
and impartial given the fact that central media represented the state. If true, the political 
fallout of the Sanlu scandal would be immense because many people who believed the 
instrumental usefulness of central media for everyday life would suspect the legitimacy of 
this mouthpiece, and ultimately that of the state, as the collusive relations between 
businesses and central media were too difficult to be ignored. As a result, people with such 
perceptions would start to question whether Party rule was based on client interests rather 
than the common good. Worse still, if people lost faith in state media, mass persuasion  – 
which I pointed out in Chapter 3 as the most commonly-used means of social control to 
ensure the Party’s legitimacy – would be less and less effective and thus shake the 
cornerstone of regime legitimacy in the long term.  
As mentioned previously, the Sanlu scandal was worth investigating owing to the 
involvement of the corporate sector, which differed this case from SARS. When it came to 
discussing the collusion between Sanlu and Baidu, China’s most used search engine, one 
should bear in mind that wide media censorship could have happened without direct state 
involvement 85 . This new ‘model’ of collusion suggested that media censorship in 
authoritarian China was becoming more prevalent and decentralised.  
                                                 
85 This was true at least in terms of ownership. Unlike state television and newspaper which were Party 
propaganda outlets, Baidu was a purely private company and was not situated within the propaganda 
apparatus.  
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Teller International, a public relations agent employed by Sanlu, reportedly advised 
Sanlu to pay ¥3 million to Baidu in order to ‘grasp the media discourse’. The proposal 
explained that ‘Baidu is a very important media [outlet] to buy off because its search 
engine is where consumers get information from … currently Mengniu, Yili, Huiyuan86 
and other companies are enjoying Baidu’s “publicity protection”…Baidu has agreed that 
Sanlu can pay for ¥3 million worth of advertisements to enjoy the privilege of getting all 
negative news deleted at an early stage’ (Sina.com, 2008a). The proposal also revealed that 
Sanlu was already in ‘strong cooperation’ with Sina and Sohu, China’s most visited 
websites, in that neither website would publish any negative news concerning Sanlu until 
the end of 2008, except when state agencies released important news that might involve 
Sanlu (Sina.com, 2008a). 
Baidu firmly denied the allegation that it accepted such a proposal, but it confirmed 
that its staff were contacted twice in this regard (Sina.com, 2008a). Although there was no 
concrete evidence suggesting Baidu had grant the so called ‘publicity protection’ status to 
Sanlu, the leaked proposal nevertheless uncovered the industry-wide deceptive practice 
behind which businesses often had a hand. It pointed out a concern that the Chinese people 
were increasingly subject to manipulation by both the state and the business, and had not 
enjoyed more freedom of information as a result of media and Internet commercialisation.  
The explanation for this persistent deception lay in the fact that ‘There is a close 
connection between the government, private sector and media, with the Party’s interests 
dominating all three’ (An Alex and An David, 2008). Apparently, the state did not even 
issue a single directive to any of the websites concerned. However, this by no means 
suggested that the state was completely innocent. In fact, the much reduced empowerment 
                                                 
86 They were all Sanlu’s competitors. 
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role of the Internet in China, i.e. the supposed but unrealised usefulness of the Internet to 
expose scandals such as the Sanlu one, should be precisely ascribed to the state policy. 
First, although most of the popular websites in China were privately owned, the 
state regulated in detail and watched closely what should and should not appear. Key staff 
at each website were reportedly contacted frequently by various agencies in the 
propaganda apparatus in regard to what to delete, what (not) to highlight and what (not) to 
recommend to netizens. Lists of prohibited topics were dispatched on a routine basis. The 
aforementioned leaked document from a public relations agency also suggested that 
incidents such as the Sanlu scandal were among the taboo. The document read, ‘In the 
period when the Olympics is held, negative news such as food scares are suppressed by the 
government. For Sanlu, this is a favourable opportunity … Your company should seize this 
opportunity and seek cooperation with Baidu before this period ends’ (Sina.com, 2008a). 
In other words, although filtering Sanlu’s negative news violated the principle of 
transparency and impartiality, it conformed entirely to established state policies, an excuse 
often used by Internet companies operating in China when they were found to have 
assisted the government with repression87. Given Baidu’s track record of profiteering from 
deception88, it was therefore reasonable to speculate that, if the scandal was made public 
any later, Baidu would have probably accepted the offer of ¥3 million and have 
implemented the censorship even without directives from above. 
This gave rise to the second reason for the puzzle of the impeded empowerment of 
the Internet – namely, prevalent self-censorship deliberately induced by government 
policies. The government decided which major websites to support in terms of their 
willingness and contribution to filtering (so to some degree, state control of information 
                                                 
87 For example, Yahoo argued that it had no choice but to cooperate, according to Chinese laws, with the 
Chinese government when it requested Yahoo to supply the passwords of email accounts of dissidents. 
88 For example, Baidu was previously exposed by CCTV for ranking websites in search results according to 
how much money each website paid, and for filtering those websites which refused to pay, see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lWPoAI7DT4M&feature=related. 
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was ‘delegated’ to these websites) while paying little attention to their ethical business 
conduct. As a result, websites like Baidu which closely followed government guidance 
were supported, whereas websites like Google which claimed to ‘do no evil’ eventually 
had to withdraw their service from China (Yang, 2010). In other words, government 
policies served to eliminate competition, which allowed notorious but ‘obedient’ 
businesses such as Baidu to dominate. Moreover, the adverse effect of such discrimination 
went far beyond commerce, because over time all independent websites would be either 
forced out or blocked because of the Gresham's law, the so called ‘Bad money drives out 
good' 89 , leaving no alternative source of information for Chinese netizens, and thus 
creating a digital gap on authentic information. Manipulated Internet commercialisation 
therefore did not work in the interests of the people since such commercialisation 
ultimately served Party interests rather than people’s concerns.  
This lack of independent information explained why the Internet and media could 
not help consumers in China as much as consumers in liberal democracies. In the latter, it 
is common for interest groups and businesses to affect, control or even own media outlets; 
however, because of pluralism, which is a built-in feature of liberal democracies, it is 
impractical to buy off all the media, for example, for covering up a product safety issue. 
Media outlets not only perform checks and balances against the government and 
commercial interests, but also among each other. In this way, a relatively transparent and 
open public sphere as a whole is formed in terms of the availability of information, despite 
the fact that individual media outlets may not be objective or honest. In contrast, having 
said that in China Party interests dominate those of business and the media, it is easy for 
the business-controlled media to put a blanket ban on an issue such as product safety, 
especially when the Party also considers such issues sensitive. In this sense, media 
                                                 
89 Examples included Google, Youtube, Facebook, Twitter and some famous blog providers.  
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commercialisation serves to worsen the situation of information asymmetry because the 
people are manipulated by state propaganda as well as business. They are even more 
deprived in terms of consumer protection and the right to know. 
 
6.4.2 The Olympics and the Milk Scandal 
 
What was argued above on Party interests dominated everything could be best 
demonstrated by its attitude towards the milk scandal during and in the run up to the 
Olympics. In the last chapter on the Sichuan earthquake, we mentioned that during this 
period, the foreign media were given more freedom to report, an open gesture made by the 
Chinese government in order to present itself as a confident state that followed 
international norms. However, this new rule did not apply to the Chinese media as much as 
to their foreign counterparts, as in China the management of domestic and foreign media 
was in fact separately administered (Brady, 2008), and control over domestic media was 
largely not bound by China’s commitment to more media freedom It made to the 
international community. Instead of being given more freedom, the micro-management of 
domestic media was actually intensified most of the time, except for a brief period in the 
initial aftermath of the earthquake.  
Since 2006, Chinese domestic media were mobilised by the Party’s propaganda 
apparatus in a concerted effort to play up the Olympics theme, a deliberate ‘campaign of 
mass distraction’ which was aimed at boosting morale and pride among the people while 
distracting their attention away from various ongoing political, economic and social 
problems (Brady, 2009:1). Media outlets were instructed to downplay stories that were 
deemed potentially disruptive to a perfect Olympics, and in an editorial guidance allegedly 
dispatched by the propaganda department, the issue of food safety was listed as one of the 
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taboos (Sydney Morning Herald, 2008). With this media control at work, the Sanlu scandal 
was undoubtedly suppressed. Sanlu, as well as those government agencies responsible for 
the tragedy, seemed to have profited from this propaganda ban on bad news during the 
Olympics (Brady, 2009). The ban allowed both Sanlu and the local government in 
Shijiazhuang about six months to manoeuvre behind the scenes without causing trouble to 
the country’s mega showcasing; in the words of Helen Clark, the Prime Minister of New 
Zealand ‘[They were] to try and put a towel over it and deal with it without an official 
recall’(Forbes, 2008). 
There was one attempt to expose the scandal before the central government 
formally stepped in but it was suppressed because of the upcoming Olympics. In July, the 
Guangdong-based Southern Weekly ‘secretly’ investigated cases of babies falling ill after 
drinking Sanlu milk in Wuhan, but it was unable to publish the report owing to enormous 
pressure from the government which asked the media only to report positive news. There 
was not much that journalists could do apart from ‘tell parents around who have babies not 
to feed them with Sanlu’ (Fu, 2009). When the Olympics closed and before Sanlu admitted 
its guilt, there were a number of reports that established links between questionable milk 
and sick babies, but none of them dared to name Sanlu as the principal culprit, because of 
its powerful commercial influence and political clout (Fu, 2009).  
Even after the case was thoroughly exposed, the Party’s inclination to preserve its 
image still impeded the media from further investigating the issue in the fear that media 
efforts to speak for the parents might form an alternative, grassroots discourse that would 
challenge the official one propagated by the state. Non-state media were told not to publish 
their own stories but to carry only Xinhua’s news releases90, while state media deliberately 
tried to downplay it (they looked very embarrassed because they now had to rebuke the 
                                                 
90 It was a common practice that media outlets were only allowed to carry Xinhua’s release after major 
incidents.  
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business to which they had offered unconditional support just months previously). State 
media soon moved on to promoting the theme of China’s first space walk that was about to 
be staged91, another mass distraction campaign which they hoped would add extra flame to 
the Olympics pride and elicit support for the regime. After all this was completed, apart 
from official updates on the number of victims, and later the bankruptcy and sale of Sanlu, 
nothing else appeared in Chinese media. The incident soon faded from public discussion. 
 
 
6.5 The Political Utility of the Milk Scandal 
 
The leadership response to the crisis was prompt after the New Zealand government 
alerted Beijing directly through diplomatic channels, which made the scandal no longer 
concealable. The reaction was still a combination of three strategies: the centralisation of 
power, a paradigm shift, and reconnecting with the people, which conformed nicely to our 
generic model. However, instead of deliberately making use of the crisis politically, crisis 
management this time was clearly more focused on problem solving. Unlike SARS and the 
earthquake where external threats existed and against which mass mobilisation could be 
launched, the milk scandal arose entirely from internal failures of the system. In other 
words, the system itself might well become the target if crisis mobilisation was conducted 
without constraints. Unsurprisingly, as we shall see, the response to the milk scandal was a 
rather passive mode of crisis management, whereas for SARS and the earthquake a more 
active mode of crisis management was used. Put simply, because the milk scandal was so 
disgraceful, this time the leadership wanted to get away from this crisis as quickly as 
possible, and so the task of deriving political utility from it was rendered secondary.  
                                                 
91Ironically again, Sanlu was designated the official dairy supplier of China's space programme. 
 286
6.5.1 The Centralisation of Power 
 
Sanlu’s sudden change of attitude since early September might have been indicative that 
the central government was taking over the decentralised governance of product safety 
from local governments. A centralisation of medical and political resources was under 
way. On the evening of 11 September, when a State Council investigation team had been 
sent to Shijiazhuang the same day, Sanlu admitted that some of their products were 
contaminated by melamine and the company would recall all of them (Caijing, 2008). 
On 13 September, the State Council initiated a concerted effort of bringing together 
all agencies charged with food safety responsibilities. As was the case with previous major 
crises, a LSG was established to resolve the milk crisis. The MOH was designated to chair 
this group, which included GAQSIQ, the General Administration of Industry and 
Commerce, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Food and 
Drug Administration and the Hebei provincial government (Xinhua, 2008i). As a result of 
this power centralisation, information processing, decision making and implementation 
became more efficient because of better coordination and the central government was more 
capable of tackling the milk crisis, at least organisationally.  
Additionally, a series of institutional arrangements were made to centralise the state 
crisis management capacity. According to the Major National Food Safety Incident 
Contingency Plan enacted in 2006, a Class I (highest class, meaning ‘very serious 
incident’) response was launched (Xinhua, 2008x). Apart from the aforementioned central 
government LSG, every locality that had a significant number of tainted milk victims also 
set up a crisis management command centre as required by the Contingency Plan (AFP, 
2008a).  
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Meanwhile, GAQSIQ, the principal food quality regulating agency, was also 
centralising food quality control. It launched a nationwide milk quality check that covered 
not only milk processing but also raw milk collection. As mentioned in the introduction, 
most national brands were found to have produced melamine-contaminated milk. In face of 
this industry-wide crisis, GAQSIQ ordered producers to recall and destroy all tainted milk, 
and it supervised the removal of over 7,000 tonnes of contaminated milk products from 
shops nationwide in just two weeks (Bloomberg, 2008). It also mobilised its personnel and 
sent them to individual factories, supervising the whole production chain and ‘inspect 
every batch rigorously before they leave the factory’ (Xinhua, 2008i). As many as 150,000 
officials were mobilised, who inspected 98 dairy producers and farms, banned 151 illegal 
companies and caught three producers that produced melamine-contaminated animal feed 
(People’s Net, 2008b).  
The scandal was so serious that it caused humiliating damage to the government’s 
credibility. The government had to make a decisive gesture to restore its reputation and 
show enough state autonomy to punish those responsible. That was where the 
organisational and disciplinary shake up came in.  
As discussed earlier, a limited accountability system was established largely as a 
result of the SARS crisis in 2003 – when two ministerial ranking officials were removed 
from office, and with a more recent precedent in 2007, when the founding director of the 
State Food and Drug Administration, Zheng Xiaoyu, was executed for granting approval to 
unsafe medicines that resulted in several deaths (BBC, 2007), when it came to the milk 
scandal the scale of the clean house was no smaller. As soon as the scandal broke out, the 
vice mayor of Shijiazhuang who was managing food and agriculture, along with several 
other local officials in charge of food safety, were fired due to dereliction of duty (Xinhua, 
2008ab). As the investigation went on, the mayor of Shijiazhuang was also removed for 
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not reporting the incident according to established procedures and failing to activate food 
safety contingency plans in a timely fashion (Xinhua, 2009b). A clean house was also 
made in Sanlu: Tian Wenhua, the company’s chairwoman, was stripped of both her Party 
and functional posts and later received a life sentence (Xinhua, 2009c).  
The ‘accountability storm’ swept through more senior cadres when the State 
Council released its initial findings on the scandal. Li Changjiang, director of GAQSIQ 
and a ministerial ranking official, was forced to resign owing to GAQSIQ’s lack of 
supervision of the dairy industry (People’s Daily, 2008b). It was during Li’s tenure that 
GAQSIQ initiated the highly controversial ‘exempt from inspection’ policy which resulted 
in the chaotic order of the dairy industry; he was therefore deemed responsible. At the 
same time, Wu Xianguo, an alternative member of the CCP’s Central Committee, was also 
removed from his post as the Party chief of Shijiazhuang, for not reporting and for 
mishandling the crisis (People’s Daily, 2008b).  
Despite these high profile cases of punishment, however, the intra-Party 
accountability system and the way decisions were made were far from transparent since 
punishment measures varied considerably across similar incidents. For example, in a 
Shanxi mudslide which happened right after the milk scandal and killed more than 200 
people, the provincial governor of Shanxi, Meng Xuenong92, was forced to resign (Xinhua, 
2008ae). Previously, in April 2008, a train crash occurred in Shandong that claimed more 
than 70 lives. The Railway Minister Liu Zhijun received an administrative demerit from 
the State Council (Gov.cn, 2009b). In light of these precedents, the governor of Hebei 
province, Hu Chunhua, who was reportedly close to Hu Jintao, luckily remained intact and 
was even promoted to become Party chief of Inner Mongolia in 2009. These differences 
inevitably raised questions about the impartiality of the Party’s accountability system.  
                                                 
92 This was the second time that he took the blame for incidents occurred within his jurisdiction and was 
forced to resign. The first time was in 2003 when he resigned from his post as mayor of Beijing, for 
misreporting the severity of SARS.  
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6.5.2 Shifting the Dominating Paradigm 
 
As the CCP’s conventional crisis management proceeded, the disciplining and shaking up 
of the entire system was then accompanied by a paradigm shift. And by implication, the 
Party-state invited the people to identify all faults with the old paradigm as well as with 
those sacked officials. As such, the central government was in desperate need to show its 
concern for the safety of the people and to be seen by them as making a difference to the 
current governing structure and practice, not specifically to the dairy industry, but to food 
safety at large.  
The State Council launched an overhaul of the food safety regime. The policy of 
inspection exemption for food, to which a scandal on this scale was mostly ascribed, was 
abolished altogether. Food producers which were granted such privileges before were told 
not to cite them again to avoid misleading consumers further (Xinhua, 2008aa). In 
addition, the government promised to set up nearly 400 product testing centres within the 
next two years, of which 80 would be food testing centres with the latest equipment. 
Market intervention in favour of dairy farmers was also implemented to lower the cost of 
feeding cows (AFP, 2008a).  
Despite the immediate remedy, the central government also made considerable 
efforts to redress the food governing system in a more fundamental way so as to ensure 
lasting effects. As for the governing structure, the State Council established a Food Safety 
Commission in 2010, headed by the Deputy Premier Li Keqiang and included three out of 
four Vice Premiers, as well as 15 ministers from relevant departments (Xinhua, 2010d). 
The creation of this high-ranking commission was an attempt to make food safety a more 
pressing issue on the state agenda, and to normalise the concerted effort and stringent 
measures during the September 2008 high profile crackdown on food contamination. 
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Nonetheless, it was still uncertain how effective this overarching commission would be 
owing to its status as a deliberation and coordination body under the State Council, as 
opposed to a discrete and independent agency in its own right. Its strength lay in the 
political authority to bring together all relevant departments when facing a crisis, whereas 
its weakness lay in the fact that it did not have many resources at its disposal, but still had 
to rely upon the ministries for day to day supervision. In other words, this new commission 
might be adept at resolving food crises because of its centralising capacity, but much less 
so in preventing a crisis from (re)occurring.  
Like learning from crisis in SARS, legal revisions were also made after the milk 
scandal. The milk scandal highlighted the fragmentation and loopholes in the legal 
framework and apparently accelerated the finalisation of the Food Safety Law. The draft of 
this law had been under consultation as early as December 2007, but the milk scandal in 
2008 provided fresh examples of what needed to be avoided, and therefore provided a lot 
of useful input in the draft revisions (CRI, 2009).  
Many argued that one of the reasons for the widespread violation in food safety was 
because the punishment was too minor compared to the human cost (Chen, 2009). As a 
result, despite its merits in merging and updating China’s previously overlapping laws on 
food safety, the Food Safety Law significantly raised the level of fines for food safety-
related offences, from previously one to five times of the illegal gain, to up to ten times of 
the goods’ value (Gov.cn, 2009a). For violations that were deemed criminal offences, the 
People’s Supreme Court issued a directive ordering subordinating courts to punish 
violators using harsher sentences (according to the law), including the death penalty. For 
major food safety incidents, the directive stipulated that all those responsible should be 
punished ‘harsher and quicker’ (Xinhua, 2011b).  
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The paradigm shift also included a shift towards more modern technical standards 
in order to assure consumers. Some of these were the direct results of learning from 
developed countries. One month after the scandal, GAQSIQ swiftly issued a new national 
standard of testing melamine contamination after consulting the standards of the US FDA 
(Food and Drug Administration) and the FCC (Food Chemicals Codex) (Gov.cn, 2008c). 
Accordingly, the MOH and the other four agencies issued a new national standard limiting 
the maximum permitted level of melamine to 1mg/kg for baby formula and 2.5 mg/kg for 
other dairy products, which was as stringent as the standard in the US (Wishnick, 2009). 
The milk scandal also acted as a catalyst for the state to overhaul systematically its food 
standard more generally. According to the MOH, a comprehensive food standard review 
(including food additives) should be completed by 2015 through updating and combining 
(abolishing) existing standards in effect at different levels (national, local and industrial) 
that were often overlapping and conflicting.  
 
6.5.3 Reconnecting with the People 
 
As we have seen in SARS and the earthquake, the CCP normally seeks to manipulate the 
opportunity offered by a crisis to bolster its popular support. It has been doing so by 
exploiting the vulnerability people face and casting itself in the most favourable light. This 
proven strategy serves two purposes. One is to cultivate a popular sense of dependency 
upon the state in an unfortunate situation and to respond to such a sense by constructing 
itself as the people’s saviour. The other is to seize such opportunities to demonstrate to the 
people that it is a benevolent, accessible and people-serving Party, rather than an apathetic 
bureaucracy as perceived by the people under normal circumstances.  
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However, as far as the milk scandal was concerned, this political utility of 
reconnecting with the people faced severe impediments to its full utilisation owing to the 
nature of this crisis. As argued above, the milk scandal originated purely from the 
systematic failures within the system. Its endogenous origins effectively prevented the 
Party from manipulating such an incident as an external threat, without which the saviour 
myth could not be validated93. The first purpose – constructing a saviour image – was thus 
difficult to fulfil because rather than acting in time to prevent the crisis, the Party actually 
came ‘too late’ in that it only responded after its own neglect had evolved into a disaster94. 
The second purpose – showing benevolence – could still be fulfilled partially, but doing so 
in this underlying context made the Party look as if it was begging for forgiveness, instead 
of convincing the people of its benevolent rule. 
No matter how awkward this was, the Party needed to take some actions to stop the 
tarnishing of its moral authority. The State Council ordered on 13 September that all 
children affected would receive free check-ups and medical treatment (Xinhua, 2008i). 
Children affected were also insured by the state for a period of 20 years (Xinhua, 2010c).  
On the public relations level, Wen Jiabao offered a formal apology during his visit 
to the Beijing Children’s Hospital and acknowledged that poor government supervision 
was partly responsible. ‘We are very sad, though our people are very understanding. But as 
a government, we feel very guilty’. He also accused responsible companies, in a more 
severe tone, for their ‘conscienceless’ actions (Xinhua, 2008o).  Hu Jintao also made a less 
apologetic, but harshly worded remark. In a meeting with officials ranked at ministerial 
level and above, he condemned some cadres for ‘turning a deaf ear to people’s appeal and 
                                                 
93 From this perspective, it was easy to understand why the government desperately sought to construct the 
milk scandal as a crisis where factors external to the political system were mainly responsible. The high–
profile arrests and trials of a dozen of dairy farmers and dealers were the demonstrations of this tactics, even 
though these were far from convincing.  
94 The phrase ‘I came too late’ was used by Wen Jiabao on several occasions where incidents were largely 
caused by the government’s own neglect, such as after coal mine explosions and a train collision. 
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suffering, and being apathetic to serious issues such as food safety that concern the 
wellbeing of the people’ (Xinhua, 2008ac).  
These compensating measures – the official apology and harsh remarks – might 
have a limited effect on pacifying popular anger, but they at best contained any further 
decline in Party legitimacy in the short term. Although during the crisis state media as 
usual operated in full capacity to publicise leadership activities that conveyed the ‘warmth 
of the Party’ to the people, in the aftermath the Party found it too frustrating to give a 
convincing explanation that its rightful and decisive intervention addressed nothing but its 
own wrongdoings, let alone other associated negative political implications. Imaginably, it 
was inclined to hide away from and muddle through the situation. As evidence of its 
deliberate motive to play down the issue, very unusually, it did not arrange an award 
assembly to praise those model cadres in the fight against the crisis. It simply wanted the 
people gradually to forget it because this crisis was almost wholly negative to the Party, 
and one which could not be used to the Party’s advantage as an opportunity to reassert 
itself actively.  
The mode of mobilisation used also determined the defensive characteristic (from 
the Party’s perspective) of managing this crisis. Reconnecting with the people after the 
milk scandal came entirely in the top-down manner, and the old paradigm of paternalism 
returned; although masked with modern public relations techniques that emphasised 
benevolence, in essence people were again treated as mere subjects and excluded from the 
political process. We might have noticed that, unlike in SARS and the earthquake, people 
were neither mobilised nor invited to participate in the ‘struggle’ to contain the milk crisis, 
and that only government personnel were mobilised. This selective mobilisation was 
natural because grassroots participation in such a context could only enhance the popular 
conviction about government faults and would only serve to undermine the Party-state. But 
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without popular participation, mobilisation legitimacy - the source of legitimacy to which 
the Party usually appealed  – could not be tapped. 
Finally, China’s unique demographics mattered, which made the milk crisis much 
more than a food scare, but an issue of regime legitimacy. Because of the One Child 
Policy, the child was usually the most important centre of attention in a Chinese family and 
Chinese parents invested a great deal of hope and money into the wellbeing of their single 
child. The hurt caused by the milk scandal would not be easily forgotten, let alone worries 
about future side-effects to their children caused by the poisoning. Monetary compensation 
and superficial benevolence were simply not enough to avoid damage to the Party’s 
legitimacy.  
 
6.6 The Milk Scandal and State-society Relations 
 
The section above explained precisely the reason why the government discouraged popular 
participation in the milk scandal. The harsh way the government treated civil society and 
organised grassroots initiatives analysed below further validated the idea that the 
government viewed mobilisation against its own internal cracks as threatening. In other 
words, it did not have a genuine interest in reconnecting with the people in a way that 
might potentially destabilise the status quo. It well reflected the Party’s losing confidence 
in that it wanted to put a firewall between grassroots initiatives and its own closed-door 
handling of the aftermath – all in the name of preserving stability.  
The milk scandal was an extraordinary event that put regime resilience to the test. 
In this regard, whether people were allowed to move their appeals forward through rightful 
resistance, and in particular how far they could actually get with the help of legal means, 
showed whether the Party-state was really committed to the rule by law. Further, the milk 
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scandal could have been a good example showcasing an improving standard of rule by law 
in China, because most of those responsible were not even part of the system. For example, 
the parents of sickened children were merely seeking to bring those unscrupulous 
companies to justice through legal means. These were just civil lawsuits95. In this respect, 
the state should have had some confidence precisely because parents were not directly 
accusing the state, and their actions were merely interest articulation within the contour of 
established institutions rather than challenges to the system. 
However, as manifested in the suppression of the post-earthquake protests, the 
aftermath of the milk scandal was also overwhelmed by tightened social control, the 
momentum of which tended to quell any resistance regardless of its nature. The tightened 
control was characterised by the frequent use of extra-judicial measures as a substitute for, 
and at the expense of, rule by law.  
These restrictive measures could be attributed to a changing discourse in the 
relationship between rule by law and Party interests. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the new 
principle that judiciary work must adhere to, the ‘three utmost priorities’, explicitly 
highlighted the Party’s cause as the top priority and downgraded rule by law to an 
instrument serving the Party’s cause. This latest change in discourse further weakened 
judiciary independence and justified Party interference in judiciary work in various ways. 
For example, in the milk scandal, the Party took over the judiciary and handled every detail 
directly with the disadvantaged. On the other hand, the judiciary process could not begin 
unless explicit Party permission was given. 
Given this background, it was not surprising that the government impeded the legal 
proceeding of lawsuits against Sanlu. There were several attempts by parents to file class 
                                                 
95 There were criminal suits against unscrupulous individuals shortly after the scandal broke out, but these 
were initiated by the state and not by the parents. Although these criminals were all sentenced according to 
the law, the role of the judiciary was less ‘intermediary’ because the lawsuits were not initiated from below 
and from the disadvantaged.  
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actions, but as of April 2009, none of these was accepted by the courts (Southern Weekly, 
2009c). Moreover, lawyers who had already accepted these cases, including more than 100 
lawyers who signed up to offer pro bono legal advice, were discouraged or even threatened 
not to help the parents. Local officials and the Party-controlled Lawyers’ Association 
reportedly told lawyers involved that the government had its own plan to deal with this and 
lawyers should ‘observe the overall situation and preserve stability’. Those who did get 
involved would face punishment that was ‘not just losing the job’ (New York Times, 
2008b; Takungpao, 2008).  
The government also suppressed other forms of collective action. It shut a website 
called ‘Home for the Kidney Stone Babies’ which called for parents to act together to 
defend their rights and facilitate the exchange of medical information. A rights activist and 
the owner of the site, Zhao Lianhai, whose child also fell ill, was sentenced to two-and-a-
half years. He was jailed because of organising collective petitions among parents who 
were dissatisfied with the government’s compensation plans, and for attempting to 
organise a news conference in order to garner support from the public (New York Times, 
2009a). Although he was later released on medical parole, the unusually harsh sentence 
indicated the defensive mentality of the government which was hyper-sensitive to any 
organised resistance, rightful or otherwise.  
Nonetheless, the Chinese government seemed to be less sensitive about individual 
lawsuits than about the abovementioned group appeals, because the latter tended to be 
viewed as threatening the regime. In March 2009, Shen Deyong, Vice President of the 
Supreme People’s Court, said during an online engagement with netizens that ‘The 
People’s Court is well prepared and is ready to accept compensation lawsuits at any time 
according to the law’ (Southern Weekly, 2009c). Subsequently, a handful of individual 
lawsuits were accepted by the courts in several provinces. These cases did move forward, 
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but the fact that they could not go ahead until senior officials gave the green light revealed 
that Party influence was the powerful determinant of judicial affairs. The fact that not all 
individual lawsuits were accepted gave rise to speculation that the sensitivity of each 
lawsuit was evaluated on a case-by-case basis, rather than universally. It revealed that rule 
by law was still heavily interfered with by administrative measures.  
The bad news was that, although a small number of lawsuits had been accepted by 
the courts Sanlu’s bankruptcy proceedings had ended before the compensation lawsuits 
were heard in court (Southern Weekly, 2009c). This meant that even if the parents had won 
the cases, they were unlikely to get any compensation from Sanlu as the company had been 
deregistered.  
In the end, no parents were able to bring Sanlu to justice through legal means. 
Therefore, the responsibility of making all compensation arrangements had to be 
shouldered by the government alone. It did make a closed-door, concerted effort to pacify 
the affected, but purely through top-down administrative means with no bottom-up societal 
intermediation involved. The State Council’s taskforce on handling the milk crisis 
instructed and coordinated 22 companies implicated in the scandal to set up a medical 
compensation fund totalling ¥1.1 billion, and emphasised that the allocation of such funds 
was a political mission. Families that lost their children received ¥200,000, ¥30,000 for 
children with serious illnesses and as little as ¥2,000 for children with moderate symptoms 
(China Radio Network, 2009). 
Ironically, the fund implied more utility than financial compensation – it was used 
by the government as an administrative measure to replace the legal process so as to avoid 
what would have been ‘the largest scale of compensation claims since the founding of the 
PRC’ (Takungpao, 2008). The condition attached to being eligible for the fund was that 
parents agreed not to sue upon receiving the fund (New York Times, 2009b). Even worse, 
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with collective actions clamped down upon, individual parents were left with little 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the government and large companies. The routine strategy of 
divide and rule prevailed again, and the compensation plan eventually turned into a 
forcible deal – those parents who rejected the compensation plan and still opted for 
resolutions through legal means would see their child’s name not included in the ‘official’ 
list of victims, and these children would not be eligible for any free medical treatment in 
the future if more problems arose before they were 18 (China Radio Network, 2009). 
Unsurprisingly, most parents eventually accepted the plan. 
Apparently, the government preserved stability as the issue soon faded from public 
attention. In essence, the rash and discursive way the government suppressed intra-
institutional resistance had serious legitimacy implications. First, the approach of offering 
economic incentives to turn people away from seeking legal resolutions, or ‘spend money 
to buy stability’, ‘resolving people (renmin)’s problem by using renminbi’, was not 
financially sustainable (Xinhua, 2009f). Facing a soaring bill for preserving stability, the 
government would eventually be overloaded with this spending 96 . Second, offering 
compensations and future healthcare in exchange for parents’ rights to sue were 
detrimental to the moral authority of the regime. At best, it was buying stability; at worst, it 
amounted to kidnapping the already miserable victims and their families. Finally, Party 
interference with and restrictions on the judiciary – an important safety valve for social 
tension – would eventually channel discontent directly against the Party-state, turning 
sporadic resistance against elements of the system into aggression against the system as a 
whole. ‘The denial of the use of rightful resistance can reveal when members of powerful 
                                                 
96  According to Human Rights Watch, China’s spending on maintaining internal stability exceeded its 
defence expenditure in 2011. Lots of money has been used to strengthen coercion – recruiting more security 
personnel and buying more surveillance equipments, but a considerable proportion of the money has been 
spent to pacify discontent. 
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groups have dared to take liberties with the symbols in which they are most invested’ 
(Scott, 1990:106, cited in O'Brien, 1996). 
 
6.7 International Impact and Domestic Repercussions 
 
The last section concerns the impact of the milk scandal on China’s image at home and 
abroad. When talking about the international dimension, the emphasis is on change in the 
external perceptions of China and the nature of its rapid rise; when speaking from a 
domestic perspective, the emphasis is placed on regime legitimacy.  
 
6.7.1 International Impact 
 
In developed countries and particularly the EU and the US, the milk scandal seriously 
tarnished the reputation of ‘Made in China’.  Although the EU and especially the US had 
not imported Chinese milk products in large quantities before the milk scandal because 
they had much higher safety standards for dairy products, the indirect economic losses 
involved were enormous. For example, the EU banned imports of baby food that used 
Chinese milk as an ingredient and subsequently ordered all food imports containing more 
than 15% milk powder to be tested as a precautionary measure (USA Today, 2008).  
While in the EU and the US the seizing of melamine-contaminated Chinese made 
food seemed to be sporadic, traces of melamine widely affected the operations of 
American and European giant food producers in China. As a result of China’s deep 
integration in the global production chain, Chinese milk had been used as an important 
ingredient in many dairy and confectionary products prior to the scandal. This was where 
much greater risk lay because it originated from multiple sources and was hard to trace. As 
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of late 2008, Cadbury, Heinz, Nestlé, Starbucks and Unilever, among others, had found 
that their products contained Chinese contaminated milk (Dani and Deep, 2010). Some of 
these contaminated products were sold outside China (especially in the Asia-Pacific 
region) in large quantities which caused another wave of panic in these countries.  
Whilst the milk scandal was not the only food scare caused by China that had 
troubled international consumer97, no single incident in the past could be comparable with 
the milk scandal of 2008 in terms of economic losses and reputational damage. Besides the 
fortune spent by major international food companies on their product recalls, this scandal 
was different from most previous cases where the major problem was excessive residues of 
veterinary medical products (Yang and Jiang, 2009). The melamine scandal was 
particularly deplorable because the adding of toxic chemicals into babies’ milk was 
deliberate. Coincidently, this scandal broke out shortly after a highly successful and 
perfectly organised Beijing Olympics (in the name of which the milk scandal had been 
covered up before the Games finished). The two events casted the Chinese state in a totally 
different light: the monolithic, strong and centralised Chinese state, that managed to stage a 
spectacular Olympics before the world, could not ensure even the basic safety standards of 
milk for the consumption of its domestic population. To the West, this feature of Chinese 
state power was very contradictory, and how this power would be used and for what 
intention remained equally opaque. Since the milk scandal, the West may well be more 
convinced that China politicised the Olympics98in a nationally concerted effort simply to 
win international prestige, but at the same time took little care of its own people’s living 
conditions. This conviction was very detrimental to China’s soft power. 
                                                 
97  For example, melamine-laced pet food ingredients exported to the US, numerous notifications made 
concerning hazardous food from China via the RASFF (the EU’s Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed), 
poisoned dumplings exported to Japan, etc.  
98 A position that China repeatedly denied. 
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In addition, in recent years China has made big investments in the West to improve 
its image through soft power projections. In serving its purpose of presenting a friendly 
China, which it asserted that the West had misunderstood previously, it first established 
many Confucius Institutes and organised cultural fairs that promoted its cultural 
attractiveness, and more recently started to broadcast directly to the western audience using 
the international channels of its media, attempting to convince the West of the uniqueness 
and superiority of China’s economic and political systems. However, soft power 
projections like this could be convincing only if domestic institutions were sustainable, 
because more often than not, a good external image was endogenous to, and an extension 
of, good institutions at home. After the milk scandal unfolded as a systematic crisis, these 
attempts seemed strikingly ironic because of the sharp contrast between the promoted 
superficial image abroad, and the harsh reality at home. It not only weakened the positive 
impact (if any) that this charm offensive might have had, but also significantly damaged 
the explanatory power of the Chinese model because the unscrupulous scandal, a product 
of China’s dysfunctioning and crony political economy, only served to prove that the so 
called Chinese model lacked institutional viability or even moral foundations.  
The consequences of the suspicion of China’s soft power, and the falsification of 
the Chinese model, were more evident in developing countries. Although the notion of the 
Chinese model actually first originated in the West, where the majority of the debate about 
it took place, the Chinese model was widely perceived as a potential challenge to the 
western liberal order. The topic was hotly debated, not because the West wanted to adopt 
it, but because the West wanted to determine how to cope with the challenge it might bring 
about. The genuine interest in the Chinese model or in learning from the Chinese 
experience was actually found in underdeveloped regions of the world, especially Africa 
(Sautman and Yan, 2007). However, when the milk scandal broke out in China, most 
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countries that implemented blanket bans on Chinese dairy products were in Asia and 
Africa, including Brunei, Ghana, Nepal, Tanzania, Togo etc. (Reuters, 2008b). The scandal 
might have prompted elites in the developing world to have second thoughts about the 
Chinese model and about learning from the Chinese governance experience.  
Basically, the international community implemented another ‘quarantine China’, as 
it did in 2003 after the SARS outbreak. Hence, while the rest of the world was debating the 
threats, experiences or opportunities a monolithic, strong and centralised Chinese state 
might bring, the same Chinese state – but with fragmented, weak and decentralised 
characteristics – haunted many countries, developed and developing alike. ‘Ironically, it is 
China's weakness, and not its strength, that will pose the greater challenge to other 
countries’ (Wishnick, 2009:220). 
 
6.7.2 The Impact on Greater China 
 
The scandal also had an adverse impact on the Greater China region. In Taiwan, the milk 
scandal triggered a political storm as contaminated milk powder was found on the island 
just a few months after Mainland China and Taiwan resumed de facto government-to-
government negotiations which had been suspended for a decade. Most of the melamine-
laced milk powder entered Taiwan as a food ingredient and affected a host of products, 
causing public panic and resentment against the mainland. The newly elected Beijing-
friendly KMT government initially exercised restraint to avoid criticising the mainland, but 
pro-independence political parties on the island utilised this crisis and framed it in 
‘unification or independence’ terms by fiercely attacking the KMT government for its 
weakness towards the mainland. Lin Fang-yue, then Taiwanese Health Minister who had 
been in his position for only four months, had to resign over his decision to loosen the 
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standards for testing melamine from zero tolerance to a maximum of 2.5 ppm (China Post, 
2008). The political storm peaked when pro-independence parties staged a massive anti-
China demonstration, joined by tens of thousands of protesters who were worried that more 
unsafe food and other products would enter the island if Taiwan became more dependent 
economically on the mainland (AFP, 2008b). Overall, the milk scandal overshadowed the 
improved cross strait relations and reinforced the negative impression of Mainland China 
among Taiwanese citizens whose hearts and minds Mainland China was desperately trying 
to win. The food scare was to some extent even more damaging to Mainland China’s 
image than more political issues such as the mainland’s missiles targeting Taiwan, because 
it was such a sensitive livelihood issue concerning a much wider population, including 
those who might not be interested in cross strait politics.   
Although the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits, mainland’s quasi-
governmental Taiwan affairs department, issued an apology to all Taiwanese consumers 
and affected food producers (VOA, 2008a), this negative perception of China may have 
become a hurdle that Beijing-friendly Taiwanese politicians had to consider when seeking 
further reconciliation with the mainland.  
In Hong Kong, and to a lesser extent, Macau, the milk scandal severely affected the 
image of Mainland China. While the panic it caused to Taiwan was largely one-off, the 
problem it caused to China’s two SARs (Special Administrative Regions) is prolonged and 
has lasted through to the present day. Mainland parents lost confidence completely in 
domestic brands, and after foreign brands raised prices following the milk scandal, they 
rushed to Hong Kong and Macau to buy cheaper and safer imported milk powder and other 
baby food. With the ease of travel from the mainland to Hong Kong, the sudden surge in 
milk powder demand could hardly be coped with by Hong Kong retailers, even if they 
temporarily imposed a limit on how many cans of powder each shopper could buy (Wall 
 304
Street Journal, 2011). The shortage of baby milk in Hong Kong caused difficulties for local 
parents to secure milk powder for their babies and led to societal resentment against cross-
border shoppers. More broadly, the competition for milk powder is regarded by the Hong 
Kong society as a typical illustration of how Mainland China ‘exported’ its problems to the 
territory and ‘poisoned’ Hong Kong’s values and order. The anti-mainland sentiment in 
Hong Kong that started to gain momentum in recent years was fuelled by the ongoing milk 
powder problem. Surveys show that a separate ‘Hongkongese’ identity is taking shape 
more rapidly among the public, whereas those that identify themselves as ‘Chinese’ have 
reached a record low (People’s Net, 2012b), especially among the younger generation. The 
Hongkongese identity is increasingly popular because people who share it believe that the 
One Country, Two Systems institution is under threat by the mainland (not just the central 
government but also the mainland nouveau riche). The mainland’s influence over Hong 
Kong is becoming increasingly powerful in that values and phenomena that are typical of 
the transitional China – such as huge inequality and panic buying – are penetrating Hong 
Kong to the extent that Hong Kong is being ‘mainlandised’. Since the milk scandal, young 
people have frequently expressed their resentment against the mainland on topics such as 
opposing the construction of high speed railway links between Hong Kong and the 
mainland, as well as complaining about rising housing prices which they believe to be 
pushed up by mainland buyers, and more recently, protesting directly against mainland 
travellers (Wall Street Journal, 2012). Some of this discontent was even aired in the form 
of  social movements.   
 
6.7.3 Domestic Repercussions 
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In terms of the political impact of the milk scandal, the domestic repercussions were even 
worse, as it affected Party legitimacy very negatively when it was found that the Chinese 
government had applied double standards when it came to addressing the international and 
domestic consequences of the crisis.   
Since the embarrassing experience of international isolation, such as during SARS, 
the Chinese government has become more receptive to international pressure. This is not 
just to assure the world of its peaceful rise per se, but is a calculated move to maintain 
stable political and economic relations with the international community from where China 
gets resources to fuel its continued growth, and upon which domestic regime stability is 
hinged (Breslin, 2010). It is therefore becoming increasingly considerate in managing 
domestic incidents that might have a global impact. Particularly in the realm of NTS or 
human security where threats transcend borders, such as public health, China is more 
willing to adopt a cooperative approach to demonstrate its commitment to being a 
responsible great power. 
Bearing this in mind, it was not surprising that as soon as the government of New 
Zealand informed Beijing and the crisis became international, the Chinese government 
took drastic actions to tackle it. It also reported the crisis to the WHO on the same day as 
the State Council knew about it (Caijing, 2008).  
As the Paralympics was still going on and Beijing was still receiving a lot of 
coverage from international media, China tried very hard to pacify the international 
community, including many sports teams that were still in China. The government 
promised that all food, including dairy products supplied for the Olympics and the 
Paralympics, were ‘under scrutiny during the whole process, from production, 
transportation, to kitchens’, and no melamine was found in these products (Xinhua, 
2008y).  
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This statement might have given some assurances to the international community. 
However, to the Chinese people, it did not come at the right time – millions of children in 
China were suffering from toxic milk produced by the same companies which took special 
quality management measures for Olympics supplies, but did little to ensure food safety for 
Chinese consumers. The popular anger was not so much against these companies as against 
the Chinese government – the same government that paid close attention to every detail of 
the food supply for mega state projects and foreigners, but took a laissez-faire approach to 
governing food quality for its own people. Later, a State Council white paper, China’s 
Food Quality and Food Safety Situation, published in 2007, gained popular attention. The 
paper said that in the domestic food market, the pass rate in random inspections rose from 
77.9% in 2006 to 85.1% in the first half of 2007, but the pass rate of food for export had 
been above 99% for many years and, according to Japanese official statistics, Chinese food 
produced for the Japanese market was even safer than those from the EU and the US 
(Gov.cn, 2007a). Such a white paper only provided more evidence to validate the popular 
conviction that the government cared how other countries viewed it more than it cared 
about the wellbeing of its own people.  
In fact, it was just the latest example of the Chinese government applying double 
standards to the same issue purposefully trying to ‘please’ the outside world whilst treating 
its own people as second-class citizens. Other examples included subsidising Confucius 
Institutes around the world whilst thousands of Chinese teenagers still could not afford 
schooling, or writing off billions of African debts whilst millions of Chinese were still 
struggling on the poverty line.  
These double standards that discriminated against Chinese people in their home 
country did not only occur in social and economic terms, but also in the crucial dimension 
of the right to information. In order to appear to have followed the Olympics convention 
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for open information and especially after the Tibet riot in March 2008, which it handled 
poorly, the Chinese government apparently took measures to increase information 
transparency, especially during times of crisis. However, this increased transparency 
seemed to be targeting an international audience only. The state news agency, Xinhua, 
either released more detailed reports in English than in Chinese, or released an English 
version only99. The Global Times, a pro-nationalist tabloid run by the People’s Daily, 
published a Chinese and an English version of the newspaper that looked as if they were 
two totally different newspapers. The Chinese version tried to avoid all taboos whereas the 
English version carried discussion on a host of sensitive topics, including on Tiananmen 
just before the event’s twentieth anniversary100. Chinese people joked that in the past one 
learnt English in order to ‘understand the world’ better, but nowadays one learns English in 
order to ‘understand the home country’ better.  
Taken together, these instances of double standards falsified the Party rhetoric of 
‘serving the people’ and ‘putting people first’. It looked as if the Chinese government was 
more accountable to other countries than to its own people, and that it was not taking its 
domestic obligations and promises as seriously as its international commitments. 
Even worse, about the same time that the milk crisis swept through China, news 
emerged suggesting that within the double standards where the Chinese government 
treated international and domestic audience differently, there was a ‘double’ double 
standards that discriminated against ordinary Chinese citizens but benefited the Chinese 
leadership. A widely circulated Internet post about the State Council Party and State 
Organisations Special Food Supply Centre revealed that the Chinese leadership and their 
families were completely insulated from unsafe food because they ate superior quality food 
                                                 
99 For example, compare Xinhua’s news releases in English and Chinese on a terrorist attack occurred in 
Kashgar, Xinjiang. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/04/content_8953646.htm and 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-08/04/content_8942060.htm 
100 See http://www.globaltimes.cn/special/2009-06/434373.html 
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that was specially grown and sourced using the strictest standards (China Digital Times, 
2008). The Chinese government quickly responded that there was no such unit called the 
Special Food Supply Centre, saying that the news was simply rumours (Chinanews.com, 
2008). But the one sentence statement was extremely weak because it neither explained 
what the truth was, nor denied the fact that top leaders ate specially supplied food. 
In fact, the practice of ‘special supply’ dates back to the Mao era, and is not limited 
to food. However, at that time only a handful of leaders were entitled to such privilege. 
The existence of the special supply is an open secret in China. What makes the people 
angry is that nowadays food for the ordinary Chinese population is much more unsafe than 
in the Mao era, but the circle of officials entitled to the special supply is greatly expanded. 
Even some provincial functional departments have their own special supply centres 
(Southern Weekly, 2011). The proliferation of these centres is clearly characteristic of a 
leviathan state that enriches itself rather than serving public interests. It worsened the 
already widely perceived inequality between those inside and outside the Party-state 
system and deepened the cleavage between state and society. The milk scandal happened 
to amplify this division and it was perhaps the greatest erosion in social cohesion and Party 




The government’s record in managing the milk crisis was very mixed. The period of 
inaction was inexcusable, but once the news broke internationally, government actions 
were prompt. Overall, the crisis was effectively contained in the short term but left 
unprecedented resentment against the government. Also, in the years following the milk 
scandal, a migration wave out of China began, and most of those that moved out belonged 
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to the upper-middle class and the middle class – strata of society that China desperately 
needed at the time of rapid transition in order to buffer social dislocation. One of the 
reasons behind emigration was that people saw through the milk scandal about rampant 
capitalism in which rogue businesses colluded with local political interests to exploit the 
people, the conduct of which had no bottom line.  Everyone in China who felt unbearable 
about this shared an ‘abandoning the sinking boat’ mentality (Xiao, 2011). Equally, the 
milk scandal voided most of China’s attempts to promote the Chinese model and soft 
power. When these two concepts produced a harsh reality which could not even convince 
China’s own people that life in China was attractive, how could it look compelling to the 
rest of the world?  
More importantly, the routine, three stages crisis management strategy, i.e. shifting 
the dominating paradigm, centralising power and reconnecting with the people, worked 
poorly in the handling of the milk scandal. This was owing to the fact that China’s political 
system was full of contradictions which were unlikely to be addressed by these short-term 
measures. And, as far as this incident was concerned, the political utility of the CCP-style 
crisis management seemed to be exhausted.  
First, paradigm shifts without political reform are more often than not superficial. 
The same problem will recur because these shifts are all interim measures that only address 
the phenomenon and not the systematic contradictions that caused the problem. For 
instance, in December 2009 and January 2010, three cases of producing and selling 
melamine-tainted milk were discovered even though the government shifted the paradigm 
towards much more stringent regulations after the 2008 milk scandal (New York Times, 
2010).  
Second, the efficacy of the centralisation of power may increasingly decay in face 
of a crisis originating from multiple sources of risk. As China’s global involvement 
 310
deepens, more risks are likely to originate from multiple domestic and international 
sources. In other words, China is likely to face more challenges of a world risk society, in 
which economic and technological decisions are made in a very decentralised fashion that 
causes huge uncertainties which easily transcend national, sector and policy area 
boundaries (Wishnick, 2009). In this regard, the efficacy of a highly centralised and 
concerted effort against risk society crisis will be diluted by multiple sources of risk. For 
instance, numerous cases of the abuse of food additives were discovered despite the 
government’s crackdown on the milk scandal in 2008, because government ‘quick fixes 
are even more quickly undone’ (New York Times, 2011). This was because government 
efforts only concentrated on addressing the risks involved in food production, and so these 
efforts did little to mitigate the risks originating elsewhere – food prices, local 
protectionism, the absence of consumer pressure groups, etc. In 2011, the Chongqing 
police announced that it would eradicate food contamination in the way it had effectively 
cracked down organised crime previously (People’s Net, 2011a) 101 . But even for the 
mighty Chongqing government, only limited results were achieved owing to multiple 
sources of risk involved in food safety, most of which the police could do little about.  
Lastly, in reconnecting with the people, the Party goal of keeping a grip on power 
indefinitely implied that this accessible gesture would often be temporary. Moreover, 
owing to advances in social media, more and more evidence emerged of the Party’s 
disconnection with the mass public, rendering this gesture incredibly dishonest. The fact 
that the Party leadership enjoyed a superior quality of everything – those living in 
Zhongnanhai even enjoyed strictly purified fresh air after the capital’s dirty air that the 
                                                 
101 Chongqing launched a crackdown on organised crime after Bo Xilai, also a member of the Politburo, 
became the city’s Party chief. It was the most high profile crackdown on crime in China in recent years. A 
number of ‘gang masters’, including former deputy chief of Chongqing’s public security bureau, were 
executed. Comments on the crackdown polarised, some argued that it frequently used extra–judicial 
measures and mass movement approaches in place of judicial process, and thus undermined rule by law; but 
others contended that such a crackdown maintained social order and thus benefited the people generally.  
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mass public breathe was rated by the US embassy in Beijing as ‘hazardous’ (Xu, 2011). 
All this counter evidence suggested that the Party pursued a set of interests that were 
different from and irrelevant to the people. Furthermore, intra-Party checks and balances, 
such as the Party’s accountability system, also failed in stemming the tendency of the 
Party’s alienation from the people. For instance, some of those fired for administrative or 
political misconduct in the wake of the ‘accountability storm’ following the milk scandal 
were reinstated in other senior positions or even got promoted somehow after 1 to 2 years 
(Zeng, 2012).  
All in all, CCP crisis management is a direct reflection of the predicaments China’s 
political system is currently facing, i.e. the contradiction between market and state, 
decentralisation and centralisation, international responsibility and domestic obligation, 
and most importantly, between keeping a grip on power on the one hand, whilst 
empowering the people to participate in the political process in an orderly manner on the 
other. In the decade of Hu-Wen’s leadership, political reforms that aimed to address these 
primary contradictions almost stagnated and solutions were yet to be found. As a result, the 
efficacy of the CCP’s crisis management is also gradually decreasing, because without a 
breakthrough in political institutions, there is less political utility that can be tapped 
through crises, but more contradictions will accumulate from crises. So far the three cases 
have been thoroughly studied. The next task is to compare them in order to identify what 
they have in common and what makes them differ from each other.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
After the three cases have been thoroughly studied, the task for the conclusion is to make 
further generalisations through comparison, and to make some predictions based on the 
pattern we have established thus far. The conclusion is also structured in response to the 
three research questions set out in the introduction. As we proceed through the conclusion, 
we will give broad answers to these questions and explain the answers in detail. 
 
 
7.1 The Comparison of Case Studies 
 
1) How well has the CCP managed crises so far? 
2) What are the important factors that condition the efficacy of the CCP’s crisis 
management? 
 
The comparison serves the purpose of responding to the first two research questions 
set out in the Introduction. It is divided into two sections. In the first section we compare 
the overall efficacy of government crisis management and explain whether this (in)efficacy 
is also perceived by the people. The second section compares the three crises according to 
the five contextualising themes that we set out in Chapter 3. In so doing, we seek to discern 
elements of change over time, and observe whether a temporary political opening or 
contraction in times of crisis is fed back into the broader political context. 
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7.1.1 The Overall Efficacy of Crisis Management and Popular Response 
 
I. Short-term Efficacy 
 
Generally speaking, all three crises were effectively brought under control if measured by 
short-term results, even by international standards. In the combat against SARS, despite 
the initial chaos caused by inaction and misinformation, China responded strongly after a 
consensus on the severity of the crisis was reached in the top leadership. This helped 
largely to eliminate the virus in fewer than three months, whereas in other territories, with 
many fewer SARS cases, it took longer. In medical terms, despite having the largest 
number of infection cases, China’s case fatality ratio was the lowest among countries with 
fatal cases (WHO, 2003). In the Sichuan earthquake, the Chinese central government’s 
response was prompt from the beginning, winning endorsement not only from the 
international community in general, but from organisations traditionally critical about 
China, such as the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2008). The worldwide, live 
broadcasted rescue effort during the immediate aftermath of the quake was arguably the 
most positive image of the Chinese government presented by western media since 
Tiananmen. This timely rescue effort contrasted sharply with the Cyclone Nargis which 
swept through Myanmar during roughly the same period, and contrasted considerably with 
the rescue effort of the US government in the 2005 Hurricane Katrina that was widely 
criticised for its chaotic handling. In August 2009, the Taiwanese government handled the 
Typhoon Morakot poorly. Taiwanese media cited China’s earthquake rescue in 2008 and 
Wen Jiabao’s prompt arrival at the scene and blamed the hesitation of Ma Ying-jeou, 
Taiwan’s president (Nownews.com, 2009). For the milk scandal, although its impact on 
Chinese soft power and the reputation of Chinese-made goods was devastating, China was 
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resolute in shutting down the production facilities in question and in punishing criminals as 
soon as the crisis became international. Its behaviour in resolving subsequent international 
trade disputes as a result of the tainted milk was also largely cooperative. 
In all three cases, China was able to mobilise quickly the Party, the governmental 
and the military (in the first two cases) apparatuses in a concerted effort once the crisis 
consensus was reached. It managed to contain these crises more rapidly than democratic 
systems owing to its possession of ‘authoritarian advantages’ – namely, the ability to 
centralise power, public support for government-initiated mobilisation, and tactical control 
of information in the course of fighting crises (Schwartz, 2012). 
 
II. Long-term Efficacy 
 
If we look beyond the immediate effects of crisis management in these cases, however, 
results were more mixed. Here our focus is on the lasting effect (how well the root causes 
of a given crisis were addressed so that it would not easily recur) and the lasting 
momentum (how long the initial transformative opening lasted, and whether it constituted 
an institutional change that contributed to more effective management of future similar 
crises). We saw a loose correlation in which the long-term efficacy of crisis management 
varied with the degree of exogeneity of that crisis, i.e. the higher (lower) the level of 
external threats embedded in a given crisis, the more (less) effective the crisis management 
will be. 
This is because the full utilisation of authoritarian advantages is conditioned upon 
either a real external threat, or one that is perceived as real. Without this exogenous 
dimension in a crisis, there will be little ground to justify the centralisation of power 
because there is no clear target against which a mobilisation from within can be initiated. 
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Similarly, public support for the government can only be strong and monolithic if the 
threat is external to the body politic. Regarding the tactical control of information, the 
propaganda system needs at least some symptoms of an external threat in order to 
manipulate and mould popular perceptions about an exogenous crisis, and only with the 
presence of an external enemy can propaganda be more convincing than usual. Conversely, 
using authoritarian advantages to address an endogenous crisis, where the threat originates 
from within the system, will only lead to chaos that devastates the system. The Cultural 
Revolution was a classic example of such misuse. 
The SARS crisis was a two-stage crisis if defined in terms of the level of 
exogeneity. In the stage prior to the Politburo’s arrival at consensus, the crisis emerged as a 
typical fragmented authoritarianism predicament from within – the confrontation of 
departmental interests paralysed decision making. In the latter stage the Politburo 
overcame the internal gridlock through the centralisation of power, after which SARS was 
defined as a threat external to the system. SARS was also depicted more as an epidemic 
than a political crisis, despite the fact that the crisis response was heavily politicised. From 
then on, SARS was in large part no different from schistosomiasis, smallpox, cholera and 
other epidemics in the 1950s. And, by using mobilisation tactics similar to those which 
effectively eliminated other epidemics, the effective containment of SARS was not 
unexpected. 
After SARS, the institutions dealing with new epidemics were revamped, meaning 
that if such epidemics did emerge in the future, they would constitute routine and familiar 
crises for which the threat would be always external to the system. This exogeneity, 
relative to the political system, lent considerable efficacy to the effective prevention and 
control of new epidemics. When the global pandemic of H1N1 swine flu reached China in 
2009, it was clearly labelled as an ‘imported’ virus (Xinhua, 2009d), i.e. it was not just 
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external to the Chinese political and medical systems, but came from outside the Chinese 
territory. Swine flu tested China’s revamped system and, although China’s response was 
not perfect owing to its controversial, heavy-handed measures against international 
travellers, it passed the test politically as overreaction was perhaps more indicative of 
system robustness (the momentum of nerves as a result of SARS), as opposed to internal 
flaws. Overall, lessons learnt from SARS improved China’s long-term efficacy in 
managing epidemics. In addition, the high profile dismissal of senior officials during 
SARS set a precedent for political accountability which continued into future crises. 
Overall, crisis management in SARS has had satisfactory long-term efficacy in terms of 
both lasting effect and lasting momentum. 
The Sichuan earthquake was also a two-stage crisis, but with exogeneity 
dominating the early stage and growing endogeneity characterising the latter stage. Since 
the first Politburo meeting hours after the quake, the crisis has been defined as a natural 
disaster entirely external to the system. This definition ensured the Party-state apparatus 
(and the military soon after) responded in a monolithic way, and greatly facilitated the 
extraordinary mobilisation of personnel and material resources towards Sichuan. As such, 
the Sichuan earthquake was largely a familiar crisis for the CCP and a continuity of the 
‘man must conquer nature’ mode first devised in the Mao era, but which has been added to 
with a more humanist tinge in recent years. In the latter stage in which the media and 
popular attention shifted away from immense sympathy to the actual disaster impact and 
the distribution of such impact, however, the endogeneity of the crisis seemed to be 
increasing. As more scandals broke out which resulted in the disproportionate vulnerability 
of school children and other less advantaged groups in the face of natural hazards, 
questions were raised about poor building codes, regional disparity and official corruption. 
Blame was laid on the deep flaws in governance and in the political system which failed to 
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mitigate disaster risks ex ante and exacerbated devastation ex post. From then on, the 
disclosure of and controversy around these scandals as well as the government’s harsh 
response to them all helped to turn the Sichuan earthquake from a seemingly exogenous 
crisis into an endogenous one. 
After the Sichuan earthquake, China’s regime for handling major natural disasters 
was further revised. Noticeable changes included a revision of the legal framework so that 
civilian leaders could also get involved in decision making regarding the deployment of the 
PLA during major natural disasters (Gov.cn, 2010a). The PLA also enacted its own 
regulation on strengthening the capability in non-combat military missions, signifying the 
PLA’s increasing emphasis on NTS. On a technical level, the PLA established at the 
national and provincial levels a 950,000 strong force designated to handling natural 
disasters (PLA Daily, 2012). In subsequent natural disasters, such as the 2010 Yushu 
earthquake and the Zhouqu debris flow in the same year, these new institutional 
arrangements improved civilian-military cooperation as well as personnel and equipment 
preparedness, which should count as evidence of their lasting effects. However, civil 
effervescence, as found in the immediate aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake, was not 
sustained when state relief forces gradually dominated the quake zone and needed only 
minimal complementary assistance from civil society. As the school collapse scandal 
unfolded, civil society resistance was suppressed. When the state-led reconstruction started 
in a very centralised manner, civil society involvement was also limited. During the Yushu 
earthquake and the Zhouqu debris flow, civil society did not have a significant presence 
and in the former case volunteers were asked not to go to the quake zone  (Beijing News, 
2010). The lack of training for these amateur volunteers could be a good reason for 
discouraging their involvement. But the fact that Yushu was a Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture might suggest why this time the government treated civil society differently – 
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because it did not want to lose control in an area where ethnic relations were delicate. 
Retrospectively, it might also indicate that civil effervescence in Sichuan was highly 
contingent and one-off. In this respect, it did not achieve lasting momentum. Therefore, 
crisis management in the Sichuan earthquake had a less satisfactory long-term efficacy 
overall, with the failure of sustaining lasting momentum offsetting progress made in terms 
of lasting effect. 
The milk scandal can also be divided into two stages. However, the characteristics 
of this crisis during both stages were almost identical – that was, endogenous. Before the 
central government stepped in, it was the combination of endogenous factors, namely, the 
dysfunctioning local political economy and the central government’s weak regulatory and 
enforcement capacity on quality assurance, that led to the problem of deliberate milk 
contamination. When there were signs regarding this scandal emerging around the time of 
the Olympics, it was the Party’s propaganda apparatus that censored the circulation of 
crucial health information that could have been used to prevent the crisis from 
snowballing. Even after the central government intervened when the crisis became 
international, the source of the threat or embarrassment was still predominantly 
endogenous. As such, the government faced a predicament in which the stronger its 
decisive intervention, the more fundamental problems these actions would expose. For 
instance, when it announced a shift in the paradigm of quality assurance, people were 
shocked by the fact that in China, where fake and substandard goods were part of everyday 
life, an ‘exempt from inspection’ system had existed for many years that favoured big 
corporations. When the government centralised medical and political resources by 
establishing a LSG to enforce nationwide quality inspections, people subsequently learnt 
that the scandal was not just with Sanlu, but industry-wide. Throughout the unfolding of 
the milk scandal, the sources of market, governance and government failures were almost 
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entirely internal to the system such that the propaganda machinery was struggling to 
articulate a sense of external threat. It finally did so by identifying the criminals involved 
in poisoning as the external threat. But as expected, such tactics were perceived by the 
people as another example of finding a scapegoat and insulating the government from 
disastrous consequences its nonfeasance caused. 
After the Sanlu scandal, cases of producing and selling melamine-tainted milk 
resurfaced (New York Times, 2010), and food scares were still part of everyday life in 
China. In fact, the Sanlu scandal was merely one major incident in a long sequence of food 
safety crises besetting the Chinese government over the years. It was not the first of its 
kind but a climax in terms of audacity, and without substantive changes in the food safety 
regime and the broader context supporting it, it would not be the last. In this regard, the 
crackdown on Sanlu had little lasting effect. This leads naturally to the question of lasting 
momentum, to which the answer is more complex. On the one hand, the central 
government has been on high alert with regards to food safety. Its efforts in building a 
more rational bureaucracy as well as updating and tidying up food standards should not be 
neglected. On the other hand, most of the progress appeared to have occurred within the 
State Council, whereas other important agencies – for example the propaganda apparatus 
and local governments – seemed to be reluctant to shift their routine practices that impeded 
the full realisation of benefits associated with the revamped food safety regime. That is to 
say, without the propaganda apparatus providing a transparent information context and 
without local governments moving away from GDPism, the lasting momentum in terms of 
perfecting the food safety regime alone only achieved limited efficacy. More 
fundamentally, the effective prevention of future food scares would require a balanced 
relationship between the state, market and civil society (consumer protection in this case) 
which the current system was not able to support. Without this balanced relationship, what 
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Wen Jiabao repeatedly urged businesses to have, the ‘moral blood’ (Xinhua, 2010a) (a 
term he created as he read Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments), would simply 
become hollow moral preaching. As such, the overall long-term efficacy of the Sanlu 
crackdown has been low, and the poorest among all three cases. 
 
III. Popular Response 
 
Popular responses to the three crises were also correlated with the extent of perceived 
external threats. The higher (lower) the degree of external threats that are pervasively felt, 
the higher (lower) the popular support to the government in the course of its crisis 
management. 
As we have seen above, there is a propensity on the part of the CCP to manipulate a 
given crisis by ideationally ‘converting’ it from an endogenous crisis into an exogenous 
one. The ideational conversion is normally handled by the propaganda apparatus that 
makes every effort to highlight the ‘external threats’ dimension of the crisis, whilst 
downplaying its internal systematic origins in order to garner popular support. Or, looking 
from a slightly different angle, the CCP often wants to convert a novel and unfamiliar 
crisis into a routine and familiar one so as to enable the full utilisation of what the CCP 
excels in – mobilisation and logistics, or the ‘people’s war’ mode. But for either strategy of 
conversion, not every type of crisis can be manipulated at ease. Therefore, the 
‘convertibility’ of a given crisis directly affects how the people view it. 
Popular responses to the SARS crisis varied with the changing origin of the threat. 
When the virus mysteriously emerged and spread in southern China but before the 
government publicly acknowledged the actual extent of infection, the public response was 
a mixture of panic and distrust towards the government. The people arguably panicked 
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about the mysterious virus as much as they did about the information opacity, especially 
when the government ordered a news blackout on the issue. With little information, they 
would rather believe in rumours and rushed to buy things that were rumoured to be able to 
kill SARS. The intensity of public anxiety culminated in a large scale flight out of Beijing 
involving hundreds of thousands of Chinese and foreign residents. In fact, this panic 
caused significant disruption to public order – the opposite effect of social stability that the 
government had hoped for. Nothing else could best exemplify the irony of the 
government’s ostrich policy than the Chinese Health Minister’s statement that SARS was 
under control. Panic, empty streets (but overcrowded railway stations), and conflicting 
information given by domestic and foreign media, were all good evidence that a public 
health crisis was escalating into a political crisis. The threats from within – 
misinformation, system fragmentation and inaction – were much greater than the epidemic 
itself. As the once-in-a-decade leadership transition was going on amid the SARS panic, 
the people also learnt that the Party would preserve its grip on power at all costs. 
After the government admitted its failure in controlling SARS and provided the 
public with complete information, the public response to the government also rebounded. 
With the state media operating at full capacity to propagate heroic stories in fighting the 
virus and the theme of unity, the popular response also became nationalistic from within, 
which was not unexpected given that, at this point, the framing of SARS portrayed it as an 
entirely external threat. It should be noted here that the government’s decisive intervention 
in SARS coincided with the completion of the leadership transition in which Hu and Wen 
were formally instated as state leaders (and perhaps Hu-Wen also deliberately utilised this 
to highlight their distinction from the previous leadership). Therefore, although public 
support for the CCP regime as a whole changed considerably as the government reversed 
its course in SARS, public attitudes towards the Hu-Wen leadership specifically were more 
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positive, because the anxious masses ‘required’ a different leadership. The leadership 
transition enabled Hu-Wen somehow to break with past mistakes under the previous 
leadership and to highlight their different approach to SARS as agents of change102.  In this 
regard, the generous attitudes towards the much-needed leadership consolidated the 
popular base of the Hu-Wen leadership. 
The popular response to the Sichuan earthquake was perhaps the most positive in 
all three crises. This high level of popular support both for the government and for the Hu-
Wen leadership was unsurprising given the nature of the crisis and the particular temporal 
milieu in which the earthquake occurred. To the CCP, this crisis was a conventional one, 
the response to which required no time-consuming consensus building. It was a natural 
disaster for which the immense rescue needs required effective centralised mobilisation 
that the CCP was best at delivering. The conventionality of the crisis made the CCP 
comfortable and confident with more transparency. This resulted in the most timely and 
unrestricted media coverage of the CCP leadership in recent years and such high visibility 
greatly boosted the popularity of Hu-Wen. Moreover, the temporary openness of the 
political system in the immediate aftermath of the quake stimulated better than ever state-
society relations. This openness enabled a large section of the society to participate in a 
historic event in all forms – online, offline and onsite. Public support increased further 
when the state responded to the people’s sentiment in the form of a series of national 
commemorative rituals. 
In addition, the earthquake occurred amid two pinnacles of nationalist sentiment: an 
earlier one associated with the Tibet riot and a later one associated with the Olympics (and 
the two events were interconnected too). Public support for the government had been 
already high before the earthquake hit Sichuan. The Olympics, as an event of ‘mass 
                                                 
102 Some interesting facts further supported this distinction, that when the Hu–Wen government was fighting 
SARS in Beijing where the spread of the virus was most severe, Jiang Zemin fled to Shanghai and met 
foreign guests there. The two pieces of news were broadcasted nationally in the same evening.  
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distraction’ that shifted people’s attention away from various ongoing political, economic 
and social problems (Brady, 2009:1), also had the effect of masking local resistance 
evolving around issues such as the school collapse scandal wherein the origin of the threat 
was clearly internal. Therefore, the overwhelming Olympics theme presumably maintained 
the public’s positive response until after the Olympics, despite later controversies showing 
that endogenously originated threats, such as corruption, aggravated the impact of this 
‘exogenous’ and ‘natural’ disaster on the ordinary people. 
As suggested above, the long-term efficacy of the crackdown on Sanlu was the 
most negative of all three crises, and so was the public response to it. Popular distrust and 
suspicion of Chinese-made products, as well as of the regime governing the quality of 
these products, has continued years after Sanlu. The endogeneity of the crisis, revealed 
after the scandal, triggered substantial public resentment against the system as a whole. 
People not only questioned the central government’s malfeasance on quality assurance, but 
the blame also extended to the local government which it oversaw that covered up the 
scandal; to the media it controlled that deliberately propagated false information and 
misled consumers; to the immoral businesses it endorsed that produced contaminated milk 
for quick profits; and, ultimately, to the Chinese model of growth that linked all these 
dysfunctioning sub-systems and resulted in this systematic failure. 
The Hu-Wen leadership in particular was unable to escape the blame either. The 
endogenous origins of the crisis made them especially embarrassed such that they were 
unable to rally the masses behind them like they did when confronting an external enemy. 
When Wen Jiabao came out on behalf of the CCP, trying to reconnect with the people by 
promising remedial measures, the stories that emerged – suggesting that the leadership 
echelons and their family ate specially grown and sourced, super safe food – made Wen’s 
benevolent and caring gesture insincere. The appearance of such news created a negative 
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popular impression that the government’s quality assurance regime, as well as the 
leadership themselves, were both responsible for the milk scandal. As such, the milk crisis 
was devastating to the CCP’s public image and was a huge blow to its legitimacy. 
 
7.1.2 The Comparison of Crises in terms of Themes 
 
I. The GDP Centred Political Economy 
 
After China underwent three crises, it can be concluded that GDPism, the prominent 
feature of the Chinese model, has not fundamentally changed. SARS, the earthquake and 
the milk scandal respectively exposed the social, environmental and regulatory imbalances 
at the heart of this growth model. However, at least in practice, GDPism remains the 
dominating paradigm despite costly lessons. 
The difficulty or inability to shift permanently away from an exclusive focus on 
GDP growth, first and foremost, lies in the CCP basing legitimacy on performance. In 
other words, unless the CCP creatively finds other convincing pillars to support its 
legitimacy (which it has not yet found in the period under examination), this chronic 
GDPism is likely to perpetuate. On a more practical level, extractive central-local fiscal 
relations and performance-based cadre evaluations (in which the ‘hard target’ of GDP 
growth still has an overriding importance) have not created enough incentives for local 
officials to embrace a more balanced growth model. 
Certainly, although GDPism is still deep-seated, the three major crises did stimulate 
the government to invest a significant amount of resources and effort in alleviating the 
ruthlessness of GDPism. After SARS, the making of social policy in China has been rising 
in importance, whereas before SARS social policy was considered a part of economic 
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policy, which under the influence of economic neoliberalism had led to the over-
marketisation of social services (Zheng, 2012b). The government therefore has been 
making efforts towards building a minimal but universal social safety net. As a result, 
spending on healthcare and especially on the control of infectious diseases has soared, and 
an advanced national disease alerting system has been established (China Newsweek, 
2013). As the learning from the earthquake, the government for the first time included a 
separate section on disaster prevention and mitigation in the Twelfth Five Year Plan for 
National Economic and Social Development (Gov.cn, 2011c). The National 
Comprehensive Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan was also enacted (Gov.cn, 
2011b). Both national plans backed the increase of funding in consolidating disaster 
resilience at national and local levels. Similarly, the milk scandal was a wake-up call for 
the government to enhance product safety regimes which lagged behind phenomenal 
growth. Significant funding was allocated for improving product quality assurance 
infrastructures, including setting up test centres with the latest equipment. The government 
campaign to promote quality-based and value-added economic growth, rather than 
focusing on the growth figure itself, has also heightened after the milk scandal. In sum, the 
government has taken substantive measures to redress GDPism by building up its capacity 
to mitigate risks associated with the single-minded pursuit of GDP growth, and these 
measures seem even more tangible in financial terms.  
What remains less tangible and more ambiguous is the government’s promise to 
replace ‘the economic task of generating growth’ with ‘a political task of promoting 
development’ (Breslin, 2008b:218) at a more fundamental level. As mentioned in Chapter 
3, the discourses of the SDC and ‘Harmonious Society’ were promoted as early as 2003-4. 
But as discussed above, local incompliance (or the inability to comply owing to local 
imperatives to generate enough revenue) means that such a paradigm shift is unrealistic in 
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the short term. Occasionally, local officials even view disasters as stimulators of growth 
because of the huge sums of resources put in by the central government on 
reconstruction 103 . Even for the central government, its commitment to balanced 
development and quality-based growth is not always consistent. For example, in the wake 
of the 2008 global financial crisis, the central government’s priority temporarily shifted 
back to being growth focused (and to a lesser extent, the same happened in the second 
quarter of 2012 when growth slowed down). Taken together, discourses on shifting away 
from the paradigm of a GDP-centred political economy largely remain rhetorical.  
 
II. State Control of Information 
 
This is a complex area where state behaviour varied considerably on a case-by-case basis. 
In order to understand these changes better, our analysis is divided into the ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ side of information control. 
On the hard and more direct side of control, i.e. media censorship, SARS was 
undoubtedly the most censored crisis and the earthquake was the least censored crisis. This 
was explained by the fact that SARS only became a full-blown crisis due to causes which 
were political, whereas the cause of the earthquake was natural. This significant difference 
in human malpractice made the government confident in refraining from routine 
censorship of the media surge during the earthquake relief. In addition, the government’s 
genuine commitment to open information (only) regarding natural disasters, and the 
generally looser information environment surrounding the Olympics, contributed to the 
unprecedented transparency during the earthquake relief. Minimal censorship in this regard 
actually helped the government to rebuild its international image as international media 
                                                 
103 In an interview with an estate manager worked in the reconstruction of the Sichuan earthquake, the 
interviewee told me that local officials saw the earthquake as an opportunity because the state-led 
reconstruction would enable their county to ‘catch up economically for at least twenty years’.  
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freely conveyed mixed, but mostly positive messages on China’s resilience and otherwise 
rarely seen humane face. The milk scandal was more complicated in terms of censorship. 
Unlike in SARS and the earthquake where the ultimate discretion to control or release 
information was retained by the state, in the milk scandal business interests played an 
important part in censoring crucial health information from going public. Business 
sponsored censorship activities were more decentralised, frequent and difficult to control, 
and they eroded both public interests and Party legitimacy.  
On the soft and more indirect side of control, i.e. the manipulation of information, 
state behaviour was also inconsistent at the height of the three crises. Regarding the flow of 
information, in SARS this flow was top-down and hierarchical during the mass campaign 
to contain the virus. In the earthquake relief, the flow of information was more interactive 
between state and society, and within society. However, when it came to addressing the 
milk scandal, the flow of information was again top-down, similar to the situation during 
the fight against SARS.   
Similarly, in regard to the openness of the discourse, SARS and the milk scandal 
both featured close-ended discourses. These state-dominated discourses were promoted by 
the propaganda apparatus as the hegemonic crisis discourses, whereas other societal 
discourses were suppressed. In contrast, during the earthquake relief, although the state 
discourse was prominent, it was friendly to the grassroots discourse. Indeed, part of the 
grassroots discourse was integrated into the state discourse, making the latter a 
predominant but open-ended discourse compared to more closed discourses in SARS and 
the milk scandal. Nevertheless, this once open-ended discourse turned increasingly 
defensive as confronting societal discourses emerged around the school collapse scandal.  
In relation to politicising information, the three crises again exhibited major 
differences. SARS was similar to previous crises handled by the CCP in that Party 
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propaganda framed the crisis as a heroic and patriotic mass campaign led by the CCP. In 
the earthquake, such politicisation was minimal. Heroism and patriotism were still 
promoted but their prominence gave way to more individual based and liberal values of 
humanitarianism, respect for lives and resilience. In the milk scandal, despite a brief 
propaganda campaign conveying leadership resolve and benevolence, Party propaganda 
made every effort to depoliticise and play down this crisis because it was caused almost 
entirely by malpractice within the political system.  
In light of these differences in different aspects, if there was a general pattern to be 
discerned on state control of information since SARS, it was the state’s (unwilling) 
decision to ride rather than stem the tide of information. As the lesson from SARS 
demonstrated, in a wired society, blunt censorship on news that was already publicly 
known became increasingly ineffectual and counterproductive. In order to stay relevant, 
Party propaganda has adapted its matrix of control strategies by placing more emphasis on 
the soft side of control, i.e. managing and manipulating information and moulding public 
opinion, as opposed to suppressing information bluntly (Blecher, 2009). And, as we have 
seen in the earthquake and the milk scandal, the framing of a crisis is as important as 
providing up-to-date information on a crisis. It remains an open question, however, 
whether people will continue to believe in the Party’s definition and framing of crisis.  
 
III. State-society Relations 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 that the evolution of state control of information and state-
society relations went hand-in-hand, when it came to comparing crises regarding these two 
interrelated themes, the pattern of behaviour was also similar. The U-turn as found in the 
government’s commitment to open information was also evident in state-society relations.  
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This U-turn on state-society relations was largely consistent with the CCP’s 
changing perceptions on social stability that shifted from dynamic to static stability. The 
new leadership’s handling of SARS perhaps marked the beginning of more dynamic and 
engaging state-society relations, during which Hu-Wen highlighted themselves as a more 
open and accessible leadership compared to the previous leadership who were largely 
responsible for the initial cover-up (Weatherley, 2006). More precisely, after Hu-Wen 
admitted the true extent of the epidemic, there emerged two new elements in state-society 
relations previously unseen, namely, transparency and accountability. They were built into 
the (implicit) Chinese social contract and have become the norms in societal expectations 
of the state. The addition of transparency and accountability into state-society relations 
seemed to be irreversible,  even during a period of deterioration in state-society relations 
when the milk scandal broke out, transparency and accountability were still evident.  
If there was a moment when China’s state and society stood side-by-side, on a 
nearly equal footing, it was in the first few weeks following the Sichuan earthquake. Civic 
effervescence during the earthquake relief showed that, after China’s state and the market 
had risen respectively in the first and subsequent three decades since the founding of the 
PRC, the Chinese society has also come to the fore since 2008. Such civic effervescence 
also demonstrated that, at least in the context of a catastrophe, popular participation would 
improve state-society relations and would lead to dynamic social stability. The state also 
seized this wave of dynamic stability by engaging with the people through the symbolic 
action of lowering the national flag for the ordinary people for the first time. The 
significance of this was that humanism was becoming the norm in the societal expectations 
of the state. As a result, national mourning for ordinary victims in natural disasters has 
been institutionalised into state rituals.  
 330
It should be noted that contingent factors such as the nationalist sentiment and the 
volunteering spirit surrounding the Olympics catalysed, if not caused, unprecedented open 
relations between state and society. In hindsight, the Sichuan earthquake was truly an 
outlier in the development of state-society relations during the Hu era. Without these 
favourable contingent factors, the height of state-society interaction and popular 
participation has been unseen ever since, even in natural disasters such as the Yushu 
earthquake and the Zhouqu debris flow. Although civic participation contributed to the 
government-led relief effort, Party officials might also be astonished by the scale of self-
organisation took place outside the state corporatism framework. The concern with Party 
hegemony, along with the complacency grown out of organising a highly successful 
Olympics, led to the resurgence of a totalitarian control mentality. The Party’s perception 
of social stability thus shifted towards static stability.  
The Party’s obsession with static stability was already evident in the suppression of 
protests against the school collapse scandal which emerged after the earthquake. Since 
then, the Party-state has become increasingly defensive and impatient in dealing with 
societal discontent. The milk scandal happened to break out amid this contraction of state-
society relations. After a brief period of opening in which the Party demonstrated its 
commitment to transparency and accountability, and after the top leadership showed a 
caring gesture, the influence of the Party-state soon overwhelmed the aftermath of the 
crisis. The government suppressed collective actions by parents whose children were made 
ill by the tainted milk. Moreover, in the course of politicising the legal system, the Party-
state interfered with judiciary work in that no parents were able to bring Sanlu to justice 
through legal means. It even resorted to the old reflex of divide and rule, persuading and 
even coercing the parents into accepting the government’s compensation plan. In short, the 
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milk scandal represented a significant deterioration in state-society relations compared to 
SARS and the Sichuan earthquake.  
What the three crises did have in common with regard to state-society relations, 
however, was that these cases invariably revealed the weakness of Chinese civil society, or 
that the potential of civil society in crisis management and in everyday governance alike 
had not been fully utilised. If civil society was able to self-organise and transmit 
information between the state and the public, the panic buying and panic escaping during 
SARS might be much less severe. In the earthquake, if more NGOs were capable of 
working in extreme conditions, they might have been able to sustain their involvement well 
into the reconstruction phase, and play a more significant role in the state-society-market 
tripartite partnership in the reconstruction. Before the milk scandal, if substantive 
consumer pressure groups existed, the contamination problem might have been spotted at a 
much earlier stage; and after the children and their parents suffered, these pressure groups 
would have been able to articulate interest on their behalf. Indeed, the fundamental 
impediment to civil society development lies in the Party’s ambivalence over whether to 
empower or control civil society. The weak position of civil society in China relative to the 
state and the market is difficult to overcome unless the Party resolves its ambivalence. As a 
result, in managing future crises the Party-state is still likely to play a dominant role.  
 
IV. Policy Making 
 
This is an area in which China’s behaviour has been more consistent. In the Hu era, 
China’s crisis management regime in the aspects of decision making and policy making 
has made remarkable progress in legal-rational terms (Weatherley, 2006). This progress 
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over time is palpable when comparing crisis management at political, administrative and 
operational levels. 
At the high politics level, the efficiency of consensus building and decision making 
has improved remarkably. When the SARS virus spread wildly, the top leadership was 
unable to reach a consensus about taking drastic actions. They seemed to be preoccupied 
with their factional interests over the people’s concerns, such that they could not even 
demonstrate apparent unity. When appearing on state television, Hu-Wen and other 
members of the PSC close to Jiang had different attitudes towards fighting SARS, as 
anxious people watched the glaringly obvious infighting and waited for clarifications. It 
was not until Hu convened a special PSC meeting on fighting SARS that a consensus was 
reached and the CCP took unified actions to fight SARS in an all-out manner. Having 
learnt from the SARS debacle, the CCP realised that it could not afford another paralysis 
when a future crisis occurred. It has thus become routine to hold PSC special meetings 
whenever there is a crisis104. This institutional arrangement to speed up consensus building 
and centralise power as early as possible worked well in the Sichuan earthquake, in that a 
special PSC meeting was held just hours after the quake, securing a prompt, unified and 
internationally praised relief effort. The same happened after the milk scandal became 
publicly known (People's Daily, 2008b). Although the milk scandal was not handled as 
openly as the earthquake, the Party-state’s response was nevertheless prompt and well 
coordinated.  
At the administrative or bureaucratic politics level, improvements tended to be 
more uneven. The earthquake relief was undoubtedly the most well coordinated case 
(probably because of its sheer scale which meant that the Party-state could not afford to 
mishandle it), during which the persistent problem of fragmented authoritarianism was 
                                                 




largely overcome. Fragmented authoritarianism, however, was more evident in SARS and 
the milk scandal but in different ways. In SARS, the initial failure to make a concerted 
effort was owing to fragmented responsibilities between civilian and military health 
authorities, whereas in the milk scandal poor governance in food safety was a result of 
overlapping responsibilities between agencies.  
Nonetheless, the government’s effort in rationalising bureaucracy has been going 
on for decades, in the hope of mitigating fragmented authoritarianism through clearly 
defined policy jurisdictions for different departments and agencies. In the Hu-Wen era 
alone, there were already three rounds of administrative reshuffling and streamlining that 
took place in 2003, 2008 and 2013 respectively. So far these reforms only seemed to occur 
following major crises (which was probably also true in any other country), and in a 
tinkering manner. Also, these administrative reforms tended only to address fragmented 
authoritarianism in a particular policy area where a major crisis had occurred. For example, 
the administrative reshuffling after SARS effectively helped to form a concerted effort in 
containing H1N1, but it did little to alleviate fragmented authoritarianism in food safety. It 
may take a long time for the Chinese crisis management regime to overcome fragmented 
authoritarianism in every major policy area through learning from different types of crisis.  
At the operational level, progress has been more remarkable because at this level 
the matter of concern is more technical than political. SARS in this respect was truly a 
catalyst for operational capacity building in crisis management. Most notable was the 
flourishing of thousands of national, departmental and local contingency plans. Without 
learning from SARS, some plans that were quickly invoked in the earthquake and the milk 
scandal would have never existed. Many of these plans drew experience from other 
countries as well as from previous crises in China, reflecting an impressive learning 
 334
capacity and adaptability on the part of the Chinese government, which lent considerable 
crisis resilience for the Party-state.  
 
V. International Pressure 
 
Of all the contextual themes, China’s crisis behaviour in regard to international pressure 
has been the most consistent. And to a large extent, progress made in this aspect over the 
three crises is linear. Over the three NTS crises, it seems that China has been adopting a 
more flexible approach to sovereignty that it once interpreted in the strictest Westphalian 
sense (although it continues to do so when it comes to traditional political-military crises). 
Even for SARS, in which China’s behaviour was the least cooperative among the three 
crises, China still granted access to the WHO inspection and research teams before it 
admitted the underreporting. Chinese leaders also expressed willingness for extensive 
international cooperation on public health, and unusually apologised at international 
occasions for mistakes made in SARS (Zheng and Lye, 2004). These gestures from the top 
leadership signalled a change in China’s attitude towards the international community in 
that its embracing of international institutions was moving beyond economic affairs, and 
into the realm of (human) security.  
Although the Chinese government intervened decisively during SARS, damage to 
its international reputation as a responsible great power was inevitable. China realised after 
SARS that its state-centred policy making also needed to include the concerns of both 
domestic and international stakeholders. The Sichuan earthquake occurred against this 
backdrop and China’s learning from SARS materialised. Contrary to SARS during which it 
only cooperated when pressed, in the earthquake China voluntarily requested international 
assistance. Moreover, the responsiveness, transparency and openness that the Chinese 
 335
government demonstrated in the earthquake relief, and the respectful and dignified way in 
which the Chinese government treated its citizens, living and dead, showed that China had 
taken a big stride forward in following international norms in disaster management. These 
showed that despite China being ideologically reserved towards ‘universal’ liberal values 
such as democracy and human rights in the western sense, it was more willing to embrace 
fundamental values such as the right to life and the right to security of the person, which it 
demonstrated through doing whatever it took to save the people. It was an indication that 
China was increasingly embracing the international society on ideational grounds, in 
addition to instrumental grounds (Buzan, 2010).  
Although it was without doubt that China’s handling of the milk scandal was 
flawed, China responded more positively to international pressure than domestic pressure. 
It was not until the New Zealand government alerted Beijing that the Chinese government 
promptly despatched inspection teams and confirmed milk contamination. When facing 
international criticism, China responded apologetically, avoiding a principled or politicised 
position (or accusing other countries of politicising the issue), which it had taken before 
April 2003 when the international community fiercely criticised the Chinese government’s 
deception over SARS. Furthermore, following the milk scandal, China allowed foreign 
quality assurance agencies to get involved in China’s governance of food safety. The FDA 
(Food and Drug Administration) of the US has opened offices in China to help the Chinese 
government to inspect food and medicine exported to the US (FDA, 2012).  
From stressing strict non-interference in domestic affairs prior to SARS, to 
accepting international aid in the earthquake, and to allowing foreign agencies to inspect 
Chinese products on Chinese soil, China has made unprecedented progress within just five 
years. As its integration with the international society deepens, China is likely to keep this 
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7.2 Conclusion: Crisis with Chinese Crisis Management?  
 
3) Are the same strategies of crisis manipulation sustainable enough for the CCP to 
manage future crises? 
 
This section aims at responding to the last research question as set out in the 
introduction. As mentioned in the previous chapter, throughout the handling of the milk 
scandal there were already signs emerging that suggested a diminishing political utility of 
CCP-style crisis management. This section elaborates on this argument further and 
assesses the sustainability of CCP-style crisis management with reference to more recent 
crises. It suggests that the three-phase routine crisis manipulation is increasingly being 
challenged.  
 
7.2.1 Shifting the Dominating Paradigm 
 
For paradigm shifts after crises, there is always a limit to which such strategy can be 
implemented in an authoritarian context. The authoritarian nature of the system that rules 
out the possibility of changing the government means that there cannot be too many 
paradigm shifts with the same government. If such shifts take place far too often and 
appear drastic, they inevitably raise the question about government competence, because 
every new shift constitutes an explicit blame of previous performance of the same 
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government. After a number of shifts, people will start to wonder if this government can 
ever get it right.  
More importantly, this paradox with paradigm shifts in an authoritarian context can 
engender adverse consequences for Party legitimacy. As argued throughout this thesis, 
Chinese politics evolves in a path dependent fashion, and in the system there exists a 
strong propensity for the continuity of policies and respect for the past (regardless of 
whether it is in a nostalgic or a more substantive sense). This path dependency restricts the 
range of options available for a new leadership whenever they want to exhibit their 
distinctiveness from previous leaderships. They are not able to promote their new 
paradigm while explicitly criticising the old one, because if they do so it will undermine 
their legitimacy (because the old paradigm is where they came from) as well as the 
legitimacy of the system as a whole (because of inconsistency). The CCP seems to be 
convinced that Khrushchev’s Secret Speech attacking Stalin sowed the seeds for a gradual 
but irreversible decline of regime legitimacy for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
and has made every effort to ensure that the same will not happen in the CCP regarding 
Mao105.  
Inevitably, paradigms promoted as new by any CCP leadership have to build on 
previous (and already flawed) paradigms, but without denouncing them. The ‘newness’ of 
these new paradigms is thus strictly confined to moderating and complementing rather than 
replacing the old paradigms. Unsurprisingly, these so called new paradigms more often 
than not become old wine in new bottles, and the seemingly flames of reform associated 
with these new paradigms will soon be extinguished by the momentum of path 
dependency. Perhaps more detrimental to regime legitimacy in the long term is that, 
without the possibility of either breaking away from the past or fundamental political 
                                                 
105 For a latest example, see Xi Jinping’s statement that ‘the eras before and after the reform should not be 
considered as separated history, and must not be considered as thoroughly contradictory’, at 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2013_01/05/20820329_0.shtml 
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reform, every additional paradigm shift along the dependent path will potentially put an 
extra constraint on the capacity to articulate reforms for the future leadership. At a certain 
point, the CCP leadership will face the exhaustion of paradigms upon which they can 
legitimise themselves. They will not be able to shift to a paradigm that has been used in the 
past, since if they do so it will appear to be a U-turn under the same government106. They 
will have to articulate a new approach to show the rule of the CCP is making progress but 
at the same time there are fewer and fewer paradigmatic resources left.  
So far, the CCP has undergone only four paradigms under Mao, Deng, Jiang and 
Hu respectively. The danger of paradigm exhaustion does not appear to be impending. 
Nevertheless, the problem of paradigm shifts as old wine in new bottles is more 
conspicuous. For example, the most prominent political legacy of Hu-Wen, the SDC, has 
been promoted for a decade, but when Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang take over, they still face 
essentially the same structural problems Hu-Wen faced a decade ago. And if the CCP’s 
Sixth Generation take over a decade after and are still confronted with what Hu-Wen and 
Xi-Li had confronted but left unresolved despite some paradigm shifts, then this will have 
serious implications for the CCP’s credibility (Breslin, 2013).  
Nothing better illustrates the limit of crisis-induced paradigm shifts than China’s 
response to the global financial crisis starting in 2008. When the decline in export figures 
showed that this crisis clearly impacted China, the Chinese government rushed to 
announce a staggering ¥4 trillion stimulus package aimed at shifting the dominating 
growth paradigm from export-oriented to domestic consumption-led (Xinhua, 2008m). 
Ideally, such a shift would require the government to invest heavily in enhancing the social 
safety net, without which the consumers would not dare to spend. Yet it soon emerged that 
a large proportion of the expenditure was actually invested in infrastructure such as 
                                                 
106 A paradigm U-turn concurrent with the change of government, however, is more acceptable.  
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railways, motorways and airports, because these projects boosted GDP growth almost 
instantly, whereas investing in the social safety net would only contribute to GDP growth 
indirectly, and such an effect would be difficult to be demonstrated. The same spending 
pattern was repeated at the provincial level, with trillions of government expenditure 
(much greater than the 4 trillion package if added together) being poured in to boost 
growth. Even worse, a large number of projects previously suspended by the government – 
owing to their low energy efficiency or uncertain environmental impact – were again 
approved by the government in the wake of the financial crisis in order to secure GDP 
growth.  
Taken together, this spending preference for investment-intensive projects over the 
much-needed social safety net was not at all surprising, given the path dependency of 
GDPism and performance-based regime legitimacy at a deeper level. The importance of 
the paradigm shift was sidelined when the more eminent target of GDP growth was at 
stake. Eventually, China’s response to the global financial crisis was not so much a 
paradigm shift as a continuation of GDP centred political economy. Therefore, from this 
example we can see how superficial paradigm shifts can be in the face of path dependency. 
In short, the political utility of introducing an apparent paradigm shift following a crisis is 
declining. 
 
7.2.2 The Centralisation of Power 
 
The political utility of the centralisation of power in crisis management is more ambiguous, 
and should be analysed with regard to different types of crisis. On the one hand, the 
centralisation of power is still highly useful in relief efforts of major natural disasters 
where the impacted locality simply cannot handle the devastating situation on its own. In 
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such circumstances, the centralisation of power will not only speed up decision making, 
but also unleash China’s formidable capacity in mobilising personnel, relief supply and aid 
funds, which many countries, democratic or authoritarian alike, cannot match. In this 
respect, the CCP will still be able to reinforce its people’s saviour myth by tapping into 
popular support in handling natural disasters.  
On the other hand, for more governance-originated crises, the centralisation of 
power may not be a lasting strategy as long as China’s day to day governance remains 
highly decentralised. On this account, centralising power or mobilising campaigns will 
only deliver short-term results, addressing the phenomena of crises without resolving more 
fundamental problems underpinning these crises. This structural contradiction between 
decentralised governance and centralised remedial measures explained why similar milk 
scandals resurfaced after the 2008 crackdown. The same pattern could be found in many 
more areas beyond food safety, where once the crackdown initiated by the central 
government swept over, the same problems would resurge shortly afterwards. The 
persistent and frequent occurrence of China’s industrial accidents (especially coal mine 
explosions), despite campaign after campaign reinforcing workplace health and safety, best 
exemplifies this: as long as the incentive structure (extractive central-local fiscal relations 
results in local preferences for quick fiscal revenue by whatever means) leading to these 
accidents is left unresolved, the limited effect of crackdown campaigns can be quickly 
undone by path dependency. The persistence of copyright infringements all over the 
country provides another good example.  
In more recent crises, powerful local or departmental vested interests as a result of 
over-decentralisation even effectively neutralised the central government’s attempts at 
centralising power from the very beginning. The train crash that occurred near Wenzhou in 
July 2011 was an example where the centralisation of power was widely perceived as 
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superficial. After the deadly train crash that killed 40 passengers and injured 172 (Xinhua, 
2011a), the Chinese government centralised power by establishing a State Council-led 
investigation taskforce in order to find out the cause of the accident and step up railway 
safety enforcement. However, the taskforce membership revealed that some of its members 
were from the MOR, including its vice-minister acting as the vice-chair of this supposedly 
independent taskforce (People’s Net, 2011b). The media and the public were outraged by 
this announcement because the MOR was a unique ministry with a dual but conflicting 
identity – it was the only railway operator in the PRC but at the same time it was charged 
with governmental responsibility to regulate and supervise its own operations. The 
involvement of senior MOR officials clearly undermined the perceived neutrality of this 
taskforce, as well as the central government’s commitment to state autonomy free from 
MOR influence. In the face of mounting pressure, the State Council eventually had to 
exclude MOR officials from the taskforce (Ifeng.com, 2011).  
On a related note, political accountability that is indispensable to the centralisation 
of power, as we have seen in SARS, also becomes a focus of contention in recent crises. 
Many officials that took the blame were later found to have been reinstated or even 
promoted to other positions in other regions, as we have seen in the milk scandal. Even 
worse, there emerged a propensity in recent years that whenever a crisis occurred, the 
government would find a scapegoat outside the system to deflect attention away from those 
officials in the bureaucracy who might be responsible. For example, in a fire that burned 
CCTV’s new headquarters under construction in Beijing, and another fire that occurred in 
Shanghai shortly after the 2010 Expo killing at least 58, which prompted a State Council 
investigation, the government invariably laid the blame on ‘temporary workers’ who 
ignored safety rules (Express News, 2011), while implicated senior officials escaped from 
 342
punishment. The centralisation of power was gradually losing its utility in shaking up the 
bureaucracy and demonstrating a high degree of state autonomy.  
For social unrest, the centralisation of power triggered the over-mobilisation of 
China’s internal security apparatus, creating tensions in state-society relations. As 
mentioned above, China’s internal security apparatus gained increasing clout over crisis 
management in recent years. Owing to their preoccupation with order and static stability, 
internal security forces tended to resort to oppression as the default response to social 
unrest, regardless of its origin. Such responses often pushed the public-private boundary 
with the use of restrictive and sometimes extra-judicial measures. During February and 
March 2011, China’s response to the domestic repercussions of the Jasmine Revolution 
provided the best example in this respect. The call for political change might explain why 
the government responded strongly, but it was the overreaction of the internal security 
apparatus to a handful of demonstrators that reinforced the repressive impression of the 
CCP regime. The extra-judicial detention and ‘temporary disappearance’ imposed on many 
rights activists, including dissident artist Ai Weiwei, undid much of China’s commitment 
to improving human rights and rule by law. The CCP’s image was also damaged 
internationally as a result.  
Even for social unrest that did not threaten the regime, the government response 
was still heavy-handed. For instance, a large number of protests were staged across China 
in recent years, concerned with the degradation of the local environment as a result of 
industrial development. Most of these protests were suppressed by internal security forces 
in the name of preserving static stability. Such suppression not only blocked potentially 
regime-enhancing rightful resistance, but extinguished local initiatives for a paradigm shift 
in the growth model or even towards participatory political reform – both of which are 
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badly needed for the current political system. In short, the over-centralisation of power has 
forced the regime operating in a constant crisis mode, which has endangered its resilience.  
 
7.2.3 Reconnecting with the People 
 
In the long term, reconnecting with the people is perhaps the political utility that will 
decline the most. As previously argued, the political utility of the Party’s embracing the 
people in crisis rests upon the premise that the people perceive the central government as 
more benevolent and legitimate than local governments. However, this popularly held 
perceptual difference is not taken for granted, and may be quickly diluted by the 
information revolution which empowers the people to deconstruct what they believed or 
imagined in the past.  
Information technology will have profound political implications for the 
generational gap and the digital gap currently existing in the population. On the one hand, 
information technology will widen the knowledge gap between generations who use or do 
not use the Internet. Traditional paper media and state television may still be propagating 
stories reinforcing the perception that although local governments might be corrupt, the 
central government is righteous enough and will eventually address local disobedience. 
Propaganda like this might still convince members of the unwired generation who have 
few alternative sources of information; however, the wired, younger generation tends to 
hold much weaker beliefs than the unwired, older generation that the central government is 
more legitimate, thanks to the ample availability of information on the Internet about the 
self-enriching nature of the central government. Previously mentioned cases where 
members of the top leadership echelon eat super safe food and breathe specially purified 
air, whilst food scares and hazardous air quality are part of everyday life for the ordinary 
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people, are good examples. But discussions on these sensitive topics have never appeared 
on traditional media and are only known to the online population. In addition, this younger 
and wired generation who has not experienced the bitter memory of the Cultural 
Revolution, poverty and scarcity, naturally exhibits a higher expectation of government 
conduct than the older generation. What might seem to the older generation as huge 
improvements compared to the past might be considered intolerable by the well informed, 
younger generation.  
On the other hand, information technology will narrow the digital gap that 
previously existed between social strata as well as between rural and urban residents. As 
more people from less advantaged backgrounds own mobile devices and have Internet 
access, information effervescence previously enjoyed by urban dwellers now also becomes 
part of everyday life for migrant workers and even people in the countryside. The political 
consequences of a high Internet penetration rate is that, as more people have alternative 
sources of information, the imagined difference in the level of integrity between central 
and local governments will be diluted. In particular, the advent of social media in China 
since 2009 is accelerating this dilution. The Wenzhou train crash best demonstrated the 
political impact of instant and interactive communication on popular perceptions about the 
integrity of the central government.  
Shortly after the train crash, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao made routine gestures of 
showing sympathy to the victims and the injured. They called for ‘all-out efforts to rescue 
passengers’ and sent Zhang Dejiang, Vice Premier in charge of transportation and industry, 
to oversee the rescue at the scene (Xinhua, 2011a). However, on the following day, the 
train wreckage was destroyed and buried and rescue efforts ended earlier than the public 
expected (a young girl was later found still alive by the police after the official rescue 
effort ended) (The Telegraph, 2011). The reason behind this rushed rescue was that the 
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government wanted to resume rail operations as soon as possible to avoid economic 
losses107, and Vice Premier Zhang also urged the rescue team to ‘clear the accident scene 
as soon as possible’ in order to reopen the line (Xinhua, 2011a).  
Unsurprisingly, the government’s inhumane handling of the crisis was met by 
immediate public fury. The apparent inconsistency between the rhetoric and actual 
behaviour of the central government also raised the question among the people as to 
whether the central government was as legitimate as they previously imagined or hoped. 
The fact that top leaders showed benevolence and stressed the importance of saving lives, 
whereas the central government prioritised economic growth over people’s lives and 
dignity, has made the Party’s reconnecting with the people hypocritical. To be fair, the 
government’s handling of the crisis was no worse than before, as it was stipulated in a 
State Council regulation regarding railway accidents that priority should be given to 
resuming operations (but in the same regulation how long the rescue effort should last was 
not specified). It was also the MOR’s standard operating procedure to bury the train 
wreckage after an accident (Southern Metropolis Daily, 2011). What made the Wenzhou 
train crash outrage the people was that this time people perceived the central government 
differently, as they received alternative information from social media.  
The crash occurred in the suburb of Wenzhou where a large number of migrant 
workers lived. They rushed to the crash site and flooded the social media site, Weibo, with 
first-hand information in the forms of tweets, photos and footage they sent through mobile 
devices. The rest of the nation had already known the story before the Central Propaganda 
Department issued a media gag. As these authentic sources of information were 
disseminated instantly by eyewitnesses and citizen reporters, the central government-led 
rescue effort was highly visible and under close scrutiny. In the past, people accorded a 
                                                 
107 This important rail line connects Shanghai, Hangzhou and Xiamen. Suspending operations for long will 
incur significant economic losses. 
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high level of legitimacy to the central government largely because of what it said in the 
rhetoric, which was carefully tailored and disseminated through state media in a top-down 
fashion. With social media sites available, more people started to re-evaluate the standing 
of the central government based on what it actually did on the ground – the details of 
which were updated by the people themselves almost every minute. It was this sea change 
in the means of communication and the characteristics of information flow that led to an 
overwhelmingly negative public perception of the central government’s standing, even 
though the government merely repeated what it had done in the past. For a week or so, 
public criticism was on the boil, but this time the top leadership seemed to close ranks to 
defend themselves again – no single PSC member responded or made a public statement. 
Eventually, Wen Jiabao had to appear in public to end this government credibility debacle. 
He visited the crash site and made an apology, like he did in the milk scandal. But this time 
it seemed he came too late and was desperate for forgiveness – he explained that he could 
not have arrived earlier because he was ill - a very unusual statement given that China 
always regards the health of top leaders as a state secret (Reuters, 2011).  
 
7.3 The CCP’s Crisis Management at a Crossroads 
 
So far in the conclusion we have evaluated the strengths and weaknesses, and short-term 
versus long-term efficacy of the CCP’s crisis management. In the section below we explore 
the implications of these on the CCP’s capacity to handle future crises. Rather than simply 
making predictions, we look at the underlying forces that will enhance or undermine the 
current CCP-style crisis management, and determine which forces are more likely to 
triumph over the others.  
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On the upside for the CCP, China in the near future will be a high-risk society 
where crises of all kinds are likely to increase both in number and in intensity. This is 
determined by China’s current stage of development. As a late developing country, China 
is simultaneously undergoing industrialisation, urbanisation, informatisation, globalisation 
and democratisation. Unlike in western industrialised societies where these transformations 
came one-by-one and over a period of several centuries, the same transformations are 
taking place in China in a much denser fashion. In other words, China is absorbing the 
confluent impacts of these transformations over several decades, including the impact of 
multifarious crises that are bred out of these transformations. This already immense 
challenge is compounded by China’s weak governance and institutions, the development of 
which significantly lagged behind the new political, social, economic and technological 
landscape.  
In this regard, China’s crisis-prone risk society is somehow good for the CCP. As 
strata become more divided and society becomes more conflictual (People’s Net, 2013), 
the desire for stability is increasing. Not coincidentally, this societal demand for stability 
assurance matches the CCP’s updated matrix of legitimating resources in which its ability 
to provide stability has been emphasised more recently (Sandby-Thomas, 2011; 
Weatherley, 2006). On the one hand, well informed citizens may no longer consider the 
CCP as having legitimacy, but still accept its rule for its instrumental utility, including its 
provision of stability. On the other hand, the CCP may find the constellation of societal 
contradictions a perfect condition for crisis manipulation and for enhancing its people’s 
saviour myth. It can thus sustain its rule through the social engineering of divide and rule. 
But if the CCP is not cautious enough as to whom it represents, its rule may slide into 
becoming client based – after all, from the perspective of some exclusive strata, the desire 
for stability may well mean the demand for the CCP’s repression of other strata.  
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On the down side for the CCP, however, it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
sustain a hegemonic crisis discourse, without which the CCP’s authoritarian advantages in 
crisis management may become irrelevant. The rise of alternative crisis discourses at the 
expense of the official version is paralleled with the people’s rising ability to deconstruct 
Party rhetoric as they receive more alternative sources of information.  
Even within the system itself, the CCP is facing the challenge of locally articulated 
crisis discourses that deviate from the official one articulated by the centre. And, for this 
particular phenomenon, we have to mention the Chongqing political scandal and Bo Xilai, 
whose manoeuvre in Chongqing and its nationwide repercussions led to the CCP’s largest 
legitimacy crisis since 1989 (Li, 2012).  
When Bo became Party chief of Chongqing in 2007, he subtly picked and mixed 
local social ills and portrayed these as indicative of a crisis of the neoliberal development 
model implemented nationally under Hu-Wen. He depicted Chongqing under his 
predecessors as a hotbed of gangsters (the origins of which were attributed to economic 
inequality and social dislocation) in order to justify his decisive intervention. From 2008 
on, Bo made a series of radical moves to tackle this constructed crisis in Chongqing. In 
managing the crisis, he invoked the CCP’s standard tripartite crisis manipulation strategy, 
albeit with different content.  
He articulated a shift away from the dominating paradigm promoted by Beijing, i.e. 
from the market orientation to a more socialist and egalitarian orientation, especially in 
social policies. For example, he initiated a large scale public housing programme, one of 
the largest in China. He centralised political control and shook up the bureaucracy. This 
was widely disputed because it seemed he purged most of the officials close to his 
predecessors and instead promoted people loyal to himself, making Chongqing an 
‘independent kingdom’ politically. The most prominent figure was undoubtedly his aide 
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Wang Lijun. Bo also reconnected with the ordinary people by resorting to Maoist symbols, 
such as mass campaigns to tackle crime, ‘smashing the criminals’, and to promote populist 
culture, ‘singing the red (revolutionary) songs’.  
After Wang Lijun fled to the US embassy in Chengdu and as Bo himself was 
implicated in a murder, Bo was disgraced (BBC, 2013). More evidence emerged that Bo 
fabricated the Chongqing crisis in order to make himself eligible for the top position in the 
CCP. For the entire period from Wang’s flight to Bo’s prosecution, people closely 
followed the unfolding of the scandal on social media and watched this as a political soap 
opera.  
What makes the Chongqing scandal perceived differently by the people is not to do 
with corruption or the abuse of power; after all, these are not uncommon with other 
disgraced officials. It is unique in that with social media available, people were able to 
watch closely and to discuss in real time an ongoing political scandal. Arguably, what 
makes the Chongqing scandal the largest legitimacy crisis since 1989 is not about how Bo 
could go so far before being disgraced, but that the people learnt as they watched, that 
elements within the CCP could fabricate and manipulate a crisis with ease and often at 
will. To a large extent, the Chongqing scandal devastated the credibility of the Party’s (or 
part of the Party’s) discourse on crisis, because people would become wary of any Party 
discourses on crisis or even discredit them altogether. When the next crisis discourse is 
articulated and propagated, will it just be another rerun of Chongqing?  
With our arguments taken together, there will be many more crises waiting to be 
handled by the CCP but on which it can no longer impose a hegemonic definition. It is 
difficult to give a black or white answer as to which forces will triumph over the others. It 
is without doubt that in the future the CCP will find it more difficult to enlist 
overwhelming public support, after people learnt through the Chongqing scandal that a 
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crisis could so easily fall into manipulative hands. With people recognising the existence of 
competing crisis discourses, it is also likely that elements within and without the political 
system will try to articulate alternative crisis discourses – Bo perhaps is not the only one 
and he will not be the last.  
However, it is also too early to suggest that under such complex conditions, the 
relevance of CCP-style crisis management will simply wither away. As suggested in the 
above discussion, part of the CCP’s current style of crisis management – for example, the 
centralisation of power – can still be highly useful in handling natural disasters. In other 
words, the relevance of some elements of the CCP’s crisis management may be retained 
even if it is losing the capacity to monopolise the definition of crisis. The implication of 
this might be that the CCP should concentrate its efforts on enhancing its capacity to 
manage those non-manipulative (or with minimal traits to be manipulated) crises. Ideally, 
crises of this kind may include all those external shocks where the origin is exogenous and, 
of course, purely exogenous crises are rare. The point is that the CCP can try to maximise 
its strength when managing predominantly exogenous crises in order to compensate for its 
declining ability to define and manipulate crises. With the remarkable progress it has made 
so far in terms of the professionalisation of crisis management, especially at the operational 
level, the task of demonstrating relevance when it comes to exogenous crises is still 
achievable for the CCP.  
 
7.4 Directions for Future Research 
 
This thesis has made the first attempt at constructing a generalised model for crisis 
management under the CCP. The explanatory strengths of this model have already been 
demonstrated in our three case studies as well as in more recent crises. Nonetheless, some 
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limitations of this model are also inevitable. In addition, the politics of crisis management 
in China is an ongoing and evolving research agenda. Some possible avenues to enhance 
this research are suggested here as the author realised these while completing this study.  
At present, our generalised model is capable of explaining the CCP’s crisis 
response where two levels of government, the central government and the local 
government, are both involved. Only when the two levels of government interact with each 
other in a crisis can our comprehension about the CCP’s centralisation of power and (the 
central government’s bypassing the local government to) reconnecting with the people be 
relevant. Yet situations like these are rare, compared to countless local crises China faces 
every day. In other words, our model is strong in explaining major crises where urgent 
situations prompted central government intervention, whereas everyday crises – occurring 
and handled at the local level only – may or may not fit this model well. As China’s 
ongoing tendency to decentralise governance shows few signs of reversion, it is this type 
of local crisis that will beset China’s political system on a daily basis and consume the 
majority of China’s overall crisis management resources. Future research designs with an 
emphasis on discerning common traits at the local level, and thus generalising local crisis 
responses, will enhance our current model in terms of wider applicability.  
In addition, as argued in the introduction, this thesis contributes to the existing 
literature on Chinese crisis management by bringing politics back into the analysis. As a 
consequence, this thesis employed a CCP-centric perspective and primarily focused on 
how the CCP behaved. Yet as we have seen in the civic effervescence during the Sichuan 
earthquake, and more recently in the Wukan crisis, approaching the topic of crisis 
management from below is as important as approaching it from above. At the moment, 
there have been a number of cases where the empowered public actively articulated 
interests and actually reversed the direction of the response to the crisis, such as in the 
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Wenzhou train crash and Wukan. However, there is not enough evidence about whether 
this transformative momentum will continue to affect policy making in normal politics. 
Future research that determines whether civic effervescence during and after crises will 
give rise to a real Habermasian public sphere under normal circumstances will be very 
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